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NIGERIA

Human Rights Developments

Nigeria, which began the year with promise of a presidential election, ended the year with the stark reality of the return of military dictatorship and the abolition of all democratic institutions. The November 17 coup was the direct result of a final attempt to cling to power by Nigerian leader Gen. Ibrahim Babangida, who annulled the results of a presidential election held in June. The furor that followed the election's annulment succeeded in sweeping General Babangida from power in late August but not in preventing the installation of an unelected civilian interim government hand-picked by the outgoing regime. In mid-November, Defense Minister Gen. Sani Abacha forced the head of the interim government to resign, effectively staging what is the seventh coup d'etat in Nigeria's thirty-three years of independence. On assuming power, Gen. Abacha banned all existing democratic institutions, including the legislature, the political parties, and state and local elected offices.

Although Babangida had manipulated the transition process and had seen to it that the presidential election would be contested by two of his friends, Moshood Abiola and Bashir Tofa, the June 12 election represented to the nation an important if imperfect opportunity to move toward democracy. One of the most unfortunate effects of the annulment was the impetus thereby provided to the divisive influences of ethnicity and regionalism, which have tainted Nigerian politics since independence. The three largest ethnic groups are the Hausa-Fulani, who dominate the northern half of the country; the Yoruba, who control the southwest; and the Ibo, who are the largest group in the southeast. Historically, political power has been dominated by the Hausa-Fulani, the majority of whom are Muslims. The Yoruba, who form the majority in the commercial centers of Lagos and Ibadan, and the Ibo are largely Christian. The strong showing throughout the country by Abiola, a Yoruba Muslim from the south, would have provided the nation's more than 250 ethnic groups an unprecedented opportunity for unity, which was lost in the post-cancellation crisis.

Although election observers gave their approval to the election, Babangida first suspended and later annulled the vote without announcing the final results, which were later published by the Campaign for Democracy (CD), a loose coalition of human rights and other grass-roots organizations. It remained unclear if the election would have been permitted to stand had Tofa, a northern Hausa-Fulani Muslim, won or whether Babangida would have been unwilling to leave office in any case.

Riots erupted in Lagos in early July after peaceful demonstrations organized by the CD were overtaken by local thugs. Over one hundreddemonstrators and other innocent victims were reported killed by military and security forces. The Civil Liberties Organisation (CLO), a Lagos-based human rights group, reported that some 250 protestors were secretly detained for four weeks at a notorious, remote island detention camp. The British government, Nigeria's largest investor, the U.S., the European Community and Canada condemned the election annulment and cut off aid.

Additional strikes and demonstrations by the CD, the Nigerian Labor Congress, the oil workers unions and other organizations were held in August, September and October. Support for the strikes was generally strong in Lagos and Ibadan but less so in the northern and eastern areas of the country.

On August 26, due largely to opposition within the military to his continued stay in office, Babangida resigned as head of state and retired from the military. He named an "interim government," headed by industrialist Ernest Shonekan, to take over from the military. Shonekan had previously headed a group of civilians co-opted by General Babangida in an attempt to placate critics of his decision to postpone his departure from politics from January to August 1993, his third such postponement. Although Shonekan was named commander-in-chief of the armed forces, Defense Minister Gen. Sani Abacha, who was the only military hold-over from the previous regime and who was widely believed to be responsible for pressuring General Babangida to leave office, actually held the reins of power.

Soon after assuming office, the interim government called elections for February 1994. However, a large segment of Abiola's party indicated it would not participate, and the CD called for a boycott of voter registration in November. The government postponed the convening of the National Assembly until November 4, citing financial constraints as the reason, but political dissention was believed to be the actual cause of the postponement.

The following week, two unannounced moves by the government followed immediately by a ruling in a Lagos High Court, increased popular disaffection with the government. On November 8, without warning, the government raised fuel prices by nearly 700 percent, prompting the NLC to call for a nationwide strike. The same day, Nigerian television announced that all elected local government council were to be immediately dissolved "in preparation for the local government elections scheduled for February 1994." Two days later, a Lagos High Court ruled that the interim government was illegal; the government immediately appealed the decision.

The next week, while the country was in the throes of strikes and demonstrations, came the announcement that had been feared since the political crisis began. Shonekan and his cabinet had been forced out of office by General Abacha, who banned the legislature, the political parties, the National Electoral Commission, and state and local governments, which were to be replaced by military commanders. All political meetings and associations were also banned. No timetable was set for the return to civilian rule.

Predictably, in this tumultuous year, human rights abuses were widespread, most notably ethnically-based attacks, killings of demonstrators, detentions of activists and journalists, and interference with freedom of expression and association.

The most devastating abuses were related to attacks against the Ogonis, a minority group inhabiting the oil-producing delta region of Rivers State, who have vocally protested the destruction of their land and culture by multinational oil companies and Nigerian military forces. From July onwards, approximately 1,000 Ogonis were killed in attacks believed to be sanctioned by governmental authorities. Villages were destroyed, and thousands of Ogonis were displaced. The government did not provide aid or investigate the attacks.

Ogoni spokesperson Ken Saro-Wiwa became the target of a government harassment campaign, and in June he was arrested and detained for over one month, during which time he was denied access to medical treatment despite a critical heart condition. On July 13, Saro-Wiwa was charged before a Port Harcourt magistrates court with six counts, including unlawful assembly and sedition, relating to a boycott by the Ogonis of the June election. Two other members of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People, which Mr. Saro-Wiwa headed, were also charged. Later that month, all three were released on bail, and their trial was adjourned.

In another ethnically related incident, death sentences were handed down between December 1992 and March 1993 to thirteen alleged participants-all members of the Kataf, a largely Christian ethnic minority-in ethnic and religious riots that had taken place in May 1992, in the northern state of Kaduna. The riots began after Katafs attacked a community of Hausa-Fulanis,and then spread to the cities of Kaduna and Zaria, where they took on a religious dimension. Hundreds of Katafs were arrested after the riots, and at least thirty-seven languished in detention for over a year.

The trials were conducted before two Special Tribunals, where all constitutional guarantees were suspended and from which there was no right of appeal. One group of six defendants received widespread attention because of the extraordinary level of abuse at the trials and the prominence of one of the defendants, retired Maj. Gen. Zamani Lekwot. The six are believed to have been made scapegoats in reprisal for their criticism of abuses against the Katafs. The involvement of the government in ensuring the convictions of the Lekwot group was made most apparent by the promulgation of Decree 55, announced in December 1992 but made retroactive to the previous July, which barred inquiries into abuses of constitutionally guaranteed rights during the trial.

The death sentences were sent for review to the National Defense and Security Council (NDSC), which in January 1993 replaced the Armed Forces Ruling Council. A suit brought by the Constitutional Rights Project, a Lagos-based human rights organization, resulted in a stay of execution for the Lekwot group. In late August, the NDSC commuted all thirteen death sentences to five years in prison and ordered the immediate release of all detained Katafs held without trial.

The press, which became increasingly outspoken in 1993, suffered its worst government assault in the country's history, beginning in March, when the editor of the Kaduna-based Reporter, owned by a former presidential candidate banned by Babangida in 1992, was arrested. In late May, the paper was proscribed. Two new and outspoken publications, The News and Tell, endured an incessant campaign of government-sponsored harassment. In May, The News was shut down and its entire editorial staff declared wanted for arrest. The magazine was later banned for several months.

In May, the Nigerian government unveiled the Treason and Treasonable Offenses Decree, which, although never published, announced a prohibition on promoting "ideas that minimize the sovereignty of Nigeria." It was believed to have been directed at the Ogonis as well as at human rights activists and outspoken journalists. In announcing the decree, the Justice Minister said that it could be interpreted to convict "[a]nybody who acts alone or conspires with anybody...either by word or publication of any material capable of disrupting the general fabric of the country or any part of it." Conviction under the decree would result in death. Two weeks after the announcement, following international protest, the decree was suspended, and it has not been revived.

After the election was aborted, the government assault on the press intensified. Five media were shut down in July --Concord Press, owned by Abiola; Punch; the Sketch group; Abuja Newsday; and The Observer. All except Newsday were proscribed by decree the following month. Four Tell journalists were arrested in August and detained for approximately two weeks.

On August 16, the Babangida government promulgated Decree 43, which contained a litany of restrictions on the press, including punishment by a ten-year prison term or stiff fine or both for publishing "false information"; the establishment of an office for each paper in Abuja within one year; and an order to submit all newspapers to the Information Secretary. If implemented, the decree's financial burdens alone would force the closure of most of the the country's independent press.

On taking power in November, General Abacha lifted the bans on the news media, but warned them to be careful about what they published.

Abuses by members of the police and security forces, a persistent human rights problem in Nigeria, remained severe, and virtually no members of these forces were held accountable for their actions. Cases of harassment and shooting of innocent travelers at illegal checkpoints, torture and extrajudicial killings of "suspects," and the widespread use of bribes to ensure release from detention continued throughout the year. There were no initiatives by the government to investigate the deaths in the July Lagos riots.

As in previous years, abysmal prison conditions, including overcrowding, insufficient and poor quality food, and the lack of sanitation, water and medical treatment contributed to an estimated prison death rate of more than 1,000.

Nigerian universities were closed down during most of 1993 largely due to strikes by various unions. In early May, the government lifted the seven-year ban on the National Association of Nigerian Students. After repeatedunsuccessful attempts to negotiate with the government, the still proscribed academic staff union called a strike in May over issues including lack of autonomy and conditions of service. The government responded by announcing a decree that reclassified teaching as an essential service and called for the dismissal of striking teachers. After a public outcry the decree was "set aside." Following meetings with the interim government in September, the academic union agreed to call off its strike.

The Right to Monitor

Attacks on human rights monitors escalated shortly after Babangida's November 1992 decision to postpone the transition. A crackdown from late November through early January included the arrest and short-term detention of a number of individuals involved in pro-democracy activities; forcible police entry into the headquarters of the CD and CLO and the seizure of materials; the interruption of a number of gatherings sponsored by human rights and pro-democracy groups; and the confiscation of a magazine that carried an interview with Femi Falana, president of the National Association of Democratic Lawyers. Printers of human rights and pro-democracy materials were detained for several days and their print shops were temporarily closed by police.

Incidents of harassment continued through the winter and spring. In late February, security agents invaded the CLO offices, took away documents, and questioned CLO officers about their funding sources and other matters. Femi Falana and Dr. Beko Ransome-Kuti, CD chair and president of the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights, were briefly arrested in March. In April, Falana and Ransome-Kuti were again briefly arrested and CD leaflets were confiscated on several occasions. CD activists were also arrested elsewhere in the country.

Hundreds of human rights and pro-democracy activists, labor leaders, academics, students and workers were arrested after the elections were canceled. Many were held for weeks without access to their families or defense counsel. In addition to the detentions, security agents conducted raids on offices of human rights activists and pro-democracy groups. In one raid on CD headquarters on August 9, forty security agents arrested everyone in the office, including visitors, and removed files.

Ransome-Kuti, Falana and Chief Gani Fawehinmi, all leaders of the pro-democracy movement, were arrested in early July and detained at Kuje Prison near Abuja. The three were charged with sedition and conspiracy to incite violence and initially refused bail. They were informed that, in addition to their criminal charges, they were also subject to detention under Decree 2, Nigeria's administrative detention decree. The three were denied access to their lawyers, families and doctors, despite serious health concerns of both Dr. Ransome-Kuti and Chief Fawehinmi. The Abuja High Court granted them bail in late July, but they were not released then because of the Decree 2 detention orders. They were finally released in August as one of the first acts of the interim government.

Many other activists were arrested in early July as well, including three members of the CLO, Wale Shittu, Femi Adeluga and Emma Nweke, who were detained for twenty-five days for possession of CD leaflets. Hundreds of protestors were arrested throughout the country following various demonstrations held from August through October. Most were released, but it was feared that some unidentified activists might have remained in detention.

U.S. Policy

The U.S. had a strong human rights policy towards Nigeria throughout 1993, raising criticism of the government's abuses and its manipulation of the electoral process. In the period shortly before the election, the White House refused a request for a meeting with General Babangida, who was in the U.S. on other business. On June 10, Michael O'Brien of the U.S. Information Agency issued a statement that a threatened postponement of elections was "unacceptable" to the U.S. government. Following protests by the Nigerian government, the statement was amended to say that a postponement of the election would cause "grave concern" to the U.S. But even that was too much for Nigeria, which reacted by expelling Mr. O'Brien and by withdrawing the accreditation of eight nongovernmental observers from the U.S. to monitor the election.

Less than twenty-four hours after the election was canceled, the State Department released a statement "deploring" the move. The U.S. quickly cut off $450,000 in aid for military training and followed by canceling an $11 million grant to the Ministry of Health and other smaller grants totaling lessthan $1 million. The rest of the bilateral aid, which funded humanitarian programs through nongovernmental channels, was left intact. One of the State Department's most commendable actions on Nigeria was a suspension of arms sales, which has only rarely been used elsewhere and represents an important initiative by the Clinton administration. In addition to these steps, Nigeria's military attaché in Washington was ordered to leave and a U.S. security assistance officer was withdrawn from Nigeria. Military relations between the two countries were also reduced. In July, the U.S. announced that it would review commercial military sales on a case-by-case basis with the presumption of denial. U.S. citizens were urged to defer travel to the country.

At an August 4 hearing on Nigeria's political crisis before the Africa Subcommittee of the House of Representatives, Assistant Secretary of State for Africa George Moose promised "additional steps" if a civilian government was not in place on August 27. Following the installation of the interim government, some lower-level Nigerian government officials were permitted to meet with U.S. officials in Washington, but a meeting requested by Mr. Shonekan with high-ranking officials was refused.

An unfortunate aspect of U.S. policy towards Nigeria was the decision in the middle of the upheaval to replace Amb. William Swing, who during his brief tenure strongly promoted observance for human rights in Nigeria. Ambassador Swing left Lagos in September to be replaced by Amb. Walter Carrington, who, among his previous academic and political posts, worked in the office of former Congr. Mervyn Dymally and also briefly served as ambassador to Senegal.

In a strong speech delivered at Ambassador Carrington's swearing-in ceremony on October 25 and released in Lagos, State Department Counselor Timothy Wirth criticized Nigeria's failure to further the transition process and promised that the U.S. would maintain the above-mentioned restrictions on aid and other forms of cooperation until there was "genuine progress toward fulfilling the aspirations of the Nigerian people for unhindered, democratically-elected civilian government."

In a statement on November 18, the State Department "condemn[ed]" General Abacha's coup, and said it was "assessing new measures...which may be necessary to reinforce those taken in the wake of the June 12 election."

The Nigeria chapter in the State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices in 1992, released in January 1993, provided an accurate view of human rights abuses in Nigeria, devoting thorough discussions to such widespread problems as police abuses and prison conditions. One shortcoming of the report was the absence of discussion of the trials of the Kataf suspects and the promulgation of Decree 55.

The Work of Africa Watch

Africa Watch published four newsletters on Nigeria. The first, published in December 1992, highlighted the renewed crackdown on human rights and pro-democracy groups. In March, "Military Injustice" discussed the death sentences of General Lekwot and the other convicted Katafs. A newsletter released in early June, "Threats to a New Democracy," was based in part on an Africa Watch mission to northern Nigeria to investigate the government's involvement in communal violence and discussed manipulation of the transition and interference with civil institutions. "Democracy Derailed," released in August, detailed human rights abuses surrounding the election annulment.

Africa Watch wrote protest letters to the government after the elections were suspended in June and again in July to protest the arrests of pro-democracy activists. A press release was distributed in June regarding the election's annulment. In August, Africa Watch testified before the Africa Subcommittee of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee.

Africa Watch wrote to Mr. Shonekan in September, raising issues including attacks on the Ogonis and restrictions on freedom of expression and asking him to respect the results of the June 12 elections. Also in September, Africa Watch called on the IMF/World Bank to take human rights into consideration in negotiating a new agreement with Nigeria. On October 6, to coincide with an address by Shonekan before the U.N. General Assembly, Africa Watch issued a press release raising various human rights concerns.

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