Since late March 1993, following a series of stabbings inside Israel, a general policy of "closure" - the term referring to Israel's sealing of the West Bank and Gaza - has been in effect in the occupied territories.1 The general closure has, for the last three years, prohibited the movement of Palestinians and of goods from or into the West Bank or Gaza, as well as movement between the occupied territories, except by persons in possession of permits issued by Israel.2 In addition, Israel has repeatedly imposed "total closure," preventing even those who hold valid permits from entering or leaving the West Bank and Gaza.

In February and March 1996, four deadly suicide bombs killed fifty-eight people in Israel, in addition to the suicide bombers, and wounded 200. While Israelis struggled to overcome the fear and terror caused by these bombings, over two million Palestinians found themselves under a state of siege for nearly two weeks, when the government of Israel imposed the strictest total closure in the history of the occupation (hereinafter the "Spring 1996 closure.")3 During the Spring 1996 closure, Israel also placed military checkpoints around the cities and 465 towns and villages of the West Bank, thus blocking movement between them. Since the signing of the Oslo Accords, Israel has imposed over 300 days of closure, over and above the general closure, in the West Bank and Gaza.4 The easing of this particular closure in late March 1996 did not end the crisis, however, since the "general closure" was still in place.5 On May 16, 1996, then-Prime Minister Shimon Peres authorized the imposition of total closure on the West Bank and Gaza "whenever warnings of terrorist attacks are received."6 As this report went to press, the new Israeli government of Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu had not indicated any change in policy with respect to closure, although certain members of the government urged that the closure be eased or lifted.7 Human Rights Watch would welcome the lifting of the closure but, more important, believes that it is necessary for the government of Israel to address that the current policies would permit re-imposition of closure without taking into account its impact on the welfare of the population of the West Bank and Gaza.

The policy of closure does not only prevent the movement of Palestinians whose final destination is Israel. Due to the non-contiguity of the West Bank and Gaza, and Israel's 1967 annexation of East Jerusalem, the sealing of the occupied territories also prevents the movement of those who wish to transit Israel or East Jerusalem in order to travel between the West Bank and Gaza. It also makes it very difficult to move between the north and south of the West Bank: Although one route bypassing East Jerusalem does exist, it is not a practical alternative for most Palestinians since it requires making a lengthy and costly detour. This road is also often blocked off during closure. Thus, Israel's policies have effectively divided the occupied territories into four distinct regions - the Gaza Strip, the northern and southern parts of the West Bank, and East Jerusalem - with access from one to another controlled by Israel. Although occupied East Jerusalem is the medical, educational, religious, cultural and economic center of the Palestinian community, the Israeli closure has virtually severed access to it for Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza. In addition to restricting the movement of Palestinians between and within the occupied territories, Israel continues to control Palestinian travel abroad since it controls the external borders of the Palestinian self-rule areas, including their borders with Jordan and Egypt.8 Thus, even the logistically impractical alternative of traveling between the occupied territories via Jordan and Egypt requires Israeli permission.

Israel's actions in the West Bank and Gaza are subject to the 1907 Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its Annexed Regulations (hereinafter the "Hague Regulations") and the 1949 IV Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (hereinafter the "IV Geneva Convention"), which seek to protect civilians living under military occupation. The establishment of Palestinian self-rule in parts of the West Bank and Gaza has dramatically altered the political and administrative structure of the territories, but has not significantly changed the nature of Israel's obligations as an occupying power under international law. Despite redeployment from parts of the occupied territories and the fact that most Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza now live under total or partial self-rule, Israel retains direct control over nearly 70 percent of the territory of the West Bank and 40 percent of the Gaza Strip.9 Even in the self-rule areas, where the Palestinian Authority (PA)10 has responsibility for internal security, the Israeli military still retains the "overriding responsibility for security," as well as responsibility for external security and control of the borders of the self-rule areas with neighboring Jordan and Egypt.11 The senior Israeli government negotiator in the Israeli-PLO talks has stated that

notwithstanding the transfer of a large portion of the powers and responsibilities currently exercised by Israel to Palestinian hands, the status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip will not be changed during the interim period. These areas will continue to be subject to military government.12

Both the Hague Regulations and the IV Geneva Convention prohibit the imposition of collective penalties on the occupied population. The IV Geneva Convention also requires that the occupying power ensure the food and relief supplies of the occupied population, in addition to ensuring and maintaining medical and health services, and allowing medical personnel to carry out their duties. These specific requirements exist alongside a general duty, set forth in the Hague Regulations, to ensure the welfare of the occupied population. Even if Israel were to claim that that it is no longer an occupying power because it has handed over sufficient powers and functions to the Palestinian Authority, the fact that it retains adequate security powers to affect the welfare of the population means that, at a minimum, an occupation functionally exists for purposes of the Hague Regulations and the IV Geneva Convention.

The manner in which Israel implements restrictions on movement violates its obligations under the Hague regulations and the IV Geneva Conventions. The three-year closure in the occupied territories does not merely create inconveniences for Palestinians; it creates profound hardship and, in some cases, humanitarian crises and even deaths. The closure also adversely affects the welfare of the population by, at times, preventing the regular flow of food and other essential products into and out of the occupied territories. In addition, the permit system prevents health-care personnel from reaching their workplaces or providing emergency services. It also severely hampers patient access to both primary and specialized health care and interferes with the movement of ambulances. Since Israel has not ensured and maintained health-care facilities within the West Bank and Gaza that adequately meet the basic needs of the population, Palestinians often have no choice but to seek medical treatment in specialized hospitals in East Jerusalem, Israel and Jordan - access to which Israel regularly prevents through closure. The general closure also prevents thousands of students from attending schools and universities and interferes with both Christian and Muslim worship. Finally, it prevents access by relatives and lawyers to Palestinian prisoners who are being held inside Israel rather than in the occupied territories, and separates families divided by the borders of the West Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza.13

These blanket restrictions, which have been in place for over three years and are often applied arbitrarily, are so broad in impact that they do not appear tailored to preventing individual acts of violence. Rather, they are applied against entire portions of the population, without regard to individual responsibility. These factors indicate that these restrictions on movement are not exclusively designed to address security concerns, but are also punitive in nature, thus amounting to collective penalties that are proscribed under international law. Instead, any security measures adopted should be discriminate and proportional, and their necessity balanced against both the exigencies of the security situation and the likely impact upon the welfare of the population.

As described below, onerous restrictions on the movement of goods have further impoverished the economies of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, causing a serious decline in wages and a rise in local unemployment. At thesame time, Israel has dramatically cut back on the number of Palestinians permitted to work in Israel. Israel does not have an obligation under international law to create economic prosperity in the West Bank and Gaza or provide jobs inside Israel to Palestinians. However, when its security policies make it difficult or impossible for Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza to meet their basic needs independently, Israel bears responsibility for ensuring that these needs are met. At a minimum, Israel has the duty to mitigate the impact of its security policies, with the goal of ensuring the welfare of the population.

This duty is heightened in light of the history, throughout the occupation, of Israeli actions that kept the West Bank and Gaza economically dependent upon Israel, and made tens of thousands of Palestinians turn to Israel for employment in order to meet their families' basic needs. Yet, Israel continues to cut back on Palestinian labor, without adopting any substitute measures to provide for the occupied population's basic needs, such as providing food and relief supplies as required by the IV Geneva Convention. These factors have caused a rise in poverty in the West Bank and Gaza and increased the number of individuals and families requiring food or cash assistance. As a result, contributions to the PA by the international donor community have often had to be diverted from investment and development projects to emergency job creation or relief programs.

Although the general closure has been in place since March 1993, procedures for obtaining permits to enter or transit Israel or East Jerusalem are not transparent. Israel has still not made public any clear or consistent rules or procedures governing which Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza are eligible to receive permits. According to local organizations, many procedures are subject to conflicting interpretations by different officials, and requirements for obtaining a permit are often unpredictable. Permit applications by medical personnel or those seeking access to medical facilities are not reviewed by individuals with the requisite training to make potentially life-saving decisions. Local Israeli organizations that assist Palestinian applicants in challenging permit denials report that Israeli authorities often deny permit requests arbitrarily, or on unsubstantiated security grounds. In many cases, Israel rejects permit requests without disclosing the basis for denial. In particular, there is evidence that Israel routinely rejects applications from individuals who have a history of nonviolent opposition to the occupation or to the peace process, but have never been convicted for any act of violence. According to Physicians for Human Rights-Israel (PHR-Israel),

... the entry permit [into Israel or East Jerusalem] is not granted to anyone considered a `security threat.' This includes all men who have at one time or another been held under arrest or been imprisoned for security reasons, as well as activists in political opposition movements and their relatives. Many other Palestinians, especially the young and single, are also unofficially barred.14

This lack of transparency, as well as the absence of a meaningful opportunity for appeal of permit denials, disregards the principle underlying Article 78 of the IV Geneva Convention, requiring that restrictions on movement such as those imposed during internment or assigned residence, be applied in accordance with regular procedures and include the right of appeal. Israel provides no explanation for denial of a permit and, while it is possible to request reconsideration of a decision, the applicant is not provided with an in-person hearing or any venue for substantive review of the decision. The arbitrary or punitive (in the case of those with a history of nonviolent opposition to the Israeli occupation) nature of many decisions on individual permits is made abundantly clear by the fact that intervention before the State Attorney's office by an Israeli human rights organizations, and theaccompanying threat that a time-consuming case will be brought before the Israeli High Court, will often lead to the prompt issuance of a permit that had previously elicited no response, or been denied on unsubstantiated security grounds. While Israel's eventual issuance of permits in these cases is welcome, the limited staff and resources of Israeli organizations means that only a limited number of Palestinians are able to benefit from their help in challenging such decisions.

The impact of the closure has been particularly severe in the Gaza Strip, where educational, health-care and other infrastructure is inferior to that which exists in the West Bank. There are fewer opportunities for higher education and far greater unemployment and poverty. Yet Gazans are subject to stricter restrictions and face even greater difficulty in obtaining permits than residents of the West Bank.

Israel's policy of closure also discriminates along ethnic lines. At no point has Israel responded to settler violence against Palestinians by restricting the movement of the West Bank or Gaza settler population.15 For example, following the Hebron Massacre of February 25, 1994, in which settler Baruch Goldstein fired on worshipers at the Haram al-Ibrahimi Mosque in Hebron, killing twenty-nine Palestinians and wounding 250 others, Israel correctly did not take measures arbitrarily restricting the movement of Jewish settlers living in the West Bank. Israel did, however, impose a closure on the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza after the massacre, the victims of which had all been Palestinian, ostensibly in order to protect the settler population against the possibility of Palestinian reprisals. Yet in cases of Palestinian attacks against settlers, Israel has not sought to restrict settler movement in order to protect the Palestinian population against potential reprisals.

In light of the security situation in Israel, the closure provides important political gains, as well as psychological comfort to Israeli citizens. The Israeli government has appeared to fall back on the policy of closure in order to prove to an outraged public that it is doing something in response to terrorism, regardless of that policy's impact on the welfare of the population. The daily newspaper Yediot Ahronot, discussing the Spring 1996 closure, observed:

In the system of considerations for making decisions on the future of the closure, the political considerations push aside the security considerations....This time the closure is dictated by the public opinion polls.16

In addition, the Israeli government has used the immense pressure that the closure places on the Palestinian population as a means of securing more anti-terrorist action on the part of Yasser Arafat, president of the Palestinian Authority. In the words of Yediot Ahronot,

The assumption is that Arafat acts only when he is placed with his back against the wall. In fact, not explicitly, Israel gave Arafat an ultimatum. The means are economic strangulation, to the brink of hunger, of the residents of Gaza, and to a lesser degree, of the residents of the West Bank....17

A few weeks later, security sources were quoted as saying, "Our intention is to keep the heat at the current temperature, while keeping a finger on the pulse of Gaza and the West Bank, to try to gauge their tolerance, in orderto keep away from the breaking point."18 Both these policies - meeting a fearful public's demand for action and gaining Yasser Arafat's cooperation in the battle against terrorism - may be part of a genuine desire to address Israel's security problems. However, both policies go beyond the legitimate security steps permissible under international law, by adopting means that adversely affect the welfare of the population and seek to punish individuals who themselves pose no security threat.

This critique does not preclude Israel from taking measures to secure the safety of its citizens. Israel's security concerns are real and substantial. The four suicide bombings in February and March 1996 were particularly horrific, occurring within the span of nine days. Since April 1994, Israel had experienced eight other such attacks, which caused the deaths of at least sixty-six people. Human Rights Watch has condemned these acts in strong terms.19 The government of Israel has the right - indeed, the duty - to protect its citizens against attacks or the threat of attacks. However, the measures it takes must conform with principles of international humanitarian law.

Both Israel and the international community have the obligation to subject any security measures implemented by Israel to greater scrutiny, in order to ensure that they comply with international law. Israel's policies must reconcile security needs with the rights and welfare of the Palestinian population, and stop subjecting the entire Palestinian population of the occupied territories to collective punishment and suffering for the crimes of a few.

Human Rights Watch Urges the Government of Israel to:

With Respect to Movement and Permits:

* Refrain from imposing restrictions on Palestinian movement between and within the occupied territories, including East Jerusalem, except when required by imperative reasons of security, and when the measures imposed are tailored to preventing specific acts or threats against Israeli security;

* Ensure that any restrictions on movement are proportionate in impact and duration, regularly re-evaluated and implemented only when and to the extent necessary;

* Ensure that, if restrictions on movement are imposed, Israel adopts measures providing alternative forms of relief to the population;

* Ensure that permits are not denied arbitrarily, or punitively, in the case of Palestinians with a history of non-violent political activity;

* Establish publicized, standardized, written procedures governing the issuance of permits;

* Require that individualized reasons be provided in writing when permits are denied, as well as a meaningful opportunity for appeal;

* If permits are revoked in a blanket manner, ensure that a mechanism is in place for the prompt re-issuance of permits, as soon as security conditions permit, in order to minimize the harm to the population;

* Provide for the prompt establishment of "safe passage routes" between the West Bank and Gaza, as stipulated in the Oslo Accords.

With Respect to Medical Care, Food, Relief Assistance and Other Basic Needs:

* Ensure the food, relief and medical supplies of the occupied population, in accordance with international law;

* Ensure and maintain medical services and facilities in the occupied territories;

* Ensure that medical personnel are able to carry out their duties and patients are able to reach health-care facilities, by allowing both groups to move freely. Permits for ambulances, ambulance drivers and health-care personnel should be valid for twenty-four hours a day and health-care personnel should be permitted to use their private vehicles in order to attend to emergencies in a timely manner;

* Permit medical patients who must leave the West Bank or Gaza in order to seek required medical treatment (as well as those required to accompany them) to move freely at all times;

* Ensure that a system is in place for the prompt approval of permit requests where the need is urgent and grave, and ensure that such applications are reviewed by persons qualified to judge their urgency and gravity;

* Ensure that economic activity that is necessary in order to meet the basic needs of the population of the West Bank and Gaza is not restricted, unless Israel provides alternative forms of relief;

With Respect to Collective Punishment:

* Ensure that collective penalties are not imposed, including collective penalties that deny access to education, religious sites or family visits;

With Respect to Laborers:

* In light of Israel's obligation to ensure the welfare of the occupied population, either allow Palestinian day laborers to work inside Israel, or provide relief to the tens of thousands of workers who have lost their jobs due to over three years of closure, and to their dependents. The legacy of Israeli policies that created Palestinian dependence upon the Israeli economy and upon employment inside Israel heightens Israel's obligation to provides workers who cannot get to their jobs due to closure and have no other viable means of support, with access to some form of relief.

With Respect to Prisoners:

* Transfer to the West Bank and Gaza Strip all Palestinian prisoners arrested in these areas who are being held inside Israel, in order to allow easier access by their relatives and lawyers and comply with Article 76 of the IV Geneva Convention.

Human Rights Watch Urges the International Community to:

* In order to comply with the requirement in Article 1 of the IV Geneva Convention that the High Contracting Powers ensure respect for the Convention, ensure that any Israeli-imposed restrictions on movement between and within the occupied territories, including East Jerusalem, comply with international law and Israel's continuing obligations toward the occupied population. In light of the extensive economic assistance that the international community provides to Israel, it should urge Israel to bring an end to any measures that violate international humanitarian law and cause such severe hardship to the Palestinian population.

Summary of Legal Analysis

The Oslo Accords, which introduced self-rule to the Gaza Strip and the West Bank as an interim measure pending a long-term agreement, created an unprecedented legal and political structure.20 Pursuant to the interim agreements, however, Israel retains a military presence in the West Bank and Gaza, and maintains the "overriding responsibility for security," even in the self-rule areas. In addition, Israel continues to exercise significant control over the daily lives of the Palestinian population through the policy of closure. Thus, while the nature of the occupation may have changed, Israel remains subject to the obligations that international law imposes on an occupying power, and which have governed its actions since it first occupied the West Bank and Gaza in June 1967.21 Specifically, according to the principles of international humanitarian law embodied in the Hague Regulations and IV Geneva Convention, Israel has the duty to ensure the welfare of the occupied population and ensure access to food, relief goods and medical care. When Israel's actions have adversely affected the welfare of the population, it has not taken affirmative steps to provide for their basic needs, such as bringing in food and other essential supplies, or permitting Palestinians to work inside Israel, thus providing them with the means to obtain their basic needs independently. Finally, the IV Geneva Convention prohibits the use of collective punishment against the occupied population.

Israel's Continued Military Presence

The interim agreements have introduced a new administrative structure in the occupied territories and brought numerous changes, the most visible of which was the redeployment of Israeli troops from Gaza and Jericho beginning in May 1994, and from most of the major population centers of the West Bank in December 1995. Israel has transferred civil and internal security responsibilities to the PA in these areas, which comprise 60 percent of the territory and nearly 100 percent of the population of Gaza, and less than 3 percent of the territory and approximately 30 percent of the population of the West Bank (the "self-rule areas").22 An estimated 28 percent of the West Bank, home to 68 percent of the West Bank's population, is under "partial self-rule," meaning that civil responsibilities have been transferred to the PA, but security responsibility rests with Israel.23 The remaining 40 percent of the territory of Gaza and nearly 70 percent of the West Bank remains under full Israeli control.24

These changes notwithstanding, it is not the case that the Israeli occupation has ended. An examination of the Oslo Accords and of day-to-day life in the West Bank and Gaza indicates that Israel has transferred certain responsibilities without relinquishing overall control. According to the Hague Regulations, "Territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the hostile army. The occupation extends only to the territory where such authority has been established and can be exercised."25 While there is no question that Israel, as the hostile army, no longer exercises the same degree of control throughout the West Bank and Gaza that it did prior to redeployment, the extent of its control is still substantial.

Although Israel has reduced its military presence in the West Bank and Gaza, it has not fully withdrawn, and its military continues to claim and to exercise military authority. Joel Singer, legal advisor to the Israeli Foreign Ministry and senior legal negotiator in the Israeli-PLO talks leading to self-rule, has explicitly asserted Israel's continuing authority over the self-rule areas:

[T]he fact that the military government in the West Bank and Gaza Strip will continue to exist is very significant. It emphasizes that notwithstanding the transfer of a large portion of the powers and responsibilities currently exercised by Israel to Palestinian hands, the status of the West Bank and Gaza Strip will not be changed during the interim period. These areas will continue to be subject to military government. Similarly, this fact suggests that the Palestinian Council will not be independent or sovereign in nature, but rather will be legally subordinate to the authority of the military government. In other words, operating within Israel, the military government will continue to be the source of authority for the Palestinian Council and the powers and responsibilities exercised by it in the West Bank and Gaza.26

The Oslo Accords place no restriction on the number of Israeli troops that may be present in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, and Palestinians living in the self-rule areas are still subjected to measures of control and harassment by Israeli soldiers - a phenomenon that, according to local human rights groups, has grown more frequent since the Spring 1996 closure.27

In addition to operating joint military patrols with the PA in areas that cross the self-rule zones, Israel retains physical control and responsibility for security in numerous areas falling within the autonomous regions. These include border crossings, military installations, lateral roads leading to settlements, the areas in the Gaza Strip identified in the interim agreements as the "Yellow Areas" and the "Mawasi Area," and Jewish holy sites such as Rachel's Tomb in the West Bank.28 Throughout the West Bank and Gaza, Israel also retains control over settlements and sole criminal jurisdiction over offenses committed by Israelis.29

Even more significant, however, is the provision in Oslo II that, even following redeployment, Israel will have "the overriding responsibility for security...."30 The agreement also confers all responsibility for external security upon Israel:

Israel shall continue to carry the responsibility for defense against external threats, including the responsibility for protecting the Egyptian and Jordanian borders, and for defense against external threats from the sea and from the air, as well as the responsibility for overall security of Israelis and Settlements, for the purpose of safeguarding their internal security and public order, and will have all powers to take the steps necessary to meet this responsibility.31

The granting of "all powers to take the steps necessary" would permit Israel to re-enter the self-rule areas. Oslo II provides Israel with extensive powers in areas where it exercises security functions: specifically, the agreement permits Israel to respond to "an act or incident constituting a danger to life or property" by taking "any measures necessary to bring an end to such act or incident," including, in certain instances, the use of firearms.32 Israel appears to have interpreted its post-Oslo II powers broadly: during the Spring 1996 closure, then-Prime Minister Peres declared, "From a security perspective, we do not recognize one side or another of the green line [separating Israel and East Jerusalem from the occupied territories], and we will interfere for the security of Jews, Arabs and settlers."33

The Continuing Occupation

Even though the PA now exercises a range of powers in the self-rule areas, the IV Geneva Convention is still applicable because Israel continues to take actions, in its governmental or military capacity, both unilateral and in collaboration with the PA, that trigger humanitarian problems that the IV Geneva Convention seeks to prevent during occupation. Consequently, persons living in the self-rule areas are automatically "protected," within the meaning of the Convention.

The IV Geneva Convention makes it clear that an agreement concluded between the Occupying Power and the authorities of the occupied territories cannot automatically be construed as having ended the occupation; certainly, it does not terminate the applicability of the Convention, and cannot deprive protected persons of its benefits.34

Speaking in his personal capacity at an international human rights colloquium in Gaza City in September 1994, Dr. Hans Peter Gasser, legal advisor to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), which is charged with monitoring compliance with the IV Geneva Convention, stated

...obligations arising out of international humanitarian law become applicable only if and when they are relevant to an issue. Indeed, to argue for continuing applicability of international law to the situation created by the Oslo and Cairo [Gaza-Jericho] agreements does not automatically mean that humanitarian law covers all relations between Israel and the Palestinian Authority....Israel exercisesprerogatives which are de facto those of an occupying power. International humanitarian law, in particular the Fourth Geneva Convention, is therefore applicable to them.35

An additional indication that the occupation is not over is the fact that Israel has not taken steps, pursuant to Article 77 of the IV Geneva Convention, to hand Palestinians detained by Israel over to the PA, as an occupying power is required to do at the close of occupation. Instead, Israel has transferred all prisoners and detainees who were not released pursuant to the Oslo Accords to facilities inside Israel. (See "Impact of the Closure on Prisoners and Detainees," below.) This action, in itself, violates the IV Geneva Convention, which requires that protected persons be detained in the occupied territory.36

The degree of control that Israel continues to exercise over the daily lives of Palestinians is a further indication of the continuing occupation:

The law of occupation is also applicable to occupations in which the occupant shares power with local administering agencies. From the point of view of the law of occupation it applies regardless of the modalities of administration chosen by the occupant....[T]he test for effective control is not the military strength of the foreign army .... [W]hat matters is the extent of that power's effective control of civilian life within the occupied area.37

As described below, Israel controls the daily lives of Palestinians primarily through the permit system. This regulates who can enter and leave the occupied territories, including the self-rule areas, including travel abroad and to schools, universities, hospitals and jobs in East Jerusalem and elsewhere in the occupied territories. Israel also controls the movement of goods and businesspersons to and from the occupied territories, and thus controls trade and economic activity. According to PA official Ahmad Faris, "You look outside and there are no longer soldiers in Ramallah, but we need the Israeli agreement for everything - our life is still in Israeli hands."38

In addition to evidence of a continuing military occupation over the territories, there is an additional reason why Israel's obligations and responsibilities vis-a-vis the population of the self-rule areas have not terminated, even with expanding self-rule. This is the fact that the status of the self-rule areas, is, quite explicitly, not that of a state; accordingly, the PA does not exercise sovereign rights over the area. To relieve Israel of its obligations would leave the population of the West Bank and Gaza in a state of legal limbo, not only denying them the rights and protection that accrue to the citizens of a state, but also the protection afforded to occupied populations under international humanitarian law, despite the continuing and extensive control exerted by Israel.

The unprecedented nature of the self-rule arrangements in the West Bank and Gaza cannot be construed in a manner that deprives Palestinians of their human rights. According to Dr. Gasser,

The Oslo and Cairo Agreements seem to raise rather intricate legal questions with regard to the applicability of the Fourth Geneva Convention. However, the underlying policy consideration is clear: to make sure that there is continuing international protection for residents of the autonomous territories.39

Israel's Obligations Under International Humanitarian Law

Under international humanitarian law, an occupying power has the duty to balance its own security needs against the obligation to ensure the welfare of the occupied population. Pursuant to Article 43 of the Hague Regulations the occupier "shall take all steps in his power to re-establish and insure as far as possible, public order and safety, while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the country." Some legal commentators have interpreted this provision as imposing rather significant obligations on the occupying power with respect to commercial and economic life in the territory:

The phrase "public order and safety" is an inadequate translation of `l'ordre et la vie publics' the phrase used in the French text, which is the only authentic text of the Hague Regulations. A duty to restore "l'ordre et la vie publics" reaches far beyond the mere restoration of public order and extends to the conduct of `the whole social, commercial and economic life of the country.' The occupant is thus under a duty to prevent economic collapse as well as a breakdown of law and order.40

What is made clear by the authoritative commentary to the IV Geneva Convention, in its discussion of the occupier's specific obligations to provide for the population's basic needs such as food and medical supplies, is that the occupier has a general duty to ensure the welfare of the population:

The rule that the occupying Power is responsible for the provision of supplies for the population places that Power under a definite obligation to maintain at a reasonable level the material conditions under which the population of the occupied territory lives.41

The Israeli High Court of Justice has also recognized Israel's obligations with respect to the welfare of the Palestinian population. A 1972 opinion, for instance, stated that

alongside an occupant's right to do all that is necessary in the occupied territory for military purposes and the safety of its forces, is a duty imposed by international law to be concerned with the welfare of the population in the territory.42

This obligation is violated when restrictions on the movement of people and goods between and within the occupied territories indiscriminately bar access to hospitals, universities and jobs and, as demonstrated in this report, cripple economic activity, thus jeopardizing the livelihood and welfare of the population. The policy of closure also violates specific provisions of the IV Geneva Convention, which seek to ensure food, medical supplies and relief goods, even in times of conflict.43

Moreover, both the IV Geneva Convention and the Hague Regulations prohibit the use of collective penalties against the occupied population.44 In describing the "principle of individual responsibility," the authoritative commentary states, "responsibility is personal and it will no longer be possible to inflict penalties on persons who have themselves not committed the acts complained of."45 Israel contravenes these provisions when it imposes blanket restrictions and often arbitrary restrictions, that have already been in place for over three years and are so broad in impact that they do not appear tailored to preventing individual acts. Rather, they are applied against entire portions of population, without regard to individual responsibility or accurate balancing of the rights and welfare of the population against Israel's security needs. The combination of these factors indicates that these measures are not only related to security, but are also punitive in nature, thus amounting to collective penalties.

Finally, while movement may be restricted as required by imperative reasons of security, the authoritative commentary to the IV Geneva Convention makes clear that the occupying power should strive to keep the rights of the occupied population unimpaired:

So far as the local population is concerned, the freedom of movement of civilians of enemy nationality may certainly be restricted, or even temporarily suppressed, if circumstances so require. That right is not, therefore, included among other absolute rights laid down in the convention, but that in no way means that it is suspended in a general way. Quite the contrary: the regulations concerning occupation ... are based on the idea of the personal freedom of civilians remaining in general unimpaired.46

Israel's Duty to Balance Security and Human Rights

In seeking to protect the rights of civilians during belligerent occupation, international humanitarian law does not prevent an occupying power from taking legitimate measures to ensure the security of its own citizens. Rather, it prevents the principle of military necessity from superseding humanitarian concerns. Leading legal commentators have concluded that the laws of war require

a balancing of the customary principle of military necessity, on the one hand, against the customary principles of humanity and chivalry on the other .... the law of war insists absolutely upon the principle of humanity over that of military necessity in the administration of a belligerent occupation .... the doctrine of military necessity, while helping to clarify permissible acts of repression and deprivation, has never been internationally recognized as an unqualified license to disregard the well-being of an occupied people or as a pretext to undermine their underlying sovereign rights. Indeed it is precisely to guard against such excesses that the Fourth Geneva Convention ... was negotiated and made law. The purpose was to ensure a measure of discrimination andproportionality in the administration of belligerent occupation and, in so doing, to overcome the discredited kriegraison theory of military necessity ...."47

To ensure that the security measures it imposes are not overly-broad, but tailored to preventing specific acts, Israel must consider their scope and duration, taking into account the heightened hardship resulting from the lack of contiguity between the West Bank and Gaza. Israel must also regularly reexamine its restrictions to confirm that they are still warranted by the circumstances, and that they have only security, rather than punitive or political objectives. Finally, when the measures imposed have an adverse impact on the welfare of the population, Israel has the obligation to take steps to counter this impact and reduce the hardship to the population.

Israel has regularly restricted the free movement of Palestinians since occupying the West Bank and Gaza in 1967. During the intifada, the Palestinian uprising that began in December 1987, the use of curfews and closures to control the population of the occupied territories grew more frequent. These measures often indiscriminately prevented Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza from leaving their homes, or required them to go through a burdensome, highly bureaucratic and often arbitrary process of obtaining a permit to enter or leave closed areas.48 During the first years of the intifada,

the most populated areas of the Gaza Strip were under curfew an average of 30 percent of the year. In some of Gaza's refugee camps, that average was as high as 42 percent of the year, or 153 days. During curfews residents were forbidden to leave their homes. This meant workers lost a day's wage for each day of curfew.49

However, aside from periods when a specific curfew or closure had been imposed, residents of the occupied territories had been more or less free to cross the border into occupied East Jerusalem or Israel. There were two significant exceptions. First, individuals who were considered a "security risk," were issued green identification cards, and prevented from entering Israel or East Jerusalem.50 In addition, Israel introduced magnetic identification cards in Gaza in 1989, without which it was impossible to leave the Gaza Strip; these cards were denied to those with a record of political activism. (See "Palestinian Labor in Israel," below).

While closures and curfews were often of short duration, there were exceptions. On January 16, 1991, during the Gulf War, Israel imposed a comprehensive curfew on the West Bank and Gaza Strip, requiring individuals to obtain permits in order to enter or transit Israel or occupied East Jerusalem, even on their way to another part of the occupied territories. The curfew, which lasted up to seven weeks in certain areas, had a devastating economicimpact. In Gaza alone, the cost of the curfew to the Palestinian economy was estimated at $84 million.51 Equally significant, however, was the sudden upsurge in unemployment, in an area that had always known underemployment, as Palestinians employed in both Israel and Gaza were prevented from reporting to work. In many cases, this turned into long-term unemployment, when thousands of workers were fired by their Israeli employers during and immediately following the Gulf War, without even the severance pay to which they were legally entitled, or the ability to collect back wages.52 Thousands of Gazans who had been illegally employed until the war, by Israeli employers who wanted to avoid paying social security or the minimum wage, also lost their jobs.53

On March 30, 1993, in response to a series of stabbings of Israelis, Israel sealed off the West Bank and Gaza Strip, preventing, with few exceptions, the entry of Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza to Israel or East Jerusalem. This general closure is still in place and has been the longest in the history of the occupation. Dozens of checkpoints have been set up to monitor the general closure and to prevent all Palestinians, except those who are able to obtain permits, from entering or leaving the occupied territories.

The international community has not recognized Israel's annexation of East Jerusalem in 1967, and considers this to be occupied territory under international law.54 East Jerusalem is not only an economic and cultural center for Palestinians, but also their traditional political center and the site of Palestinian educational institutions, specialized hospitals and major Muslim and Christian holy sites, as well as foreign consulates. The highly restricted access to East Jerusalem since March 1993 has thus had a dramatic impact on Palestinian life. It has also disconnected West Bank and Gaza Palestinians from the over 150,000 Arabs living in East Jerusalem. The general closure has made it very difficult for most Palestinians to travel between the West Bank and Gaza, or even between northern and southern points within the West Bank. A resident of Bethlehem, for example, may find him or herself without access to the West Bank city of Ramallah, which is only approximately twenty-two kilometers or a half-hour drive away, but is difficult to reach if one cannot go through Jerusalem.55

Israel's policies have thus effectively divided the occupied territories into four distinct regions - the Gaza Strip, the northern and southern parts of the West Bank, and East Jerusalem- with access from one to another controlled by Israel.56 Moreover, no progress has been made on the plan for the establishment of a "safe passage"route, as stipulated in both the Gaza-Jericho and the Oslo II Agreements, which was supposed to facilitate travel between the West Bank and Gaza.57

The decision, in 1993, to seal off the territories has been exacerbated by Israel's recurrent "total closures" of the West Bank and Gaza, as a security measure. During total closure, Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza are prohibited from entering Israel and East Jerusalem, regardless of whether they hold valid permits, need to reach their jobs or universities, or require medical treatment. Although Israel maintains that exceptions are made for humanitarian reasons, this frequently does not happen (see below).

Between September 13, 1993, the signing date of the Declaration of Principles, and June 24, 1996, Israel has imposed 200 days of total closure and 100 days of partial closure on the territories.58 These closures were imposed over and above the general closure. Israel justified many such closures as "preventive." On August 10, 1995, for example, Israeli officials said that they had received information that an attack on Israel was imminent, and thus imposed an eleven-day closure on Gaza.59 During the 1995 Jewish holidays, a twelve-day closure was imposed on Gaza and the West Bank, because of a reported expectation of attacks by opponents of the peace process.60 Other closures have followed attacks against civilians or soldiers inside Israel, such as a thirteen-day closure imposed following the October 1994 suicide bombing of a Tel Aviv bus. In some cases, Israeli officials provide no reason for a closure, such as the February 12, 1996, closure of the West Bank and Gaza, when the self-rule city of Ramallah was also sealed off and declared a military zone. This unexplained closure was then extended for three days due to security concerns related to the end of the forty-day mourning period for the January 5, 1996 assassination of Yahya Ayyash in Gaza.61

The stated purpose behind the closure policy is to prevent the entry into Israel of Palestinians who pose security threats to the Israeli population. Only a limited number of Palestinian residents of the West Bank and Gaza, are able to obtain permits into Israel or occupied East Jerusalem - the only means of traveling between the occupied territories, since the logistically impractical alternative of traveling between the West Bank and Gaza via Jordan or Egypt is also subject to permission from Israel. When a total closure is imposed, permits are automatically invalid. As discussed above, the need to transit Israel in order to travel between the occupied territories, including East Jerusalem, means that many of those who are denied permits are effectively precluded from the normal pursuit of education, work, health care, religious, commercial and cultural interests.

In spite of the hardship that the permit policy entails for Palestinians, the process of granting permits is highly arbitrary and bureaucratic. Although the policy of closure and permits has existed since 1991, Israel has still not established and made public clear, consistent, written rules to govern the process. On April 24, 1991, the Israeli High Court of Justice recommended that "the Civil Administration issue comprehensive and specific directives, which will be publicized, concerning movement of physicians and sick persons during curfew" and that "said procedures will serve as standing orders for soldiers stationed at checkpoints."62 To date, the government has failed to make public any such procedures. Instead, according to local human rights organizations, many rules are oral and are inconsistently interpreted by different individuals at the Israel central coordinating office and its regional branches, the coordination and liaison administration (CLA), as well as by soldiers at checkpoints.63 According to Physicians for Human Rights-Israel, these individuals, who decide whether a permit will be issued or an emergency case will be allowed through a checkpoint, "lack clear definitions of what constitutes an `emergency humanitarian case' entitled to special consideration under the closure's entry restrictions."64

An example described by Physicians for Human Rights-Israel illustrates the problem:

there is a rule that trucks can get in [to the West Bank and Gaza] with medicines if they have an Israeli license plate. But then at the checkpoint [the soldiers] can refuse. Or they insist that not only the plates must be Israeli but the driver must be Jewish. There are no written rules - no way to prove that this entry is permitted.

An additional obstacle is the difficulty in obtaining what officials from the coordination and liaison administration consider "sufficient" medical documentation. According to Physicians for Human Rights-Israel,

Israel demands that prior to submitting a request for a permit to the PA, patients must have written confirmation of an appointment with an Israeli doctor or hospital, specifying date and time. This often constitutes a Catch-22, since in order for a doctor to refer a patient for examination or treatment in Israel, the patient must already have had a prior exam. For Gazan residents, even preliminary communication with Israeli hospitals is problematic due to serious deficiencies in telephone and postal services between Gaza and Israel.65

This is further complicated by "the CLA's [the Israeli coordination and liaison administration's] insistence on seeing the original documents and not Xeroxed copies or facsimiles.... The major advantage of electronic communications tools is to save time - an especially important factor when medical issues are concerned."66 The following case is not unusual:

A forty-five year old woman [from Gaza] and her mother, age sixty-eight, had a doctor's appointment at the Herzliya Medical Center [in Israel]. The appointment letter was sent from the Hospital Center by fax. The reply: insufficient medical document." What about it was insufficient? That was not noted. Was the insufficiency the fact that the appointment letter arrived by fax?.... At times of normal closure it is possible to find someone [who has a permit] who happens to be goingto Tel Aviv and is willing to pick up the document from the doctor's office. At times of total closure this is impossible.67

There is little sensitivity to the needs of patients, or to the cultural traditions of the Palestinian community. In a letter to Prime Minister Peres, Physicians for Human Rights-Israel wrote

Parents of young children, especially fathers [aged twenty to forty,] face numerous difficulties, and sometimes absolute refusal, when they apply for exit permits from Gaza for the purpose of accompanying their young children for examinations or treatment in hospitals in Israel or the West Bank. In certain cases the permit is granted to the mother but not the father.... Few women in Gaza speak Hebrew [so cannot get by alone in Israel.] Moreover, Muslim society does not look favorably upon women traveling in foreign places alone. Even if we do not agree with this, we cannot ignore it.68

As a result,

sick or injured patients hospitalized in Israel may not see their family for weeks and sometimes months at a time. This has adverse implications for both their physical recovery and mental adjustment. In certain instances Israel allows entry, but not in private vehicles. However, only well-to-do families can afford to hire a taxi to visit a hospitalized family member, as costs can run up to hundreds of dollars. A case in point is twelve-year old Ismael Al-Shamas who was hospitalized in an East Jerusalem medical center for seven months after sustaining bullet wounds in the back from IDF fire.69 During this time, his family visited him every week, each time paying US$50 for a taxi.70

In another case, the father of nine-year old Iman Yusuf Karaje, who had been hospitalized in Jerusalem since November 1995 and was reportedly close to death, was denied a permit to visit his child during the Spring 1996 closure. A permit was issued only following the intervention of the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI).71

Bureaucracy and a Lack of Transparency

Since the implementation of self-rule, Palestinian authorities are also involved in the permit application process. Applicants file their request with the Palestinian Authority's Civil Affairs Coordination Committee, which then submits the application to its Israeli counterpart, the Coordination and Liaison Administration. According to the Israeli rights organization Hamoked - the Center for the Defence of the Individual,

the Palestinian officials play no real role - they are like the mailman who delivers the application to the Israelis, who decide whether or not to grant the permit. In Gaza, the PA won't even accept applications which they think are likely to be refused, such as men under the age of thirty-five.72

The involvement of the PA adds another step to a process that is already quite bureaucratic. It also eliminates direct contact between the applicant and the decision maker, thus removing the possibility that a sympathetic Israeli official might expedite an urgent case on the basis of a personal plea. The addition of Palestinian bureaucrats to the process has also diffused accountability. When applicants whose requests have been rejected address themselves to Israeli authorities, Israel's position is that the application was made to the PA, and it is thus the PA that is responsible. The Association for Civil Rights in Israel (ACRI) points out,

In the past it was easier to deal with these issues because it was clear that it was the Israeli Authority that decided. But now that the Palestinians are also involved, the courts can dismiss these cases as political issues because the mechanisms for the process were agreed upon in the Oslo Agreements.73

Lack of Opportunity for Appeal

The most glaring flaw in the process is the lack of a meaningful opportunity for appeal. This indicates a disregard for the principle underlying the requirement in Article 78 of the IV Geneva Convention that restrictions on movement, such as those imposed in the case of internment or assigned residence, include the right of appeal. First, no explanation is given for denial of a permit, and responses to permit requests are rarely provided in writing. Moreover, the person responsible for the decision is not required to sign the form, making follow-up even more difficult. Although a request for reconsideration can be submitted, applicants are not provided with an in-person hearing or any venue for substantive review of the decision. Consequently, the right to appeal is not a meaningful one. Instead, according to established procedures, the Gaza or West Bank director of the PA civil affairs coordination committee must raise each permit issue with his counterpart on the Israeli side. If the case remains unresolved, it rises another level to the head of the PA civil affairs coordination committee, and his Israeli counterpart. The final level requires that the issue be raised by President Arafat to Prime Minister Peres. This set-up indicates that the process is intended as a mechanism for political negotiation, since it is controlled by political bodies rather than by the individual affected. According to Physicians for Human Rights-Israel,

The process doesn't make sense. It's a way for Israel to get out of the responsibility because they know the PA cannot complain every time there is a denial or no response to a permit request, while the individual would probably persist with the Israeli authorities, because it's his own case. The "four-stage process" for appeal involves very high level people - they are very busy and have more serious problems to worry about than the denial of a permit. Also, when relations between Israel and the Palestinians are not good, doors are shut in the face of the PA. The system is ridiculous; there should be other means for a person to appeal than to go through these high levels.74

Due to this ineffective system, the applicant's only real recourse is to the Israeli High Court of Justice. At this stage, intervention by an Israeli or other human rights organization, and the implicit threat that a case will be brought before the High Court of Justice, a time-consuming prospect for Israeli authorities, will often suddenly expedite a case to which the authorities had been unresponsive, or result in the issuance of a permit to an applicant who had previously been rejected without explanation or on unspecified security grounds. Physicians for Human Rights-Israel states,

the fact that the authorities removed their opposition to issuing permits with only the threat of court action is in itself proof that they have no acceptable excuse for keeping medical workers out; otherwise, they would surely have gone to court.75 The Israeli officials' willingness to re-evaluatethe requests of Palestinians when PHR or other human rights organizations intervene underlines the fact that security is not the sole consideration leading to the policy of total closure. Moreover, in PHR's negotiations with numerous Israeli authorities it has become apparent that different levels of compassion exist: even within the very strict rules of this closure, room for one's own judgment remains. In the worst of cases, this arbitrariness endangers lives.76

It is difficult to state precisely how long it takes to obtain a permit, since there are no public rules or consistent patterns. Hamoked estimates that it can take one to two months to obtain a permit to visit Jordan, one to two weeks to get a one-day medical permit, and three weeks to three months for divided families (see below) to obtain a permit. When permits are granted, they are only valid for a limited period of time, ranging from a single-entry to a maximum of three months. Permits are rarely issued for the use of private vehicles, and Israeli security officials have not made public any permanent procedures for the issuance of private vehicle entry permits for medical staff. In addition, although permits sometimes include overnight stays in Israel or East Jerusalem, they usually expire at 7:00PM; anyone violating this restriction can have his or her permit confiscated, and is subject to a fine and imprisonment. These restrictions are particularly harsh when medical personnel are involved; indeed, the limited hours and the inability to use private vehicles allow no flexibility for medical emergencies and sharply reduce the number of personnel available to work night shifts.

Every time a total closure is imposed, permits that have already been issued are automatically revoked. Once the closure has been lifted, permit holders are required to repeat the bureaucratic process in order to obtain a new permit by "special request," the processing of which can take several days or longer. This also applies to all employees of Palestinian hospitals and other institutions, who must reapply for permits. According to Physicians for Human Rights-Israel,

Not infrequently, Israel will deny new permits to individuals who had previously obtained one without any problems. In these cases, PHR [intervenes and] after some time, ranging from a week to several months, and following repeated action by PHR, most of the bans are removed.77

Arbitrary Permit Denials

According to Hamoked, permit requests can be denied for a variety of reasons, including "security grounds, the `captain's' personal whim, denial of entry to the [Israeli] Civil Administration office, etc."78 Physicians for Human Rights-Israel states that "writing anti-Israeli slogans on a public wall in 1989 - even if the perpetrator was twelve years old at the time - may be reason enough to be denied entry by the GSS [General Security Services] in 1994."79 Examples of arbitrary denials of permits abound. Israeli attorney Allegra Pacheco, who works at the Society of St. Yves, a Catholic legal resource and human rights organization, described the following case to Human Rights Watch:

One of our clients, a twenty-eight year old woman from a village near Bethlehem, has to go to Ramallah three times a week for kidney dialysis. The doctors have ordered that she be accompanied by someone after dialysis. Her parents are elderly and she only has one brother. On July 24, 1994, her brother applied for a permit [to transit East Jerusalem on his way from the south to the north of the West Bank] but was refused for security reasons. We inquired on his behalf and it took threemonths to get a response from the Civil Administration. The only explanation was that three years ago he had been a suspect in a robbery case, in which he was acquitted. We appealed to the State Attorney on February 7, 1995 and said that we would take the case to the High Court. So he finally got a permit, but now we have to go through this every three months, where he applies for a new permit, the permit is denied for security reasons, and we have to go back and explain the whole story and threaten to go to the High Court.80

Hamoked describes a case in which it was asked to intervene on behalf of a resident of the West Bank, who had been injured in an explosion, requiring the amputation of both of his hands.

He turned to Hamoked following the refusal of the Civil Administration to issue him with an entry permit to Jerusalem, to take driving lessons on a specially equipped vehicle unavailable in the West Bank. He had also requested an exit permit to Jordan, for the fitting of artificial hands, which was also refused by the Civil Administration. Hamoked's appeal concerning the exit permit was granted; however this person [fell] into the 16-25 years category, [who were previously] required to stay abroad for nine months before being allowed to return. Hamoked turned to the State Attorney's office on both issues: the entry permit without time specifications for the stay abroad [was also] granted.81

In another case, a twenty-six-year-old resident of the West Bank needed to travel to Jordan for a kidney transplant, after a transplant in Israel had failed. According to Hamoked,

On April 2, 1995, he came to the bridge [connecting the West bank to Jordan] with his mother and younger brother ([his] prospective kidney donor) and was returned by the police. Intensive and urgent advocacy by Hamoked produced no results, except for the `security risk' answer. Hamoked turned to the State Attorney's office on April 11, 1995, whereupon the resident was able to exit to Jordan and undergo the transplant operation.82

According to Attorney Pacheco,

Two weeks ago a man from Beit Sahour [which is under self-rule] who has a pottery factory was supposed to travel to Germany for a pottery exhibition. He had a Palestinian passport and a German visa. But the Israeli Civil Administration refused to give him a permit for Ben Gurion Airport. If they had a real security reason for denying him a permit, they would arrest him. But what's happening is that anyone who has a history of opposition to the occupation - including those who were never involved in any violent acts - are denied permits. And now the population has been divided into parts: those who support the peace process and those who oppose it. So even if someone opposes the process peacefully, or if they were active in the past but have now stopped all political activity, they still have a black spot. This means these people will be security cases for the rest of their lives.83

George Abu Zuluf, director of the Bethlehem office of the Society of St. Yves, was a student activist and had been detained five times during the intifada. He explained to Human Rights Watch that

I was always accused of being active in the PFLP [Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine], but never for any violence or military activity. I was released from administrative detention for the last time in April 1992.84 Since then, every time I apply for a permit I am denied. Our office has sent many letters to the Civil Administration, explaining that I am a human rights activist, that I need a permit to travel to our Jerusalem office meetings and other places in the West Bank for work, to interview clients and go to court. The Israelis have responded that they found that I continued in my activities and that I threatened the security of the state and the security of Jerusalem. I have the right to struggle against the occupation - I will not deny that I have. But I have never been involved in any violence and the Israelis have never brought such charges against me. This is not just my case. There are thousands of cases like this in the Palestinian community. If you're talking about a new page in Israeli-Palestinian history, then the Israelis should change their thinking. We are still being punished for the past.85

According to Ahmad Faris, director general of the PA civil affairs coordination committee in the West Bank,

Seventy to eighty percent of the applications we submit are refused under the umbrella of security, but no reasons are given. Sometimes it could be because they have a relative who is active in the opposition. Even high level ministers and officials of the PA, and members of the Palestine National Council need permits to move between the occupied territories. If a ministry employee needs to go from Ramallah to Gaza and we ask for a permit, the Israelis will ask why it is necessary for him to do this job in Gaza. They may not have a specific security concern, but they interfere in how the PA conducts its affairs. So a simple PA employee will rarely get a permit; we have to send a high level official - even a minister - to do a simple task, and even they are not allowed to stay the night. Even they are often refused permits. Even if a PA official gets a permit, we have to coordinate in advance with the soldiers at Erez checkpoint to let them know someone will be entering. Sometimes even if you have done the coordination and you have a permit, the person will still be turned back at Erez.86

Confiscation of Magnetic Identification Cards

In August 1995, Israel renewed the magnetic identification cards that all Gazans must obtain, in addition to a permit, in order to leave the Gaza Strip (see section on Palestinian Labor in Israel, below.) Immediately thereafter, an estimated 700 cards were confiscated by Israel, preventing their holders from leaving Gaza. According to the newspaper Ha'aretz,

The CLA computer monitor displayed the announcement they all were `prevented for security reasons.' Indeed? So many people - adults, fathers of at least five or six children, whose extended families, not only the nuclear families, depend on their paychecks - decided at such short notice to take the risk and join in hostile activity? And if they are `prevented for security reasons' why wasn't that information passed on to the Palestinian Authority so that the latter might take steps tofrustrate their subversive plans? Following pleas by [the director general of the PA Labor Ministry], magnetic cards were returned to eighty-five people.87

Human rights activists also allege that Israel denies work permits on security grounds to individuals who have been working in Israel for years, and do not actually pose such a threat, in order to induce them to collaborate with Israel on security issues. In exchange for providing information, these people are promised work permits. According to Ha'aretz,

Experience shows that there is another reason for confiscation [of magnetic cards]: this is how the Israeli Shin-Bet tries to recruit new informers. The magnetic card is now the only document, the issuing of which brings residents of the Gaza Strip into direct contact with Israeli officers .... "Help us and we will help you"- workers said that they heard this sentence from Shin-Bet agents at the CLA offices, when they came to find out why their magnetic cards had suddenly been taken from them.88

According to Kav La'oved, the Workers Hotline for the Protection of Workers' Rights in Israel, "We've heard about this problem so much that we know it exists. We have collected testimony from workers and written a letter to the Civil Administration about this matter. They responded that these people were security risks."89

On February 25, suicide bombings in Jerusalem and Ashkelon killed twenty-six people. The government immediately placed the West Bank and Gaza, including the self-rule areas, under strict closure, not even permitting food to move in or out. Exactly one week later, another suicide bombing in Jerusalem claimed eighteen lives. This was followed by a fourth suicide bombing in Tel Aviv on March 4, that left another fourteen people dead. These attacks shook the state of Israel, and prompted some of the most restrictive measures ever carried out during closure. The Israeli government declared the occupied territories, including the self-rule areas, a military zone. For the first time, internal movement within the West Bank was also prohibited, as cities under self-rule and the 465 towns and villages of the West Bank were separated by Israeli military checkpoints, effectively placing more than 1.3 million residents under town arrest. In addition, a naval blockade was imposed on the Gaza Strip. Even PA officials were prevented from moving between the West Bank and Gaza, or among different villages in the West Bank, forcing most ministries and official bodies to operate with serious staff shortages.90 The statement announcing the closure stated, "the IDF will treat all violators of closure in a very severe and unmerciful manner."91

Collective Punishment

The Israeli government took immediate steps in response to the deadly bombings, many of which targeted large groups within the population without regard to individual responsibility, and appeared aimed at punishing thepopulation, rather than preventing specific acts of terror. Such measures, which amount to collective punishment, violate Article 50 of the Hague Regulations and Article 33 of the IV Geneva Convention. The Israeli army placed entire villages and refugee camps under twenty-four-hour curfew. In Al-Fawar refugee camp near Hebron, for example, residents were prohibited from leaving their homes and no provisions were allowed in for at least eleven days.92 The army carried out some 1,000 arrests, often arbitrarily, in the areas under its control and subjected many of those who were arrested to torture and ill-treatment during interrogation.93 Relatives of suspects, including minors, were also placed under arrest.

In addition, the army sealed and demolished the homes of nine terrorism suspects, leaving at least seventy-five uninvolved family members homeless and causing damage to twenty-two neighboring homes.94 This directly contravenes the IV Geneva Convention, which not only prohibits collective punishment, but specifies that the destruction of property is only permitted when "rendered absolutely necessary by military operations."95 In this case, most of the homes belonged to the families of individuals who had already killed themselves in suicide bombings. According to the IDF spokesman, "The sealing and demolition of houses in the West Bank is a deterrent measure. It is legal according to the law prevailing in these areas and the principles of international law."96 At the same time, however, Israeli officials did not attempt to conceal the punitive aim of these actions. For example, the chief commander for the West Bank, Maj.-Gen. Ilan Biran, stated that

The house of each family of a suicide [bomber], or one who intends to commit suicide, will be destroyed, and the surrounding area will be severely punished. This will be the case in every village and town. We shall act mercilessly.97

The daily newspaper Davar Rishon pointed out that

...nobody proposed that the home of Baruch Goldstein [responsible for the 1994 Hebron massacre] be demolished, thereby harming his wife and children. Also, the houses of members of the Jewish underground, as well as the suspect in the murder of late Prime Minister Rabin, were not demolished; and it is good that they were not.98

Dismissing claims of collective punishment against more than one million Palestinian residents of the West Bank, Maj.-Gen. Biran declared, "If humanity among them has disappeared or vanished then we can take any step to save our people."99

A Humanitarian Crisis

The unprecedented restrictions imposed by Israel in March 1996 closure paralyzed the occupied territories. Since movement between villages and cities, as well as between the West Bank, Gaza and East Jerusalem, were prohibited, most medical, educational, commercial and other activities came to a halt. A total ban was also placed on Palestinians working in Israel and Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. A humanitarian crisis ensued, as even food, medications and other essential supplies were not allowed into the territories. Both health-care personnel and patients were denied access to health facilities. At least nine people died during the first ten days of the closure, following delays or denial of passage at checkpoints. In addition, hundreds of other patients, including those in need of treatment for cancer, renal failure and heart disease, were denied access to medical care. (See section on Obstruction of Health Care, below.) The PA Deputy Minister of Economics, Trade and Industry, Samir Huleileh, provided the following appraisal of the new closure's economic effects:

There is no Palestinian economic activity; the economy has ground to a halt. Internal trade is very limited and trade with the outside world is non-existent. Production in most Palestinian factories has stopped, all produce is being sold at very low prices. As for transportation, banking and tourism sectors, they are completely paralyzed. Economic performance has been totally frozen. The economy is performing at about 3 to 4 percent of its capabilities, and countries in general can cope with this type of situation for around a week. If conditions stay as they are, then we will be faced with an economic disaster, which neither the PA nor the donor countries will be able to deal with.100

Interference with Access to Food and Medical Supplies

Blocking the movement of essential foodstuffs and medical supplies is a violation of Article 55 of the IV Geneva Convention, which imposes on the Occupying Power the "duty of ensuring the food and medical supplies of the population," including "bring[ing] the necessary foodstuffs, medical stores and other articles if the resources of the occupied territories are inadequate." Despite this requirement, Israel closed the Karni crossing, which serves as a transfer point for Israeli and Palestinian goods for Gaza and, for nearly ten days, nothing was allowed through, including emergency food and medications. Although Israeli security measures had, in the past, regularly interfered with the movement of goods across the borders of the West Bank and Gaza, they had never before blocked food and essential supplies for such a long period of time. According to the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, access to the sea was also denied to the 4,000 Gazans employed in the fishing industry, which provides $3 million in annual revenue to Gaza's economy and provides a major source of food.101 Those who did venture out were fired upon by the Israeli navy.102

According to Deputy Minister Huleileh,

There is a serious lack of foodstuffs in Gaza due to the imposition of total closure. In the West Bank, there is a shortage of general provisions in some, but not all areas .... These regions, while maybe not heading for famine, are suffering from a serious food shortage....Israel is not dealing with us at all, nor does it have the desire to do so, as it has prevented the shipment of thousands of tons of flour from Egypt.103

In violation of its obligations under international law, it was not until nearly ten days after the imposition of the total closure that the Israeli army finally allowed eighty trucks of flour and produce to enter the Gaza Strip from Egypt - a quantity that was insufficient for the needs of the population. Gaza requires 250 tons of flour daily in order to feed its population of nearly 950,000, but only 3,113.5 tons of flour were allowed in between February 25 and March 22, 1996. According to the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, the flour was distributed through a ration system and families often ended up waiting in line overnight to obtain their share.104 Meanwhile, tons of produce intended for export to Israel, abroad or elsewhere in the occupied territories were left to rot because of restrictions on exportation.

Similarly, despite critical shortages of medications, oxygen tanks and sterile water, shipments were not permitted into Gaza until March 7 - ten days after the PA had requested permission from Israel. A permit for a truck carrying surgical thread was also delayed four days. In both cases, permits were finally obtained following intervention by Physicians for Human Rights-Israel for Human Rights and Yael Dayan, a member of the Knesset.105

Many Palestinian villages, particularly those that are contiguous to Jerusalem, are completely isolated when denied access to Jerusalem, because they have no shops, schools or businesses of their own; these were among the villages that suffered the most. The "internal" closure of the West Bank, which lasted nearly ten days, was lifted three times for twelve-hour intervals, in order to permit Palestinians to move to neighboring villages to stock up on food and other essentials, and seek medical treatment. Dr. Moustafa Barghouti, director of the Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees commented, "The lifting of the closure for twelve hours so people can get to a hospital is a temporary solution, but it's too short. People do not plan when to get sick."106 Moreover, supplies continued to dwindle as no replacement goods or produce were allowed in; cash was also a problem, since the vast majority of Palestinians were not able to get to their workplaces and, thus, did not receive salaries.

Denial of Access to Relief Supplies

By denying access to vital relief supplies during the March 1996 closure, Israel violated its obligations under Article 55 of the IV Geneva Convention, which requires that the occupying power "bring in the necessary foodstuffs, medical stores and other articles if the resources of the occupied territory are inadequate," as well as Article 59, which provides that, "if the whole or part of the population of an occupied territory is inadequately supplied, the Occupying Power shall agree to relief schemes on behalf of said population, and shall facilitate them by all means at its disposal."

The internal closure seriously affected the ability of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees (UNRWA) to carry out its mandate of providing assistance to Palestinian refugees. Refugeesmake up 30 percent of the population of the West Bank and 60 percent in the Gaza Strip.107 According to Lee O'Brien, special assistant to headquarters coordinator at UNRWA,

At our headquarters in Jerusalem, 200 of our 350 employees can't come to work. We haven't been able to do relief distribution because our international staff is so small, and they are the only ones who can move around inside the West Bank.108

The Mennonite Central Committee reported, "Foreign nationals - including international NGO [nongovernmental organization] workers - have also been hindered from moving between Palestinian population areas, at a time when the services of NGOs are desperately needed."109 The unprecedented near-total barring of foreigners from Gaza paralyzed much relief work. According to Patrick Conners of Save the Children, U.S.A.,

Our water and sanitation program has stopped, because we need to purchase water and sewage pipes. We had reached the point, in past closures, where international staff had to be the link between our offices [in the occupied territories.] This time we are completely cut off.110

In the West Bank, there was confusion as to the precise limitations on movement. On several occasions, residents discovered that checkpoints blocking off their villages had suddenly been lifted and the soldiers had departed. Because the closure had been temporarily lifted at a few points, people from villages that had no shops or were low in stocks would take immediate advantage of the removal of the checkpoint to go to surrounding villages to buy food and supplies, or to return to work. However, a few hours later they would discover that the checkpoint had been reinstated, without warning, because this had not been an "official" lifting of the checkpoint. Such incidents left dozens of individuals stranded, sometimes for days.111

Lifting of the Internal Closure

The internal closure of the West Bank was lifted on March 15, 1996. The general closure remained in effect, however, and Israel granted very few permits to Palestinians, with the exception of some 7,000 laborers working in Israel; by June 1996, this figure had risen to 22,000. Prior to the Spring 1996 closure, approximately 35,000 Palestinians had permits to work in Israel as day laborers.112 Restrictions on the flow of food and goods into Gaza continued into the month of April. According to the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights,

The easing measures which have been taken only allow the import of amounts which are below the minimum requirement of basic foodstuffs; and the amount of goods Israel allows to be exported is not sufficient to maintain the various production sectors.113

The Spring 1996 closure also caused substantial damage to the Palestinian economy. Indeed, the shortage of raw materials crippled most industrial and construction activity, causing Palestinian unemployment to skyrocket. According to Huleileh,

Previously, the figures [for losses to the Palestinian economy due to the closure] were around US$5-6 million a day, but now you have to take into account the loss of revenue from our agricultural harvest, and the loss of importers' and people in general's confidence in our ability to produce.114

On May 15, 1996, Israel decided to reimpose a total closure on the Gaza Strip and tighten the closure on the West Bank until the May 29 Israeli election.115 This primarily affected the movement of the estimated 7,000 laborers who had been issued permits since late March 1996, and whose permits were once again invalid.

Israel's policy of closure has severely interfered with, and in many cases prevented, the access of patients and medical personnel to hospitals and treatment centers both within the occupied territories and in Israel. This violates explicit protections set forth in Articles 16 and 17 of the IV Geneva Convention, requiring that the wounded, sick, infirm and expectant mothers be "the object of particular protection and respect" and that provisions be made for medical evacuation. In addition, Israel has violated it obligation, pursuant to the IV Geneva Convention, to ensure and maintain "the medical and hospital establishments and services, public health and hygiene in the occupied territories," and permit "medical personnel of all categories ... to carry out their duties."116 The effects of this policy have been all the more severe due to Israel's failure, throughout the occupation, to maintain adequate health-care services in the occupied territories. In order to comply with its obligations under international law to ensure and maintain medical facilities and services, Israel has a duty either to permit access to available facilities in Israel and East Jerusalem, or maintain adequate facilities inside the West Bank and Gaza.

Inadequate Heath Care in the West Bank and Gaza

According to Physicians for Human Rights-Israel,

The health services in the territories do not meet the needs of the population or fulfill the criteria of developed nations .... [D]uring 28 years of occupation, Israel failed to invest in the development of a comprehensive health system in the territories ....The infrastructure of health services in the territories is collapsing under the load, and no change for the better is on the horizon.117

In 1986, for example, a year for which statistics are available, the per capita expenditure for medical services in Israel was $350, while the Israeli military government spent only $30 per capita in the Occupied Territories.118 Despite chronic unemployment, even amongst physicians, hospital budgets were insufficient to hire additional physicians; as a result, the physician/population ratio for the occupied territories was 8/10,000 in contrast to 28/10,000 in Israel and 22/10,000 in Jordan.119 Serious deficiencies in equipment and training render hospital facilities inadequate:

[H]ospitals [in the West Bank and Gaza] do not even have the medical equipment or services that their counterparts in Israel would consider basic.... it is enough to note that in Shifa Hospital, the largest in Gaza, not a single electronic microscope can be found, as opposed to twenty in Sheba Medical Center alone. Because of this acute lack of equipment, hospitals in the territories perform no radiotherapy at all and only very little chemotherapy. There is almost no early diagnosis of cancer - a staggering deficiency, since early detection drastically increases the chances of recovery. No mammographs to detect breast cancer or angiographies are performed; there are no special chemicals to detect antibodies, no isotopes, cryopreservation equipment, projectors or video microscopes. The story is the same in surgery, cardiology, intensive care (including ambulatory ICUs) and rehabilitation. The health system ... also suffers from a total lack of laboratory technicians in such fields as virology, immune chemistry, genetics, toxicology and food testing; trained CT scanner and dialysis machine operators are also lacking.120

Following the Oslo Accords, it was hoped that the Palestinian Authority could begin to correct many of the infrastructural and other deficiencies in the Palestinian medical system. It is estimated that the construction of an independent medical infrastructure in the occupied territories would require approximately three hundred million dollars.121 However, the entire annual budget of the PA Ministry of Health is only twelve million dollars.122

Israel has also occasionally delayed health-related products intended for the occupied territories in its customs warehouses. According to Physicians for Human Rights-Israel:

At the end of 1994, $3.5 million worth of medical instruments and equipment sent by the World Health Organization were detained by customs for six months and only in mid-1995 did Israel release them. These delays are a violation of [Article III, para. 14 (a) of the Protocol on Economic Relations], which stipulates that, in the event of a disagreement regarding the nature of goods intended for the PA, the goods may not be delayed at customs in Israel for more than forty-eight hours."123

The Importance of East Jerusalem and Israel

With each total closure, the inadequacy of the health-care system in the occupied territories grows more acute, jeopardizing the limited health-care infrastructure and services that do exist. This is primarily due to the denial of access to East Jerusalem, which is the center of medical care in the occupied territories, and is the site of theMokassed, Augusta Victoria and St. John's Ophthalmic Hospitals, which offer virtually the only specialized medical care in the occupied territories. In addition, there are many kinds of treatment that even the specialized Palestinian hospitals have very little capacity to provide, such as cancer treatment, dialysis and specialized surgery. Patients seeking these treatments have no choice but to travel to Israel or abroad. Since the March 1993 closure, however, it has grown increasingly difficult for both patients and medical personnel from the West Bank and Gaza to travel to outside hospitals, even in East Jerusalem. According to Dr. Amin Thalji, the director of Mokassed Hospital,

There are specialties at our hospital, such as internal medicine and surgery, where all the doctors are from the West Bank. Every time there is a closure they cannot get to work. These are well-know physicians. Why not give them permanent permits? There are also specialties that only exist at Mokassed, such as neurosurgery, pathology, neonatology and cardiac catheterization. Patients from the West Bank do not have any other hospitals to go to for these services if they cannot get to Jerusalem. So the Israeli policy is depriving people of the basic right of getting medical care.124

The financial blow dealt by the repeated closures threatens the very survival of Palestinian health-care institutions. According to Dr. Thalji,

Mokassed is a charitable institution, but we've had to shift our focus to efforts to raise income. We've had to raise fees and tighten our admission and discharge policies. Before the [Spring 1996] closure, we grossed 50,000 shekels a day. Now, it is down to 5,000 shekels a day. Two-thirds of our patients come from the West Bank and two-thirds of our employees also - they can't get to Jerusalem. For the last six months, we have not been able to pay salaries on time. This month, I don't know what we'll do. We haven't even paid a portion of the salaries. Ramallah Hospital now has three children to a bed and no money to expand. Even under normal circumstances it would be very difficult for us to cope, let alone with this situation of closure. So, if the closure continues for a long time, Mokassed, which was established in 1960, before the occupation, will have to close, and so will other health institutions.125

David Johnson of the Lutheran World Foundation, which operates the Augusta Victoria Hospital in East Jerusalem, echoed many of these concerns:

Because of the closure, our patient levels have gone down substantially since 1992. This has changed the funding basis for the hospital. During this [Spring 1996] closure, our patient load has gone down about 50 percent. But it is still easier for patients to get here than doctors when there is a closure. We primarily serve the refugee community, but we have had to reduce the number of refugee and West Bank patients. But if we're not available, it is a safe assumption that our specialized services, such as high risk obstetrics and neonatal intensive care, will be lost to the refugee community.126

If rules exist governing the issuance of permits to enter East Jerusalem and Israel in emergency medical cases, they have not been made public. According to Physicians for Human Rights-Israel,

Residents of the West Bank and Gaza who require medical care in Israel and have the necessary funding must await their turn like any Israeli patient. However, in the event that a closure is imposed at the time of the scheduled appointment, the treatment will be missed and the individualsmust restart the procedure all over again -from arranging a new date to submitting another entry permit request. This is the result of Israeli policy permitting only "humanitarian cases" to be considered for entry during times of closure. But what is a humanitarian case? Who decides what the definition of a humanitarian case is? And how long is the waiting period before a case is classified as humanitarian or not? There are no definitive answers to these questions, but it is known, for example, that the humanitarian category excludes patients in need of ongoing treatment (except chemotherapy), like rehabilitation. Clearly, this policy fails to account or make exceptions for medical conditions that can potentially deteriorate as a consequence of cessation or deferral of treatment.127

Moreover, according to Physicians for Human Rights-Israel, a precedent has been established whereby "individuals with no medical training whatsoever are allowed to affect decisions on medical care in accordance with financial, security and political considerations."128

The Results of the Spring 1996 Closure

During the Spring 1996 closure, the restrictions were more far-reaching than ever before, and exceptions were rarely made even for "humanitarian" cases. The blockade of villages and towns in the West Bank halted the entry of all medical supplies into the occupied territories, and prevented medical personnel, including employees of the PA Ministry of Health, from getting to their workplaces. As a result, both primary and specialized health care suffered immensely. During the closure, Dr. Munzer Shareef, deputy minister of health for the PA, told Human Rights Watch,

Two hundred and forty-five primary health centers in the West Bank and thirty in Gaza cannot carry out curative or preventative health care. Even NGO [nongovernmental organization] and hospital staff can't move. Immunization programs have stopped because we can't bring vaccines from Israel into the West Bank. Medications and oxygen supplies are running out. Around 130 patients with cancer or renal failure patients who used to go to Israel for chemotherapy or dialysis aren't allowed in. There are shortages of nutritional materials and we can't send any supplies or medications to Gaza. During a normal closure, we have problems transferring patents to hospitals in Israel or Jordan. Now we can't transfer patients even within the West Bank. There is a three-year old boy with a fractured skull in Kalkilya who needs to be transferred to Nablus Hospital, but we can't do it. I can't trust Israel anymore on these matters. Israel says that it gives us special permission for emergency cases, but they refuse to recognize this at the checkpoints. Even the [PA] Deputy Minster of Health cannot pass through checkpoints. We have never witnessed such a situation before.129

By March 19, 1996, thirty-six PA health workers had been arrested by Israel for trying to get to their jobs, in defiance of the closure.130 According to Dr. Barghouti,

Seventy percent of our population live in rural areas where there are no health-care facilities. Eighty percent of our facilities are not functioning and one hundred communities have no facilities at all. So far we have not charged workers for not coming to work. But starting Saturday we will have to consider them on leave. 30 percent of the funding for our health-care facilities was targeted to come from local income. Now we will have to ask for emergency help or we cannot go on.131

Denial of Passage to Ambulances

A major problem is the Israeli practice of restricting the passage of ambulances, which violates the IV Geneva Convention.132 Only a limited number of ambulances receive permits to enter Israel or East Jerusalem. In the Gaza Strip there are only twenty-four ambulances; of these, Israel has provided permits to only six. Another four or five ambulances in the West Bank have permits. According to Physicians for Human Rights-Israel, at least double this number would be required to meet the population's needs.133 Of forty-three ambulance drivers, only eleven have permits to drive ambulances into or through Israel; only three have twenty-four hour permits and up to five are permitted limited stays, from 5:00AM to 7:00PM.

Even drivers and ambulances that have permits can be delayed or turned back at checkpoints. According to the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights,

Notwithstanding the serious medical conditions of the patients, and possession of the required permits, ambulances leaving the Gaza Strip are subjected to stringent security measures at the border. These security measures last around three hours and in several cases Israeli security personnel at the border have sent the ambulances back, demanding that they be changed.134

In addition, even before the Spring 1996 closure, Physicians for Human Rights-Israel reported,

Patients are often forced to disembark from the ambulance before the checkpoint, cross the border on foot, and then reboard on the other side (some 750 meters). Ambulances leaving Shifa Hospital in Gaza at 6:30AM complete the journey into Israel at 10:30AM, although the actual travel time ... is one half hour.135

Many of the deaths that occurred during the first week of the Spring 1996 closure demonstrated the danger posed by this Israeli policy. On February 25, 1996, fifty-nine year old Khadija Odwan, who was suffering from a retroperitoneal tumor, kidney disease, anemia and hypertension, was declared in a critical medical state by doctors at Shifa Hospital in Gaza. The PA immediately handed in a request to secure her transferral to an Israeli hospital, but received no response from the Israeli authorities until February 27, following the intervention of several human rights organizations. According to the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights,

At 2:00 PM on February 27, the ambulance carrying Khadija Odwan and Dr. Jamal Tarazi arrived at Erez Checkpoint. The Israeli soldiers checked the ambulance three times during a period of two hours, regardless of Dr. Tarazi's entreaties to speed the procedure. The soldiers ... ordered that the ambulance had to be changed. The second ambulance crossed at 6:30PM, following further checks,which took ninety minutes. At 7:00PM the patient arrived at Asaf Harofeh Hospital in Sarafand, Israel and died minutes after being admitted into the emergency unit.136

On March 10, a two-month old baby, Shaker Shawaneh, died on his way to the hospital in the West Bank city of Tulkarem, only fifteen kilometers away, after his ambulance was stopped for ninety minutes at one checkpoint, and another sixty minutes at the entrance to Tulkarem. At the time, the spokesperson for the Civil Administration attributed this death to "a lack of coordination."137 However, in an April 8, 1996 letter addressed to the Association of Civil Rights in Israel, the deputy director of the Israeli defense ministry stated,

I have been told that on March 22, the IDF officers and representatives from the PA investigated the incident and they have concluded that there is no immediate connection between the death of the baby and the fact that the ambulance had been detained at the army checkpoint and prevented from reaching the hospital.138

In another case, Salma Shkir, an eighty-year old woman suffered from chest pain and collapsed on March 6, 1996. Her son, Khalid Abdallah Surki, told Human Rights Watch,

We could not call an ambulance because all the phone lines in the village have been cut for several days. At 7:30 a.m I carried her, with three other men, to the checkpoint outside our village, Sheikh Sa'ad. I tried to explain the situation to the soldiers but they refused to let her through to Jerusalem, which is fifteen meters from our village! So we had to try to go to Bethlehem, which is twenty-five to thirty kilometers away. We carried her up the hill to the other side of the village where we stopped a car and asked them to take her to a West Bank hospital. At the checkpoint in the South of Beit Sahour the soldiers refused to let her enter Beit Sahour or Bethlehem. We spent two and a half hours at the checkpoint. Gradually she went into shock. Finally, they gave us permission to go to Beit Jalla Hospital [in the West Bank.] But her condition had deteriorated and when we arrived there, at 2:00PM, she had a cerebral infarction. The doctors said they couldn't do anything. She needed a coronary care unit, and the only ones are at Mokassed and Hadassah [hospitals] in Jerusalem. So we had to bring her home. At Beit Sahour, the same checkpoint we had crossed just a few hours before, they stopped us again for one hour. At 6:00PM we arrived home. She died on Sunday.139

The Failure to Issue Sufficient Emergency or Temporary Permits

During the three weeks following the Spring 1996 closure, "approximately 100 permit requests were filed [in] Gaza concerning medical treatment in Jordan and Israel; only ten received positive answers, and three of those required Physicians for Human Rights intervention."140 On March 31, 1996, Israeli authorities informed the PA that only applications for "very urgent" medical cases should be submitted for permits between April 3 and 19, due to the Passover holiday. According to the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights, "It is unclear what is meant by `urgentcases,' as all the cases which have been submitted so far for permits have been patients requiring medical treatment for cancer and heart disease."141

Efforts to secure permits for a limited number of essential medical personnel met with failure. Palestinian health ministry officials found that "their appeals to Israeli authorities requesting entry permits for patients and physicians were being answered by having telephones slammed down."142 On March 12, 1996, Lt. Colonel Shmulik Ozenboi, Assistant Coordinator of Activities in the Territories, reiterated that the entry of Palestinian physicians into Israel and East Jerusalem was prohibited. Even the transport of corpses from hospitals for burial in other West Bank villages and cities, as well as the attendance by family members at funerals in surrounding villages, was prohibited.143

On March 18, 1996, Mokassed Hospital, Physicians for Human Rights-Israel for Human Rights and the Association for Civil Rights in Israel petitioned the High Court to overrule prohibitions against the movement of medical personnel. Two days later, the court ordered that 250 physicians and nurses be temporarily permitted to report to work in East Jerusalem hospitals. In addition, the court demanded that procedures be established within forty-five days to provide a limited number of health-care personnel with permits that would remain valid during future closures. Of the list of names submitted for temporary permits, only 181 were issued permits by Israel; the remainder were rejected for "security and administrative" reasons.144 According to Physicians for Human Rights-Israel for Human Rights,

In spite of the arrangement approved by the Court - and in contradiction to the spirit of its ruling - the State of Israel has failed to exercise its ability to expand the quota of medical employees with permits, and in the month that has passed since the decision, no answer to the court order has been submitted. Clearly, no real understanding of the medical needs of these hospitals or the unbearable difficulties closure causes exists.145

Thus, the issuance of temporary permits amounted to a token measure, as the denial of permits to hundreds of medical personnel perpetuated serious staff shortages. At Mokassed Hospital, for example, only 150 of 435 employees were permitted to reach the hospital by the end of April. None of the thirty-five Gazans employed at the hospital had received permits. At St. John's Hospital in East Jerusalem, only twenty-three out of sixty-five West Bank nurses had received permits; moreover, three of the six physicians who are West Bank residents continued to be denied permits, on the grounds that part-time employees and staff engaged in training are not crucial to the functioning of the hospital."146

The Isolation of Gaza

Additional problems arise due to the increasing isolation of Gaza, which is often closed off, not only to West Bankers, but even to residents of East Jerusalem, Israelis and foreigners - regardless of whether there is an emergency.

Physicians for Human Rights-Israel for Human Rights reports,

Because there is no individual with sufficient expertise living in Gaza, a medical technician from Tulkarem [in the West Bank] is responsible for all of the medical equipment belonging to the public hospitals there. Each time his expertise is required in Gaza, before departing he must request a permit from the regional coordinating office and await an answer. This process alone may take several days. Meanwhile, potentially life-saving equipment remains out of use. Similarly, during [the January 1996 closure,] a CT scanner - one of two in the entire Gaza Strip - broke down. Israeli authorities refused an entry permit request from an East Jerusalem technician due to instructions not to consider any requests for entry into Gaza.147

When a permit was finally issued after the intervention of Physicians for Human Rights-Israel for Human Rights, Ha'aretz reported,

Once again it was proven that the best way to maneuver between unequivocal instructions from the IDF and their meticulous interpretation by the CLA [Israeli coordination and liaison administration], and civil and human logic, is through the intervention of an Israeli group. The requests of the latter are heard more clearly it seems. And once again, the question arises: what of all those people who do not manage to reach an Israeli group that will bother to open a crack in the wall surrounding the Gaza Strip?148

During the first few weeks of the Spring 1996 closure, no foreigners or Israelis were permitted into Gaza, with the exception of journalists and diplomats. For example, Israel rejected a March 17, 1996 request by Physicians for Human Rights-Israel for Human Rights, for permission to send staff members to assess the medical situation in Gaza. The group did not succeed in entering Gaza until May 1996.

Prior to redeployment from the Gaza Strip and Jericho in July 1994 and from parts of the West Bank in December 1995, Israel transferred over three thousand prisoners and detainees from the occupied territories to prisons inside Israel.149 This is a violation of Article 76 of the IV Convention, which requires that protected persons who are detained or sentenced to prison terms be held in the occupied territory. Pursuant to the Gaza-Jericho and Oslo II Agreements, over 4,000 prisoners were released following redeployment, but because additional individuals have since been detained, an estimated 3,500 Palestinians remain in custody in Israel.150 It is difficult to know how many have been charged with or convicted of violent crimes. Some were arrested after being found in Israel without a permit; others are accused not of having committed any violent acts, but of membership in an illegal organization. Still others are being held in administrative detention without charge or trial.

Israel's policy of closure has had a profound impact on prisoners. First, lawyers from the occupied territories are unable to visit their clients in Israel without going through the burdensome permit application process. During total closures, they are not able to enter Israel at all. Since March 1996, for example no Palestinian lawyers from the West Bank and Gaza were permitted to visit detainees in Israel, despite the fact that Israel arrested and detained over 1,000 Palestinians during this period. This meant that only Israeli attorneys could visit their Palestinian clients, leaving hundreds of Palestinians detainees without legal representation.

The closure also makes it difficult for family members to visit detainees. This violates Article 116 of the IV Geneva Convention, which requires that "every internee shall be allowed to receive visitors, especially near relatives, at regular intervals and as frequently as possible." Even when a total closure is not in place, and family members (usually women, since it is far more difficult for men, particularly young ones, to obtain permits) are able to obtain permits, the trip to Israel is nevertheless much more time-consuming and logistically difficult than the trip to a facility in the West Bank. The difficulty of visiting prisoners in Israel can also make it difficult to obtain prompt information about detainees' conditions or their whereabouts.

Oslo II provides that Israel will remain responsible for external security, including along the Egyptian and Jordanian borders, even though travel between these countries and the occupied territories does not require entry into Israel.151 Israel has also retained the authority to deny exit or entry to the West Bank or Gaza. Although Palestinian security forces are present at the borders, they have only limited responsibility.152

Since there are no consular services in the occupied territories (except in East Jerusalem), anyone who needs to travel abroad must first obtain a one-day permit to enter East Jerusalem or Israel, in order to apply for a visa. Since there are no airports or ports in the occupied territories, travelers planning to fly out of Tel Aviv must then apply for a second permit to enter Israel on the day of their trip, and a third permit for entry to Ben Gurion Airport in Lod. During total closures, Palestinians are denied access to Ben Gurion Airport, although they may, with Israeli permission, travel to Jordan or Egypt via the crossing points in the self-rule areas.

A visitor coming to the self-rule areas from Egypt or Jordan must either obtain an Israeli visa, or in the event that his or her country of citizenship does not have diplomatic relations with Israel, must obtain a special visitor's permit through a resident of the West Bank and Gaza. This permit is cleared by Israel but issued by the PA. Just as it regularly denies, without providing a basis, permit applications from Palestinians seeking to move between the occupied territories, Israel often denies permits to applicants who wish to visit their relatives residing in the West Bank or Gaza.153 Hamoked intervened in the case of a resident of Qatar who wished to visit his family in Gaza:

His mother, aged seventy-nine, is a resident of Gaza, as well as his brother and sister, together with their families. The mother has three times requested an exit permit, allowing her son to visit. All of her requests were refused.154

Following Hamoked's intervention before the State Attorney's office, the permit was issued. In another case, Hamoked turned to the State Attorney's office when an eighty-year old Jerusalem resident in a poor state of healthasked for a permit enabling her physician son to visit her from Dubai. The permit was refused on security grounds, with no reasons given. When Hamoked protested to the State Attorney's office, the son was issued a permit, after paying a deposit that was to be refunded upon his departure.155

Arbitrary conditions are often attached to permits. For example, until February 1996, men under the age of twenty-five could not receive permits to travel to Jordan unless they stayed out of the occupied territories for at least nine months.156 This meant, for example, that students who were attending university in Jordan could not return home for weekends or holidays, even though they simply had to cross a bridge to do so. Although Israel has reportedly canceled this requirement, human rights organizations have not yet been able to obtain written confirmation of this change.

Education

The policy of closure has also disrupted all levels of education in the West Bank and Gaza. It prolongs the time and expense required for completion of a degree - at a high cost both to individuals and to Palestinian society as a whole. During the intifada, the education of an entire generation of young Palestinians was routinely disrupted due to regular school and university closures by the Israeli military.157 Even after the signing of the Oslo Accords, Israel has continued to block the pursuit of education through regular closures and the arbitrary system for granting of permits. In May 1995, for example, Israel passed regulations prohibiting the issuance of permits for study in Jerusalem to any students who had not previously been registered in an educational institute, thus preventing any new students from enrolling for studies in Jerusalem.158 Closures can often prevent the access of students and staff to universities. For example, a "preventive" closure imposed by Israel on February 12, 1996, on the city of Ramallah, which is under Palestinian self-rule, blocked the access of some 3,000 of Birzeit University's 5,000 students, faculty and staff to the campus.159

Gaza Students at West Bank Universities

The students who are hit hardest by these restrictions are Gaza students who choose to pursue their studies at West Bank universities, where they can pursue specialities that are unavailable in Gaza, such as electrical and chemical engineering, sociology and political science. In 1995, an estimated 1,300 Gaza students were able to enroll in West Bank universities; others wished to enroll but were not granted permits.160

The situation at Birzeit University in the West Bank illustrates the hardship imposed on Gaza students due to restrictions on movement. In a report issued in 1995, the university estimated:

The average Gaza student spends approximately fifteen hours waiting in line at various Israeli civil