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CROATIA

Human Rights Development

Denial of citizenship on ethnic grounds, eviction from homes on the basis of past military affiliation, interference with freedom of the press, lack of due process for alleged "war criminals," and mistreatment of minorities and refugees blemished Croatia's human rights record in 1993.

Croatian ethnicity, parentage and place of birth-rather than residency-were the criteria most frequently used to determine whether or not a person was granted Croatian citizenship. Without citizenship papers, a person was not entitled to welfare and medical benefits and was in danger of losing his or her job. Many non-Croats who were denied citizenship and could not keep their jobs or support their families chose to leave Croatia, thereby decreasing the number of minorities there. Some Croats also were denied citizenship. Those who appealed the denials sometimes were granted decisions in their favor.

In 1991, the Croatian Defense Ministry had assumed the right to ownership of all property belonging to the Yugoslav Army (JNA)-including apartments and homes owned by the JNA and in which its personnel lived. Throughout 1993, an administrative office of the Defense Ministry continued to forward eviction notices to the occupants of such homes-usually non-Croatian former JNA personnel. If the occupants did not move by the specified date, soldiers forcibly evicted them. The persons being evicted were not granted the opportunity to appeal to an independent entity, such as a civil court.

In 1993, the Croatian government completed its two-year-long effort to control the independent Split-based daily newspaper, Slobodna Dalmacija. Early in the year, a new editorial board wasinstalled and most of the paper's journalists resigned to protest the government's de facto takeover. Feral Tribune, a bi-monthly satirical and politically critical paper formerly part of Slobodna Dalmacija, was threatened with a 50 percent tax on all profits. Such a tax usually is imposed against pornography and would force the paper out of business. Novi List, a private daily based in the port city of Rijeka, continued to publish as of November without direct government interference.

Despite the promulgation of a law that would amnesty all those who fought on behalf of Serbian forces in Croatia, local and municipal courts continued to try persons accused of organizing the Serbian rebellion in Croatia. Although the charges may or may not have been justified, there were several cases in which the defendant was not granted due process, such as the ability to call witnesses in his defense, or was mistreated while in police custody. Most of those indicted were tried in absentia in violation of due process norms.

Physical violence against Serbs declined in 1993, but abuses against Muslim refugees from Bosnia-Hercegovina escalated during the year. On several occasions, Muslims and some Croats and Serbs without proper refugee status-and some with proper papers-were forcibly repatriated to Bosnia. During the summer, the Croatian police arbitrarily arrested and detained Muslim and some Bosnian Croat refugees in a stadium and then bused them to Bosnia against their will. In general, the Croatian government stopped repatriating refugees after the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and foreign governments publicly protested such actions.

The Croatian Interior Ministry improved its human rights record somewhat; abusive police chiefs were dismissed, and discipline within the police force was enforced. However, the military police continued to destroy property and physically abuse civilians throughout Croatia. The Croatian Defense Ministry did little, if anything, to ensure that military police officers observed a code of conduct.

Thirty percent of Croatia remained under the control of Serbian insurgents throughout 1993. Armed conflict between the Croatian army and troops belonging to the self-proclaimed Serbian Republic of Krajina escalated, beginning in January when the Croatian army launched an offensive to recapture a dam, an airport and a strategic bridge near the city of Zadar. Conflict in the areas of Sibenik and Zadar continued throughout the year. In September, Croatian Army troops launched a second offensive in the Lika region where they destroyed eleven Serbian villages and arbitrarily executed at least sixty-seven Serbs, including civilians. In October, the Croatian government reported that it had suspended two military commanders pending an investigation of their role in the massacre. Serbian forces responded to the Croatian offensive by attacking Croatian cities, including the suburbs of the country's capital, Zagreb. During the fighting in January and September, both sides attacked civilian targets.

Most non-Serbs were expelled from Serbian-controlled areas of Croatia by early 1993. After the Croatian offensive against Serbian-occupied areas on January 22, the few Croats that remained in the Krajina region were expelled by Serbian forces. Serbian authorities in the Knin area took steps to ensure the temporary safety of some Croats until arrangements could be made for their transfer to Croatian-controlled territory. Killings, beatings and intimidation continued against non-Serbs and liberal Serbs living in Serbian-controlled areas throughout the year.

The Right to Monitor

The Croatian government generally did not interfere with the ability of domestic and international groups monitoring human rights in their country. Peace groups in Zagreb, Rijeka and Osijek worked to prevent forcible evictions and other human rights abuses in their respective localities and brought their concerns to the attention of the local and national authorities. Similar human rights groups in Split, however, were harassed and intimidated by local extremists, and some of their members had their personal property vandalized or destroyed. A Croatian Helsinki Committee was formed in 1993, and on several occasions itsmembers met with Croatian government officials to discuss human rights concerns. The Serbian Democratic Forum in Zagreb and its affiliate in Rijeka continued to document violations of human rights against Serbs throughout Croatia.

Several international and multilateral groups also monitored human rights abuses in Croatia, including Serbian-controlled areas of Croatia. Civilian affairs officers and police monitors for the U.N. peacekeeping mission regularly monitored human rights in Serbian-controlled areas of Croatia and in part of western Slavonia, which is controlled by the Croatian government. UNHCR officials also documented human rights violations against refugees, displaced persons and civilians throughout Croatia. When refugees were arbitrarily arrested and held for repatriation during the summer, U.N. officials initially were denied access to those arrested. The field staff of Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the Special Rapporteur for the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, also monitored human rights violations both in Serbian-controlled areas of Croatia and in areas under Croatian government control. However, in areas where active fighting or military operations were taking place, both Croatian and Serbian forces denied access to international observers.

The Role of the International Community

The United Nations

The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) faced considerable obstacles in Croatia in 1993. Originally deployed in May 1992 to oversee the terms of the January 1992 cease-fire agreement brokered by then U.N. Special Envoy Cyrus Vance, the 15,000-troop UNPROFOR mission was not able to fulfill its mandate of preventing the outbreak of armed conflict between Croats and Serbs in January and September; it was not able to ensure the demilitarization of the U.N. Protected Areas (UNPAs); it could not prevent the continued displacement of non-Serbs from Serbian-controlled areas of Croatia; and it did not repatriate a single person who had been forcibly displaced from Serbian-controlled areas of the country. A U.N.-created civilian police unit (CIVPOL) was the most active in protecting the human rights of the local population in the UNPAs, and CIVPOL officers had the most success in implementing their part of the UNPROFOR mandate. However, U.N. peacekeeping forces generally failed to impose their authority in the UNPAs.

In January 1993, after months of tenuous peace in Croatia, the U.N. struggled to prevent the start of a new war there. After the January 22 Croatian army offensive, however, Serbian forces broke into a number of U.N.-monitored storage facilities and retook heavy weapons that had been turned over to joint U.N.-Serbian control. On January 25, the U.N. Security Council demanded an end to the fighting, ordering the retreat of Croatian troops to the pre-offensive front lines and the Serbs' return of the heavy weapons seized from the storage areas. Although the Croatian government and the local Serbian authorities signed an agreement to implement the terms of the U.N. resolution, neither side complied, and the U.N. did little to enforce its own demands.

On February 19, the Security Council extended UNPROFOR's original one-year mandate in Croatia to March 31, 1993. On March 30, the Council extended the mandate for another three months. In late September, the Croatian government and parliament threatened to cancel the acceptance of U.N. troops on its territory when UNPROFOR's present term expired on November 30, unless steps were taken to implement all U.N. resolutions and to seek enforcement of UNPROFOR's mandate. On October 4, the Security Council voted to extend for six months UNPROFOR's mandate, noting that sanctions against Yugoslavia would not be lifted until it used its influence with Serbs in Croatia to make peace with the Croatian government in Zagreb.

The European Community

For the most part, the European Community's (E.C.) involvement in Croatia consisted of supporting the U.N. peacekeeping mission. France, Denmark and Belgium each contributed troops to the UNPROFOR operation. The E.C. maintained its own monitoring mission in Serbian-controlled areas of Croatia, usually assisting in the exchange of prisoners and remains of the deceased between the two warring factions. Representatives of the Croatian government and the Krajina Serb authorities were brought to the negotiating table under the auspices of the joint E.C.-U.N. Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.

Generally, the E.C. was silent on the issue of human rights abuses in Croatia. However, in the spring of 1993, it vocally condemned Croatia's support of Bosnian Croat forces. In June, the E.C. threatened to "initiate restrictive measures" against Croatia if it did not withdraw its military support from Bosnia. On July 19, the E.C. met again to debate ways in which it might apply diplomatic pressure to Croatia. Although German opposition prevented the community from considering the imposition of sanctions against Croatia, E.C. representatives agreed to warn Croatia that such sanctions were possible in the future.

U.S. Policy

U.S. policy toward the Republic of Croatia in 1993 was overshadowed by concern for the conflict in neighboring Bosnia, and the U.S. did not respond sufficiently to human rights abuses for which the Croatian government should be held accountable.

Since recognizing Croatia in April 1992, the U.S. government has maintained diplomatic relations with the newly formed republic. When Bosnian refugees were arbitrarily arrested and detained in a stadium in Zagreb, U.S. Ambassador Peter Galbraith visited the stadium and lodged a protest with the Croatian authorities. In September, Galbraith made clear to President Franjo Tudjman that the U.S. would hold the Croatian government accountable for abuses perpetrated by the Bosnian Croat forces, which were politically, economically, and militarily dependent on the Croatian government in Zagreb.

The Work of Helsinki Watch

In order to monitor civil and political rights and laws of war violations in the country, Helsinki Watch maintained one or more staff members in Croatia throughout 1993. Staff representatives investigated human rights violations and sustained contacts with human rights activists, government officials, officials in Serbian-controlled areas and members of the press in Croatia. Helsinki Watch also conducted three missions to Croatia. In January, together with the Women's Rights Project of Human Rights Watch, Helsinki Watch investigated the treatment of Bosnian women who had sought refuge in Croatia. Staff members of Helsinki Watch and the Women's Rights Project spoke widely on the subject of rape and mistreatment of women in the conflicts in Croatia and Bosnia.

Between May and September, Helsinki Watch investigated civil and political rights in areas under Croatian government control for a report on the topic. In June, Helsinki Watch contributed a section on U.N. peacekeeping efforts in Croatia and Bosnia for the Human Rights Watch thematic report titled The Lost Agenda: Human Rights and U.N. Field Operations. Between May and September, Helsinki Watch continued its research of U.N. operations in the former Yugoslavia, including Croatia, for a detailed report on the UNPROFOR mission. Throughout the year, evidence was collected on war crimes perpetrated during the siege and after the fall of Vukovar in 1991. A report on the siege of Vukovar and current U.N. efforts to gather evidence of war crimes in the city will be released in 1994. Helsinki Watch and Human Rights Watch also lobbied for the establishment of an international tribunal to try those accused of war crimes in Croatia and Bosnia. For further information, see Bosnia and Hercegovina section covering the work of Helsinki Watch.

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