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VI. THE U.S. ROLE




Under the stated objective of fighting drugs, the U.S. has armed, trained, and advised Colombia's military despite its disastrous human rights record. Strengthened by years of U.S. support, the Colombian military and its paramilitary partners instead have waged a war against guerrillas and their suspected supporters in civil society, including members of legal political parties, trade unionists, community activists, and human rights monitors. Far from moving to address the mounting toll of this war, the U.S. has apparently turned a blind eye to abuses and is moving to increase deliveries of military aid, including weapons, to Colombia.

As U.S. military support for El Salvador waned in the late 1980s and early 1990s, Colombia emerged as the hemisphere's top recipient of U.S. military aid. Since 1989, the U.S. has provided $322 million in military aid to Colombia, nearly all on a grant (give-away) basis. 291

Not only did the United States play a disturbing role in supporting the military intelligence reorganization that led to serious human rights violations, U.S. aid, weapons, materiel, and training meant to fight drugs have gone to units implicated in serious human rights violations, a fact the United States is aware of but has not made public. In addition, Colombian officers linked to human rights violations have received U.S. training, including CIA-sponsored training in Panama and at the School of the Americas, and have even served at the School of the Americas and the Inter-American Defense College in Washington, D.C. as instructors.

U.S. arms sales to Colombia not only continue unimpeded, but are expected to reach a record level. Military aid provided to Colombia by the U.S. has been used to finance weapons purchases from the U.S, which totaled $73 million in FY 1992, $45 million in FY 1993, $88 million in FY 1994, and $31 million in FY 1995. The Pentagon estimates sales in FY 1996 at $84 million and in FY 1997 at $123 million - the highest level ever. 292

As U.S. presidential campaign rhetoric turned to drugs, the Clinton Administration notified Congress of its intention to sell twelve Black Hawk helicopters, twenty-four M60 machine guns, 920,000 rounds of 7.62MM (M80) ammunition, and related items to the Colombian army, worth $169 million. 293 At a hearing on the proposed sale, administration officials admitted that the Colombian army was under no obligation to use the aid only to fight drugs. When Rep. Lee Hamilton (D-Indiana) asked if helicopters could be used "100 percent for counterinsurgency" if the Colombian army wished, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics Matters Robert Gelbard answered: "Theoretically, they could." 294 Though some legislators expressed reservations, Congress did not block the sale.

Subsequently, the Clinton Administration announced it would send free of charge, using a special presidential drawdown authority, $40 million in nine river patrol boats, thirty-two helicopters, five C-26 observation aircraft, aircraft spare parts, communications gear, field equipment, and training and utility vehicles for the Colombian military, ostensibly for counternarcotics operations. 295

Moreover, these government-to-government arms grants and sales are expected to be supplemented with significant arms deliveries from the private commercial arms sale channel (direct from U.S. companies to Colombia). Commercial arms deliveries from the U.S. to Colombia have usually amounted to only $1-2 million per year for the past decade, but are officially estimated at $35 million in FY 1996 and $21 million in FY 1997. 296

Indeed, administration officials now argue that fighting drugs and fighting guerrillas are one and the same. In a 1995 interview with Human Rights Watch, then-U.S. Southern Command chief Gen. Barry McCaffrey suggested that since both the ELN and FARC participate in the drug trade, counterinsurgency and counterdrug operations are "two sides of the same coin" and both merit U.S support. 297

A U.S. Defense Department letter to Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) explains further:

In certain regions of Colombia, guerrillas and narcotics traffickers are very often located in the same area and have an increasingly symbiotic relationship. The traffickers use the guerrillas for protection, and, in exchange, the guerrillas receive financing from the traffickers. In some areas, the guerrillas are also actually involved in the cultivation of illicit crops (both opium poppy and coca), drug processing, and the transportation of both drugs and precursor and essential chemicals. Both police and military units that are engaged in counter-drug missions have encountered guerrillas as they carry out their duties. 298

Human Rights Watch does not dispute that some guerrillas may take part in the drug trade. However, their activity cannot be used to ignore - or covertly support - the Colombian military's campaign against political dissent.

In fact, U.S. officials are well aware of military complicity in human rights abuses in Colombia and the dangers inherent in sending them weapons. In 1994, Amnesty International published a report calling on the U.S. government to suspend military aid to Colombia until it could assure the U.S. Congress that no aid was going to units implicated in human rights abuses. Although the U.S. government denied that aid supplied such units, an inquiry based on a list of units supplied by Al was initiated." 299

Three weeks after Al called for the suspension of aid, Staff Judge Advocate Col. Warren D. Hall III sent a memo to his superiors evaluating the information. The memo is significant because it demonstrates that U.S. officials are not only sensitive to the danger of arming and training military units that violate human rights, but are also aware of military paramilitary ties. The memo warns that U.S aid and training can be used to commit human rights violations, with possible "legal and political" consequences:

a. The light infantry skills U.S. special operations forces teach during CD [counter drug] deployments for training can be used by the Colombian armed forces in their counter- insurgent effort as well. If the host nation (HN) forces trained by USSOUTHCOM to conduct CD operations are deployed on counter-insurgency missions during which they commit human rights violations, the possibility exists that the U.S. will be subjected to criticism.

b. A similar problem exists regarding the equipment provided to enhance HN CD capabilities. It may be used in counter-insurgency operations during which human rights violations might occur. There are various "end-use" limitations on equipment provided to HNs. The conflict in Colombia, however, involves the Colombian armed forces and police combating guerrillas and narcotraffickers, with paramilitary groups operating in support of all parties to the conflict. 300

Under these circumstances, Hall notes, it is "unrealistic to expect the military to limit use of the equipment to operations against narcotraffickers." 301

In fact, to our knowledge, no unit in the Colombian military is devoted exclusively to combating drugs. Yet units engaged almost exclusively in counterinsurgency operations have received U.S. military aid meant to fight drugs. According to a companion inquiry apparently initiated by Ambassador Myles Frechette, the U.S. Military Advisory Group reported that the First, Third, Fifth, Thirteenth, and Fourteenth Brigades, Mobile Brigades One and Two, and the Tarqui, José Hilario López, Numancia, Luciano D'Elhuyar, Ricuarte, Palacé, and La Popa Battalions - all implicated in serious human rights violations, including violations associated with paramilitaries, some described in this report - had received military aid, including vehicles, M60 and M60E3 machine guns, pistols, grenade launchers, 7.62mm and 9mm ammunition, and Claymore mines. 302

To take just one example, it was the Palacé Battalion alone that carried out both the Trujillo and Riofrío massacres, described in the Impunity section. These two massacres, which since 1990 have cost the lives of at least 120 people, remain largely unpunished.

Since 1990, the year a U.S. commission of advisors drafted recommendations for Colombia's military intelligence reorganization, U.S. weaponry provided to the Colombian army and navy has included 2,020 M9 pistols, 426 M16A2 rifles, 945 M60E3 machine guns, and 255 shotguns, as well as various military vehicles and communication equipment. 303 Between 1990-1994, the U.S. embassy reported that the security assistance program for the Colombian army totalled approximately $66 million. 304

The year 1991, when the Colombian military's intelligence reorganization plan was implemented, was a banner one for U.S. arms shipments to Colombia's army and navy: 10,000 M14 rifles, 700 M16 rifles, 623 M79 grenade launchers, 325 M60 machine guns, 26,000 60mm rifle grenades, 20,000 40mm rifle grenades, 37,000 hand grenades, 3,000 Claymore mines, and about 15 million rounds of rifle ammunition. 305

According to the 1994 U.S. Military Advisory Group report, more mobile units receive U.S. training and equipment, including the Mobile Brigade One and Fourth Division in Meta; the Third Brigade in Cali; the Fourth Brigade in Medellín; the Sixth Brigade in lbague; the Eighth Brigade in Armenia, Valle; the Ninth Brigade in Neiva; the Eleventh Brigade in Antioquia; the Sixteenth Brigade in Yopal and Arauca; and the three Special Forces un its. 306 All of these units are primarily devoted to counterinsurgency, not fighting drugs, and most have been implicated in human rights violations.

All told, at least twenty-four Colombian army units comprising a significant percentage of total troop strength, devoted primarily to counterinsurgency and with a disturbing record of human rights violations, have received U.S. weaponry.

The potential abuse of U.S. military aid and weaponry by security force units that violate human rights has long been a concern shared by Human Rights Watch and other national and international groups. In 1990, we wrote, "The behavior [of the Colombian security forces] in counterinsurgency and internal security operations should make them ineligible for aid, whatever their behavior in drug interdiction operations." 307

In response to such criticism, the U.S. Congress sought to limit military aid to units that engage "primarily" in counternarcotics operations, not counterinsurgency, acting on the belief that units fighting drugs did not abuse human rights. Through this provision, advocates hoped to build a wall between counternarcotics units and counterinsurgency units implicated in human rights violations. In 1994 and each year since, the U.S. Congress has required by law that, in order for Colombia to receive military aid, the Secretary of State must certify that the funds will be used "primarily for counternarcotics activities." 308

However, the U.S. Military Advisory Group's 1994 End-Use Monitoring Report - published after the investigations identifying units implicated in human rights violations that had received U.S. aid - certified that Colombia was in compliance with U.S. legislation limiting weapons sales and that "US assistance is being effectively employed against narcotics activities." 309

Such inspections clearly fail to ensure that aid is not being used to commit human rights violations or by the units that commit them. They also fail to clearly show that the Colombian military does not transfer weapons provided by the United States to paramilitary forces. 310

Nor have the U.S. teams that conduct these inspections made any measurable effort to inquire about (or comment on in their reports) ongoing human rights cases when visiting bases of publicly reported paramilitary activity." 311

Seeking to toughen human rights protection, in September of 1996, Sen. Leahy added additional language to legislation controlling appropriations for international narcotics control through the State Department. The so-called "Leahy Law," enacted on September 30, 1996, stipulates that narcotics-control funding "must be suspended" to specific units if the "Secretary of State has credible evidence to believe such unit has committed gross violations of human rights unless the Secretary determines and reports to the Committee on Appropriations that the government of such country is taking steps to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to justice." 312

While we welcome Senator Leahy's initiative, we believe current U.S. legislation on military assistance, including countemarcotics assistance, continues to fall far short of the minimum standard necessary to protect human rights. U.S. legislators can no longer claim that limiting military aid and training to security force units engaged "primarily" in counternarcotics activities helps diminish support to abusive forces; neither can they argue that the mere "taking of steps" to bring accused officers to justice effectively curbs abuses. Although clearly such steps are necessary, we believe the United States must adopt a higher standard. First and foremost, the United States must demand an end to human rights abuses by the Colombian military and their paramilitary partners before resuming aid. If the Clinton Administration is serious about defending and promoting human rights, it must take immediate steps to ensure that no additional assistance goes to forces engaged in a systematic pattern of abuses.

Colombian military units carry other U.S. arms, including AR-15 semi-automatic rifles. The Colombian government buys them directly from U.S. firms, which are licensed to sell them by the State Department. For example, from 1989 to 1993, the State Department issued thirty-nine licenses to U.S. firms to export small arms to Colombia, for a total value of $643,785. 313

A more detailed accounting is considered classified, on proprietary grounds, by the State Department, despite the concern that these weapons are going to parties known to abuse human rights. Nonetheless, the above figure is known to include sales of AR-15 rifles produced by Colt Manufacturing Company in West Hartford, Connecticut, which has a permanent sales representative in Colombia. 314 In Colombia AR-15 rifles are commonly used by paramilitary forces even though they are forbidden to civilians. 315

Human Rights Watch has also obtained the in-country U.S. Military Advisory Group deployment schedule for fiscal year 1996, included here as Appendix C. It shows that U.S. military personnel continue to advise and train the Colombian military, including the navy, and work in areas where the military maintains a partnership with paramilitaries. The United States deployed two teams of fifty-two U.S. Army Special Forces personnel to Colombia for two-month missions beginning in January and April. Their mission was to teach Colombian army non-commissioned and commissioned officers "junior leadership" combat skills. Out of forty-nine deployments involving a total of 231 U.S. military and intelligence advisors scheduled for 1996, thirty-two deployments involving ninety-seven advisors are in support of the navy. They include the stationing of a U.S. navy intelligence officer with the Colombian navy in Santafé de Bogotá. 316

The CIA Directorate of Operations has also sponsored combat training by U.S. Green Berets in Panama for Colombian army Special Forces units, ostensibly to fight drugs. 317

In Colombia, U.S military trainers have also conducted classes inside the Colombian army base at Cimitarra, Santander, even though the Colombian law enforcement documents cited in this report have consistently identified the town as a focal point of the military-paramilitary partnership, with paramilitary training centers near army bases. In 1995, U.S. officials, including Ambassador Myles Frechette and the U.S. Embassy human rights officer, flew to Cimitarra to observe training. 318

Although the U.S. military has in recent years announced that it has instructed its own personnel to report any suspected human rights abuse they may observe, this policy has to date produced few apparent results. Under the leadership of General McCaffrey, the U.S. Southern Command issued new theater-wide guidelines last year. One stated goal is to:

ensure that all U.S. military personnel assigned to USSOUTHCOM or deployed into the AOR [area of responsibility) understand their responsibility to immediately object to all suspected human rights abuses and report them, regardless of the identity of the victim or the perpetrator. 319

General McCaffrey also issued each officer and soldier under his command a wallet-size card entitled "Southcom Reporting Procedures: The Five Rs of Human Rights." They are: Recognize, Refrain, React, Record and Report. Similarly, the U.S. embassy in Bogotá, under the leadership of Ambassador Myles Frechette, has established a human rights coordinating committee which meets every two weeks to discuss human rights matters. 320

In addition, Human Rights Watch has information from reliable sources showing that U.S. intelligence services regularly intercept and record the radio and cellular telephone conversations of known paramilitaries who are also drug traffickers, which may include conversations about past killings, coordinations with the military, and future plans. Although in the past, the U.S. has shared information with the Colombian attorney general's office to prosecute drug traffickers, to our knowledge similar information on paramilitaries and their military patrons has never been provided to the Colombian authorities. 321

In an interview with Human Rights Watch, Col. Thomas R. Carstens, the U.S. Military Advisory Group Commander, commented: "I've never discussed paramilitaries with [the Colombians]." 322

Although some U.S. officials told Human Rights Watch about suspected abuses during the course of this investigation, they said their careers might suffer if they reported them, as instructed, up the chain of command. "They say they're concerned about human rights, but they're not," said one. "They tell you to report [abuses], but they really don't want to hear it," said another. 323

It is within this climate that U.S. Ambassador Frechette assured Human Rights Watch: "Occasionally, local commanders or officers decide to collaborate with paramilitary groups. [But] I have no information that it is institutional." 324


School of the Americas

Many of the same Colombian officers who are believed to have organized and worked with paramilitaries and are named in this report studied at the U.S. School of the Americas, which operated in Panama until its 1984 move to Fort Benning, Georgia. Several of these officers were students at the school at the time that its curriculum included training manuals recommending that soldiers use bribery, blackmail, threats, and torture against insurgents, according to documents recently released by the Pentagon. Although the Pentagon claims to have destroyed all of the materials containing such recommendations, it is not clear how many may remain in the possession of the Colombian military. 325

School of the Americas graduates include:

- Gen. Harold Bedoya Pizarro, the commander of Colombia's armed forces, studied military intelligence in 1965 and served as a guest professor in 1979. 326 Bedoya also received military intelligence training at Fort Chaffee, Arizona. 337 Bedoya continues to publicly defend paramilitaries in the Chucuri region.

- Gen. Manuel José Bonett Locarno, the army commander, took courses in 1981. 328 Bonett has repeatedly failed to investigate or allow the government's civilian investigators to fully examine reports of his troops' involvement with paramilitaries, including during his tenure as commander of the Third Brigade, responsible for the area around Trujillo, department of Valle, from 1989-1980, when the Trujillo killings were taking place. 329

- Gen. Marino Gutiérrez Isaza, commander of the Fourth Division in 1995, took a course on military intelligence in 1973 and was a guest professor in 1985. Gutiérrez's tenure at the Fourth Division coincided with the rise of "Black Serpent," a paramilitary group reportedly run by Victor Carranza.

- Gen. (ret.) Luis Eduardo Roca Maichel took courses in 1987. Roca signed Order 200-05/91 as commander of the Colombian armed forces.

- Gen. (ret.) Alvaro Hernán Velandia Hurtado took courses in 1980. In 1995, Velandia was dismissed over the 1987 disappearance of Nydia Erika Bautista and has been linked to paramilitary activity in the Middle Magdalena region.

- Gen. (ret.) Farouk Yanine Díaz took courses in 1969. As commander of the Fourteenth Brigade in 1984, Yanine was linked to MAS, but was never formally investigated. Similar charges were made against him in 1988 when he commanded the Second Division. Nevertheless, Yanine was never formally investigated. 330 In 1996, Alonso de Jesús Baquero Agudelo, alias "Vladimiro," a paramilitary leader sentenced to thirty years imprisonment for his role in the killing of twelve judicial officials near La Rochela, department of Santander, gave the attorney general's human rights unit enough information for them to issue an arrest warrant for Gen. Yanine for his role in the killings by paramilitaries of nineteen salesmen in the Middle Magdalena region in 1987. 331 After his retirement, Gen. Yanine taught at the Inter-American Defense College until his return to Colombia in October 1996, where he turned himself in to civilian authorities for questioning.

- Lt. Col. Luis Felipe Becerra Bohórquez took military intelligence courses in 1968. He later took part in the La Honduras/La Negra massacres and the Riofrío massacre.

U.S. Army Maj. Gordon Martel, a School of the Americas spokesperson, told Human Rights Watch that they "no longer offer any counter-insurgency courses." Most Colombian graduates, however, took other courses, including military intelligence. Currently, Martel said, "there are more Colombians than any other [national] group taking, our counter-drug courses," he added. 332 All of the officers named above except Becerra also served as military attache to the Colombian embassy in Washington, D.C. 333

The United States has taken some steps to address human rights violations by the military. One positive step has been the vetting by a U.S. Embassy team of individual Colombian officers who seek U.S. training. In coordination with the Colombian Defense Ministry, the team eliminates from eligibility any military officer who has been implicated by Colombian government investigators in a crime. Since U.S. training is highly valued and is essential for career advancement, Colombian military officers take such vetting seriously. 334 The vetting process may also help explain why some military officers now write letters defending their actions after evidence surfaces suggesting that units under their command may have committed abuses. 335

However, we believe that the United States should increase pressure on the Colombian military by also suspending the visas of officers with records of human rights abuses. Even now, officers implicated in serious crimes travel freely in the United States. Additionally, the United States should screen not only individuals, but also units engaged in a pattern of human rights violations, including the Luciano D'Elhuyar Battalion. 336 Such units should not receive U.S. training or supplies until the Colombian government can supply convincing evidence that not only have past abuses been fully investigated and those responsible punished, but also that there is effective oversight preventing similar abuses from occurring.



Footnotes:


291 Includes aid from FY 1989 - FY 1995. The aid has been provided on a grant basis. except for a $20 million loan in FY 1991. The aid is provided through the Foreign Military Financing, MAP Merger, and IMET programs, as well as through special presidential emergency drawdown authority under Section 506 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. U.S. Department of Defense Security Assistance Agency, Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts, As of September 30, 1995 (1996).

292 Largely due to Congressional concerns about the human rights record of the Colombian armed forces, military aid decreased in recent years, from $56 million in FY 1992, to $30 million in FY 1994, $8 million in FY 1994, and $10 million in FY 1995. A perceived lack of cooperation in anti-narcotics efforts resulted in a limitation on military aid in FY 1996 and FY 1997 to $900,000 through the International Military Education and Training program. See DSAA for FY 92-95. The FY 96 and FY 97 estimates are from U.S. Department of State, Congressional Presentation for Foreign Operations, Fiscal Year 1997, p. 455.

293 Transmittal No. 96-71, "Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer Pursuant to Section 36 (b) (1) of the Arms Export Control Act," delivered to the U.S. Congress on September 12, 1996.

294 Transcript of the hearing of the House International Relations Committee, Federal News Service, September 11, 1996.

295 This authority is given to the President under Section 506 (a) of the Foreign Assistance Act, which allows him to designate up to $75 million per fiscal year worth of articles, services, and training for international narcotics control assistance. White House, "Fact Sheet: Defense Drawdowns to Aid Foreign Anti-Drug Programs," September 24, 1996.

296 Figures provided by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, as reported in "A Review of Arms Export Licensing," Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, June 15, 1994, p. 461.

297 Human Rights Watch interview, Quarry Heights, Panama, March 30, 1995. McCaffrey later retired from the military to head the office of the special advisor to the president for counternarcotics, known as the drug czar, a post he occupied as this report went to press.

298 U.S. Defense Department letter to Senator Nunn, August 26, 1994.

299 Amnesty international-USA Press Release, October 29, 1996.

300 Department of Defense, United States Southern Command, Memorandum for Commander-in-Chief, April 8, 1994.

301 Ibid.

302 "Equipment acquired through U.S. grants," U.S. Military Advisory Group report, 1994.

303 1994 End Use Monitoring (EUM) Phase II Report for Colombia.

304 1994 End-Use Report, 1995.

305 EUM Report on Weapons and Munitions [for 1991].

306 1994 End-Use Report, 1995.

307 Americas Watch, The "Drug War" in Colombia, pp. 129-136, 133.

308 Public Law 103-306, August 23, 1994, 108 STAT. 1621.

309 1994 End-Use Report, 1995.

310 These assessments are based on "bi-monthly field inspections of Colombian installations" by Military Group officers, "usually" accompanied by "observers from the Embassy's political section." They purport to identify "the location of the U.S.-supplied equipment distributed to the field to at least the brigade level." U.S. Defense Department letter to Senator Nunn, August 26, 1994.

311 1994 End-Use Report, 1995.

312 Leahy Law, enacted September 30, 1996.

313 Figures provided by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, as reported in "A Review of Arms Export Licensing," Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, June 15, 1994. p. 37.

314 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Customer Service Representative, Colt Manufacturing Company, West Hartford, Connecticut, March 25, 1996.

315 Human Rights Watch interviews with Colombian law enforcement officers, September 1995. Source agreement prevents us from further identification.

316 List of FY '96 Deployment for USMILGP COLOMBIA.

317 Human Rights Watch interviews with three U.S. officials in Santafé de Bogotá and Washington, 1995. Source agreement prevents us from further identification.

318 Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Susan Abeyta, U.S. Embassy, September 28, 1995.

319 USSOUTHCOM Human Rights Policy, Policy Memo # 1-95, June 16 1995, Commander in Chief, Gen. Barry R. McCaffrey.

320 Human Rights Watch interview, Santafé de Bogotá, October 20, 1995.

321 The agreement to share information on drug cases is currently suspended and under review. "Colombia: Prosecutor General Meets Visiting U.S. Official," El Tiempo, FBIS, June 5, 1996.

322 Human Rights Watch interview, Santafé de Bogotá, August 24, 1995.

323 Human Rights Watch interviews with U.S. officials, Santafé de Bogotá and Quarry Heights, Panama, 1995. Source agreement prevents us from further identification.

324 Human Rights Watch interview, Santafé de Bogotá, October 20, 1995.

325 Steven Lee Myers, "Old U.S. Army Manuals for Latin Officers Urged Rights Abuses," New York Times, September 22, 1996.

326 Ejército Nacional, Hoja de Vida, Harold Bedoya Pizarro.

327 Human Rights Watch interview with General Bedoya, Santafé de Bogotá, October 20, 1995.

328 A School of Americas list of Colombian graduates is on file at the Washington Office on Latin America.

329 OMCT and others, Terrorismo de Estado, pp. 71-72.

330 lbid., pp. 371-373.

331 "¡Acusado!" Semana, September 3-10, 1996, pp. 24-28.

332 Human Rights Watch telephone interview, February 20, 1996.

333 OMCT and others, Terrorismo de Estado, pp. 59, 72, 166, 278, 373.

334 Human Rights Watch interview with Capt. Rodrigo Cañas, Medellín, July 5, 1996.

335 One such letter, quoted in this report's section on the Barrancabermeja navy intelligence network, was written by Gen. Marino Gutiérrez after a unit under his command was implicated in the disappearance of four navy death squad members captured at an army roadblock.

336 Memorandum from COMUSMILGP [U.S. Milgroup Command] through DCM [Deputy Chief-of-Mission] for Ambassador [Myles] Frechette; Subject: U.S. ARMY Training and Equipping of COLAR [Colombian army] Units accused of Human Rights violations; August 11, 1994.





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