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Looking to the Future

Addressing the Gaps in UNDP

It is demanding a lot of any existing U.N. agency to provide programs that meet all the needs of displaced populations.  However, it is not unreasonable to expect that the U.N. agencies tasked with the care of internally displaced populations would seek to draw on their strengths in providing services to the displaced, while acknowledging and addressing their weaknesses.  In this way, through shared expertise and learned lessons, a standardized institutional expertise within the various agencies dealing with the internally displaced would be developed over time.  This process requires an active effort by the institution to draw on outside expertise where appropriate, while building an in-house capacity.  With each completed program, the agency can take a hard look at the results and assess its successes and failures in order to strengthen future activities.

UNDP does have a role to play in administering programs for the internally displaced.  It brings unique and valuable contribution to this area.  UNDP is an agency with extensive experience in issues pertaining to community reintegration, poverty alleviation, land tenure, and sustainable development.  UNDP’s development mandate also allows it to bring a broader, longer-term vision to emergency programs which, if lacking, can create or reinforce food relief dependencies among uprooted populations.   Further, UNDP’s permanent presence in a country and its familiarity with a country can also strengthen its ability to successfully implement programs.

 

Conversely, UNDP has relatively little experience in emergency work, conflict resolution processes, human rights and humanitarian principles, or protection assistance—all prerequisites to a successful reintegration program for populations whose displacement is linked to government abuse or civil unrest.  The gaps in UNDP’s institutional capacity do not inherently preclude it from successfully assisting internally displaced populations.  In fact, these gaps are illustrative of the existing deficiencies in the international system more generally regarding a holistic approach to displaced populations—there is no existing agency that can fully address all the needs (immediate and long-term) of the displaced.  The point, however, is not that UNDP is lacking certain areas of expertise with regard to the internally displaced, but that as an institution it appeared unwilling or unable to expand and evolve its capacity fully to address the situation in Kenya.  UNDP not only overlooked its own past experiences in implementing programs for the internally displaced, but also did not actively seek to address or supplement the institutional weaknesses that became apparent as the program unfolded.  It is also unclear whether the lessons learned from the Kenyan program have prompted UNDP to make any institutional changes toward improving its implementation of internally displaced programs for the future. 

There are identifiable factors that contributed to the problems encountered in UNDP’s Displaced Persons Program in Kenya, which, if addressed by UNDP, could significantly strengthen its future implementation of such programs.  The Kenyan experience indicates that specific elements need to be in place for such a mission to succeed: a contract with the government, which sets out minimum conditions for engagement; a plan for data collection and dissemination; human rights monitoring and advocacy; a protection component; and a method for drawing on inter-agency expertise.

First and foremost, the leadership at UNDP must take the necessary steps to respond to the expanded responsibilities that come with its designation as an agency that administers programs for the internally displaced.  This process requires a committed examination of UNDP’s traditional operating practices to determine where it needs to adopt a different working approach as well as to develop capacity in the areas where it lacks experience.  UNDP has already begun this process, acknowledging and identifying in its policy documents that human rights, social justice and land reform are critical factors in reintegration efforts.  The UNDP management must now take the next step and adopt an approach that integrates assistance, prevention, protection, human rights, and development components into the implementation of its programs for the displaced.  In doing so, UNDP will need to provide training to existing staff and may also require the addition of specialized staff to supplement field staff in certain skills.  If UNDP does not possess or decides not to develop an in-house expertise, it should be willing to genuinely coordinate and cooperate with other U.N. agencies to ensure that its programs are comprehensive.

UNDP needs to prioritize data collection and dissemination as part of its programs.  In order to do this, UNDP needs to develop better tools to monitor and evaluate the condition of the displaced.  Without underestimating the difficulty of collecting such information, UNDP should as best as possible ensure that it creates a systematic monitoring system to collect aggregate numbers (and names where possible) and to document the condition of the displaced.  The information should include conditions of physical need as well as protection issues.  UNDP should create a mechanism to disseminate this information on a regular basis within the U.N. system as well as to other relevant local and international agencies.  

UNDP needs to strengthen its capacity to promote and protect human rights.  UNDP’s projects, while having human rights implications, have not traditionally required the agency to develop expertise in human rights reporting and advocacy work, nor to view human rights promotion and protection as a central part of its mandate.  Frequently, displacement is caused by human rights violations and, as often, reintegration and rehabilitation solutions are integrally linked to the resolution of human rights and protection issues.  In these programs probably more than any others, human rights considerations cannot be dispensed with in order to further good relations with a government or to secure other operational goals.  UNDP should be responsible for vigorous advocacy efforts at the local, national and international levels to protect the rights of the displaced.  If quiet representations to the government or controlling authority are unsuccessful, UNDP should adopt more public protests.  

The absence of a strong human rights component in UNDP’s work has been attributed primarily to the fact that this area has not traditionally been seen to be a priority of UNDP’s development work.  There is a widespread perception within UNDP that human rights work is not development work, despite the fact that the building of development processes to promote democratization of government and to strengthen institutions and processes for disclosure of information, access, and due process are all development goals with human rights implications.  Another reason offered for UNDP’s downplaying of human rights is the premium placed on the appearance of neutrality.  Rather than be outspoken on issues that would be sure to earn a government’s ire, UNDP appears to conceive of its role as that of a neutral implementor of a reintegration program devoid of any potential political tensions.  Some in UNDP justify silence on human rights issues by arguing that channels of communication with a government should be kept open in order to further the cause of the displaced.  The misperception that human rights issues should be left to the human rights agencies in the U.N. must be actively overcome by UNDP, particularly where human rights concerns can impede a lasting solution for a displaced population.¹⁹⁹  This policy change must be given the necessary political support at the highest levels of UNDP to alter these widely held misperceptions about human rights work within the agency.  

UNDP needs to develop and incorporate protection responsibilities in the implementation of its programs for the internally displaced.  Unlike many other development projects in which UNDP is involved worldwide, programs that deal with the internally displaced are made more difficult by the security and political issues surrounding the nature of their displacement.  Protection issues with the displaced come up both with regard to ensuring physical security from threats of coercion and violence, and the longer term issues of defending legal rights that were violated by those responsible for the displacement.  While the responsibility for providing protection ultimately rests with governments, UNDP has a role to play in making this a priority with governments, training government officials on human rights and humanitarian standards, and advocating vigorously for safety for the displaced.  UNDP has traditionally not taken on a protection role that requires it to be critical of a government’s abuses against its people.  However, as UNDP continues to administer programs for the internally displaced, it will have to deal with the inevitable tensions that arise between seeking to provide protection to the displaced while attempting to work with the very government that often caused the displacement.  The narrow operating space requires a skilled and careful balancing act between being critical of government policies while relying on government assistance to provide the political will and security for reintegration.  Few, if any, UNDP staff have expertise on how to deal with the physical safety of the displaced, even in places where protection issues are paramount.  In this regard, there are some lessons that UNDP can learn from UNHCR, which has extensive experience in this area.²⁰⁰

UNDP needs to be prepared to transform its political relationships with governments, when necessary, to protest government policies against the displaced.  UNDP has traditionally worked very closely with governments in order to undertake its programs.  Having to work governments on its other development projects, UNDP resident representatives may be reluctant to compromise their position and programs in the country by speaking out on human rights and protection issues.  Thorny human rights and protection issues appear to be seen as too sensitive a matter to push with errant governments.  In Kenya, the attitude adopted was that if UNDP wanted to remain operational, it had to approach any government abuses diplomatically and distance itself from those groups (mainly NGOs) publicly criticizing the government’s abuses toward the displaced.  This translated into little or no pressure on the government from the one actor which arguably had the most influence with the government to address the human rights issues integral to lasting solutions.  Having not handled human rights issues on a regular basis, UNDP has also not dealt extensively with the attendant angry responses that such work usually generates from the offending government.  At the moment, the institutional instinct to avoid controversy with a government results in sidestepping crucial human rights and protection issues instead of making them a fundamental starting point for resolving situations of internal displacement.

UNDP should take steps to address the inherent tension that inevitably arises when a UNDP resident representative, with a close working relationship with a government, is designated as a resident coordinator of an emergency program dealing with the displaced.  As a resident coordinator, that person may be required to take on a more critical role of government policy in order to advocate on behalf of the displaced.  A U.N. official working on internally displaced issues at DHA identified a major problem related to UNDP’s involvement in programs for the internally displaced:

The way the programs are currently structured brings an inherent tension into the role that the UNDP resident representative is being asked to play.  On the one hand, that person is being asked to work closely with the government on all development projects and to foster a good relationship.  Then you are asking that same person to put on another hat when they are the resident coordinator of an emergency program and criticize the government for human rights violations against the internally displaced.  The government is obviously not happy about that and complains.  Promotions in UNDP are predicated on good relations with the government.  A resident representative who is doing a good job for the internally displaced is probably not doing good things for their career.²⁰¹

Further complicating the situation is the fact that DHA plays a role once a resident representative is designated a resident coordinator.  A resident representative/ resident coordinator may be put in the difficult professional position of receiving differing instructions on how best to proceed from UNDP and DHA.  UNDP needs to give the necessary support and direction to its resident representatives/resident coordinators to ensure that this institutional dilemma does not undermine programmatic goals with regard to the displaced.

UNDP needs to provide training and direction to its staff, particularly resident representatives, in the areas where there is relatively less in-house expertise, such as human rights and protection responsibilities.  The mistakes of the Kenya operation went unchallenged by the policymakers at UNDP headquarters for the duration of the program. There appeared to be little institutional attention to the unfolding problems or any attention given to the fact that the program needed direction.  UNDP is planning to decentralize its programs to the field offices.²⁰²  However, in doing so, it must ensure that its field staff are properly trained and equipped to take on the task of implementing such programs.

Lastly, successes and failures of past programs should be examined and utilized to strengthen future programs.  The findings of this examination process must be actively incorporated into programs for the internally displaced through a systematic institutional procedure.  For instance, the complete absence of a human rights component in the UNDP program in Kenya is all the more puzzling given that a prior UNDP program for the reintegration of displaced populations in Central America was widely viewed as a success, in large part because it prioritized the promotion and protection of human rights as a central component of that program.  The Development Program for Displaced Persons, Refugees, and Returnees in Central America (PRODERE), executed by UNDP between 1989 and 1995, was created to promote and facilitate the social and economic reintegration of more than two million people uprooted by regional conflicts in the 1980s.  Initially a three-year program, PRODERE was extended two years until the end of July 1995.  PRODERE was the largest single program ever executed by UNDP/OPS. 

PRODERE’s program consisted of an approach that addressed the root causes of the conflict and created a basis for sustainable development.  PRODERE also promoted the creation of local institutions that remained in place after the closure of the program to provide services in areas such as production, employment, income-generation, promotion of human rights, health, and education.²⁰³   The perceived success of the PRODERE program is in large part due to its approach, which recognized that the program “must grant the highest priority to the promotion of human rights, as an indispensable component of the development, peace and democracy process in Central America.”²⁰⁴   Notwithstanding its own problems, PRODERE was credited not only with strengthening national human rights institutions, but promoting the creation of grassroots human rights activities that helped change the local human rights culture.  Among other human rights activities, PRODERE provided training and technical assistance for human rights monitors, creating a network of local people who could assist victims to bring cases through the judicial system; it disseminated human rights information in Spanish and indigenous languages; and brought together local human rights groups with government and law enforcement officials.  Yet, where were the lessons of PRODERE reflected in the UNDP Kenya program? While it is clear that it was not a simple matter of replicating PRODERE in Kenya, there were important lessons that PRODERE offered UNDP.  UNDP did send over some Kenyan government officials and UNDP staff to Central America at the outset of the program.²⁰⁵  However, little of the expertise and positive experiences that UNDP had developed in Central America appeared to have been translated to the Kenyan context.

Lack of a Strong Integrated U.N. Framework to Protect the Displaced

The U.N. is well-positioned to take the lead in designing international mechanisms to improve protection and assistance to the internally displaced.  As the Kenyan example indicates, the U.N. can facilitate negotiations and support from the government and local authorities.  It can bring together diverse groups and coordinate efforts.  U.N. interlocutors can be an important link in terms of communication, information sharing, and consultation.  However, U.N. programs for the displaced should not be embarked on without an understanding of what needs should be addressed and the strengths and weaknesses of the organizations tasked to deal with the situation.

The ability of the international community to offer effective assistance and protection to internally displaced populations will remain inadequate as long as there is a lack of a clearly designated institutional mandate within the U.N. to assist the internally displaced.  Although shared responsibility by the various U.N. agencies that have undertaken programs on behalf of the displaced is not the problem per se, the manner in which this arrangement has evolved has resulted in a series of separate agency programs—none of which seem to be benefitting from the expertise of the other. The needs of the internally displaced span the spectrum from emergency humanitarian relief to economic development and reintegration.  Since no one agency is solely tasked with the internally displaced, all the agencies currently dealing with displaced programs are lacking some capacity to administer certain aspects along this broad spectrum.  In particular, the issue of protection appears to be most neglected.  What is required is a more systematic approach which consolidates and builds on the U.N.’s capacity so that identifiable elements (such as protection, documentation, human rights reporting and legal assistance) that are critical for programs for the internally displaced are automatically incorporated into all programs.

The lack of a clear mandate for assistance, protection and long-term solutions with regard to the internally displaced is a problem that will continue to plague those U.N. agencies attempting to deal with them.  In the absence of a clear mandate, U.N. agencies are not sure how to relate in given circumstances as lines of responsibility and accountability are not clear.  The ad hoc mandates of the U.N. agencies given the responsibility of dealing with the internally displaced are an inappropriate substitute for the creation of a regularized system. 

For instance, UNHCR’s core mandate for refugees has resulted in a regular and defined mechanism to address the protection problems facing that group of uprooted people.  UNHCR has comparatively much more experience than UNDP in working with governments to provide protection to refugee populations.  It has developed standards, criteria, and training programs which have enhanced its ability to offer protection to refugee populations over the years.  Similarly, it has a wealth of experience in dealing with hostile and recalcitrant host governments on which it must rely to ensure refugee protection.²⁰⁶  Yet although internally displaced populations are facing comparable conditions, no system is in place to ensure that similar protection steps are being taken by other agencies working on the displaced.  For instance, in Kenya, protection issues should have been a priority since the government itself had been responsible for instigating and condoning the violence, and because security forces had not provided protection.  Yet, UNDP does not have extensive experience with protection.  This should have been anticipated.

In the Kenyan example, the UNDP program appeared to function as a completely internal UNDP project, rather than as part of a broader U.N. program for the internally displaced.  It appeared to have little or no genuine collaboration with other U.N. agencies, including DHA, and sought or benefitted little from obtaining direction or expertise available from other agencies within the U.N.  Other U.N. agencies, such as UNICEF, that wanted to become more involved in the Displaced Persons Program in Kenya were neither encouraged to nor able to contribute in the manner in which they wanted to.²⁰⁷  Other U.N. agencies that should have been consulted were not.  For example, within Kenya alone there were two U.N. agencies dealing with the forcibly displaced between 1993 and 1995: UNHCR dealing with Somali, Sudanese and Ethiopian refugees predominantly in the North-Eastern Province, and UNDP dealing with the Kenyan internally displaced in Rift Valley, Western and Nyanza Provinces.  In both situations, security and protection for the victims was a problem.²⁰⁸  In both situations, the government was hostile to the populations.  In one situation, publicity and active pressure was placed on the government by UNHCR, which resulted in positive changes in the situation of refugees in Kenya.²⁰⁹  In the other, private engagement and public silence on the situation of the displaced by UNDP resulted in no change in government policy.  While the two situations are not identical, this example indicates that this government responded only when publicly and actively pushed to do so.  Yet, UNDP did not collaborate or cooperate with UNHCR to discuss ways in which protection for the internally displaced might be improved. 

In the area of protection, UNHCR has by far the best developed standards, rules of conduct, and practical guidelines for planning and implementation of its refugee programs.  Many of these are transferable to situations of internal displacement.  There is much more scope for U.N. agencies to look to UNHCR for guidance in this area.  UNHCR has distinctly relevant experience in dealing with the issues facing uprooted people.  Other U.N. agencies can benefit from this expertise through cooperation and coordination with UNHCR.  However, increasing UNHCR involvement cannot be done as a cynical means through which to contain refugee populations within their country of origin to avoid having to provide international protection, including asylum.  Some states have advocated increased UNHCR involvement with the internally displaced as a means to preempt such populations from becoming refugee populations with the incumbent responsibilities on states to provide asylum.  There is considerable apprehension among refugee protection circles that increased protection for internally displaced persons may be used as a way to contain refugee flows in order to diminish international responsibility for providing protection and asylum to refugee populations.  This valid concern should not, however, result in less protection for the internally displaced, but rather a search for balanced solutions to the problems of both refugee and internally displaced populations, which do not undermine the refugee protection framework. 

There is no reason why UNDP, or any other U.N. agencies, should be in the position of having to blunder through areas where they have traditionally not developed an institutional capacity, particularly when that developed expertise already exists in other agencies within the U.N.  Enhanced inter-agency collaboration is an important factor in improving services to the internally displaced.  Although the UNDP PRODERE reintegration program in Central America benefitted from inter-agency collaboration,²¹⁰ as a rule most U.N. inter-agency work is fraught with misgivings, personality clashes, and turf battles.  Inter-agency collaboration within the U.N. remains weak and fractured.  If the U.N. is to continue its practice of designating a variety of different U.N. agencies to take responsibility for internally displaced populations, the organization must actively improve inter-agency collaboration.  This will require sustained attention to create incentives and conditions within the organization for genuine inter-agency collaboration to solve or address the problems of the internally displaced.  

Effective coordination and cooperation is the major challenge to developing an institutional capacity that transcends all the U.N.’s agencies and addresses the integral issues connected to the internally displaced.  The existence of DHA and the Inter-Agency Task Force on the Internally Displaced do not appear to translate into a genuine leadership or overseeing role once a program is under way.  In the Kenyan case, UNDP program administrators and field officers were given no training to develop expertise in human rights or protection issues.  Furthermore, little or no cross-agency assistance appeared to have been offered or sought from within the broader U.N. which might have been able to strengthen the UNDP program or to put pressure on the Kenyan government to comply.  Unfortunately, this problem is as valid today as it was a few years ago before UNDP embarked on its displaced program in Kenya.  Until the U.N. begins to systematize and institutionalize its programs for the displaced, the same blunders and omissions will continue to surface, at the expense of those who can least afford it—the internally displaced.

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