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EGYPT

Human Rights Developments

Egypt continued to be ruled under emergency law, imposed in October 1981 following the assassination of President Anwar el-Sadat. The law, which had previously been in continuous effect from June 1967 until May 1980, continued to provide the executive branch with exceptional legal powers that, in effect, voided the human rights guarantees set forth in Egypt's constitution. Those provisions included broad discretion to arrest and detain any individual and the option to try civilians in military courts. The independent, Cairo-based Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) stated in a July 1993 submission to the U.N. Human Rights Committee that the continuous application of the state of emergency had yielded "another constitution for the country" and "led to wide transgressions on the part of the security apparatus."

The political violence that marked 1992 continued in 1993, presenting the government of President Hosni Mubarak with a security crisis of serious proportions, as the death toll and human rights violations mounted. The government appeared increasingly sensitive to criticism of its human rights performance, and created human rights departments in key ministries, beginning with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in February. Similar offices were organized in the Justice and Agriculture Ministries, and plans were announced for an office in the Ministry of Interior. It appeared that the primary task of the Foreign Ministry unit was to rebut the findings of international human rights organizations.

President Mubarak was elected to a third six-year term in a rubber-stamp national referendum on October 4, following his nomination on July 21 by the People's Assembly, the elected parliament overwhelmingly dominated by the ruling National Democratic Party. Mr. Mubarak ran unopposed. The Ministry of Interior said that almost sixteen million people (84 percent of those registered to vote) cast ballots, with 96.28 percent voting in favor of the president's re-election.

Armed Islamist extremists stepped up attacks in 1993 on Christian citizens, senior government officials, policemen and high-ranking security officers, causing casualties among intended victims and bystanders. There were also sporadic attacks during the year on tour buses and boats and at tourist attractions. From March 1992 to October 28, 1993, a total of 222 people lost their lives in the unrest: thirty-six Coptic Christians and thirty-eight other citizens; six foreigners; sixty-six members of security forces; and seventy-six known or suspected militants killed while allegedly resisting arrest. The latter died in raids by and shoot-outs with security forces, and at the scene of planned attacks. On March 9-10, a series of raids in Cairo, Giza, Qalyubiya province (north of the capital), and Aswan left dead a reported fifteen suspected militants and five members of security forces. In one of the raids in Giza, part of metropolitan Cairo, the fatalities included the wife and child of Khalifa Mahmoud Ramadan, a suspected militant who was himself killed. The government-owned Middle East News Agency (MENA) reported on March 10 that the raids were part of "a plan for an all-out confrontation to apprehend the fugitive leaders of the terrorist elements." The operations had been "prepared and planned at a high level," MENA reported, and had involved all of Egypt's internal security forces, including the powerful General Directorate of State Security Investigation (SSI).

The government's determination to crush the militants led to human rights violations on a large scale, including arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detention and torture. The government also resorted to military courts to try civilians accused of "terrorism" offenses. As of November 3, thirty-nine death sentences had been handed down against Islamist militants by these tribunals, and seventeen executions had been carried out.

Freedom of association, already significantly restricted in Egypt, was further circumscribed by measures designed to tighten state control of unlicensed political groups and private mosques, and to thwart Islamist electoral victories in the country's professional associations. Freedom of expression suffered a serious setback in October, when the government clamped down on the moderate Islamist opposition with the detention of two leaders of the Labor Party, a legal political party that is allied with the Muslim Brotherhood, and two journalists from the party's twice-weekly newspaper, al-Sha'ab. Coupled with the summoning of the newspaper's chief editor and board chairman for questioning, the move was prompted by articles in the newspaper critical of the Mubarak government.

The dismissal in April of Interior Minister Gen. Abdel Halim Musa did not bring an end to mass and arbitrary arrests, incommunicado detention, and torture. Ironically, the new interior minister, Gen. Hassan el-Alfi, said in a July interview with the Saudi weekly magazine al-Majalla that it was only Egyptian authorities' determination to "adhere to the law and human rights" that had hindered the elimination of extremist violence. In October, he claimed that reports about torture and other rights violations in Egypt were "mere purposeful rumors that seek to distort Egypt's image."

Despite public pledges by Gen. el-Alfi, the practice of "hostage-taking"-the arrest of family members of suspects wanted by authorities-continued. In one particularly shocking case, the parents and twelve other relatives of Ahmed Farouq, a thirty-year-old construction worker, were detained between August 20 and September 4, to put pressure on Farouq to give himself up. Farouq's father told EOHR that he was detained at SSI headquarters in Giza, where he was severely beaten while bound at the feet and wrists. His wife was beaten in his presence and suffered wounds to the head when thrown against a wall. Farouq himself surrendered to authorities on September 2. Police sources were reported as saying that he confessed to involvement in three bombing attacks in Cairo, including one in August that injured the interior minister and killed five people. Farouq died in custody the next day, after being held at Lazoughly, the Cairo headquarters of SSI, where torture of political and security detainees wasroutinely practiced. Farouq's death certificate noted that there were several bruises on his face, suggesting that he may have been tortured during interrogation. Farouq's father was not allowed to identify his son's body at the morgue, bring others to the burial, or hold a funeral. In a September 23 press release, EOHR noted that Farouq's death was the fourth since May believed to have been caused by torture.

Two other events were particularly egregious: a siege of Imbaba, a neglected neighborhood of one million residents in metropolitan Cairo that had become a stronghold of Islamist militants, and a raid on a mosque in Aswan, Egypt's southernmost city. On December 8, 1992, thousands of security force members began a weeks-long search-and-arrest operation in Imbaba. EOHR documented major abuses during the campaign. Security forces "entered the homes of suspects who belonged to Islamic militant groups in the late hours of the night and occasionally destroyed furniture and terrorized the inhabitants, assaulting and insulting them," EOHR reported. There were widespread arbitrary arrests. Persons were detained on mere suspicion or because they had beards; periods of detention typically ranged from fifteen to thirty days. Relatives of wanted suspects-including mothers, sisters and wives, and children as young as eight years old-were arrested "to force [suspects] to give themselves up or to obtain information from victims as to their whereabouts." EOHR found that some of the women were beaten with rods, forced to undress and sexually molested by officers at the Imbaba police station. Numerous male detainees were moved to security police camps on the Cairo-Alexandria desert road, where they were blindfolded and questioned by SSI officers. According to EOHR, torture methods during interrogation included beating with coiled wires, beating on the soles of the feet with the body held in awkward positions, electric shocks on sensitive body parts, and standing outdoors while naked, followed by dousing with cold water.

Among those from Imbaba held incommunicado at these camps was twenty-three-year-old Amhed Hamido al-Sawi, who was arrested on December 9, 1992. Ten days later, on December 19, al-Sawi's family was informed that he was dead. His brother was asked to sign a statement that al-Sawi had committed suicide. EOHR believed, however, that al-Sawi died under "severe torture" and submitted a written complaint to the prosecutor general. As of November 1993 EOHR had received no reply.

On March 9, 1993 in Aswan, eight militants and one policeman reportedly were killed when security forces raided the Rahman mosque, which was frequented by members and supporters of the Islamic Group, the clandestine organization that had claimed credit for numerous acts of political violence. Security sources cited by MENA claimed that the mosque was being used to store weapons and explosives and to harbor gunmen believed to have killed one local policeman and wounded another three days earlier. MENA reported that "terrorists opened fire on police, who retaliated in kind." But eyewitnesses interviewed by foreign journalists disputed the government's version of events, claiming that those inside the mosque were unarmed and that the assault, with tear gas and automatic weapons, began without warning.

Despite the aggressive pursuit of militants, anti-government violence only escalated during the year. There were attempted assassinations in Cairo of Information Minister Safwat el-Sherif in April and Interior Minister el-Alfi in August. Policemen and security officers, including high-ranking commanders, were frequently injured or killed in targeted attacks. On March 3, for example, Lt. Col. Mahran Abdel Rahim, an intelligence officer in Dayrut in Upper Egypt, and his eight-year-old son Muhammed were killed when assailants fired at their car. The Islamic Group claimed responsibility, stating: "Bullets against bullets, according to the law of retaliation."

Coptic Christians continued to live in fear and to fall victim to sectarian-inspired violence by suspected Islamist extremists, particularly in Upper Egypt. On April 19, author Shihatah Aziz Jirjis was shot and injured by two gunmen in his home in Dayrut, a a town north of Assyut. On July 22, Dr. Fawzi Mikhail, a gynecologist in his sixties, was shot dead in Manfalout, near Dayrut. Also in Dayrut, pharmacist Philip el-Komous was killed on August 5, Sami Shawfiq Mounis was shot and killed in his shop on September 3, and professor Edward Nakhou'a Iskandar was shot and killed on his way to work at a local college on September 21. Iskander was the thirty-fifth Christian killed since March 1992 by assailants believed to be Islamist extremists. Militants have also targeted the Christian community byattacking and killing security forces guarding churches. On March 6, gunmen shot two policemen stationed outside a church in Aswan, killing one of them; on May 9, in Qusiyah, a police officer guarding the Catholic church was killed, and a policeman was shot and wounded at the Coptic church thirty minutes later; and on September 28, gunmen shot at two police guards in front of the Anglican church in Dayrut, killing one of them.

During the twelve months under review, the government signaled its intention to clamp down on independent spheres of activity within civil society. It narrowed the limited political space available to opposition groups lacking legal status, notably the Muslim Brotherhood; announced a plan to phase out private mosques; and tightened controls over elections in nongovernmental professional associations. Also, moderate Islamist political leaders and journalists were interrogated and arrested for exercising their right to freedom of expression.

In December 1992, the People's Assembly passed an amendment to the political parties law. The amendment barred political activity by groups that lacked legal status and prohibited political alliances between such groups and legalized political parties. Although the government had previously tolerated its electoral alliance with legalized opposition political parties, the Muslim Brotherhood-by most accounts the largest and most vigorous opposition group in Egypt-was thus further excluded from formal participation in the political process.

In another development with serious implications for freedom of speech and association, the government announced in December 1992 that the state would gradually assume control over all of the country's mosques, in an apparent attempt to eliminate the influence of radical Islamists at private religious institutions. Only about 30,000 of Egypt's estimated 170,000 mosques were built and are administered by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. Sheik Ahmad Hindi, a ministry official responsible for Minya, Assyut and Sohag provinces in Upper Egypt, where militants have a strong base, said in February that the 2,835 private mosques in his area (of a total of 4,950) would be brought under government control over the following three years.

Al-Ahram Weekly newspaper reported in March that the ministry also planned to dictate topics for the sermons by imams at Friday noon prayers. According to the head of the ministry's Mosques Administration, Sheik Mansour al-Rifa'i Obeid: "Exercising control over all mosques is meant to guarantee that the sermons delivered therein are in strict compliance with true Islamic teachings." Dr. Muhammed Ali Mahjoub, the minister of religious affairs, said in an interview published in April in the semi-official October weekly that "the government respects freedom of speech" but added that "[i]f the word is poisonous and subversive, it must be stopped....It is known that the ministry is earnestly working to annex all private mosques to control the Islamic call and secure the people ideologically."

The Mubarak government also set down controversial regulations governing elections in the country's professional associations, which have about 1.2 million members nationwide. Without consultation with the associations, a bill-which provided for what the state termed "guarantees for the democracy of professional associations"-had been rushed through the People's Assembly on February 16 and signed into law by President Mubarak the next day. Mubarak said that Law No. 100 of 1993 was intended to prevent "a minority from imposing its dictatorship over the majority." It mandated that 50 percent of the registered members of an association had to cast ballots; if this turnout fell short, a quorum of 33 percent had to be met in a second round of voting. In the continued absence of the required number of voters, the law provided for the appointment of a panel of judges and senior association members to administer the organization for a six-month period, until new elections could be organized. In the past, low voter turnout had facilitated victories by well-organized Islamists. Professionals across the political spectrum expressed vigorous opposition to the law.

In a move that belied the government's stated commitment to freedom of expression, state security prosecutors in October detained and questioned Salah Bedaiwy and Ali el-Qammash, journalists from al-Sha'ab, the twice-weekly newspaper of the opposition Labor Party; party vice-president Dr. Muhammed Helmi Murad, a seventy-three-year-old lawyer and former minister who writes for the paper; and partysecretary-general Adil Hussein. Prosecutors also summoned for questioning the newspaper's chief editor, Magdi Hussein, and Ibrahim Shukri, the head of the Labor Party and chairman of the board of the newspaper. Why We Say No to Mubarak, a book of previously published articles by Dr. Murad and Adil Hussein, was ordered confiscated because, according to prosecutors quoted by Agence France-Presse, it constituted "propaganda for extremist ideas and a justification of terrorist operaitons."

In newspaper articles, Dr. Murad had advocated a boycott of the October 4 presidential referendum and called on President Mubarak to disclose details of government arms sales and purchases. According to EOHR, the charges against Dr. Murad included "contempt of the person of the President of the Republic." Among the charges against the two journalists-who had written articles critical of security forces and state agricultural policies-was publishing ideas harmful to national unity and social peace, a crime under the July 1992 "anti-terrorism" amendments to Egypt's penal code. In a newspaper interview on October 11, President Mubarak commented that Dr. Murad and the journalists were "supporting terrorism."

Egyptian courts figured prominently in human rights developments during the year. President Mubarak, using his powers under the emergency law, began to refer cases of civilians accused of "terrorism" offenses to three-judge military courts in October 1992; the hanging of those condemned to death by such courts commenced in June 1993. The president maintained that military court trials were necessary in cases where "quick measures" were required, and that the national interest permitted "no room for extended procedures." In December 1992, the Supreme Military Court in Alexandria handed down judgments in two trials. Eight militants were sentenced to death (seven of them in absentia), and the condemned man in custody was hanged on June 13. Other military court trials of civilians followed, including several mass trials each with over thirty defendants. Between December 1992 and November 3, 1993, military courts issued thirty-nine death sentences against Islamist militants; seventeen of the condemned men have been hanged.

Those trials violated human rights standards on three counts. First, the verdicts could not be appealed to a higher tribunal, as required by Egypt's obligations under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which it is a state party. Civilians sentenced to death by military courts were denied the right provided to civilians condemned to death by regular criminal courts, who could appeal verdicts by applying for review by the Court of Cassation, Egypt's highest appeals court. Second, the military justice system-as part of the executive branch of government-lacks the fuller independence of Egypt's civilian judiciary. Last, the treatment of defendants and the court proceedings raised serious concerns about denials of due process and fair trial. Defense lawyers repeatedly complained that they were afforded insufficient time to review case files and prepare adequate defenses. They also said that some of their clients had been tortured and denied access to legal counsel during the initial days of custody and questioning.

In juxtaposition to the outcomes of military trials, on August 14 a civilian security court ruled as inadmissible confessions that had been extracted under torture, and acquitted the defendants of murder charges for lack of other evidence. The twenty-four Islamist militants (eight of them in absentia) accused of involvement in the assassination of People's Assembly speaker Dr. Rifaat al-Mahjoub in October 1990, were acquitted of murder charges by the Supreme State Security Court. Ten were sentenced to prison terms for other offenses. The president of the court, Judge Wahid Mahmoud Ibrahim, said that forensic medical reports indicated that some of the defendants had been subjected to the "ugliest forms of torture," including electric shocks. In a scathing rebuke to Egypt's security apparatus, Judge Ibrahim observed that the use of torture to obtain confessions constituted "proof of the failure and incapacity of the police to discover the truth."

Some scholars at al-Azhar-the prestigious institution of Islamic teaching and research supported with state funds and closely tied to the government-continued during the year to play a role in legitimizing intolerance in the name of religious orthodoxy. In an important development in June, one prominent sheik publicly condoned the killing of Muslims deemed apostates. Sheik Muhammed Ghazaliappeared on June 22 as a defense witness at the security-court trial of thirteen defendants accused in the 1992 assassination in Cairo of the secular Muslim writer, Dr. Faraj Foda. Sheik Ghazali testified that a Muslim who opposed the implementation of Islamic law (as did Dr. Foda) was an apostate "liable to be killed." He further stated that in the absence of an apostasy law in Egypt, Islamic sharia law dictated that an individual who killed an apostate should not be punished, even though such an act constituted an encroachment on the state's authority. The testimony appeared to justify, and condone, murder; as EOHR noted, it constituted "an invitation to extrajudicial killing."

In another development, Sheik Mahmoud Abdel Mutagalli, another prominent scholar who sits on the fatwa (religious ruling) committee of al-Azhar, sought the banning of a low-priced series of forty contemporary and historical books on Islam, reprinted and published by the Ministry of Culture. According to Ahmed Selim, an official at the government's General Egyptian Book Organization as quoted by al-Ahram Weekly, the aim of the series was "to confront, from a liberal perspective, the misguided ideas embraced by the extremists." One of the books was Islam and the Rules of Government, written by sharia court judge Sheik Ali Abdel-Raziq. Originally published in 1925, the controversial book, which led to Abdel-Raziq's dismissal, postulated that an Islamic caliphate as a system of government was not prescribed in the Quran or the Sayings of the Prophet Muhammed, and that Islam and a civilian government therefore were not incompatible. Sheik Mutagalli was said to be particularly disturbed by the inclusion of this volume, and he petitioned al-Azhar Grand Sheik Ali Jad el-Haq to ban the series. The grand sheik referred the matter to Azhar's Islamic Research Center (IRC) for an opinion as to whether the contents of the books contradicted Islamic law. The IRC in previous years had taken unilateral action to ban and confiscate books on various political and religious subjects. Although its censorship authority under the law extended only to the Quran and the Sunna (The Traditions of the Prophet Muhammed), security forces and the General Egyptian Book Organization had taken action on the basis of al-Azhar's opinions.

The Right to Monitor

Locally based human rights groups are tolerated but not legalized, and continued to suffer from government restrictions on freedom of association. During 1993, the eight-year-old Egyptian Organization for Human Rights (EOHR) was able to carry out field work and advocacy, and issued numerous reports and press statements. But despite the group's growing prominence and international stature, it continued to be denied cooperative working relationships with, and information from, Egyptian authorities responsible for human rights oversight, most notably the prosecutor general's office. EOHR was forced to operate in a legal limbo because authorities had refused to grant it formal status as a private organization (Egypt's 1964 law governing private associations reserves broad power for the state to deny or rescind legalization of any group). The region-wide Arab Organization for Human Rights, founded in 1983 and also based in Cairo, was similarly denied legal status under the same law, as has the Egyptian section of Amnesty International.

The government was increasingly vocal in criticizing international human rights groups in 1993, declaring, for instance, that it no longer intended to respond to Middle East Watch. In an interview with Rose al-Yousef magazine published in June, the director of the newly created human rights department in the Foreign Ministry, Na`ela Gaber, stated that Middle East Watch had "held a press conference in Cairo [in July 1992 to release a major report on torture]. Their goal was to stir up trouble and to politicize the human rights issue, tying it to American aid. Now, there is no longer any dialogue with this organization since it does not respect the rules by which we operate." In a twenty-three-page statement to Middle East Watch dated June 9, the Foreign Ministry denied the existence of a pattern of human rights violations in Egypt. It stated: "We are astonished by the ever increasing and dutiful concern of MEW with regard to the conditions of the terrorists, and to the publication and repetition of their accusations....Our analysis of all the reports that the organization has prepared about Egypt...[indicates that it] has not proven the existence of a prevailing pattern of human rights violations." The ForeignMinistry also complained that MEW had "attacked Egypt and its ruling order" in press articles.

In a disturbing development, in February security forces in Upper Egypt interfered with the work of Middle East Watch and EOHR, and questioned two defense lawyers with whom the groups had made contact. Harassment included close surveillance by security forces in plainclothes. SSI questioned the executive director of EOHR about Middle East Watch's activities, with a request that additional information be provided as work proceeded. In a letter of protest to the Interior Minister, Middle East Watch said that these actions compromised the ability of rights monitors to gather information and created an atmosphere of intimidation. There was no reply to the letter. But the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, in its June statement, made note of this complaint and asserted that "security agencies reported that [Middle East Watch], during [its] visit, overstepped the internationally acknowledged functions regulating the activities of nongovernmental organizations concerned with human rights."

U.S. Policy

Public criticism of Egypt's human rights performance by U.S. officials continued to be taboo, despite mounting documentation of the Mubarak government's poor record. Middle East Watch understood, however, that behind-the-scenes U.S. government pressure was responsible for the creation of human rights departments in key ministries.

As in prior years, the only public comments about human rights were found in the State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in 1992, issued in February 1993. The country report accurately stated that many basic rights in Egypt "continue to be significantly restricted" and that "the pattern of human rights abuse...remained essentially unchanged in 1992." Among other violations, the State Department identified security forces' excessive use of lethal force; the widespread pattern of arbitrary arrest and detention; the systematic use of torture and the failure of authorities to investigate effectively allegations of abuse; substantial restrictions on freedom of peaceful assembly and association, including the right to form political parties; and important limitations on freedom of religion.

In an April 15 letter to Middle East Watch, the State Department's Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs asserted that its "interest in human rights conditions in Egypt will continue to be an important element in U.S.-Egyptian relations." It further stated that concerns and specific cases regarding torture, arbitrary arrest, prolonged detention without trial, and discrimination against Christians and women had been "raised...with Egyptian authorities at high levels."

Clinton administration officials made clear that bilateral relations with Egypt were guided by broad U.S. foreign policy concerns in the region. In testimony on April 28 before the House Foreign Affairs Committee's Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs Edward P. Djerejian described the basis of bilateral relations. He cited Egypt's "important role in contributing to stability in the Middle East and furthering U.S. objectives in the region." He noted that Egypt "has provided essential support for the U.S. military presence in the Middle East," and said that U.S. security assistance to Egypt "has paid off handsomely."

The Clinton administration requested $2.15 billion in aid for Egypt for fiscal year 1994: $1.3 billion from the Foreign Military Financing Program; $1.8 million in International Military Education and Training program funds; $815 million in Economic Support Funds (ESF); and $35 million in food assistance. A small portion of the ESF is allocated for judicial exchanges and training, including human rights training, and the development of information systems in the People's Assembly, Egypt's elected Parliament. As in past years, the administration made no effort to link the continuation of assistance to the Mubarak government's undertaking of specific measures to improve human rights. In fact, Secretary Djerejian, pledged on April 28 that the administration would make its best effort to maintain aid levels in subsequent years. There was no evidence that President Clinton, in his meetings with President Mubarak in Washington, D.C., on April 6 and October 25, raised the subject of Egypt's poor human rights record.

In violation of U.S. law, security assistance to Egypt continued despite a pattern of gross humanrights violations, including torture and long-term detention without charge or trial. Under Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act, these rights abuses should trigger either a cutoff of military aid or an explanation by the administration of the "extraordinary circumstances" that merit the continued assistance.

The Work of Middle East Watch

In 1993, Middle East Watch pursued a strategy of research, information dissemination and advocacy, in order to document and publicize rights violations, maintain pressure on the Egyptian government to acknowledge and remedy abuses, and urge the U.S. and the European Community to use their considerable leverage to press the Mubarak administration to correct abuses.

In January and February, Middle East Watch carried out fact-finding in Egypt, traveling to Cairo and six other cities and towns. One focus of the mission was to obtain information about the treatment of Christians, who constitute at least ten percent of Egypt's population of fifty-nine million. Middle East Watch examined how government policies and practices have undermined religious tolerance, and obtained testimony about abusive and violent actions by Muslim militants. The problems documented included specific anti-Christian activities by extremists and their followers; the state's discriminatory restrictions on church construction and repair; the mistreatment of Christians and Muslim converts to Christianity by SSI officers because of their suspected peaceful religious activities; and the failure of security forces to respond adequately to complaints by Christians about law-breaking and violence by extremists. The report based on this research was scheduled for an early 1994 release.

Middle East Watch also worked closely with the Fund for Free Expression, another division of Human Rights Watch, to provide support for its March-April mission to Egypt, undertaken jointly with the American Association of Publishers, to investigate freedom of expression and association. The mission was particularly concerned with the ways in which the tension between the government and Islamist opposition was manifested in freedom of the press, television and radio broadcasting, book publishing, and limitations on freedom of association-principally the restrictions on political parties and professional associations.

Following up on Middle East Watch's on-site inspections of six Egyptian prisons in 1992, a book-length report on prison conditions was released in February in Cairo. In July, Middle East Watch issued a newsletter about the trials of civilians before military courts, arguing that the trials violated international human rights norms.

Middle East Watch communicated human rights concerns directly to Egyptian government officials several times during the year. In February, a letter of protest was delivered to then-Interior Minister Musa about security forces' interference with the work of human rights monitors during a fact-finding mission to Upper Egypt that month. In May, a representative met in Washington with Egypt's ambassador to the U.S., Ahmed Maher el-Sayed, to discuss incommunicado detention and torture, and specific recommendations for addressing these abuses. The ambassador was presented with eight letters written by Middle East Watch to senior Egyptian officials between March 1992 and February 1993 that had gone unacknowledged.

In July, Middle East Watch and the Fund for Free Expression wrote to President Mubarak, expressing concern about the court testimony of Sheik Muhammed Ghazali, described above. The letter called on the president to denounce the sheik's legal opinion condoning the killing of apostates and to confirm publicly that the rule of law in Egypt would not be undermined by private religious versions of justice. In September, Middle East Watch wrote again to President Mubarak, urging that an independent investigation be conducted of the suspicious death in SSI custody of security suspect Ahmed Farouq on September 3. The only reply to these and earlier communications was the lengthy June 9 statement by the Foreign Ministry, which failed to address the specific cases raised.

In advance of President Mubarak's two visits to Washington, D.C., in April and October, Middle East Watch urged that human rights issues be discussed in Congressional and executive branch meetings with the Egyptian leader. An October newsletter, designed as a briefing document for policymakers, provided an overview of major human rights developments since December 1992. Middle East Watchselected Hisham Mubarah, a lawyer and executive director of the Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, as one of the thirteen international human rights monitors honored by Human Rights Watch in observance of Human Rights Day, December 10.

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