Publications

DOCUMENT 1

PAGE 1

[Cover letter:]

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

Confidential and Personal

Subdirectorate of Military Intelligence, Northern Sector

Ref.: /Sh.3/Q.4/1603

Date: 21 October 1985

To: General Directorate of Military Intelligence (Third Section)

Re: Study

In reference to your confidential and personal letter ref. 18887 of 28 August 1985: Enclosed is a study about the practical way of establishing groups of fighters from the Yazidi sect, as you requested.

    Please be informed.

Enclosures: Study

[In handwriting:] Salman, 20/10

[Signature]

Lt.-Colonel

Deputy Director of Military Intelligence, Northern Sector

[In handwriting:] Nuri, 20/10

__________________________________________________

[Main document:]

[EXCERPT:]

C. Special Detachments

The Special Detachments are deemed to be the best format for the recruitment of the fighters from the Yazidi sect, but the number of each detachment should not exceed 50 fighters. There are many reasons why this is the preferred [method]:

First: The ease with which the Special Detachments can be controlled because of their small size and unity of command.

DOCUMENT 1

PAGE 2

Second: The success of the Special Detachments that were formed in the Sinjar sector and their outstanding [performance in] pursuing and attacking the saboteurs in that sector.

Third: Information gathering in the entire sector, especially about the sect itself. [Free translation].

Fourth: The conditions of accepting the fighters in the Special Detachments, which enabled us to select the good elements who are capable of fighting. In other words, quality over quantity.

Fifth: The crumbling of the centers of power and authority among the leaders of the Yazidi sect, as the loyalty of their sons [i.e., members] has a sectarian and ethnic base.

Sixth: The enrichment of an Arab nationalist sentiment among the sons of that sect.

____________________________________________________________

[The above is an excerpt from a longer report prepared for and circulated by Iraq's military intelligence agency. It concerns the Yazidis, a Kurdish group that, unlike the majority of the Kurds, does not adhere to Islam but constitutes a syncretist sect that worships the Peacock Angel. The Ba`ath regime has arbitrarily designated the Yazidis as Arabs, and for that reason has undertaken efforts to split them from their Muslim Kurdish brethren. One of the tactics is discussed in this document: to set up Special Detachments for them, separate from the National Defense Battalions whose members are all Muslim Kurds. The purpose of these detachments is to battle the Kurdish guerrillas, and in addition, according to paragraph 6, membership is supposed to stir sentiments of Arab nationalism among the Yazidis. The document, in other words, expresses the complete denial on the part of the regime of the Kurdish ethnicity of the Yazidi sect.

    During Anfal, Yazidis were singled out for special punishment on the accusation that they, by preferring to continue to live in the "prohibited areas," had chosen to be Kurds and not Arabs. Unbeknownst to them, they had been excluded from the "general amnesty" of September 6, 1988, which the regime had referred to as an amnesty "for all the Kurds." (See Genocide in Iraq, pp. 312-17). MEW].

(MEW ref.: 2061/9-B).

DOCUMENT 2

PAGE 1

-Confidential and Urgent Message-

Date and Time of Issuance:

-------------------------

31/8/1988

To: Security Directorates of the Branches

From: Security of Erbil

Ref.: SH.S.5//13069//

We were informed as follows:

1. There are elements from the Shabak [tribe] who joined the National Defense Battalions and who changed their ethnicity from Arab to Kurd and are residents of Nineveh Governorate.

2. The Struggling Comrade Ali Hassan Al-Majid, head of the Northern Bureau, has ordered the destructio of all their houses and their deportation to the housing complexes in our governorate. They will absolutely not be compensated.

For your information. Take whatever measures are necessary, and keep us informed.

[Signature]

Colonel of Security

Director of Security of Erbil Governorate

[In handwriting:] This should be circulated

      [Signature]

      1/9

[In handwriting:] 2445

      --------

1/9/1988

[In handwriting:] 31/b

____________________________________________________________

[While the Iraqi government encouraged Kurdish tribes to change their stated ethnicity to Arab, the reverse was firmly punished, especially after 1988. The Shabak had always considered themselves to be Kurdish prior to the October 1987 national census, when some altered their self-designation to Arab under official pressure. The regime accused the Shabak tribe of choosing to be Kurdish so that they would be able to join the pro-government Kurdish militia and thus not be sent to the front in the war with Iran. Now that the war had ended, in August 1988, the regime had its hands free to take revenge. MEW]

(MEW REF.: 45/5-B).

DOCUMENT 3

PAGE 1

Part 1

One Arab Nation With an Immortal Message

[In handwriting:] 19/6/87

The Socialist Arab Ba`ath Party

Dohuk Branch Command

Sersank Section Command

Sersank Division Command

Ref.: 1/950

Date: 16/6/87

To: All the Party Organizations

Re: The Arab Citizens

Comradely Greetings:

[Concerning] the letter of the Sersank Section Command, ref. 1/1679 of 14/6/1987, letter of the Dohuk Branch Command, ref. 1/4776 of 9/6/1987, in reference to the letter of al-Ta'mim Governorate / the Office of Citizen Affairs / Personal and Confidential / ref. 1347 of 24/5/1987, based on the letter of al-Ta'mim Branch Command, personal and confidential, ref. 55/6312 of 3/6/1987, and according to the directives of the Comrade, member of the Regional Command of the Party, the director of the Northern Bureau Command, of 11 April 1987:

It has been decided to include the Arab citizens residing in the governorates in the transfer of their registration records to al-Ta'mim Governorate, and to include them in the agreed benefits (land, the agreed money grants).

Please be informed. With our regards.

Keep Up the Struggle.

[Signature]

The Comrade

Mut`eb Assaf al-Sa`doun

Secretary of Sersank Division Command

[In handwriting:] [Signature]

      --------------

      22/6

DOCUMENT 3

PAGE 2

Part 2

Decree

In accordance with the provisions of Article 42, Paragraph (a), of the Constitution, the Revolutionary Command Council has decided the following:

First: An Iraqi [citizen] who is not from the governorates in the Autonomous Region has the right to own residential land in the Autonomous Region according to the laws in force regarding the distribution of [public] land to citizens, in addition to what he owns in his place of birth. He is eligible to receive a loan from the Real Estate Bank on an exceptional basis.

Second: An Iraqi [citizen] residing in the Autonomous Region has the right to own residential land in the city of Baghdad and in the other governorates, except Nineveh, al-Ta'mim and Diyala, in addition to what he owns in his place of birth. He is eligible to receive a loan from the Real Estate Bank on an exceptional basis.

Third: This Decree shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall supersede any text that conflicts with its provisions.

Signature

Saddam Hussein

Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council

__________________________________________________

[Underneath: Accompanying cover letter from the Director of the Security Directorate in Suleimaniyeh Governorate to all the branches, referring to the decree, which is Revolutionary Command Council Decree #529 of August 24, 1989].

____________________________________________________________

[These two documents highlight the Iraqi regime's policy of inducing Arabs to move to the Kurdish areas (in the Autonomous Region), while placing restrictions on where Kurds (here referred to as Iraqis "residing in the Autonomous Region") are permitted to own land. The mechanism by which this was done was the distribution of public land and attendant benefits, and the key area barred to Kurds consisted of the three governorates that border on the Autonomous Region: Nineveh (capital: Mosul), al-Ta`mim (capital: Kirkuk) and Diyala (capital: Khanaqin). These three governorates were especially marked for Arabization, a policy that is continuing to this day in those traditionally Kurdish districts under government control. The first document is important for its explicit reference to the ethnic criterion that is being employed by the regime. MEW]

(MEW ref.: 191/10-C and 2045/3-A).

DOCUMENT 4

PAGE 1

[Main document:]

(Copy of a letter of the Northern Bureau Command, ref. 1/2713 of 10/4/1987)

In accordance with the authority granted to the Struggling Comrade Ali Hassan al-Majid, member of the Regional Command and Secretary of the Northern Bureau Command:

His Excellency has ordered that [legal] cases of people from the villages prohibited for security reasons or cases of the saboteurs, regardless of their nature not be heard, and to freeze the cases that have already been heard.

Please be informed and take the necessary measures. With regards. Keep Up the Faith and Struggle.

The Comrade

Radhi Hassan Salman

Deputy Secretary of the Northern Bureau Command

__________________________________________________

[Underneath: Accompanying cover letter from the Deputy Director of the Security Directorate of Suleimaniyeh Governorate to all the branches]

____________________________________________________________

[Soon after Ali Hassan al-Majid was appointed secretary general of the Ba`ath Party's Northern Bureau in Kirkuk and given special powers by President Saddam Hussein (see Document 13 below), orders started streaming down the ranks. They enabled a broad range of measures aimed at defeating the Kurdish insurgency, and in the end sought to crush the rebels by destroying the entire Kurdish countryside. The above order is an example of the type of measures that were imposed against the Kurds living in the "prohibited areas": in addition to an economic blockade (see Document 5 below), they also faced an administrative boycott, including a complete halt to accepting judicial cases from claimants in the "prohibited areas" before the courts. At the same time, Middle East Watch has found orders issued by the Revolutionary Command Council stating that citizens of other Arab countries were permitted to bring legal cases to Iraqi courts. MEW]

(MEW ref.: 5/12-A).

DOCUMENT 5

PAGE 1

[Above: Cover letter from the Deputy Director of the Subdirectorate of Military Intelligence, Eastern Sector, to all the branches, referring to a letter from the Central Security Coordination Committee of al-Ta'mim Governorate of August 2, 1986]

__________________________________________________

[Main document:]

In accordance with the letter of the Presidential Cabinet, ref. 28189 of 2/8/1986, it has been decided to continue and intensify the blockade on the villages and the areas that are prohibited for security reasons. In accordance with the central directives issued for that purpose, it is completely prohibited for food and other supplies to reach there. Please take the necessary measures and keep us informed. With regards.

cc. The Commands of the First and Fifth Corps

    All the Branch Commands [Ba'ath Party]

The Security Directorate of the Autonomous Region

    The Subdirectorates of Military Intelligence, Northern and Eastern Sectors

Please be informed for the same purpose. With regards.

____________________________________________________________

[This document expresses in no uncertain terms the precise nature of the "blockade" on the "prohibited areas" in 1987, one year before the Anfal campaign: no foodstuffs or other goods were allowed to reach the people living there. The measure was enforced through army checkpoints on the roads leading out of the towns, where food and other commodities were confiscated from persons who carried identity cards indicating they were from a village in the "prohibited areas." The population was thus dependent for its food and kerosene supply on night smuggling, with all the attendant risks to life and limb. (See chapter 2 of Genocide in Iraq). MEW]

(MEW ref.: 2128/7-C).

DOCUMENT 6

PAGE 1

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

Confidential and Personal

Headquarters of the Security Committee in Shaqlawa

Ref.: /Security/55

Date: 5/4/1987

To: The Security Committee of Erbil Governorate

Re: Minutes of Meeting

Enclosed are the minutes of the meeting of the Security Committee of Shaqlawa district, held at 19:00 on Wednesday 1/4. Please be informed.

[Signature]

Colonel

The head of the Security Committee in Shaqlawa

cc. Command of Division 45 / For your information. Enclosures:

    Minutes of the meeting

District Administrator of Shaqlawa }

Party Division of Shaqlawa }

Police Directorate of Shaqlawa }

The Security Directorate of Shaqlawa / For your information.

    Enclosures: Minutes of the meeting

Confidential and Personal

[In handwriting:] 1440

      -------

      9/4

__________________________________________________

Minutes of the Meeting of the Security Committee at 19:00

on Wednesday 1/4/1987

1. The Security Committee of Shaqlawa district held a meeting at 19:00 on Wednesday according to the directives of the Governor to the chairmen of the Security Committees and the Administrators of the districts and subdistricts in his meeting with them at 11:00 on Wednesday in the Governorate's Cabinet. The Security Committee studied the following subjects:

DOCUMENT 6

PAGE 2

a. The Villages Prohibited For Security Reasons

First: The villages which are prohibited for security reasons are those villages that are located outside the protective cover of the armed forces.

Second: Those villages became havens for the saboteurs and reconnaissance centers for sabotage activity inside the towns, as well as resting areas for their bands and a source of food, drink and clothing for them.

Third: For the above reasons, the Security Committee suggests that agreement be reached on the total elimination of all the villages that are prohibited for security reasons.

b. Villages Not Prohibited For Security Reasons

There are many villages that are not prohibited for security reasons, especially those that are close to the towns. The saboteurs use these as a source of supplies and a path to go back and forth. Some of their inhabitants provide assistance to the bands of saboteurs. The Security Committee therefore suggests the following:

First: To warn the inhabitants of the villages that are not prohibited for security reasons to prevent all types of assistance to the saboteurs for whatever reason.

Second: The villages that are not prohibited for security reasons are [to be] treated the same as the villages that are prohibited for security reasons if they do not implement the first [paragraph] above.

2. [Concerning] the letter of the Security Committee of Erbil Governorate, confidential and personal, ref. 870 of 15/3, and the letter of the Security Committee of Erbil Governorate, confidential and personal, ref. 1040 of 28/3, the Security Committee suggests the elimination of the poultry farms mentioned in the above letters, for the following reasons:

a. They have become havens for the saboteurs and reconnaissance centers because these farms are close to the town of Shaqlawa, and [thus] became places for their [i.e., the saboteurs'] nighttime rest.

b. The owners of these farms provide food and fuel to the saboteurs, and they are forced to do so in order to protect their property because the army bases are far away.

d. [sic]. The saboteurs used these farms to meet with [members of]

the internal organization [i.e., the guerrillas' underground network].

c. [sic]. They have become stations for the loading of smuggled supplies during the night.

3. A plan has been prepared to eradicate the phenomenon of smuggling in the district.

DOCUMENT 6

PAGE 3

4. A plan of action has been discussed in the event any incident takes place in the sector of [our] jurisdiction. The following has been decided:

a. Communication will be established at once between the chairman of the Security Committee and the members of the Committee.

b. A decision will be made to act at once to deal with the incident.

5. The Security Committee discussed the matter of the necessity to ensure the complete protection of tourism during the year. It also discussed the holes in the protective cover during the past year. The Committee then discussed the force that is available and that which is required. It reached the conclusion that it is absolutely necessary to charge a section of the Popular Army with the creation of an internal security parameter for the town and the protection of tourist and government facilities in the center of the district [i.e., the town of Shaqlawa].

[5 signatures]

Major Lt.-Col. Mr. Mr. Colonel

Director of Director of Secretary District Chairman of

Security, Police, of Shaql. Administrator Security

Shaqlawa Shaqlawa Division Shaqlawa C'tee in

          Shaqlawa

          district

____________________________________________________________

[The meeting held in Shaqlawa in essence constituted a rehashing of instructions received from the Governor of Erbil, who in turn, according to the regular chain-of-command, would have received his orders from the Northern Bureau. The first item of discussion offers the key to an understanding of how a counter-insurgency campaign was allowed to become a campaign of genocide: In order to fight the rebels, most of rural Kurdistan was declared "prohibited," and the villages in these areas were marked for destruction regardless of the question whether the inhabitants actively participated in the insurgency or in any other way offered support to the rebels. In the 1987 campaign of village destruction, all villages that the military forces were able to reach were destroyed. Significantly, they included a large number of villages that were not located in areas that had been designated as "prohibited." The next stage was Anfal, in which the remaining villages were destroyed and their inhabitants were detained and killed, again regardless of whether they themselves belonged to the rebels or not. MEW]

(MEW ref.: 70/10-J).

DOCUMENT 7

PAGE 1

Ref.: 3324

Date: 14/5/1987

From: Halabja Security Directorate/Sh.3

To: Suleimaniyeh Security Directorate/Sh.3

    We were informed by the Subdirectorate of Security in Halabja, in its message ref. 2858 of 14/5/1987, that they were informed by the Command of the Fifth National Battalion, in its message ref. 945 of 13/5/1987, of the following:

    The Commander of the First Army Corps issued an order as requested by Comrade Ali Hassan al-Majid to execute the wounded civilians after the Party Organization, the Security and Police Departments and the Intelligence Center have confirmed their hostility toward the authorities; to use earth movers and bulldozers to excise the Kani Ashqan neighborhood; to let the Security, Police and Army take care of any gatherings; to impose a curfew from now until further notice; and to destroy with tanks and bulldozers any house from which fire is opened.

For your information. With regards.

[Signature]

Director of Security, Halabja

____________________________________________________________

[This document refers to reprisals to be taken against the residents of the Kani Ashqan quarter in Halabja following an anti-government demonstration there, one year before the chemical attack that killed thousands. The situation in Halabja, as well as other Kurdish towns, was tense in May 1987 in the wake of the chemical attack on the villages of Balisan and Sheikh Wassan on April 16 - the first major Iraqi chemical attack against the Kurdish civilian population. The orders to execute wounded civilians and raze to the ground an entire neighborhood (reportedly, some 1,500 homes) are particularly egregious. MEW]

(MEW ref.: SP-1).

DOCUMENT 8

PAGE 1

Confidential and Personal

[In handwriting:] 23/6

      77

From: Rania

To: The Northern [Sector Subdirectorate of Military Intelligence]

Ref.: Sh.3/Q.2/1416/

[Concerning] our letter, confidential and personal, ref. 1405 of 20/6:

The deportation of Qala Dizeh district has been completed today. The [construction] equipment of Division 24 has commenced the destruction of the houses. There have been no incidents.

Please be informed.

[Signature]

First Lieutenant

Director of the Military Intelligence Center in Rania

23 June 1989

[In handwriting:] [Signature]

      Hashem/Yunis

      2040

____________________________________________________________

[This short handwritten note speaks volumes of the continuing policy of destruction one year after the Anfal campaign. Qala Dizeh, with an estimated population of 70,000 in 1989, was destroyed probably because it was the only large town that still remained in the vicinity of the border with Iran. The four surrounding housing complexes (Sengaser, Tuwasuran, Pemalek and Jarawa), whose population had been forcefully removed from the rural areas in earlier campaigns of village destruction, were destroyed at the same time, and their residents, along with those of Qala Dizeh, were moved to complexes near Suleimaniyeh and Erbil. In 1990, the town of Sidakan in Erbil Governorate was also razed to the ground. If the war over Kuwait had not taken place, it is a matter of conjecture to the Kurds which town would have been slated for destruction next. MEW]

(MEW ref.: 3001/9-E).

DOCUMENT 9

PAGE 1

[Cover letter:]

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

[Emblem of Iraqi Military Intelligence]

[In frame:] Please refer to the full number

The Martyrs Remain More Generous Than All of Us

Presidency of the Republic

Secretary

The General Directorate of Military Intelligence

Subdirectorate of Military Intelligence, Eastern Sector

Intelligence Center of Kalar

Confidential and Personal

Ref.: Q.3/Qadissiyat Saddam/404

Date: 26/6/1988

[Stamp, partly illegible:] ref.: 12935

      date: 27/6/1988

To: Subdirectorate of Military Intelligence, Eastern Sector (Sh.3)

Re: Quarterly Report About the Saboteurs

Enclosed is the quarterly report about the saboteurs' movements within our sector during the first half of 1988.

Please be informed.

Enclosures: 1 quarterly report

[Signature]

Captain

Director of the Intelligence Center of Kalar

[In handwriting:] To be shown, and ask the other centers

      27/6

(1 of 1)

Confidential and Personal

DOCUMENT 9

PAGE 2

__________________________________________________

[Excerpt of quarterly report. Only the marked area on page 6 of the report has been translated here:]

Top Secret

b. During the month of March 1988, our aircraft bombed the headquarters of the sabotage bands in the villages of Saywan (4596) and Balakajar (4294) in a chemical strike. This resulted in the death of 50 saboteurs and the wounding of 20 other saboteurs.

c. At 19:15 on 19/6, an unknown person threw a handgrenade at the house of the citizen Saleh Muhammad Aziz in Kalar district, Bengird neighborhood. There were no casualties or damage to the house.

[Etc.]

[Signature]

Captain

Kifah Ali Hassan

Director of the Intelligence Center of Kalar

(6)

Top Secret

____________________________________________________________

[This document contains the first, but by no means only, direct reference in the Iraqi state files to a chemical attack carried out by Iraqi forces. The attack in question took place, according to eyewitnesses interviewed by Middle East Watch in the summer of 1992, in the Qaradagh area on March 22, 1988, at the beginning of the second Anfal operation. The casualties, which local inhabitants put at between seventy-eight and eighty-seven, were almost all civilians, as the rebels had their bases outside the two villages mentioned here. (Please note that Saywan is referred to as Sayw Senan by the Kurds). The numbers in parenthesis following the villages are the coordinates given to them by the military. Middle East Watch has seen maps which list all the villages by number rather than by name. (For further information on the chemical attack in the Qaradagh area, see chapter 4 in Genocide in Iraq). MEW]

(MEW ref.: 2123/5-C).

DOCUMENT 10

PAGE 1

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

[Emblem of Iraqi Military Intelligence]

[In frame:] Please refer to the full number

The Martyrs Remain More Generous Than All of Us

Presidency of the Republic

Secretary

General Directorate of Military Intelligence

Subdirectorate of Military Intelligence, Eastern Sector

Confidential and Personal

Ref.: /Sh.3/Q.1/Qadissiyat Saddam/16093

Date: 13 December 1988

To: General Directorate of Military Intelligence (Sh.3)

Re: Information

The following is the information that we received from source no. 202 about the sabotage movements:

[Excerpted. Translated here is only point 10. a. on page 5:]

10. The following is information from the source regarding the journalists who visited the saboteurs in Iranian territory.

a. After the expulsion of the saboteurs of the First Section of the Barzani band [i.e., the KDP] in the Badinan Sector by our forces during the Final Anfal operation, six British journalists arrived in the triangular border region of Iran, Iraq and Turkey to see the saboteurs who had come from the above sector via Turkish territory and interview them about the chemical strike undertaken by our forces.

(5 of 7)

Top Secret

____________________________________________________________

[This is a second document making a direct reference to chemical attacks undertaken by Iraqi forces, this time during the Final Anfal in Badinan. Along with the attack on Halabja

DOCUMENT 10

PAGE 2

in March 1988, the attacks in Badinan in Augist 1988 were the only attacks that attracted any measure of international attention, largely owing to the ability of foreign journalists to interview refugees in Turkey and Iran. (For a description of the chemical attacks on Badinan, see chapter 10 in Genocide in Iraq). MEW]

(MEW ref.: 2123/6-A).

DOCUMENT 11

PAGE 1

[Cover letter:]

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

[Emblem of Iraqi Military Intelligence]

The Martyrs Remain More Generous Than All of Us

[In frame:] Please refer to the full number

Presidency of the Republic

Secretary

General Directorate of Military Intelligence

Confidential and Personal

Ref.: M.5/Sh.3/Q.2/9879

Date: 18 May 1988

To: The Subdirectorate of Military Intelligence, Eastern Sector

Re: Report

[Stamp:] Subdirectorate of Military Intelligence, Eastern Sector

    Ref.: 1034

    Date: 19/5/1988

Enclosed is our special report about the Northern Region for the month of April 1988. Please be informed.

Enclosures: 1 report.

[Signature]

Brigadier-General

Deputy Director, General Directorate of Military Intelligence

[In handwriting:] For the information of the director when he returns.

      [Signature]

      Lt. Colonel

      20 May 1988

(1 of 1)

Confidential and Personal

[In handwriting:] On vacation

      21/5

DOCUMENT 11

PAGE 2

__________________________________________________

[Main document. From the 6-page report, only page 4 has been included here:]

Confidential and Personal

b. Once the pressure of the Anfal operation was focused on the band of the agents of Iran [i.e., the PUK], which caused them heavy losses, the organizations [i.e., members] of that band began discussing why the government was aiming to eradicate their band and not the other bands.

c. After the special strikes against the villages where the headquarters and bases of the agents were, their organization distributed a quantity of medical supplies against chemical strikes (injections and pills) among the inhabitants of those villages as well as neighboring villages.

d. The leadership of the agents established headquarters near the town of Halabja to coordinate [activities] with the Iranian enemy forces that were present in the Shahrazour plain. Their headquarters are now in Zammaki complex, Anab complex, Jalila village and Hawar village.

e. After the Anfal operations, the leadership of the band of the agents of Iran held a number of meetings and studied the status of their band in the wake of those operations. The following are the most important matters that were discussed:

First: the reasons for their defeat by our forces. They reached the conclusion that the reasons are the following:

(1) The false promises of the Iranian regime, who had promised to send them forces, weapons and ammunition in the event our forces were to attack them.

(2) The lack of concern on the part of some of the officials of their band, and their negligence during the operations.

(3) [The fact that] the intensity of the artillery bombardment by our forces and the use of "the special ammunition" led to heavy losses among them.

(4) They reached the conclusion that they must utilize small detachments in carrying out their sabotage activities, and not face our forces directly.

(4 of 6)

Confidential and Personal

DOCUMENT 11

PAGE 3

____________________________________________________________

[The significance of this document lies in the explicit link it draws between "special attacks" and medical supplies obtained by the Kurds as an antidote to chemical poisoning. In the time before we found specific references in the documents to chemical attacks, we had found many documents mentioning either "special attacks" or the use of "special ammunition." Through our eyewitness testimonies it can be deduced from the dates of these attacks that the term was, in fact, an Iraqi euphemism for chemical attacks. The above document is the first document providing concrete evidence of this. Please note the reference in paragraph b to "the other bands" which had been spared from attack as of the middle of May 1988: the KDP was attacked later - during the Final Anfal, in August 1988. MEW]

(MEW ref.: 2128/6-B).

DOCUMENT 12

PAGE 1

In the name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

Confidential

General Security

Security Directorate of Erbil Governorate

Ref.: Sh.Sh./4947

Date: 11/6/1987

To: Security Directorate of Shaqlawa

Re: Information

We were informed that:

1. On 27/5/1987 our aircraft attacked the villages of Malakan, Talinan, Kandor, Bileh Aliya and Bileh Sufla in Khalifan subdistrict, which harbor some saboteurs. As a result of the bombing, Omar Abdullah, brother of the criminal Mustafa Abdullah, who had been an adviser [mustashar] of Battalion 88 [of the National Defense Battalions, a pro-government Kurdish militia] and later joined the saboteurs, lost his eyesight. A number of saboteurs were killed and about 30 people lost their eyesight as a result of the bombing, including the family of Kamal Haji Khidr Agha, the commander of the 12th [PUK] division. They were all sent to hospitals in Iran.

2. Some of the families of the saboteurs have traveled to Iran and the Iranian government has resettled them in complexes in Bakhtaran and Sanandaj districts.

3. Some members of the National Defense Battalions, especially the newly created ones in the Harir and Khalifan sectors, are saying that if the authorities eliminate their villages, they will attack the deportation committees and then join the saboteurs.

[Signature]

Director of General Security of Erbil Governorate

____________________________________________________________

[It is clear from this handwritten memorandum that the attack referred to in paragraph 1 must have been a chemical attack, because the victims lost their eyesight. After we found this document, we were able to locate and interview one of the victims mentioned here, Kamal Haji Khidr, in Kurdistan in March 1993. He confirmed that he and his family had been temporarily blinded in a chemical attack on May 27, 1987; he added that an 18-month old nephew later died from the effects of the chemicals in a hospital in Europe. Paragraph 3 is also of interest, because it shows that the regime was destroying all villages, i.e., not only those in the "prohibited areas" but also those belonging to the pro-government militias living under their control. The government's target, in other words, was not the rebels, as it has claimed, but the Kurds as such. MEW]

(MEW ref.: 54/4-F).

DOCUMENT 13

PAGE 1

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

[Emblem of the Iraqi Republic]

In the Name of the People

Revolutionary Command Council

Number of the Decree: 160

Date of the Decree: 29/3/1987

DECREE

In accordance with the provisions of Article 42, Paragraph (a), and Article 43, Paragraph (a), of the Constitution, and in order to execute what was decided in the joint meeting of the Revolutionary Command Council and the Regional Command of the Ba`ath Party on 18/3/1987,

The Revolutionary Command Council decided in its meeting on 29/3/1987 the following:

First: The Comrade Ali Hassan al-Majid, member of the Regional Command of the Ba`ath Party, will represent the Regional Command of the Party and the Revolutionary Command Council in implementing their policies in all of the northern region, including the Autonomous Region of Kurdistan, in order to protect security and order and guarantee stability and the implementation of the Autonomy Law in the region.

Second: The Comrade, member of the Regional Command, will have authority over all the state's civil, military and security apparatuses to carry out this decree, in particular the authorities of the National Security Council and the Northern Affairs Committee.

Third: The following authorities in the northern region fall under the Comrade's authority and must implement all the decisions and directives issued by him, as by this order:

1. The Executive Committee of the Autonomous Region of Kurdistan.

2. The Governors and the heads of the administrative units under the Ministry of Local Government.

3. The Foreign Intelligence apparatus, the Internal Security Force, and Military Intelligence.

4. The Commands of the Popular Army.

Fourth: The military commands in the region must respond to the Comrade, member of the Regional Command, concerning everything pertaining to the first paragraph of this decision.

DOCUMENT 13

PAGE 2

Fifth: This Decree goes into effect on the date it is issued until further notice, and any regulations contradicting this Decree are suspended.

[Signature]

Saddam Hussein

President of the Revolutionary Command Council

____________________________________________________________

[Revolutionary Command Council Decree 160 of March 29, 1987, contains the all-important order authorizing Ali Hassan al-Majid to take charge of all affairs in northern Iraq. In it Saddam Hussein spells out the extent of al-Majid's authority over all other security, military and civil organs. It was immediately after the appointment of al-Majid that the chemical attacks against Kurdish civilians began and the campaign of village destruction went into high gear. Decree 160 was revoked on April 23, 1989, through Revolutionary Command Council Decree 272 (MEW ref.: 82/4-E), after Ali Hassan al-Majid had completed his job: He had defeated the Kurdish insurgency by erasing almost all the Kurdish villages from the map and killing most of their inhabitants during the Anfal campaign. MEW]

(MEW ref.: 42/5-L).

DOCUMENT 14

PAGE 1

One Arab Nation With an Immortal Message

The Socialist Arab Ba`ath Party

Iraq Region

Northern Bureau Command

Ref.: 28/3650

Date: 3/6/1987

Top Secret and Personal

To: Governorate of .........

Commands of First, Second and Fifth Corps

Commands of Branches of the Bureau

Command of the Salah al-Din Branch

Command of the Diyala Branch

Directorate of Security of the Autonomous Region

Directorate of Security of Erbil Governorate

Directorate of [Foreign] Intelligence......

Directorate of [Military] Intelligence

Re: Decree

1. It is totally prohibited for any foodstuffs or persons or machinery to reach the villages that have been prohibited for security reasons that are included in the second stage of amalgamating the villages. Anyone who so desires is permitted to return to the national ranks. It is not allowed for relatives to contact them except with the knowledge of the security agencies.

2. The presence of people is completely prohibited in those areas of the villages prohibited for security reasons that were relocated in the first stage, and also in the areas included in the second stage until June 21, 1987.

3. Concerning the harvest: after the conclusion of the [harvesting of the] winter [crop], which must end before July 15, farming will not be authorized in [the area] during the coming winter and summer seasons, starting this year.

4. It is prohibited to take cattle to pasture within these areas.

5. Within their jurisdiction, the armed forces must kill any human being or animal present within these areas. They are totally prohibited.

6. The persons who are to be included in the relocation to the complexes will be notified of this decision, and they will bear full responsibility if they violate it.

DOCUMENT 14

PAGE 2

For your information and action, each within his jurisdiction. With regards.

Keep Up the Struggle.

[Signature]

The Comrade

Ali Hassan al-Majid

Secretary General of the Northern Bureau Command

____________________________________________________________

[This is one of the two main "smoking gun" documents found to date about Iraq's policy toward the Kurds. This key directive, from June 1987, reinforces the existing total embargo on designated "prohibited areas" throughout those parts of the Kurdish-inhabited countryside outside full government control. It also, in paragraph 5, institutes a shoot-on-sight policy in those areas. What is interesting here is that, while such a policy, according to our eyewitness testimonies, had already been in effect for several years, this is the first explicit expression of the regime's intent in this regard. The document also refers to the policy of amalgamating villages that had remained under government control. The inhabitants were forcibly moved into housing complexes and their villages destroyed. This campaign was well under way at the time this order was issued. MEW]

(MEW ref.: SP-2).

DOCUMENT 15

PAGE 1

Northern Bureau Command

The Secretariat

Date [sic]: 28/4008

Ref. [sic]: 20/6/1987

[In handwriting:] Sh.3 810

      23/6/87

From: Northern Bureau Command

To: First Corps Command / Second Corps Command / Fifth Corps Command

[Stamp:] 3

    12533

    23/6/87

Re: Dealing With the Villages That Are Prohibited For Security Reasons

In view of the fact that the officially announced deadline for the amalgamation of these villages expires on 21 June 1987, we have decided that the following action should be taken effective 22 June 1987:

(1) All the villages in which the saboteurs -- the agents of Iran [i.e. the PUK], the offspring of treason [i.e. the KDP], and similar traitors to Iraq -- are still to be found shall be regarded as prohibited for security reasons.

(2) The presence of human beings and animals is completely prohibited in these areas, and [these] shall be regarded as operational zones in which [the troops] can open fire at will, without any restrictions, unless otherwise instructed by our headquarters.

(3) Travel to and from these zones, as well as all agricultural, animal husbandry and industrial activities shall be prohibited and carefully monitored by all the competent agencies within their respective fields of jurisdiction.

(4) The Corps Commands shall carry out random bombardments using artillery, helicopters and aircraft at all times of the day or night in order to kill the largest number of persons present in those prohibited areas, keeping us informed of the results.

(5) All persons captured in those villages shall be detained because of their presence there, and they shall be interrogated by the security services and those between the ages of 15 and 70 must be executed after any useful information has been obtained from them; keep us informed.

DOCUMENT 15

PAGE 2

(6) Those who surrender to the government or Party authorities shall be interrogated by the competent agencies for a maximum period of three days, which may be extended to ten days if necessary, provided that we are notified of such cases. If the interrogation requires a longer period of time, approval must be obtained from us by telephone or telegraph or through comrade Taher al-Ani.

(7) Everything seized by the advisers [mustashars] or fighters of the National Defense Battalions [i.e., the pro-government Kurdish militias] is considered theirs to keep, with the exception of heavy, mounted and medium weapons. They can keep the light weapons, notifying us only of the number of these weapons. The commands of the Battalions must promptly bring this to the attention of all the advisers and company and brigade commanders, and must provide us with detailed information concerning their activities in the National Defense Battalions.

cc. Head of the Legislative Council; Head of the Executive Council; [Foreign] Intelligence Agency; Chief of the Army General Staff; Governors (Chairmen of the Security Committees) of Nineveh, al-Ta'mim, Diyala, Salah al-Din, Suleimaniyeh, Erbil and Dohuk; [Ba`ath Party] Branch Secretaries of the above-mentioned Governorates; General Directorate of Military Intelligence; General Directorate of Security [Amn]; Directorate of Security of the Autonomous Region; Subdirectorate of Military Intelligence, Northern Sector; Subdirectorate of Military Intelligence, Eastern Sector; Security Directors of the Governorates of Nineveh, al-Ta'mim, Diyala, Salah al-Din, Suleimaniyeh, Erbil and Dohuk.

For your information and action within your respective fields of jurisdiction. Keep us informed.

[Signature]

The Comrade

Ali Hassan al-Majid

Member of the Regional Command, Secretary General of the Northern Bureau

____________________________________________________________

[This pre-Anfal memorandum, our second "smoking gun" document about the Iraqi regime's policy toward the Kurds, sets the framework for the Anfal campaign of 1988 by turning the "prohibited areas" into free-fire zones; by ordering the arrest, interrogation and summary execution of all those aged 15-70 who are found in the "prohibited areas"; and by giving permission to the pro-government Kurdish militias to keep everything they might seize in those areas, not only light weapons but also personal belongings, thereby giving true meaning to the word "Anfal," or "spoils." The instruction, in paragraph 5, to summarily execute all those between the ages of 15 and 70 who were detained by the military forces

DOCUMENT 15

PAGE 3

was so blatant that it caused confusion in the ranks, and the Northern Bureau was forced to repeat it on several occasions to remind the soldiers of their duties (see, for example, Document 28 below). During Anfal, the above order was generally observed. Documents from that period show that all the people from the villages in the "prohibited areas" were rounded up and sent on to the authority of the Security Directorate in Kirkuk, whose agents were asked to carry out the "necessary measures" according to the directives of the Northern Bureau, (see, for example, Document 23 below). We know from eyewitness testimonies that from there, most were taken away and killed. MEW]

(MEW ref.: 93/1-B).

DOCUMENT 16

PAGE 1

Part 1

[In handwriting:] 171

      --------Security

      15/9/87

[In handwriting:] 184

      -----

      C

Urgent and confidential /12/9/

From: First Corps / R./Sh.I.D./

To: Division 24 / 27 / 28 / 34 / 36 / 39 / Command of the National Defense Corps Forces 1 /Division 44 / Division H.N. / Headquarters of First Corps / the First Forces

Ref.: 4198

[Concerning] the confidential letter of the Northern Bureau Command, ref. /435/ of 8/9, the following has been decided:

In view of the meeting that was held on 6/9/1987, led by Comrade Ali Hassan al-Majid, General Secretary of the Northern Bureau:

1. The Security Committees in the northern Governorates must submit a survey of the families of saboteurs. This must be done during the period of 6/9 to 15/9. Immediately after the completion of the survey, the deportation of these families to the areas where their saboteur relatives are must be commenced, except for the male [members], between the ages of 12 inclusive and 50 inclusive, who must be detained. The families who have martyrs, missing persons, prisoners of war, soldiers, or fighters in the National Defense Battalions [among their sons/husbands/fathers] are excluded from these measures. In this case, the mother only must be deported to the side of the saboteurs.

2. Public and administrative meetings must be held. In these meetings, the importance of the census, which it was decided will be held on 17/10/1987, must be pointed out. Be certain to clarify that anyone who does not participate in the operation [i.e., the census] without a reasonable excuse will lose his Iraqi-ness [i.e., his citizenship] and will be considered to be an army deserter, and [in this case] Revolutionary Command Council Decree #677 of 26/8 will apply to them.

3. The return of the saboteurs without their weapons is not acceptable between 6/9 and 17/10. After 17/10, their return is not acceptable even if they bring their weapons.

DOCUMENT 16

PAGE 2

Please be informed, take the necessary measures, and let us know.

[In handwriting:] R.A. [i.e., Chief of Staff]

      Please be informed and disseminate

      16/9 [initialed]

[In handwriting:] The commander

      Please be informed

      Approve for dissemination

      16/9 [initialed]

[In handwriting:] I.S. [i.e., Military Intelligence]

      1. To be disseminated

      2. Put together the responses as soon as possible and inform the First

Corps

[In handwriting:] It has been disseminated

      16/9

DOCUMENT 16

PAGE 3

Part 2

One Arab Nation With an Immortal Message

The Socialist Arab Ba`ath Party

Iraq Region

Erbil Branch Command

Salah al-Din Section Command

Ref.: 60/2648

Date: 12/9/1987

To: Erbil Branch Command

Re: Minutes of Meeting

--------------------------

Comradely Greetings:

On 12/9/1987, the Salah al-Din Section Command held an extraordinary meeting at the headquarters of Salah al-Din Section Command. Comrade Ashour Shahab Ahmad, the Secretary of the Section Command, chaired the meeting. The Comrades, members of the Section Command, attended the meeting. The meeting addressed the following [issues]:

1) The letter of Erbil Branch Command, ref. 34/11521 of 18/9/1987 [sic; date must be wrong], decision [sic]. The Section Command studied the contents of the above letter and suggests to help Comrade Adnan Hamdan Alwan, member of the Koysinjaq Division [of the Ba`ath Party], with 250 Iraqi dinars because he has a limited salary and a big family.

2) The Section Command studied all the survey and evaluation forms of the families of saboteurs who arrived from the Division Commands. After checking all the forms, the Section Command proposes the following:

First: To detain and deport members of the saboteurs' families according to the regulations included in the letter we received from the Branch Command, ref. 38/11540 of 9/9/1987, and the message of the Northern Bureau Command, ref. 435 of 7/9/1987. There are 111 families [i.e., according to the survey] who do not have a martyr, prisoner of war, soldier, fighter in the National Defense Battalions or fighter in the Popular Army [among their male members].

Second: To deport the saboteurs' mothers or their oldest sisters in accordance with the regulations contained in the message of the Northern Bureau Command. There are 103 families who have a martyr, prisoner of war, missing person, soldier, fighter in the

National Defense Battalions or fighter in the Popular Army [among their male members].

DOCUMENT 16

PAGE 4

Third: To strip the families who joined the saboteurs with all their family members of their Iraqi citizenship, and to confiscate their movable and immovable property. There are 82 forms.

Please be informed. With regards.

Keep Up the Struggle.

[Signature]

The Comrade

Ashour Shahab Ahmad

Secretary of the Salah al-Din Section Command

[In handwriting:] I was informed / For keeping

      [Signature]

      14/9

cc: The Comrades, respected members of the Section Command / Please be informed. With regards.

____________________________________________________________

[These two documents highlight an important policy announced in the fall of 1987 and subsequently implemented. The Iraqi population census of 1987 (the census is held every ten years) became a key event in the build-up to the Anfal campaign. As is clear from paragraph 2 of the first document, all those who failed to register in the census would lose their Iraqi citizenship. In reality, this meant that all persons living in the "prohibited areas" were excluded from the census; to be registered they would have had to move from their ancestral villages into government-provided housing in one of the complexes. Needless to say, very few people were prepared to leave their land and homes (essentially denying themselves their livelihood) only to be included in the census. The result was that they were stripped of their citizenship and overnight became virtual outlaws living on their own land. At this time, when Iraq was at war with Iran, to be considered an ex-Iraqi, a virtual traitor to the Iraqi cause, was particularly dangerous. During Anfal, the people who had failed to register in the census were rounded up and killed. (Please note that an amended version of RCC Decree 677, mentioned in paragraph 2, is included as Document 19 below).

Paragraph 1 of the first document highlights another important policy: that of deporting the wives, mothers and children of alleged guerrillas to the "prohibited areas." They, too, were stripped of their Iraqi citizenship, and subsequently became the victims of Anfal. As the document shows, some exceptions were made for families who had at least one member in the Iraqi armed forces or the pro-government Kurdish militias. The second document shows how this policy was being carried out with meticulous care by local Ba`ath Party officials (see also Document 20 below). MEW]

(MEW ref.: 56/52-A and 2192/5-A).

DOCUMENT 17

PAGE 1

[In handwriting:] 6573

      ---- Q.3

      22/5

LLLLL

From: M.Is. Kalar [i.e., Military Intelligence Center Kalar]

Confidential and Personal

22/5/1987

[Stamp:] Subdirectorate of Military Intelligence, Eastern Sector

    Ref.: 15577

    Date: 22/5/1987

To: /M.IS.M. Eastern/Sh.3

Ref.: Q.3/10/2101/Q.S./Maps Tuz Khurmatu/Qal'at Shirwana 1/100,000

[Concerning] your confidential and personal letter ref. Sh.3/Q.3/9062 of 21/5/1987:

The number of deported families from 13/5 until the present is 1,500 families. Some of these families joined the saboteurs, [i.e.] agents of Iran saboteurs [the PUK]. Their number is estimated to be 450 families. Most of them are from the villages of Omerbel / 9948, Kopan Arab / 9742, Qara Qojali / 1252, Biyasijr / 1653, Rotin / 1354, and Melasur / 1350. The other part [i.e., families], whose number is estimated as 1,050 families, have been resettled with their relatives in towns and villages that are not prohibited for security reasons. A residential complex was assigned to the deported families from the district of Kalar near the village of Shakal / 1935, and was named Sumoud neighborhood. Pieces of land have been distributed to them. Please be informed.

Sender / N.Dh. [i.e., non-commissioned officer] Hussein

Recipient / Hamed

LLLLLLL

1249

LLLLLLL

[In handwriting:] Q.3

      --------

      The center must be asked for details: "How many families deserted

      every day"

DOCUMENT 17

PAGE 2

    Put together with the answers of the [other] centers

    [Signature]

    23/5

[In handwriting:] It will be written to the center

      [Signature]

      22/5

____________________________________________________________

[This document is important because it shows how in subtle ways the Iraqi bureaucracy was criminalizing innocent people. The document refers to some 450 families who "joined the saboteurs." We know from our testimonial evidence that families never joined the guerrillas; only the men did. Families living in the villages might support guerrillas who passed through by feeding them, but the concept of "joning the guerrillas" did not really exist for families. What is meant here is something entirely different, which is also consistent with evidence we have found in other documents: People who evaded the campaign of village destruction and deportation in the spring of 1987, thereby refusing to be moved to one of the government housing complexes, and who fled from areas of government control into the "prohibited areas," were henceforth equated with the guerrillas, regardless of their loyalties. From that moment on, they would also be treated like the guerrillas, a policy that found its apogee in the Anfal campaign (see also Document 22 below). MEW]

(MEW ref.: 2104/12-O).

DOCUMENT 18

PAGE 1

[Main document:]

The head of the Presidential Cabinet has decided as follows:

1. The names of persons who are subject to a collective judgment must only be disseminated in separate memoranda.

2. Such memoranda, when disseminated, should be accorded the greatest secrecy.

Please take whatever measures are necessary, and act accordingly.

    Signature/ ..

    The Dep. Minister of Interior

__________________________________________________

[Cover letter:]

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

General Security

Directorate of Security, Erbil Governorate

Secret, Personal and Urgent

Ref.: Sh.S.5/14314

Date: 1/11/1987

To: All Directorates of Security Branches and Political Sections

Re: Secret Documents

The above is a copy of the Interior Ministry's memorandum -- Directorate of Secret and Political Affairs -- ref. 17903 of 15/10/1987. Please act accordingly.

[Signature]

Major of Security

The Dep. Director of Security, Erbil Governorate

[In handwriting:] 3423

      -------

      8/11

      [Signature]

      To be disseminated

DOCUMENT 18

PAGE 2

____________________________________________________________

[While Kurds deported from villages or taken into government custody were being dealt with collectively, their cases were itemized individually by the Iraqi bureaucracy. The significance of this document is that the regime apparently wanted to have a complete record of all those who were subject to collective punishments. For example, during the Anfal campaign, persons were sorted out for deportation and execution based on their place of capture rather than as a result of an individual judgment following interrogation and/or trial, and each person arrested during Anfal was therefore briefly questioned about matters of personal status, place of residence, etc. MEW]

(MEW ref.: 70/4-A).

DOCUMENT 19

PAGE 1

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

[Emblem of the Iraqi Republic]

Revolutionary Command Council

Number of the Decree 10

Date of the Decree: 3/1/1988

Decree

In accordance with the provisions of Article 42, Paragraph (a), of the Constitution, the Revolutionary Command Council, at its meeting held on 3/1/1988, decided as follows:

First: Revolutionary Command Council Decree No. 677 (six hundred and seventy-seven) dated 26/8/1987 (twenty-six August of the year nineteen hundred and eighty-seven) is hereby amended to read as follows:

1. The Party organizations shall carefully examine the situation of military deserters and draft dodgers who are captured.

2. The death sentence shall be carried out by the Party organization, after that examination, on every deserter or draft dodger who is captured if the duration of his desertion or draft evasion exceeds one year or if he has committed the crime of desertion more than once.

3. A draft dodger or deserter who returns repentant or whose period of draft evasion amounts to one year or less, even if captured, shall be handed over to his unit to be dealt with in accordance with military law and regulations.

4. The provisions of this Decree shall apply to all persons who evaded military service prior to its date of promulgation and who do not present themselves for re-enlistment within 30 days from the date of its publication in the Official Gazette.

Second: This Decree shall be published in the Official Gazette and shall supersede any text that conflicts with its provisions.

[Signature]

Saddam Hussein

Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council

DOCUMENT 19

PAGE 2

____________________________________________________________

[This document demonstrates both the toughening stance of the regime in early 1988, less than two months before the start of the Anfal campaign, and the supreme power of the Ba`ath Party in implementing the new policies, including the execution of army deserters and draft dodgers. It was the Ba`ath Party that presented itself as the final authority in the Anfal campaign, which was marked by mass executions of combatants and non-combatants alike, including army deserters. MEW]

(MEW ref.: 175/4-K).

DOCUMENT 20

PAGE 1

[In handwriting:] Fatima Ahmad Omar

(Confidential and Personal Message)

To: The Security of Autonomous Region

From: Security Dohuk / Sh.S.64

Ref.: 13075

Date: 15/9/1987

According to the directives issued by the Northern Bureau Command regarding the deportation and detention of families of saboteurs, deserters and draft dodgers, the following is the situation today, 15/9/87, for those families who were deported and detained within our Governorate after their photographs were taken and all their official identity cards proving their Iraqi-ness were taken away from them. Please be informed. With regards.

------------------------------------------------------------

[In handwriting:] 15154

[Signature]

Director of Security of Dohuk Governorate

First: The deportees who are from Sersank subdistrict in Amadiya district

1. The family of the criminal deserter Ibrahim Yusef Mustafa:

    Miriam Abd-al-Rahman Abdullah / his mother / housewife / 1907 / She has been deported.

2. The family of the criminal deserter Muhammad Ali Abd-al-Majid:

    Zimrud Abdullah Muhammad / his mother / housewife / 1930 / She has been deported.

3. The family of the criminal deserter Mustafa Saleh Omar:

    Fatma Muhammad Alo / his mother / housewife / 1930 / She has been deported.

4. The family of the criminal deserter Hassan Taher Mirkhan:

    Halima Birmus Hassan / his mother / housewife / 1916 / She has been deported.

5. The family of the criminal deserter Mustafa Abba-Bakr Hassan:

    Hamra' Fakhri Birmus / his mother / housewife / 1917 / She has been deported.

6. The family of the criminal deserters Esmat and Iskan Muhammad Hassan Osman:

Zulekha Muhammad Mustafa / their mother / housewife / 1916 / She has been deported.

7. The family of the criminal deserter Ibrahim Rashid Budagh:

    Guli Suleiman Amin / his mother / housewife / 1920 / She has been deported.

8. The family of the criminal deserter Ahmad Muhammad Abd-al-Qader:

    Fatma Bapir Hassan / his mother / housewife / 1925 / She has been deported.

9. The family of the criminal deserters Zubeir and Ayed Muhammad Ali Sheikho:

    Amina Yusef Hamid / their mother / housewife / 1936 / She has been deported.

(More)

DOCUMENT 20

PAGE 2

____________________________________________________________

[Only page 1 of the document has been included here. The full document lists 86 families. The document makes very clear how the policy enunciated in Document 16 above was being carried out. Elderly women, mothers of alleged guerrillas, were being stripped of their Iraqi citizenship in the fall of 1987 and deported to the "prohibited areas," apparently guilty of no crime other than association with wanted persons. As inhabitants of the "prohibited areas," they were included in the Anfal campaign the following year. MEW]

(MEW ref.: 2014/7-B).

DOCUMENT 21

PAGE 1

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

Command of the Fifth National Defense Forces

Administration

Ref.: A./3/163

Date: 26/4/1988

To: List (1) Contingent 81

Re: Implementing the Death Penalty

[Concerning] the memorandum from the Presidency of the Republic, the Secretary to the President for Party Affairs, ref. Sh./H./78 of 20/1/1988, conveyed in memorandum ref. 106 of 2 February 1988 from the Army Chief of Staff, as relayed in the memorandum of the Command of the First National Defense Forces ref. D.Q./2/1879 of 30/3/1988, which was a cover letter to the original memorandum of the Office of the Minister of Defense, Top Secret, ref. 2041 of 28 January 1988, and contained the agreement of the Comrade, the Struggling Leader, the Secretary-General of the country and Secretary-General of the Military Bureau (May God Protect Him) [i.e., Saddam Hussein], to implement orders issued by the Party headquarters and branches regarding the execution of the condemned: Army units must not make any delays in implementing these [orders], and they should not reopen the files.

Please be informed of this, and implement it accordingly.

[Signature]

Captain

Jiyad Mahdi al-Khadr

Dep. Commander of the Fifth National Defense Forces

____________________________________________________________

[The order referred to in this document, which was issued barely a month before the start of the Anfal campaign, uses an important word that sheds light on what was about to take place during Anfal. The document refers to "the condemned," a deliberate choice of words favored over the more usual: "those who have been convicted." This choice seems to imply the existence of a blanket order to execute a certain group of people without due process of law. This should not be a surprising discovery, given the language of paragraph 5 of Northern Bureau directive SF/4008 (see Document 15 above), which mandated mass executions. MEW]

(MEW ref.: 125/24-A).

DOCUMENT 22

PAGE 1

One Arab Nation with an Immortal Message

The Socialist Arab Ba`ath Party

Salah al-Din Section Command

Rawanduz Division Command

Ref.: 52/461

Date: 19/4/1988

To: All Membership Cells

Re: Directives

Comradely Greetings:

Below are the directives issued by the Section Command. They are as follows:

1. The families who have arrived from the areas of the saboteurs should be treated in the same way as the saboteurs [are treated]. The Party organizations should carry out searches and gather information, and if families are found, they should inform the security authorities about this.

2. The Party apparatus is responsible for the expurgation of the geographic area in which it operates with regard to the families who are mentioned in Paragraph 1. Each mukhtar [village or neighborhood head, appointed by the government] should be informed that if any family lives in his area and he does not inform us about them, he and his family will be detained and his house will be demolished. If he was not aware [that there were families in his area], he will be detained for three days.

3. If five or more families are found in the neighborhood of the mukhtar's jurisdiction, the neighborhood mukhtar will be executed.

4. It is strictly forbidden to hand over any saboteur to the National Defense Battalions [the pro-government Kurdish militia]. They should only be handed over to the Security. As for the Party agencies, they, too, should hand over saboteurs who surrender with their weapons to the Security.

5. Mobilize the religious leaders and meet with them so as to induce them to erode [the support of] the saboteurs and their collaborator commanders.

6. The Party organizations should collect information about those who have joined the saboteurs, using special lists on which all information should be written.

DOCUMENT 22

PAGE 2

The collection of information should include [members of] the internal organizations [i.e., the guerrillas' urban underground] and their families according to where they reside, and every family's survey form should be done separately. This form should be presented to the Division Command within one week.

Please be kindly informed. With regards.

Keep Up the Struggle.

[Signature]

The Comrade

Zaydan Atiyeh Akmoush

Dep. General Secretary of the Rawanduz Division

[Stamp:] Socialist Arab Ba`ath Party

    Salah al-Din Section Command

    Rawanduz Division Command

    Unity, Liberty, Socialism

[In handwriting:] Bring it up in the meeting.

____________________________________________________________

[This document from the time of Anfal addresses two important matters. First, it defines all women and children fleeing the "prohibited areas" as "saboteurs." We know from other documents (for example, Document 23 below) as well as from eyewitness testimonies that families were in fact treated the same way as the men (many of whom were not combatants either, but civilian inhabitants from the villages). Second, it shows that the regime went after the people from the "prohibited areas" even after they had managed to reach the towns and complexes. There they were hunted down, arrested and forwarded to the Security police in Kirkuk, much as the people who had been captured during the military campaign in the "prohibited areas" before them. (See also Document 25 below). Although a number of families were able to survive Anfal because they found safe shelter with relatives, intimidation tactics like the ones mandated above vis-a-vis the appointed neighborhood officials (the mukhtars) enabled the regime to detain many others. MEW]

(MEW ref.: 2161/17-A).

DOCUMENT 23

PAGE 1

[In handwriting:] 603

    Sh.3

    14/4

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

We Seek Justice, Not War

Command

Oil Protection Forces

General Staff

Intelligence

Ref.: 289

Date: 11 April 1988

Top Secret

[In handwriting:] 238

    -------Q.2

    14/4/88

[In handwriting:] 321

    Sh.3 [Signature]

[Stamp:] Subdirectorate of Military Intelligence

    Ref.: 7205

    Date: 14/4/1988

To: Directorate of Security of al-Ta'mim

Re: Sending Families

We are sending you the families who surrendered to our military forces on 11 April 1988 and whose names are in the appended list.

Please take the necessary measures according to the directives of the Northern Bureau, and acknowledge receipt.

Enclosures: 11 lists with 307 names

[Signature]

Brigadier-General Q.Kh. [i.e., Special Forces]

Bareq Abdullah al-Haj Hunta

Commander of the Oil Protection Forces

DOCUMENT 23

PAGE 2

cc: First Corps Command (Sh.Id. and Is.) [i.e., Administrative Section and Military Intelligence]. Enclosed is a copy of the list. Please be informed.

    M. Is. M. Eastern [i.e., Subdirectorate of Military Intelligence, Eastern Sector]. Enclosed is a copy of the list. Please be informed.

[In handwriting:] Mark for correspondence

    [Signature]

    15/4

    The Captain

(1 of 1)

Top Secret

____________________________________________________________

[This may be one of the most important documents we have found to date. Above, only the cover letter has been included. The remainder of the document offers a list of 139 families (or 307 individuals). There were several other, similar lists in the same file, including hundreds of names. These lists have proven to be extremely significant, because we were able to match names listed there with the names of people who, according to the information we obtained during our field research in the Kurdish areas, never returned home following their arrest by the army in Anfal. If 58 is a relatively small number, this merely reflects the limited scale of our field research. Matching the names on the lists with the names collected systematically by Kurdish human rights organizations could prove to be a much more valuable corroboration of those who `disappeared' in government hands.

The importance of the lists goes further: Not only were we able to make 58 positive matches of names, we also found the names of three of the execution survivors we had interviewed in the summer of 1992. (See chapter 9 in Genocide in Iraq). Through the testimony of these three survivors, we are now able to conclude with a high degree of certainty that virtually all of the people named in the lists were in fact executed in 1988. The survivors mentioned several persons whose names appear on the lists as having been in their company at the time of the executions. This proof concerning their fate would confirm the nature of the "necessary measures" ordered by the Northern Bureau: in all likelihood the document is referring to Northern Bureau directive SF/4008 of June 20, 1987.

The Iraqi government has yet to account for the persons it has admitted having arrested in 1988. MEW]

(MEW ref.: 2110/9-A).

DOCUMENT 24

PAGE 1

[In handwriting:] 3584

    ------Q.3 /321

    17/4

[In handwriting:] 1233

    ------Q.3

    17/4

[Stamp:] Subdirectorate of Military Intelligence, Eastern Sector

    Ref.: 11029

    Date: 17/4/1988

LLLLL

Confidential and Urgent 17/4

From: M. Is. Chamchamal

To: M. Is. M. Eastern /Sh.3

Ref.: 663

[Concerning] our confidential and urgent letter, ref. 641 of 14/4:

For the reasons mentioned in our above letter, we suggest the release of some of the saboteurs and deserters who are currently detained in the camps, as well as some families, at the discretion of the Investigation Committee in each subdistrict and district, so as to encourage the remaining saboteurs wishing to return. Most of them are seeking refuge in the forests and are awaiting the outcome of the detainees [i.e., waiting to find out what has happened to those who were detained previously]. Please be informed.

Sender: Ibrahim

Recipient: Muwaffaq

Time: 9:30

[In handwriting:] The Director of the Section

    Please be informed

      Above is a suggestion from the director of the Istikhbarat Center in

Chamchamal re: encouraging the saboteurs to return to the national ranks.

Please instruct.

      [Signature]

    17/4

    The Captain

[In handwriting:] To be read

    [Signature]

    18/4

DOCUMENT 24

PAGE 2

____________________________________________________________

[This document is of special interest because it mentions one of the ploys used by the regime to convince those who had fled the advance of the troops during Anfal to come down from the wooded hills and caves, and surrender. It also matches the testimonies of Anfal survivors collected by Middle East Watch in 1992 and 1993. The fate of most of those who surrendered is known: They were arrested, deported and killed. MEW]

(MEW ref.: 2110/9-I).

DOCUMENT 25

PAGE 1

Confidential and Urgent Time of Issuance And Day

        17/4

From: The Committee to Fight Hostile Activity in Shaqlawa

To: The District Administration in Shaqlawa, Division Command of the Leading Party, Directorate of Police in Shaqlawa, Directorate of Security in Shaqlawa

Ref.: L.M./102

[Concerning] the letter of Erbil Governorate (the Committee to Fight Hostile Activity), confidential and urgent, ref. 2538 of 12/4:

In view of the contents of the letter from the Northern Bureau Command, ref. 413 of 10/4/88, (1) to detain all the families who have come to the towns and the complexes [after] stealing out of the villages that are prohibited for security reasons; and (2) to activate all the Security, Party and Army organs, and inform us of their names [i.e., of the families] immediately. The Security Directorate is in charge of detaining them. Please take the necessary measures and let us know.

[Signature]

The Colonel

Commander of Salah al-Din Sector

Chairman of the Committee to Fight Hostile Activity

[In handwriting:] Q.

    ------------

    The contents of this letter must be copied to the base of Salah al-Din Sector. They must be asked to urge the headquarters of the Battalions to monitor these matters, and let us know [so that we can] take the necessary measures [i.e., detain those families].

    [Signature]

    17/4

Confidential and Urgent

____________________________________________________________

[This document highlights who the targets of the Anfal campaign were: not just the Kurdish guerrillas but all the Kurdish inhabitants of the "prohibited areas," even if they had left those areas to seek shelter in the towns and complexes. Many families were rounded up in raids on neighborhoods after Anfal, and they too were taken and disappeared. (See also Document 22 above). MEW]

(MEW ref.: 92/1-J).

DOCUMENT 26

PAGE 1

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

Secret and Personal

Qaradagh Section Command

([Military] Intelligence)

Ref.: I.S./28/56

Date: 31/5/88

To: All the Units

Re: Elimination of Villages

[Concerning] the letter of the First Corps, secret and personal, ref. 208 of 25 May 1988, of which we were informed in the letter from the First Forces Command, secret and personal, ref. 97 of 28 May 1988, the following was decided:

1. The information we received makes clear that there are villages and separate houses in the prohibited areas which were covered by the Anfal operation but have so far not been eliminated as required.

2. It was decided to speed up the destruction and elimination operation for all the villages and scattered houses as soon as possible, and to give this matter top priority within a time frame not exceeding 10 June 1988.

3. Groups of the Corps Intelligence and the Command Intelligence will check the villages that were not eliminated.

4. Please provide us with the list that includes the coordinates of the villages, marked and unmarked, which have not yet been eliminated. Please state your engineering requirements so that we can help you in the elimination of these villages. This request should be hand-delivered to us within 48 hours because of the importance of the matter.

5. Please follow up and acknowledge receipt of this letter.

[In handwriting:] [Signature]

    I was informed, 1/6

[Signature]

Colonel

Fahmi al-Sayed Adel Rashid

Qaradagh Section Commander

cc.

C.M.H. Abd-al-Hassan//..

DOCUMENT 26

PAGE 2

____________________________________________________________

[This Military Intelligence memorandum from the middle of the Anfal campaign, in May 1988, indicates that the destruction of all villages in the area of the second Anfal (which ended on April 1) had not been completed on schedule. In dry bureaucratic language, the fate of Kurdish villages is decided here. None survived. MEW]

(MEW ref.: 234/9-A).

DOCUMENT 27

PAGE 1

Confidential and Urgent Message

Date

6/10/1988

From: The Committee to Fight Hostile Activity in Suleimaniyeh Governorate

To: Sub-Committees to Fight Hostile Activity in the Districts

Ref.: 1650/ [Concerning] the message of Northern Bureau Command / Secretariat Bureau, ref. 2946 of 4/10/1988, the following:

Because the end of the period of the amnesty is approaching, the respected Struggling Comrade Ali Hassan al-Majid, head of the Northern Bureau, has decided:

1) All the Returnee Reception Committees must terminate their work at 6:00 [a.m.] on 9/10/1988.

2) Starting 9/10/1988, the returnees to the national ranks must be sent to the Secretariat of the Northern Bureau after coordinating with the Secretary of the Northern Affairs Committee.

3) The military authorities will be in charge of escorting those who are mentioned in Paragraph 2 to the Secretariat. Please take the necessary measures and let us know. With regards.

--------------------------------------------------------------

[Signature]

Ja'far Abd-al-Karim al-Barzinji

Chairman of the Committee to Fight Hostile Activity

in Suleimaniyeh Governorate

[In handwriting:] To be copied to the subdistrict of Bazian

    -----------------------------------------

      6/10

cc: Suleimaniyeh Branch Command

    of the Leading Party }

Directorate of Security

    Suleimaniyeh Governorate } For the same above purpose.

    Military Intelligence Center in With regards.

    Suleimaniyeh Governorate }

DOCUMENT 27

PAGE 2

____________________________________________________________

[This is an important document because it indicates once again who holds final responsibility for the people who "disappeared" during Anfal. On September 6, 1988, the regime had declared a general amnesty "for all the Kurds." The amnesty lasted for a little over one month, ending in the early hours of October 9. Eyewitness testimonies indicate that most persons who surrendered to the authorities within this period were set free, though forced to live in one of the government-controlled housing complexes. By contrast, persons who surrendered after the expiry of the amnesty were transferred to the authority of the Northern Bureau in Kirkuk - and from there disappeared without a trace. MEW]

(MEW ref.: 258/2-D).

DOCUMENT 28

PAGE 1

Confidential and Urgent Message

The Time and Day of Issuance

22/11/1988

[Scribble:] Shaqlawa

To: The Directors of Security Branches / Q.S.M.

From: Security of Erbil

Ref.: Sh.2/17983. In accordance with the directives of senior authorities, it has been decided to apply Paragraph 5 of the message of Northern Bureau Command, ref. 4008 of 20/6/1987, to anyone present in the prohibited `no-man's land' areas [muharram] and the areas banned for security reasons [mahdour], without exception. Please be informed, take the necessary measures, and carry out [the order]. Let us know.

[Signature]

Dep. Brigadier-General of Security

Director of Security of Erbil Governorate

[In handwriting:] To be disseminated

    [Signature]

    24/11

C./0012

[In handwriting:] 3175

    ----------

    24/11/1988

____________________________________________________________

[Two-and-a-half months after the end of Anfal, it apparently was still necessary to remind officers in the lower echelons of the Security police that Northern Bureau directive SF/4008 of June 20, 1987 remained in force. In other words, the Anfal campaign was over in name only. One point of clarification: In the above document, the writer is using two different words in Arabic (muharram and mahdour) to express the concept "prohibited" in English. The border zones cleared of all population in the late 1970s were designated by the regime with the first term, used to denote the empty land between two warring forces, while the vast areas demarcated during the 1980s received the second term meaning that all human presence was prohibited in them.

(MEW ref.:44/1-C).

DOCUMENT 29

PAGE 1

To the Honorable Director:

Greetings

On 25/9/1990, the Honorable Director issued the following directive:

The phrase "We do not have any information about their fate" will replace the phrase "They were arrested during the victorious Anfal operation and remain in detention."

The purpose of this is to be accurate in dealing with such an eventuality.

[Signature]

Director of Security

Officer N.M.R.

[In handwriting:] It was raised in the monthly conference

    [Signature]

    Political Officer

    18/10/1990

____________________________________________________________

[This order indicates that after Anfal, the regime absolved itself of all responsibility for those who had been arrested during the Anfal campaign. Government offices had been besieged by people wishing to know what had happened to their relatives, and this was the official response from the government that had arrested and killed them: "We have no information about their fate." MEW]

(MEW ref.: 102/7-A).

DOCUMENT 30

PAGE 1

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

[In handwriting:] 74

    -----Q.3

    23/1

[Emblem of Iraqi Military Intelligence]

The Martyrs Remain More Generous Than All of Us

[In frame:] Please refer to the full number

Presidency of the Republic

Secretary

The General Directorate of Military Intelligence

Subdirectorate of Military Intelligence, Eastern Sector

Top Secret

Ref.: Sh.3/Q.3/Qadissiyat Saddam/978

Date: 6/Rajjab/1411 H.

Corresponds to: 22 January 1991 M.

[In handwriting:] Meetings of the Agents of Iran [i.e., PUK]

To: General Directorate of Military Intelligence (Sh.3)

Re: Information

The informer at our subdirectorate in Suleimaniyeh, Muhammad Mahmoud Mamand, who is related to the criminal Rasoul Mamand, the head of the Kurdistan Socialist Party band, has provided us with the following information and publications, listed below, which he obtained from the saboteurs when he went to get food supplies in Suneh [i.e., food smuggled from Iran]:

[section not translated]

2. The leadership of the agents of Iran band [i.e., PUK] has placed its saboteurs on alert and a state of readiness, and [told them] to remain close to their bases. It was also decided to suspend all leave at the current time. The leadership of the agents distributed heavy and light arms, as well as protective masks against chemical weapons, to its saboteurs.

[remainder not translated]

DOCUMENT 30

PAGE 2

____________________________________________________________

[The above excerpts, based on informer reports, from a military intelligence document suggest that after the start of the allied air war over Kuwait and Iraq in the middle of January 1991, the Kurdish leadership expected that their guerrillas might be drawn into the conflict and might again become targets for an Iraqi chemical attack. Hence their decision to distribute gas masks. MEW]

(MEW ref.: 2104/11-A).

DOCUMENT 31

PAGE 1

[Main document:]

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

[In handwriting:] 63

    -----

    12/4

The Revolutionary Command Council

Number of the Decree: 64

Date of the Decree: 21 Sha`ban 1411 H.

      9 March 1991 M.

Decree

In accordance with the provisions of Article 42, Paragraph (a), of the Constitution, the Revolutionary Command Council has decided the following:

First: To grant the Comrades, members of the Regional Command of the Socialist Arab Ba`ath Party, or members of the Revolutionary Command Council who supervise directly the forces and columns that face resistance from the groups of traitors and agents who are supported by Iran, the powers of the President of the Republic to reward and punish.

Second: To grant the Vice-Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council the powers of the Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council for the purposes mentioned in Paragraph 1 of this Decree.

Third: To grant the Minister of Industry and Military Industrialization the powers stated in Paragraph 1 of this Decree.

Fourth: This Decree shall be in force from the day it is issued until the end of the crisis.

Fifth: The Ministers and pertinent authorities must implement this Decree.

Saddam Hussein

Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council

__________________________________________________

[Cover letter:]

[Scribble:] [Signature]

    13/4

DOCUMENT 31

PAGE 2

[Scribble:] [Signature]

    M. the Battalion

    To be disseminated to all the units for their information

    ---------------------------

    12/4/1991

[Scribble:] [Signature]

    R.A.

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

The Headquarters of Infantry Brigade 846

Administration and Supplies

The Administration

Ref.: A/267

Date: 12/4/91

To: List A. F.1

Re: Decree

The above is a copy of Revolutionary Command Council Decree number 64, of 9 March 1991, which was transmitted in the letter of the Presidential Cabinet, top secret, ref. 3139 of 9 March 1991, transmitted in the letter of the Cabinet of the Ministry of Defense, top secret, ref. 1723 of 10 March 1991, conveyed in the information from the Army Chief of Staff, ref. 4955 of 11 March 1991, conveyed in the letter of the Administration Office, top secret, ref. 508 of 12 March 1991, transmitted in the letter of the Fifth Corps, ref. 126 of 26 March 1991, transmitted in the letter of Division 38, ref. 699 of 6 April 1991. Please take the necessary measures.

[Signature]

The Captain

Abd-al-Hakim Abd-al-Majid Muhammad

Deputy Commander of Infantry Brigade 846

____________________________________________________________

[This document shows the seriousness of the political crisis in Iraq in the wake of the regime's defeat in Kuwait and the start of the popular uprisings in the south and in the north. Unable to control the situation, President Saddam Hussein was forced to

delegate authority by granting senior Ba`ath officials presidential powers in suppressing the uprisings. MEW]

(MEW ref.: 80/68-D).

DOCUMENT 32

PAGE 1

Confidential and Urgent

Time and Date of Issuance

--------------------------

12/6

From: The First Battalion, Infantry Brigade 22, Security

To: All the companies (3)

Ref.: /Security/78

[Concerning] the letter of First Corps (Sh.I.D. - H.), S.F. 90 of 31/5/1991, transmitted in the letter of Infantry Brigade 22, S.F. 80 of 12/6/1991:

In order to prevent incidents of sabotage and to assert control over the towns, we have decided the following:

[1.] To kill any armed or unarmed Kurd who tries to insult military personnel.

2. From 15:00 on 31/5, Brigade 22 and Commando Brigade 2 of the Corps will move to assert complete control over the town of Suleimaniyeh and impose a prohibition on the movement of people and vehicles.

3. To execute any soldier who leaves his position.

4. All the units and formations will make an inventory of the weapons, and execute any soldier who lost his weapon.

5. To prohibit any gathering of more than 10 persons.

6. To kill any person who walks in the town of Suleimaniyeh and tries to disturb the peace and refuses to obey orders.

7. To explain the above to every soldier.

8. First Battalion 15 and First Infantry Brigade 20 must stay at the entrance of Suleimaniyeh and be prepared to move into the town when required. Infantry Brigade 22 and Commando Brigade 2 of the Corps will occupy selected positions in the town. Each position should be occupied by not less than one platoon, and preferably by a company.

9. The movement to the abovementioned locations must be done in quiet and with full control.

Ended.

DOCUMENT 32

PAGE 2

[Signature]

The Captain

Dep. Commander of First Battalion, Infantry Brigade 22

June 1991

____________________________________________________________

    [The importance of the above document lies in the army's use of the phrase "any...Kurd." In the documents from before and during Anfal to date, we have found no direct references to the Kurds being targeted as Kurds. The language of the September 1988 amnesty made clear for the first time that it was the Kurds as a group who were being targeted. The above document repeats this.

[After the allied forces had established a safe haven in a small part of Iraqi Kurdistan as well as a no-fly zone north of the 36th Parallel in April 1991, the Iraqi regime and the Kurdish rebel leadership worked out an arrangement of joint control over the Kurdish towns and complexes. The situation remained very tense throughout the summer, as the above document shows, and following a series of smaller uprisings the regime finally decided, at the end of October, to withdraw its troops from most of the Kurdish region altogether. MEW]

(MEW ref.: 3003/1-A).

DOCUMENT 33

PAGE 1

[In handwriting:] Shaqlawa

Confidential, Personal and Urgent Message

Time and Date of Issuance

-------------------------

4 Muharram 1410 H.

5/8/1989 M.

To: Security of the Sections / The Political Branches

From: Security of Erbil

Ref.: /Sh.5//11655/

The Presidential Cabinet has informed us of the following:

It has been decided to inform all the responsible officials not to refer to the matter of the number of enemy prisoners-of-war when speaking to the media or others, because this would place responsibility on Iraq before the International Committee of the Red Cross and other international organizations who are concerned with the matter of prisoners-of-war, and could be exploited by the Iranian regime and its well-known tactics in the matter of prisoners-of-war. Please take the necessary measures.

[Signature]

Colonel of Security

Director of Security of Erbil Governorate

Ibrahim/..

[In handwriting:] It will be disseminated by telex to the Security officers of the regions.

      [Signature]

      7/8

____________________________________________________________

[In the aftermath of the devastating eight-year war between Iran and Iraq, one of the most difficult matters that remained unsettled has proven to be the issue of prisoners-of-war. Some prisoner exchanges have taken place, but until today, both countries continue to hold enemy POWs. Both sides have attempted to conceal pertinent information; the above document is a clear statement of intent on the part of the Iraqi government not to release information about Iranian POWs held in Iraq. Forensic field research conducted by MEW and Physicians for Human Rights in Iraqi Kurdistan, in 1991 and 1992, indicating that some Iranian POWs were executed extrajudicially, and clandestinely buried. MEW]

(MEW ref.: 52/2-E).

DOCUMENT 34

PAGE 1

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

Secret

Security Directorate of Shaqlawa

Ref.: Sh.S.T./1326

Date: 30/12/1987

To: All the officers of Security in the region

Re: Bodies of the Convicts

The General Directorate of Security, Crimes Section, has informed us in letter ref. 20926 of 24/12/1987 that the Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, Legal and Administration Bureau, has indicated in their letter ref. 3357 of 7/12/1987 that one of the main reasons why the bodies of convicted persons are being kept in the morgues beyond the latter's capacity is the delay by the staff of Special Security in informing the relatives of the convicts. This in turn has led to a delay in the executions of other convicts.

The director of General Security was informed about the above, and he [lit.: the respected sir] has ordered that the relatives of the convicts be informed.

Please follow up this matter personally, and implement the directives.

[Signature]

Lt.-Colonel of Security

Director of Security in Shaqlawa

[In handwriting:] Q.

    We have read and implemented the above

    [Signature]

    30/12

[In handwriting:] 3061

    31/12

____________________________________________________________

[This gruesome document speaks for itself. Perhaps it is significant that it dates from December 1987, only two months before the start of the Anfal campaign. Limitations on morgue capacity presented a bottleneck to the quick disposal of executed guerrillas and other persons, and thus may have informed the policy during Anfal of lining people up in front of trenches and then shooting and burying them. MEW]

(MEW ref.: 77/11-C).

DOCUMENT 35

PAGE 1

Part 1

One Arab Nation With an Immortal Message

The Socialist Arab Ba`ath Party

Iraq Region

Northern Bureau Command

Secretariat

(Confidential and Personal)

Ref.: 1035

Date: 13 Rajjab 1409

    19/2/1989

To: Subdirectorate of Military Intelligence, Northern Sector

Re: Review

Comradely greetings:

[Concerning] your letter S.3/Q.3/221 of 5/2/1989:

1. It has been decided to carry out the death penalty against all the criminals whose names are listed in your above letter. There is no need to send them to the Investigation Court of the General Directorate of Military Intelligence.

2. As for the family of the criminal deserter Abbas Bayez Balou, who are now in Erbil, we will instruct you how to deal with them in the future.

Please take the necessary measures and let us know. With regards.

[Signature]

Abd-al-Rahman Aziz Hassan

Secretary of the Northern Affairs Committee

19/2/1989

[In handwriting:] Detailed and urgent review

    [Signature]

    22/2

DOCUMENT 35

PAGE 2

Part 2

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

[Emblem of Iraqi Military Intelligence]

Presidency of the Republic

Secretary

General Directorate of Military Intelligence

Subdirectorate of Military Intelligence, Northern Sector

Confidential and Personal

Ref.: /Sh.3/Q.3/324

Date: 23 February 1989

    17 Rajjab 1409 H.

[In handwriting:] 60

    S.3

    24/2/89

To: Northern Bureau Command / Secretariat

Re: Implementation of Sentence

[Concerning] your personal and confidential letter, ref. 1035 of 19 February 1989:

On 23 February 1989, we carried out the death penalty against the criminals whose names are listed below, and who were referred to in our confidential and personal letter, ref. 221 of 5 February 1989:

1. The criminal Qader Khidr Hamad

2. The criminal Sheikh Ma`rouf Sheikh Isma`il

3. The criminal Haji Agha Bayez Balou

4. The criminal Muhammad Abdullah Ali

5. The criminal Khaled Ahmad Abdullah

6. The criminal Abdullah Agha Abdullah

Please be informed. With regards.

[Signature]

The Colonel

Director of the Subdirectorate of Military Intelligence, Northern Sector

23/2/89

(1 of 1)

Confidential and Personal

DOCUMENT 35

PAGE 3

____________________________________________________________

[The above two documents display the interaction between the all-powerful Northern Bureau in Kirkuk and local officers of the military intelligence agency. The Northern Bureau responds to a letter from military intelligence, saying that there is no need to take certain arrested "criminals" to court; they can be executed summarily. A few days later, military intelligence responds that the executions were carried out. The word "criminal" is routinely used to denote political cases, including the cases of army deserters and guerrillas. MEW]

(MEW ref.: 93/1-D).

DOCUMENT 36

PAGE 1

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

[Emblem of the Iraqi Republic]

Presidency of the Republic

Secretary

General Directorate of Security

Ref.: Sh.A.H./Q.4/783

Date: 29/4/1989

    23 Ramadan 1409 H.

Confidential and Personal, For Addressee Only

To: The Security Directors of the Governorates

Re: The Census Forms

In reference to our previous directives that the Security Directorates must have background information on all Iraqis, which, at a minimum, would be the minimum information available to the Subdirectorates of Security. As the census of 1987 has provided an opportunity to prepare this record [of information], and in consideration of its extreme importance in obtaining the information in the easiest and speediest way, we have decided that once the distribution of the census forms has been completed you must act as follows:

1. To supervise their distribution [i.e., of the forms] to the Subdirectorates and to follow up personally all aspects.

2. To emphasize to the Subdirectorates that the enclosed special instructions concerning the use of the forms must be implemented.

3. To appoint no fewer than two cadres, one working in the other's absence and [both] supervised by the officer of the Subdirectorate, to organize and [classify] the forms and keep them in good order.

4. To prepare a room to store the forms.

5. To prepare wooden shelves for the forms.

6. To prepare records for cataloguing the forms according to the user's manual so as to organize them and facilitate the return of a requested form [to the shelf], and also to organize the circulation of a form during its use.

7. The Directorate of the Computer Section will train your officers in the use of the forms and the user's manual. They will visit you regularly to follow up on implementation.

DOCUMENT 36

PAGE 2

We hope that everyone will act accordingly and with precision because of [the project's] importance. Each Directorate must inform us after having carried out the necessary steps.

[In handwriting:] M. Administrative

[In handwriting:] Installations

[cc.] The Director of the section of the General Director's office

    M.M.A. [i.e., Director of the Directorate of Security] for Political Affairs

    M.M.A. for the Autonomous Region

    The Directorate of Administrative

    Affairs - Supply Section } Take the necessary

    The Directorate of Administrative measures for

    Affairs - Finance Section } implementation

(2 of 2)

Confidential and Personal, For Addressee Only

____________________________________________________________

[The importance of this document lies in its first paragraph: Original forms of the nation-wide 1987 census were obviously used by the Security Directorate for its own purposes, i.e., the policing of Iraq's citizens. Among the shipment of documents captured by the PUK from the Amn offices in Shaqlawa are seven boxes filled with original census forms, each one for an inhabitant of Shaqlawa. It is indicative of the priorities of a government when original census forms are found in the offices of its internal security agency rather than of the Ministry of Planning. This is the only reference we have found to date to the computerization of security information. It is noteworthy that in 1990 the computer section in Baghdad was offering training to provincial offices. No physical evidence of computer files is known to have been discovered during the March 1991 ransacking of security offices in northern Iraq. MEW]

(MEW ref.: 79/17-A).

DOCUMENT 37

PAGE 1

[Main document:]

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

Revolutionary Command Council

Number of the Decree: 840

Date: 4/11/1986

Decree

In accordance with the provisions of Article 42, Paragraph (a), of the Constitution, the Revolutionary Command Council, in its meeting on 4/11/1986, has decided the following:

First: To amend the text of Article 225 of The Law of Punishment No. 111 of the Year 1969 as follows:

Article 225

1. To sentence to life imprisonment and confiscate the movable and immovable property of any person who insults in any public fashion the President, or anyone acting on his behalf, or the Revolutionary Command Council, or the Socialist Arab Ba`ath Party, or the National Assembly, or the Government; to sentence him to death if the insult or attack was of a barefaced nature and was intended to incite public opinion against the authorities.

2. To sentence to a prison term of not less than seven years, or to sentence to prison and impose a fine on any person who insults in any public fashion the Courts, or the Armed Forces, or any other public authorities, or government offices or institutions.

Second: To cancel Article 226 of the Law of Punishment.

Third: This Decree will be in force from the day of its publication in the Official Gazette.

Signed/..

Saddam Hussein

Chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council

[In handwriting:] I was informed

    [Signature]

    1/12

__________________________________________________

[Cover letter:]

DOCUMENT 37

PAGE 2

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

May God Have Mercy On the Revered Martyrs

General Security

Directorate of Security of Erbil Governorate

D.Q.

Ref.: 2396

Date: 25/11/1986

To: All the Directorates of the Sections [i.e., in the Governorate] and Branches of the Center [i.e., in the town of Erbil]

Re: Amendment of a Law

The above is a copy of Revolutionary Command Council Decree 840 of 4/11/1986, which was transmitted to us in the letter of the General Directorate of Security / Legal Office, ref. 12340 of 19/11/1986. Please take note of its contents, and please take the necessary measures to mark it up [i.e., to make the change in their copy of the law].

[Signature]

Dep. Director of Security of Erbil Governorate

[In handwriting:] 26/11

____________________________________________________________

[In a totalitarian state, one does not poke fun at the president, as the above document so graphically demonstrates. Apparently, the Iraqi regime has felt sufficiently insecure to find it necessary for the Revolutionary Command Council, the country's highest legislative organ, to devote time to writing laws aimed at protecting the nation's president and institutions from public ridicule. MEW]

(MEW ref.: 56/1-C).

DOCUMENT 38

PAGE 1

Ref.: 871

Date: 8/2/1989

To: Security, Erbil / Sh.5

From: Security, Shaqlawa

In reference to your letter ref. 1657 of 30/1/1989:

We have studied and benefited from the imformation contained in our security plan of action. For your information. With regards.

[Signature]

First Lieutenant of Security

Dep. Director of Security, Shaqlawa

__________________________________________________

In the Name of God, the Merciful, the Compassionate

General Security

Directorate of Security, Erbil Governorate

Ref.: Sh.5/1657

Date: 30/1/1989

Personal and Confidential, For Addressee Only

To: The Director of Security, Shaqlawa

Re: Plan of Action for the Marshes

Having assessed the current security situation in the Marshes and studied the outcome of the large-scale operations that have been carried out against deserters and hostile elements, we have found that these elements are still engaging in sabotage activity, exploiting the Marsh areas as launching pads for these operations. It has also become clear to us that those groups are still operating in accordance with political organizational directives received from Iran through intermediaries who infiltrate for that purpose.

In fact, the criminal Muhammad Baqr al-Hakim, the head of the so-called "Supreme Council of the Islamic Revolution in Iraq," considers those elements to be the nucleus of the so-called Islamic Army for the Liberation of Iraq and has increased his support for them in his public statements. Moreover, following the failure of their plans in the northern region, all the hostile movements based in Iran are now concentrating their efforts on the dispatch of a number of their Iranian-trained agents to contact the hostile groups in the Marshes with a view to using them as a new playing card to destabilize our country's security situation, particularly after the changes that have been made in the Iranian regime's policy as a result of its acceptance of the cease-fire agreement, which has affected the activities and operations of the hostile movements

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inside Iran. Accordingly, we must reassess our actions, study the plan of action that was

approved last year, examine the positive action that has been taken with a view to its intensification, and evaluate the negative results so that we can ascertain their causes.

[In handwriting:] We have studied and benefited from the

information contained in the security plan of action

      [Signature]

-More-

// P. 2 //

On 5/12/1988, a conference was held at the headquarters of the Directorate of Security of the Governorate of Basra in the presence of the respected general director. The conference discussed the security situation in the Marsh areas, as well as courses of action to be taken in order to put an end to the hostile presence there, and the duties of the security services in the southern region during the coming phase. The following topics were discussed:

First: The directives which the hostile groups in the Marshes have received from Iran through its agents, namely:

1. Action must be continued in the Governorate, while maintaining operational security and secrecy.

2. The groups must inflict the greatest possible damage on the authorities without themselves suffering any losses.

3. Operations must be conducted outside the Marshes in order to deflect suspicion from the Marsh groups and maintain their operational security, i.e., one operation must be conducted in the Marshes while a number of operations must be carried out in other areas by the same groups so as to deflect suspicions.

4. The groups must be tested by instructing them to carry out an operation and then having it carried out by a different group in order to see whether any of the other groups claim to have carried it out themselves.

5. Details of the operations must be reported accurately, giving special attention to time and place.

6. Information must be gathered on important personalities.

7. Every means must be used to discover the methods employed to expose the freedom fighters.

8. Relationships must be established with military personnel, giving special attention to their rank and units.

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9. Information must be transmitted in code.

10. Liaison must be established between the groups dispersed in the Dhi Qar, Misan and Basra Marshes in order to coordinate their activities.

11. The groups must be instructed to obtain confidential telegrams, as well as the codes and transmission frequencies used by military units.

-More-

// P. 3 //

12. Persons who collaborate with the authorities may be killed and their property may be seized and used for Islamic action. When they are taken prisoner, they may be tortured in order to obtain information from them. Such prisoners may be killed and their children may be kidnapped in order to further the objectives of the so-called freedom-fighters.

13. Foreigners working for foreign companies may be kidnapped and killed, particularly those from non-Islamic countries, since they are working to strengthen the regime.

14. Persons who surrender to the authorities and inform on the believers may be killed.

15. Army deserters who are killed during the campaigns are to be regarded as martyrs whose bodies do not need to be washed and shrouded before burial.

Second: Emphasis was placed on the plan of action for the Marshes, which was adopted in 1987 and approved by the President and Commander-in-Chief (May God Protect Him), and which included the following:

1. Strategic security operations (such as poisoning, explosions and the burning of their houses) must be conducted against the saboteurs in the Marsh areas through friends and trusted persons in order to show them that the Marsh areas are not safe havens.

2. A number of competent and trustworthy deserters living in the Marshes must be selected and assigned to assassinate hostile elements and carry out missions to further our security activities in return for the granting of a pardon in respect of their desertion and evasion of military services and all the legal consequences thereof, provided that they carry out the assignments.

3. Carefully planned operations must be conducted in areas in which hostile groups are concentrated, provided that we can guarantee the secrecy and effectiveness of those operations, and provided that their results are commensurate with the size of the military units participating therein.

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4. The Popular Army duties of persons living in or on the periphery of the Marshes shall be confined to the maintenance of security in those areas, parrticularly in the governorates of Basra, Misan and Dhi Qar.

-More-

// P. 4 //

5. Vehicle traffic between the town centers and the Marsh areas must be controlled by the Security Committees in the governorate.

6. Punitive and deterrent operations, such as the burning and demolition of houses, must be conducted from time to time against residents of the Marshes who are found to have collaborated with the saboteurs so as to deter others.

7. The joint committees that have been formed to track down deserters and draft dodgers must intensify their activities.

8. The principle of economic blockade must be applied to the villages and areas in which saboteurs are operating. This will be achieved in the following manner:

    - [through] the withdrawal of all food supply agencies;

    - [through] a ban on the sale of fish;

    - by taking the most severe measures against persons who smuggle foodstuffs to deserters, outlaws and hostile groups;

    - by prohibiting goods traffic from entering those villages and areas.

At the same time, the tribal chiefs and prominent personalities in those areas must be summoned and given to understand that these measures will not be lifted unless they cooperate effectively in ending the presence of the deserters.

9. Consideration must be given to the possibility of regrouping the Marsh villages on dry land, which is easy to control, and opening roads and points of access deep inside the Marshes.

10. Launches and motorized barges operating in the Marshes and nearby areas must be confiscated and totally banned.

11. Helicopters, supported by military aircraft, must be made available, if requested by the Security Directorates concerned, in order to help them discharge their duties in this regard.

-More-

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// P. 5 //

12. The Committee chaired by our Comrade, the Secretary of the Southern Bureau, shall be responsible for the full supervision of dealings with the inhabitants of the Marshes and for the formulation of clearly defined guidelines to which everyone must adhere.

13. Emphasis must be placed on the role of the Party and mass organizations in educating the inhabitants of the Marshes and strengthening their nationalist spirit.

Third: The above-mentioned conference stressed that the action taken during the coming stage must be in accordance with the following guidelines:

1. Action taken against the hostile groups in the Marshes must be commensurate with the threat that they pose, since they are disrupting security and stability in the southern region.

2. Continued efforts must be made to infiltrate those groups by sending undercover agents to join their ranks.

3. Sophisticated security operations must be undertaken against subversive elements in the Marsh areas.

4. The locations of deserters and hostile groups must be accurately determined through air reconnaissance in conjunction with information received from confidential sources.

5. The economic blockade must be maintained in a more effective manner in view of its positive role in suppressing the activities of the criminal elements in the Marshes by restricting their access to the vital requirements of everyday life.

6. Various security methods must be used to lure the hostile elements so that we can capture them and track down their supporters inside and outside the Marshes.

7. There must be continued coordination with the Air Force so that maximum use can be made of helicopters in operations to hunt down deserters.

8. A search must be made for new sources [of information] located in the depths of the Marshes.

-More-

// P. 6 //

9. The Security Directorates in the southern governorates must schedule interviews with agents after gathering full information on them, particularly in regard to the following

aspects:

    - the tribe to which the agent belongs;

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    - his previous political background and affiliations;

    - whether he is a native of the Marshes or a deserter who took refuge there;

    - an evaluation of the security performance and usefulness of each source.

For your information and benefit. Please acknowledge.

[Signature]

Lt.-Colonel of Security

Dep. Director of Security in Erbil Governorate

[In handwriting:] 30/1/1989

..

____________________________________________________________

[The above document is one of the "smoking guns" found by Middle East Watch among the 18 tons of documents stored in the United States. Though found in the offices of the Security Directorate of the Kurdish town of Shaqlawa, it does not concern the Kurds but the population of the Marshes in southern Iraq. It outlines a "Plan of Action" to regain control over the Marsh areas, where many army deserters had found refuge during the protracted war with Iran. Among others, the document refers to official approval for policies ranging from imposing an economic blockade to the poisoning of opponents and the burning of homes. The existence of such policies has indeed been confirmed in eyewitness testimonies. The senior authority in the southern governorates is the Southern Bureau of the Ba`ath Party, which plays a role similar to that of the Northern Bureau in the Kurdish areas.

In the above translation, MEW has benefited from an earlier version that appeared in the report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Iraq, Mr. Max van der Stoel (Report on the situation of human rights in Iraq, pp. 94-98) to the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, February 19, 1993, E/CH.4/1993/45). MEW]

(MEW ref.: 32/1-B).