II. THE MILITARY SITUATION

The conflict in East Timor takes the form of ongoing civil strife as well as sporadic clashes between the Indonesian army and the guerrilla organization known as Falintil, the armed wing of the political organization called the National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM). CNRM is an umbrella organization of East Timoresenationalist organizations that includes the much better known political organization, Fretilin. The size of Falintil is the subject of much speculation: for the last decade, the Indonesian military has been using a figure of 200 armed regulars; other sources put the figure at 700, with thousands of underground activists involved in unarmed political activity.3

Indonesian military forces in East Timor include regular police, mobile brigade police, troops from Indonesian infantry battalions, units of the Indonesian special forces (Kopassus); at least one air force battalion; local territorial troops; a variety of paramilitary forces; and an extensive intelligence network.

East Timor has more than 2,500 police, a far higher concentration than Indonesia proper. In July, Col. (Pol) Atok Rismanto, head of the East Timor provincial police command, said the ratio of police to people in East Timor was 1:300, whereas nationwide, the average was 1:2,000. He noted that new troops had been recently added, but that was in anticipation of retirements.4 Of those police, more than 800 are fully armed mobile brigade troops (Brimob), half of whom rotate in and out of East Timor on fourteen-month tours of duty. In May 1997, for example, it was announced that 155 men from a West Java Brimob unit were replaced by 128 men from North Sumatra. The latter joined two other Brimob companies from the Moluccas and West Kalimantan as well as a company based in East Timor of 449 men.

The current number of troops in East Timor is not certain. In 1993, the Indonesian army had eight battalions from Indonesian proper serving in East Timor, each consisting of about 700 troops. Two were withdrawn in September 1995 but any reduction in troop strength was more than offset by the creation of local battalions, as well as by a variety of military and paramilitary groupings described below.5 Infantry battalions known to be operating in East Timor in 1997 include Nos. 744, 745 (both largely East Timorese in composition), 407 (operating around Viqueque), 312 (operating around Baucau), 515, 620, 621 and 713. When the battalions rotate out, they are replaced by battalions from the same army division so that knowledge and experience in the area is retained. In addition to the full battalions that are rotated in to East Timor, members of other Indonesia-based infantry battalions are sent in on a nine-month basis to augment the strength of the two "task forces" (satgas) based in East Timor of the army special forces (Kopassus), Rajawali I and Rajawali II. In July 1997, for example, Jakarta newspapers carried an article about 146 soldiers from five different battalions of the Sriwijaya division of the army based in South Sumatra who were given a heroes' welcome after the completion of nine months in East Timor with Rajawali II. Collectively (and ominously) termed the "Hunter Company" (Kompi Pemburu), the soldiers had been tasked with hunting down guerrillas in an effort to crush the insurgency.6 Kopassus also has a permanent detachment in East Timor, No.81, but it is not clear what its troop strength is.

Special counterinsurgency units, led by army special forces in areas believed to have a high concentration of guerrillas, operate alongside local units in military operations; some of these appear to have been formed at the same time that Jakarta was announcing the withdrawal of combat units from East Timor. Each of these units is believed to have between 200 and 300 men, according to a local source, and there is a high proportion of East Timorese. The Saka forces are one such unit in Baucau, headed by a Kopassus officer, Francisco Sicofae; the Halilintar ("Thunderbolt") is its counterpart for the area of Atabai, Kailaco, and Balibo, commanded by João Tavares,former bupati or district head of Bobonaro, and Makikit operates in the Viqueque area. These appear to be relatively new units, reportedly formed under the direction of President Soeharto's son-in-law, General Prabowo. While a counterinsurgency unit with the name Halilintar was active during one of the worst offensives of the conflict in East Timor, from 1977-1980, it was then dissolved, only to be resurrected in 1995. A similar unit is believed to be in operation around Los Palos, in eastern East Timor.

In addition to these combat units, there are also hundreds of troops based in the regional military command (Korem 164), each of the thirteen district commands (Kodim) and the dozens of smaller subdistrict commands (Koramil). Normally, a Korem has about 350 troops, the Kodims about fifty each, and Koramils about seven or eight.

These field units are reinforced by a variety of quasi-military and paramilitary organizations, many of them youth groups. The "three-month army" (tentara tiga bulan) is one such creation where East Timorese receive three months of training in Malang, East Java, then are given uniforms and firearms to fight alongside more experienced combat units in the Rajawali task forces. The recruits for the three-month army are from the civilian militia called hansip. The Gardapaksi (Garda Pemuda Penegak Integrasi or Youth Guard for Upholding Integration), created in July 1995, is supposed to be a wholly civilian program for training unemployed East Timorese youth in occupations such as furniture-making and automobile repair. Headed by Marcal d'Almeida, head of the GOLKAR or ruling party faction in the local parliament, its members are also reported to receive military training from Kopassus, non-lethal equipment such as walkie-talkies and occasionally firearms, and have accompanied regular military units in operations against suspected independence supporters. As of mid-1997, Gardapaksi was reported to have 800 members.7 In addition to the unemployed, the pool of recruits for Gardapaksi is said to include youths who have been arrested for anti-integration violence, held in custody and often abused, then released on the condition that they become informers. East Timorese sources told us that Gardapaksi youth get an "honorarium" of Rp.17,000 (US$8.50) a day for taking part in specific actions, such as mounting counterdemonstrations to pro-independence rallies. Members of Gardapaksi are said to be given special incentives, such as better housing, access to university, and so on. After a leader of Gardapaksi in Viqueque was killed in April, apparently in retaliation for having been involved in a military operation there in February, the organization took on a much lower profile.

At various intervals since 1989, masked or hooded East Timorese called ninjas, believed to be working with the army, have been involved in attacks on anti-integration youth. It was a fatal ninja attack on an East Timorese in October 1991 that led to the Dili massacre a month later, where Indonesian armed forces opened fire on a memorial procession for the slain youth. While reports of ninja attacks or intimidation have been less frequent during the last two years (coinciding with government efforts to build up the Gardapaksi), a twenty-five-year-old student at the University of East Timor named Marcelino was stabbed to death by a masked man in black clothes on July 11 in the village of Potete, Ermera. The acting head of the provincial police, Drs. Yohanes Paplangi, issued a statement denying the attacker was from the military, suggesting there had been allegations locally that he was.8