III. MARGINALIZATION

The heavy military presence is one element that may be leading to increased support for the opposition to Indonesian rule and the intifada-like activities in East Timor's urban areas. But social, economic and political marginalization may be another, as land acquisition by Indonesians and in-migration are changing the social fabric of the territory. It is indicative of the social changes taking place in heavily Catholic East Timor that not only was the end of Ramadan publicly celebrated in 1997 for the first time in Ambeno district, but in July, more than 2,000people took part in the Hindu celebration of Saraswati at the Giri Natha temple in Dili, presumably all of them civil servants or transmigrants from Bali.9

In 1995 and 1996, major clashes broke out between East Timorese and migrants of the Bugis and Makassarese ethnic groups who came to East Timor from South Sulawesi and who are renowned both for their commercial skills as well as for their Muslim piety. These clashes, which usually started with a fight in a marketplace between East Timorese and migrant traders, deflected attention from the more formal government-sponsored transmigration program that has brought thousands of Indonesians to East Timor as "model farmers" (petani teladan). These farmers are supposed to set an example for the East Timorese on how to grow crops, although they are often utterly unfamiliar with the climate and soil conditions of East Timor. The presence of both "spontaneous" migrants who come on their own as well as those who come through government programs also serves the political purpose of "integration" by increasing the proportion of non-Timorese in the population.

The social and political problems created by the influx of Indonesians were noted as long ago as 1990 by a team from Gajah Mada University in central Java. They warned that the "flood of newcomers" would "sow the seeds of communal conflict" and was already creating the feeling among the East Timorese that the migrants were extorting their money, taking their jobs, preventing their economic advancement, and bringing no tangible benefits.10

When Transmigration Minister Siswono Yudohusodo visited a transmigration site in Suai, Covalima, on May 19 as part of the election campaign, he arrived in a convoy of dozens of cars and was greeted by thousands of people waiting to see him and shouting "Long live GOLKAR!" "Pancasila Forever!" and "Development Must Continue!"11 The reception may have been orchestrated, but it illustrates how the transmigrants provide a buffer for the government against East Timorese nationalist sentiment. The minister said that 2,250 transmigrant centers were scheduled to be built in East Timor in 1997-98, and one hundred families were being brought from outside East Timor to work in poultry/livestock production, particularly in the areas of Ainaro, Covalima and Laore.12 The government office of transmigration noted that from January 1 to June 26, 1997, 521 heads of households, or 1,699 people, moved through an assisted transmigrant program, while 266 heads of household, or 834 people, who are self-sufficient transmigrants (transmigrant swakarsa mandiri or TSM) had moved.13

All of the transmigrants, government-sponsored and spontaneous, are moving on to land that, for the most part, East Timorese people worked but did not have formal title to under the Portuguese colonial government. Much of that land was vacated, through a forcible relocation and resettlement program, in the aftermath of the 1975 invasion and later declared tanah negara or state land, or sold to the highest bidder. In addition to the transmigrant program, a new and highly controversial development project is underway in East Timor that will allow President Soeharto's son Tommy and his company, PT Putra Unggal Sejati, to develop 25,000 of the most fertile hectares along the southern coast of East Timor into a vast sugar cane plantation. The project has generated intense opposition in East Timor, but one man who raised social and economic concerns relating to it told Human Rights Watch that thegovernor of East Timor, Abilio Soares, said there had been "an order from the palace" to go ahead with it. The project will involve an unknown number of transmigrants among the estimated 10,000 people to be employed in sugar cultivation, infrastructure construction, and work in the sugar factory. While it is being billed as a means of providing employment and alleviating poverty in the area, economists in Jakarta told us that it would be far more economical to import sugar, and the social and political costs will be high -- especially as sugar cane is a hated crop, even in Java, because of the low returns to farmers and the backbreaking work involved in harvesting the cane. At a meeting in Viqueque, East Timor, to discuss the project, an unidentified participant noted, "The land in question is owned by the people and must not be seen as empty or infertile. It's simply that the security situation has not permitted the people to cultivate it."14

Likewise, a cement factory, the construction of which was announced with great fanfare in May, has raised eyebrows. The local government is billing the factory as a pioneering development initiative and noting that 49 percent of the shares will be held by East Timorese. But the East Timorese in question are the three most outspoken defenders of integration with Indonesia, men known up until now for their role as political lackeys, not their business acumen. They are former Fretilin leader Abilio Araujo; Indonesia's "ambassador at large for special tasks," F. Lopes da Cruz, and F. Xavier dos Amaral, former president of the short-lived independent state of East Timor who was co-opted by the Indonesian government and now has the title of second chairman of the Indonesia-Portugal Association, an organization set up by President Soeharto's daughter, Tutut.15 The other 51 percent is held by a close Soeharto associate, Budi Prakoso, and his company, PT Tuban Oceanic Research and Recovery (TORR).