IV. INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE HAITIAN NATIONAL POLICE

Developing Police Leadership

The weakness or absence of HNP leaders clearly has contributed to the emergence and persistence of police abuse. Yet, there is little evidence that human rights violations committed by the HNP have been ordered by police commanders or result from a top-down policy. Many instances of excessive use of force resulted from situations where inexperienced agents, working without guidance or coordination, panicked and over-reacted. More ominously, police officers tolerated and failed to discipline abuse and displayed grave flaws in their own leadership.

The HNP has suffered a severe leadership vacuum since its inception. The first HNP Director General, Adrien Rameau, was appointed in May 1995, only weeks before the June 4 graduation of the first class of HNP cadets. Recruitment of secondary and regional police commanders lagged further, even as the first HNP were deployed to the field. Early in 1996, the HNP was operating with: only four of the nine departmental directors in place; only seventeen of 133 police chiefs (commissaires, including senior police officials required at headquarters); and seventy-three sergeants (inspecteurs) out of a required total of 500 to 600.87 By late 1996, the HNP had deployed seven of the nine departmental directors and had appointed but not fully deployed some eighty-five police chiefs.88 The absence of leaders from many police stations led one HNP agent to conclude that "the population is the only one evaluating the police."89

In addition to problems created by empty leadership posts, there were no clear procedures or criteria for the few appointments that were made. Constitutional procedures were followed with Senate ratification of the director general of police, but other police officers were chosen on the basis of personal connections rather than professional criteria. The HNP then deployed these officers with little or no training.

Police officers frequently failed to discipline unprofessional or abusive behavior, and they themselves committed illegal and unprofessional acts. A police chief in the south-east reportedly developed an entourage of armed civilian "bodyguards" wearing dark glasses.90 Many police commanders appropriated police vehicles for personal use and permitted the use of automatic weapons, rifles, and other non-police-issue weapons. Police commanders tolerated and failed to punish unprofessional behavior such as: not turning up to work on time and not wearing uniforms on duty; failing to display proper identification on vehicles; failing to holster weapons; not observing legal arrest procedures; and displaying apparent ignorance of basic police functions.91 These practices rapidly undermined HNP discipline, morale and professionalism, leading the HNP to display what the U.N. characterized as "a lack of motivation that is expressed in chronic absenteeism and even desertion."92

The HNP must demonstrate a break from past practices by ensuring that competence rather than connections guide appointments and promotions. By law, the HNP should select chiefs from the police ranks based on seniority and merit. The law also permits the inspector general to appoint former soldiers to command posts. In fact, because the entire force is new, police agents do not have sufficient seniority to fill higher-level command positions. The HNP has recruited civilian and ex-military candidates for many police chief posts. The HNP also selected some agents demonstrating leadership promise for an ongoing leadership development program.

HNP Director General Denizé, who was appointed by President Préval in March 1996, informed us that the Superior Council of the National Police (CSPN) should approve all nominations at the level of departmental director and above, but that it had not done so consistently. In accordance with these procedures, civilian candidates now have been appointed to seven of the nine departmental director positions.

Efforts to fill the leadership vacuum have proceeded slowly. HNP Director General Denizé initiated a recruitment process with support from CivPol and ICITAP in May 1996. This process aimed to recruit and train eighty police chiefs by the end of June. All police and civilian candidates had to be university graduates and pass an examination that included written exercises on human rights and community policing and hypothetical scenarios of problematic police interventions.93 HNP personnel, civilians, former soldiers who had served in the IPSF, and previously appointed police chiefs (many of whom were ex-soldiers required to pass the examination in order to remain on the force), took the examination during May and June 1996. HNP authorities hoped that this uniform, objective process would avoid divisions in the police leadership and ensure that police commanders garnered greater respect and shared a "common National Police style."94

Only twenty-two of the 130 eligible ex-military officers took the first examination. Only twelve passed, two of whom were later dismissed following review of their personnel files. The low turn-out for the exam reportedly stemmed from fear and resentment by former military officers in the IPSF that they should have to pass another hurdle. In response, HNP authorities opened some later exams to additional ex-soldiers.95

Due to low pass rates, the HNP recruited only about forty police chiefs through this process, half of them former military officers. Members of Parliament raised serious concerns about the preponderance of former military personnel. As a result, none of the officers were deployed until further recruitment could take place to reduce the overall percentage of former soldiers. Consequently, seventy police stations still were operating without chiefs at the end of September 1996.96 Ongoing recruitment for police chiefs was open to civilians but primarily sought HNP personnel. The HNP conducted recruitment and training during September, October, and November 1996, and January 1997. At the time of writing, the Haitian government and HNP authorities still had not deployed many of the new recruits.

The majority of police commanders selected in 1995 and early 1996 were deployed with no formal police training. The only training available, which many appointees reportedly failed to attend, was a two-to-three day orientation course by ICITAP in November 1995. CivPol trainers deployed with each graduating class of cadets also advised commanders in the field.

ICITAP and CivPol provided four weeks of classroom training and one week of fieldwork for HNP officers recruited in 1996. MICIVIH conducted a day and a half of officer training on international human rights norms; the U.N. Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials; the Police Code of Ethics; human rights organizations in Haiti; rules on treatment of detainees; Haitian laws on local government; maintenance of order issues, including crowd control; lawful public demonstrations; and, prison and morgue visits. Despite improvements in police leadership recruitment and training, HNP Director General Denizé noted significant weaknesses in the process.

We are taking a university graduate, giving him five weeks training and putting him at the head of an unhappy and undisciplined police. There is a real question about whether this is going to work very well.97

The Role of Former Military Personnel in the Haitian National Police

The admittance of former military personnel, particularly to command positions, has been one of the most controversial issues in the development of the HNP. During the last months of Aristide's government, under the tenure of then-Acting-Director General Fourel Celestin, former military officers assumed the top positions in the HNP.98 Since that time, the incorporation of 130 former military officers, of the rank of 2nd Lieutenant and above (who had served in the IPSF) threatened to solidify the dominance of former military personnel in HNP command positions. This development provoked protests in the human rights community and debates in the Haitian press.

The high percentage of former military officers recruited as police commanders apparently reflected an expedient response to the lack of experienced civilian candidates. According to CivPol, the officers remaining in the IPSF were the best performers on the force. CivPol had selected more problematic individuals for early removal from the IPSF in the process of demobilizing that force.99 CivPol officials, concerned about the leadership crisis on the ground, put forward the former military officers in the IPSF as a potential pool of HNP leadership candidates.

We remain concerned that ex-military officers, whose human rights records have not been closely scrutinized, dominate command-level positions in the HNP. Police under the command of former military officers, such as in the Port-au-Prince and Delmas posts, have committed many of the worst incidents of human rights abuse. While there are strong arguments, grounded in short-term expediency, for relying on the more experienced former soldiers, this reliance could carry longer-term costs for the HNP's professionalism and civilian nature. The presence of ex-soldiers in HNP command posts already has shaken the Haitian population's trust and confidence. Former military personnel should be incorporated on an individual basis only, following the same recruitment and training procedures as for civilians, but with additional background checks on their human rights records. The HNP appears to have followed these procedures in recent recruitment of police chiefs. Nonetheless, the information shortfalls that have dogged other screening efforts in Haiti also may have compromised this screening of HNP officers.100 In 1994,Haitian and U.S. authorities selected soldiers to serve in the IPSF based on a screening process to remove individuals suspected of human rights abuse. However, the process was rushed and based on limited information, allowing a real possibility that abusive ex-soldiers now serve in the police.101

Significant numbers of former military personnel also are serving at lower levels of the HNP, particularly in the notorious Port-au-Prince police stations known as Anti-Gang and "Cafeteria," and in the Traffic Police. HNP leaders incorporated 699 former soldiers into these units in December 1995, adding to the roughly 450 former soldiers already serving in the palace and presidential guards. The Haitian public is very sensitive to the possibility that soldiers from Haiti's extremely abusive military have a significant role in the new, civilian police. This is partly reflected in a common belief that large numbers of former soldiers also entered the HNP through regular recruitment for academy training. Very few actually did so. ICITAP stated that "no more than twenty former military" passed the examination and screening procedures for academy training.102

Maintaining IPSF personnel in homogeneous units, and on different contracts and pay scales from the rest of the HNP, has generated considerable tensions and rivalries between different police units. HNP authorities are planning a process to make all former IPSF personnel, both military and Guantánamo recruits, take educational and physical tests. Those passing the examinations will be incorporated into the ranks of the HNP and those failing will be removed. This should diminish the tensions between forces and help to ensure that only qualified personnel work for the HNP.

Parallel Forces Within the Police

Haiti has a long history of competing armed units engaging in abuses against civilians with impunity. President François "Papa Doc" Duvalier created a paramilitary force called the Tonton Macoutes to counterbalance the military and their uncertain loyalty to his presidency. His son and successor, Jean-Claude "Baby Doc" Duvalier, fearing the potential independence of the Macoutes, created and favored an extremely abusive military battalion called "the Leopards." During President Aristide's first period in office before the coup, his creation of a Presidential Guard was perceived by opponents as the latest manifestation of this tradition. The August 20, 1996 killings of two opposition leaders, reportedly by an unofficial member and agents of the presidential security unit, heightened this concern.

It is alarming that multiple armed units, both pre-existing and new units created since 1994, started to operate beyond their mandates during 1995 and the first half of 1996, with little or no control by HNP authorities. These were the Ministerial Security Corps (Corps de Sécurité Ministeriel, CSM), the Palace Guard, Presidential Guard, "Cafeteria" and Anti-Gang police units, all of which formally are under HNP authority. The Interior Ministry had legal authority over the National Intelligence Service (Service d'Intelligence National, SIN), which was created in 1986 with CIA assistance. Private bodyguards and security corps developed by local governmental authorities, particularly in Port-au-Prince, generated further concerns.

In early 1996, U.N. observers deemed the SIN and CSM "uncontrollable."103 U.N. concern stemmed from incidents such as those in November 1995 following the killing of the Deputy Jean Hubert Feuillé when the SIN, CSM, and Palace and Presidential Guards conducted house to house searches, built road blocks, and made arrests,all of which exceeded their own mandate and were duties of the regular HNP force. They also used automatic weapons and rifles, and wore civilian clothes. They reportedly committed serious human rights violations during some of these operations. As noted above, the CSM were implicated in the March 6, 1996 Cité Soleil violence. The SIN also caused particular concern, because of its past record of abuse. Interior Ministry authorities had limited control of the force at best. The Interior Ministry attempted three times to verify SIN personnel between late 1995 and early 1996 and failed each time. At the time of their dismantling in May 1996, rosters showed eighty-four SIN agents and additional "assistants" (adjoints).104 Large numbers of falsified SIN identification cards reportedly were used by individuals implicated in robbing residences. On May 14, President Préval announced the closure of the SIN. However, only those SIN agents who were in their premises at the time of the shutdown were disarmed, leaving the majority of former agents and their assistants presumed still to be heavily armed.

The CSM is a police unit devoted to ministerial security composed of 279 Guantánamo police recruits who previously served in the IPSF.105 Until recently, the unit's commanding officers were former military personnel. CSM agents, who are based at the old military airport in Port-au-Prince, typically wear civilian clothes and travel in unmarked vehicles. They have been implicated in a number of troubling incidents, including the March 6, 1996 killings in Cité Soleil, when a hundred or more CSM agents reportedly responded to a police radio SOS call. Following the Cité Soleil incidents, HNP Director General Denizé fired the CSM's commanding officer, ex-soldier Lt. Guy Michel Philippe, but Philippe did not actually vacate the post until several months later.106 U.N. observers attribute the CSM's problems primarily to Philippe's direction and to weak HNP leadership in late 1995 that allowed the force to become "cowboys." HNP authorities had considered Guantanamo recruits for rural police posts, but their behavior in the CSM suggests that they might bring abusive police practices to Haiti's villages.

Personal security forces created by local authorities have been involved in several shooting incidents, causing further concern. Acting extra-legally, the mayor of Port-au-Prince, Emmanuel Charlemagne, created a security detail armed with heavy weapons.107 The mayor's guard have harassed market vendors and others on Port-au-Prince streets. National government authorities for the Department of the West (Delegation de l'Ouest, which includes the Port-au-Prince area) also created a security force that was accused of illegal activities. President Préval closed down that unit, as well as the SIN, on May 14, 1996.

The palace and presidential security guards comprise 464 former military personnel. Both the presidential and palace guards have conducted searches and set up road blocks in actions that appear to have exceeded presidential security duties. As described above, Eddy Arbouet, reportedly an unofficial member (attaché) of the presidential security unit and a former U.S. soldier, is suspected of killing opposition politicians Pastor Antoine Leroy and Jacques Florival on August 20, 1996.108 In September the U.S. successfully pressured for the suspension of the unit's senior officers. At the time of this writing, the Haitian government reportedly had suspended seven presidentialsecurity guards who were under investigation for possible participation in the killings.109 Republicans on the U.S. House of Representatives International Relations Committee also have accused the presidential guard of involvement in at least six alleged political killings during 1995.

Justice Minister Antoine and HNP Director General Denizé insist that there "is one police force and only one" and that they will not tolerate different armed entities that are not under their command, as required by the constitution. Initial steps, particularly the disbanding of the SIN and the Department of the West security corps, as well as new command appointments have started to address these problems. HNP authorities should investigate accusations against all HNP units, closely monitor the personnel in these units, and remove any HNP officers or agents responsible for abusive or unprofessional behavior.

Logistical Support and General Capabilities

In addition to leadership weaknesses, the limited training given to HNP agents and slow institutional development of logistical support capabilities appear to have contributed to human rights abuse by the police.

Further Training Needs

Beyond firmer discipline, a genuine likelihood of prosecution for criminal acts, and leaders who exemplify proper police professionalism, the HNP requires further training. Four months of academy training clearly were insufficient. Police trainers concur that cadets require a year's training to develop professionalism. The short training was particularly insufficient in the Haitian context, where the HNP was created from scratch over the past two years, and has no historical civilian police experience to draw on. ICITAP originally had proposed a six-month program that was shortened in order to train the full complement of HNP by February 29,1996, when U.S. troops were withdrawn from the U.N. forces.

At the academy, Haitian instructors taught half of the courses - those on the Haitian constitution and law - in French, while foreign instructors taught the other classes. Translation of many of these instructor's classes into French or Créole further compressed the amount of training actually received. International and Haitian authorities have emphasized training specialized units to confront problems such as crowd control and "requalification training" in the use of force, firearms, and human rights. Recent HNP training prepared a SWAT team, and airport, customs, anti-narcotics, border, and coast guards. (See Section V below on international training programs.) HNP abuses of detainees in 1996 illustrates a need for further training in interview techniques, humane treatment of detainees, and the appropriate use of force.

Limits on Police Resources

Logistical and resource limitations have a negative impact on the HNP's ability to conduct effective policing and may have contributed to police abuse. Without radio communications, police on patrol are cut off from stations and unable to call for back up. This reportedly has contributed to panic in situations where police fear for their security. In several such cases, they have used excessive force. The HNP lacks use of deadly force alternatives. HNP stations also lack sufficient transportation. Back-up police cannot reach officers on patrol quickly and police often cannot respond promptly to emergency calls. HNP agents frequently rely on CivPol to transport them to execute arrest warrants. They also have used public transport for moving detainees, which has proven insecure. These shortfalls clearly have taken a toll on the morale and professionalism of the HNP.

The HNP has received significant international material assistance, including vehicles, uniforms, office supplies, and radios. However, basic resources, logistical support, and operating budgets remain extremely limited, and the HNP has managed poorly the few resources it has, partly due to the lack of maintenance capabilities. The rapidcreation of the HNP, which required quick deployment of the force even as support systems lagged behind, contributed to these problems.

The HNP inherited the former military's guard posts around the country, many in appalling condition. Most police stations have no adequate lock-up facilities, phones, electricity, running water, or toilets, and many also lack windows and other basics. Conditions were so bad at the southern post of Ile La Vache, that CivPol withdrew the HNP agents sent there in early 1995. They feared that the HNP agents would desert their post and return to Port-au-Prince, as had happened in other areas. CivPol helped institute twice-weekly visits on market days by the police until the station was repaired.

At Grand Goâve in early 1996, the HNP had no telephone or radio and shared one motorcycle among fifteen agents.110 The entire Department of the South East was operating with five radios, two pickup trucks, and two motorcycles for 500 HNP officers and agents.111 In mid 1996, twenty HNP stationed at Plaisance in the North had no telephone and shared two radios that were not capable of reaching the nearest police chief in Limbé, some fifteen miles away.112

HNP agents lost and may have stolen some supplies when the force was first deployed. There was no control system requiring personnel to sign out radios or other equipment (but the force has since developed one). HNP agents wrecked many vehicles in accidents, while others broke down. Many HNP agents did not know how to drive and their training did not include driver education. Local police stations lack any maintenance capability and frequently do not have money for gas.113

Logistical limitations pose a security issue for the HNP as well as for the population. Many criminals in Haiti are heavily armed and well aware of the HNP's limitations, as evidenced by the killings of police. Each HNP agent was issued three rounds for his or her .38 pistols (eighteen bullets).114 HNP agents told us that they faced constant shortages of bullets at police stations and resorted to buying them from other agents who would charge $3 to $5 Haitian dollars a bullet (approximately US$1.00 to US$1.70).115

Police authorities and agents recognize the need for equipment that matches their difficult working conditions. Use of deadly force alternatives is key, such as providing and training agents in the use of pepper spray or other means to subdue a person without endangering his or her life. HNP commanders also have proposed alternative modes of transport such as horses, which are cheaper to maintain and can reach remote areas inaccessible even to four-wheel drive vehicles. Local officers supported the idea, arguing that two dozen horses could be maintained for the cost of a single vehicle. Having police on horseback, who could reach Haiti's roughest terrain, would improve the HNP's service to rural populations who frequently complain of a very limited police presence. Senior policeleaders appear sympathetic to the proposal, but the HNP relies heavily on international donations and most assistance has come in the form of vehicles. The situation has improved somewhat in Port-au-Prince with the provision of fifty radio-equipped vehicles, but HNP throughout Haiti continue to confront severe logistical shortfalls.

HNP authorities are trying to confront other problems and shortages including ending the late payment of police; assuring that every HNP agent has two uniforms (many police who only received one uniform went to work at least one day a week in civilian clothes, making them hard to identify); training personnel for police garages in Port-au-Prince, Cap Haïtien, and Les Cayes; developing gunsmith capabilities; and, establishing a health insurance policy for police and their immediate families. International assistance is helping to address these issues. Taiwan is providing fifty vehicles, while the United States is sending mechanics to repair broken-down HNP cars and trucks, along with US$1,000,000 of auto parts. With assistance from ICITAP and CivPol, the first HNP operations center opened in mid-November. At this central location, the HNP can communicate by radio with agents and officers in all of Haiti's nine departments.116

Challenges Faced by the Police

Police-Community Relations

While Haitians demand justice and more effective policing, some mistrust the police and many are deeply cynical about the judiciary. Beyond further reforms of the police and judiciary, improving police-community relations will require both public education and a new style of interaction between the Haitian people and the police. Crowds have thrown rocks at police, in some cases in response to police abuses, while in other cases unprovoked. A human rights monitor observed, "[A]s often as police abuse citizens, people attack the police in a kind of `social negotiation' that is defining the limits of power on both sides."117

Many local people said that they want to see more of the police, particularly in remote rural areas. They want the police to attend their meetings and understand the work being done by local organizations. Nonetheless, they recognize that building more collaborative relationships may be difficult as Haitians have no experience of working with a police force. The police themselves also note the need for civic education with an emphasis on the role of the police in a democratic society.

Public frustration with a weak justice system has contributed to widespread bursts of popular violence that typically go unpunished. MICIVIH documented 110 such killings from January to October 1996.118 Police have attempted to protect people suspected of crimes who face vigilante violence. On May 13, 1996, near the northwestern town of Port-de-Paix, local people killed a man accused of murder who police were holding in the local station. A crowd threw rocks at the police station, injuring an agent, and prompting police to try to move the detainee to Port-de-Paix in a local bus (as they had no vehicle). The crowd followed and the police agents shot into the air, trying to disperse them. When police ran out of bullets, the crowd attacked and decapitated the detainee.119 In an incident in Vieux Bourg d'Aquin in southern Haiti, police saved three suspects from a crowd who said that the robbers hadno right to justice. Nine police officers were wounded by the stone-throwing crowd as they evacuated the suspects from the tribunal.120

Despite police abuses and sometimes erroneous public expectations of the police, we found many positive local assessments of the HNP, particularly outside Port-au-Prince. Local community leaders were appreciative of efforts to reach out to the community in areas where "community policing" activities had taken place. A human rights monitor in the south said: "the population accepts and needs the police and understands there will be problems due to lack of experience and proper equipment."121 However, local activists also note the potential for rapid deterioration in relations: "We have no real problems with the HNP. They make proper arrests, and there are no beatings. But some are arrogant, and the people here had a terrible experience with the military and its police."122 In Anse à Galets, following the November 11, 1996 HNP shooting death of Venerable Setil Christel, an angry crowd responded by attacking and burning down the police station and the courthouse. Reportedly, relations between police, the justice of the peace, and the population deteriorated following several problematic incidents. One of these was a July 4, 1996 death in police custody that may have been a suicide. Twelve HNP agents were trapped by the angry crowd until CivPol officers arrived in the early hours of November 12 and evacuated them.123 Such deterioration in police-community relations is a likely, but not inevitable, consequence of alleged police abuses. In Grande Rivière du Nord, where we interviewed four victims of police shootings, the victims and other local residents drew a clear distinction between the two HNP agents responsible for abuses and the force as a whole, which they said was doing a good job and engaged in community outreach.

Haitian police authorities and international police monitors agree on the need to improve public understanding of public order issues and improve police-community relations. In response, they have focused increasing attention on community policing approaches. Senior Haitian government officials endorse the community policing approach. According to Denizé: "If we give them a minimum of radios, cars, and some back-up, then they will be out on the beat in the community. [Conducting community policing] is a technical issue, not a cultural or substantive question."124 Many local police stations have initiated school visits where they discuss a variety of subjects, including drug awareness and how the police can help students.125 Others also have met regularly with local activists and community leaders. In some areas, police have started sports programs with local youth. Some HNP agents also mentioned an interest in learning more about conflict mediation.126 Typically, in larger urban areas police were creating special community-policing units, while in smaller communities all the local agents were involved in community outreach. In many police stations we visited, the HNP had put up posters with the motto of the force ("serve and protect"), and signs with the slogan "listen before you act" (tande avan ou reyaji). CivPol has supported community policing efforts, and should continue to do so for the duration of its mandate in Haiti.

Local grass-roots leaders we spoke with endorsed community policing approaches. One human rights monitor noted:

The HNP and the government must promote civic awareness, they should make the police and community work together, have the police participate in the life of the community, work on community projects. This will get rid of the mentality that prevailed among the Haitian military-that "I'm the chief here."127

Initiating serious exchange between the public and police on issues of policing in a democracy requires commitment by civil society organizations as well as the police. Some human rights organizations, concerned that impunity for police abuse continues, say that the police must earn the respect and confidence of the people before the human rights community will engage directly with them on broader policing issues.128 For their part, police authorities urge that the human rights community play a role in explaining to the Haitian public what a police force can and cannot do.129 This kind of disagreement seems less prevalent in rural areas. Local human rights groups in Jacmel told us that they wanted to invite the police to their meetings and hoped that the HNP would participate in radio shows they planned to produce on human rights issues.130 Another community leader described two meetings with the HNP to discuss local concerns and problems. He described a key element of such contact as understanding questions such as "who are the police and what can they do for us?" He commented, "If people don't know what the police can do, if there is no dialogue, then it will be hard to keep order. Then people with bad intentions will cause trouble and try to manipulate the situation."131

Where community outreach has taken place, it appears to have generated good-will and put the police directly in contact with the community. This "humanizes" them in the eyes of the population they are there to protect and whose assistance and trust are essential to police work.