The months of May, June, and July 1997 seemed to mark an intensification of the conflict in East Timor, with guerrilla attacks on both Indonesian military targets and civilians in Dili, Baucau, Ermera, and Los Palos, and intensive operations by the Indonesian army to find and punish those responsible. The timing of the attacks was linked to the May 29 national elections in Indonesia in which Foreign Minister Ali Alatas ran representing East Timor on the list of the ruling party, GOLKAR. Both Alatas and Transmigration Minister Siswono Yudohusodo made highly publicized campaign visits to East Timor in mid-May, with Alatas challenged by students at the University of East Timor on Indonesia's refusal to hold a referendum on the territory and Siswono's presence serving to underscore the highly sensitive issue of how government-sponsored migration is changing the demographics of East Timor.1 The outcome of the election was never in doubt -- GOLKAR won in East Timor by more than 80 percent of the vote as opposed to its 74 percent overall victory in Indonesia -- but guerrillas targeted polling places, election officials, and, in some cases, voters to highlight their rejection of Indonesian rule. Some thirty people died in these attacks, including at least ten civilians, whose deaths Human Rights Watch condemned as a clear violation of international humanitarian law.

But violations of humanitarian law by the guerrillas, some of which are described in detail in this report, cannot justify violations in return by the Indonesian government and armed forces: the months following the attacks have been characterized by widespread arbitrary detention, torture, and at least one high-profile death in custody that needs further investigation. Human Rights Watch does not question the obligation of the Indonesian authorities to arrest people believed responsible for crimes such as murder, arson, and assault. But the Indonesian government is not just arresting those responsible. Military teams have been systematically rounding up large numbers of people, detaining them for days or weeks at a time without a warrant or detention order, and intimidating or torturing them so that the army can get information about possible suspects. Hundreds of East Timorese, men and women, were arrested in this manner in June and July 1997, a continuation of a long-established pattern in East Timor.

Torture, particularly with electric shocks but also with a variety of instruments such as rattan, metal pipes, and electric cable, is a standard method of interrogation used by police and army personnel alike. Torture is carried out primarily in police stations and military posts or intelligence safe houses immediately after arrests, but Human Rights Watch has also received reports of arresting officers taking suspects from their homes into forest areas in the vicinity and torturing them for information there, where there may be less danger of word filtering back to local human rights monitors or the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC). Torture has even apparently become a source of income for individual officers in East Timor who are selling photographs and even videotapes of interrogation sessions to the highest bidder, with the price rising as more details (such as where and when the interrogation took place) are included.2

This report focuses on the period from May to July, but it also includes new information about earlier incidents. Outside human rights organizations are not allowed formal access to East Timor; a request from Human Rights Watch to the Indonesian government in early June has not been answered. The information presented here comes from a variety of sources, including interviews with East Timorese, trial documents of East Timorese convicted in Dili district court, eyewitness accounts compiled in East Timor and made available to Human Rights Watch, and articles from the local Dili newspaper, Suara Timor Timur (Voice of East Timor).

It is important to note that the conflict did not suddenly erupt again in May after a long period of dormancy. Rather, tensions have escalated steadily in recent years as the army has tried to "Timorize" the security forces, with a heavy reliance on unemployed young people as informers, and as socioeconomic problems (a high unemployment rate; development policies seen as favoring non-Timorese; and an increasing number of Indonesian migrants) have fueled resentment of the Indonesian presence. The attacks in May were preceded by a series of violent outbreaks, each of which led to mass arrests and accompanying human rights violations. They include:

* March 23, 1997: a demonstration by young people at the Mahkota Hotel in Dili where U.N. special envoy Jamsheed Marker was staying was forcibly broken up and led to the arrests of thirty-three people, several of whom were tortured in custody.

* February 21, 1997: a riot in Oecusse, Ambeno district, involving more than 600 youths started after a parish priest attending the first-ever celebration there of the end of the Muslim fasting month at the district military command on February 19 was served a meal that had been tampered with beforehand, making it look like he was getting someone's leftovers. Despite apologies from the military commander, word of the incident leaked out and led to a riot in which one man was killed and several kiosks were destroyed. Dozens were arrested by armed troops from the mobile police brigade (Brimob). Seven were later charged with a variety of criminal offenses.

* February 6-10, 1997: more than thirty people were arrested in Viqueque after armed members of the youth militia, Gardapaksi (see below), together with the counterinsurgency Rajawali forces, mounted an operation in Uai-Tame and Nae-Dala, two villages suspected of being logistical supply bases for the guerrillas. Villagers were terrified by the operation, saying it was as bad as anything they had seen since 1975, the date of the Indonesian invasion. The leader of the Gardapaksi unit that led the operation, Eugenio da Costa Soares, was later killed in an ambush by guerrilla forces in April.

* December 24, 1996: Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo returned to Dili from Norway after receiving the Nobel Peace Prize. Hundreds of thousands lined up along the road to welcome him from the airport, but in several places, people suspected of being intelligence agents were set upon by East Timorese youth who believed they were planning to assassinate the Bishop. An army corporal was killed, and the police commander of Dili and several others were beaten. A massive manhunt took place in the aftermath of the violence; sixteen people were eventually arrested, tried, and received light sentences in July. One reason for the leniency, according to the lawyer, may have been the evidence of torture produced at their trials.

In addition, countless raids took place on communities suspected of supporting the guerrillas or the underground political network. Some of these incidents are documented in this report.

Recommendations

Human Rights Watch calls on the Indonesian government and the guerrillas of Forcas Armadas de Libertacao Nacional de Timor Leste (Falintil, the Armed Forces for the National Liberation of East Timor) to respect human rights and humanitarian law.

To the Government of Indonesia:

· demonstrate a commitment to curbing the practices of torture and arbitrary detention respectively by inviting the U.N. Special Rapporteur on Torture and the U.N. Working Group on Arbitrary Detention to visit East Timor and make recommendations designed to eliminate these abuses.

· cease the provision of military and paramilitary training for "pro-integration" youth groups and investigate charges that these allegedly civilian groups have participated in military operations in East Timor with regular and special forces.

· set up a central register of detainees in East Timor and require all members of the military, including police (a branch of the armed forces in Indonesia) to report immediately names of those arrested so that family members can know immediately who is detained and where.

· issue clear instructions, to be published in the newspaper Suara Timor Timur (Voice of East Timor) and other public places, that members of the security forces, including police, army, and various paramilitary groups, are explicitly banned from using any form of torture, including electric shocks, beatings, and submersion in water, at all times. The government should cooperate with local human rights organizations like the Commission on Justice and Peace to set up a mechanism by which torture victims could report to the commission with confidence that their reports would be fully investigated, that they themselves would suffer no reprisals, and that the torturers would be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law.

· ratify the U.N. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.

To the Falintil

· announce their full adherence to the principles of humanitarian law, particularly Common Article 3.

· announce an immediate cessation of the practice of executing civilian Timorese suspected of being informers or collaborators.

To the International Community

· ensure that no arms or military equipment that can be or have been used in the commission of human rights abuses in East Timor should be sold or provided to the Indonesian government.

· request full transparency from the Indonesian armed forces on the number of security forces stationed in East Timor, including rotating battalions, special forces, counterinsurgency units, paramilitary groups, police, and intelligence units, and engage the Indonesian government in discussions on how to reduce that number.

· ensure that any training programs for the Indonesian military include a human rights component to be developed in consultation with experienced Indonesian human rights NGOs, and that it include a mechanism for making the military careers of the participants a matter of public record in Indonesia as well as in the country offering the assistance and for tracking their careers for a five-year period after the training concludes. An evaluation of the human rights record of the participants should then be conducted, with that record again to be made publicly available, both in Indonesia and in the country offering the training.

· ensure that bilateral aid and investment programs for East Timor are undertaken in consultation with Bishop Carlos Ximenes Belo and representatives of the Catholic church in the area where the project is to be implemented.
1 "Indonesia tidak takut referendum," Suara Timor Timur, May 24, 1997.2 In July 1997, we saw one set of photographs that had been purchased in this way and spoke with the buyer who requested that we not use his name or that of the officer who sold him the prints.