LAND
MINES IN ANGOLA An
Africa Watch Report Human
Rights Watch New
York!Washington!Los Angeles!London Copyright 8 February 1993 by Human Rights Watch. All rights
reserved. Printed in the
United States of America. Library of
Congress Catalog Card No.: ISBN
1-56432-091-X Africa Watch Africa Watch was established in
May 1988 to monitor and promote observance of internationally recognized human
rights in Africa. The chair of Africa
Watch is William Carmichael. Alice
Brown is the vice chair. Janet
Fleischman and Karen Sorensen are research associates. Urmi Shah and Ben Penglase are associates. Human Rights
Watch Human Rights Watch is composed
of Africa Watch, Americas Watch, Asia Watch, Helsinki Watch, Middle East Watch
and the Fund for Free Expression. The executive committee is
comprised of Robert L. Bernstein, chair;
Adrian W. DeWind, vice chair;
Roland Algrant, Lisa Anderson, Peter Bell, Alice Brown, William
Carmichael, Dorothy Cullman, Irene Diamond, Jonathan Fanton, Jack Greenberg,
Alice H. Henkin, Stephen Kass, Marina Pinto Kaufman, Jeri Laber, Aryeh Neier,
Bruce Rabb, Harriet Rabb, Kenneth Roth, Orville Schell, Gary Sick and Robert
Wedgeworth. The staff includes Aryeh Neier,
executive director; Kenneth Roth,
deputy director; Holly J. Burkhalter,
Washington Director; Gara LaMarche,
associate director; Ellen Lutz,
California director; Susan Osnos, press
director; Jemera Rone, counsel; Kenneth Anderson, Arms Project
director; Joanna Weschler, Prison
Project director; Dorothy Q. Thomas,
Women's Rights Project director; and
Allyson Collins, research associate. Executive
Directors Africa Watch Americas Watch Asia Watch Juan
E.Méndez Sidney Jones Helsinki Watch Middle East Watch Fund for Free Expression Jeri Laber Andrew Whitley Gara LaMarche Addresses for
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africawatch@gn.apc.org For information
on publications please contact our New York office. CONTENTS INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY............................................................................ 1 1. HISTORY OF THE
CONFLICTS IN ANGOLA......................................................... 4 Colonial Rule..................................................................................................... 4 Independence and Civil War.......................................................................... 5 The Peace Process............................................................................................ 8 The Impact of the War..................................................................................... 9 The Future....................................................................................................... 11 2. TECHNICAL
ASSESSMENT OF MINELAYING.................................................. 13 Mine Types and Sources.............................................................................. 13 Anti-personnel
mines..................................................................... 13 Directional devicesCremote or trip initiation........................................................................................... 17 Anti-tank
devices........................................................................... 18 Dissemination Strategies
Employed............................................................ 19 Route denial..................................................................................... 19 Ambush............................................................................................ 19 Bridgehead
Mining......................................................................... 20 Defensive Mining of Key Structures
and Facilities........................................................................................... 20 Random
Dissemination.................................................................. 21 Use of Improved Explosive Devices and Booby-Traps................................................................................................... 21 Land Mine Records........................................................................................ 22 Assessments of the Total Land
Mine Threat............................................ 23 United States Involvement............................................................................ 25 3. THE HUMAN COST.................................................................................................. 26 Who are the Victims....................................................................................... 26 Where the Mines are Planted....................................................................... 28 Who Laid the Mines...................................................................................... 34 Knowledge about Minefields and Warnings Given................................................................................................................. 35 Emergency Care for the Injured.................................................................... 36 Medical Care and Rehabilitation.................................................................. 36 Social Rehabilitation....................................................................................... 38 4. THE SOCIAL AND
ECONOMIC IMPACT............................................................ 41 Repatriation..................................................................................................... 42 Moxico and the Lundas................................................................................. 42 Zaire, Uíge and Malanje................................................................................. 44 Overall Impact................................................................................................. 47 5. MINE CLEARANCE
INITIATIVES......................................................................... 49 FAPLA/FALA Teams.................................................................................... 49 SADF Involvement......................................................................................... 51 British Army Initiatives.................................................................................. 52 United States Involvement............................................................................ 54 Equator Bank, USA, Initiative....................................................................... 55 The Cap Anamur Initiative............................................................................ 56 Conclusion....................................................................................................... 57 6. LAND MINES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW.......................................................... 58 The Basic Rule: Protecting Civilians and Civilian Objects............................................................................................................. 59 Prohibition of Disproportionate
Attacks.................................................... 61 Prohibition Against Starvation of the Civilian Population........................................................................................................ 62 Recording Requirement................................................................................. 64 CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS........................................................ 66 Conclusions..................................................................................................... 66 Recommendations.......................................................................................... 68 I. General.............................................................................................. 68 II. To the Angolan Government........................................................ 68 III. To
FAPLA, FALA/UNITA, and
the Cuban Armed Forces.................................................................................................. 69 IV. To the United Nations, Western Donors
and Former Eastern Bloc Countries 69
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY To the homes, to
our camps, to the beaches, to our fields, we shall return. Agostinho
Neto, 1960 When
Agostinho Neto, the first leader of Angola's liberation struggle, spoke those
words, he cannot have imagined that more than three decades later, hundreds of
thousands of Angolans would still be waiting to return to their homes, camps,
beaches and fields. Even during the
relative peace that prevailed between the signing of the ceasefire in May 1991
and the elections in September 1992, much of the country remained uninhabitable
or dangerous. One of the main reasons
for this is the vast number of land mines in Angola. These mines have claimed tens of thousands of victims. At
the time of writing, the future of Angola looks bleak. A return to fighting, following the disputed
election results of September 1992, has claimed thousands of lives. No doubt, the widespread and indiscriminate
use of anti-personnel land mines will continue to be a significant feature of
the war, as it has in the past. This
report demonstrates that the use of land mines by both sides represents a gross
violation of basic human rights. Both
parties to the conflict deserve international opprobrium if they return to
their former tactics of land mine usage and do not clear mines laid in the
past. If
peace returns, civilian casualties due to land mines will continue. One victim interviewed by Africa Watch is A.
da S., who stepped on a mine outside a bar in his home town of Camanongue in
Moxico Province, the day after returning home just weeks after the ceasefire
was signed in May 1991. If normality
returns, and Angolans begin to reclaim the use of their land, casualties will
mount. Mines have rendered large areas
of arable land and pasture, many roads, bridges, riverbanks and villages, and
some important economic installations, off-limits to people. This report documents how this tragedy came
about and its devastating consequences for the Angolan people. It also documents what efforts are being
made to undo some of the damage. The
value of these efforts is extremely uneven, and a more concerted attempt to
eradicate land mines in Angola will be needed in the future. Chapter
one consists of a brief history of Angola and the wars that have ravaged the
country for the last thirty years. Chapter
two is a technical assessment of minelaying in Angola. It examines the makes and types of mines
that have been used, and the methods of their use. Angola itself does not manufacture mines; all the devices found
in the country have been supplied from abroad by manufacturers, governments and
arms dealers who are thereby complicit in the maiming and death of tens of
thousands of Angolan civilians. Africa
Watch has confirmed that thirty-seven types of mine have been used in Angola,
and the number is probably greater. The
total number of mines in Angolan soil cannot be known, but runs into the hundreds
of thousands or millions. Mines have
been laid for a variety of military purposes, such as protecting key
installations and denying the use of roads and bridges to the enemy. Few of these minefields have been recorded
or marked; there have rarely been any attempts to protect civilians from the
dangers they pose. Perhaps the most
common use of mines has been their random dissemination in and around
villages. While there may have been a
slender military rationale for this use, its main impact has been to render
paths, fields and villages unusable to civilians except at great personal
danger, thereby terrorizing the community.
This use of land mines is illegal. Chapter
three examines the human impact of the land mines. Angola suffers from one of the highest per head ratios of land
mine victims in the world. At least
15,000 Angolans are amputees as a consequence of stepping on land mines; about
half of these are soldiers and half civilians.
There are more disabled men than women on account of land mines, but
this may reflect higher fatality rates for women during and after land mine
accidents. Children are also
victims. Civilians are injured in their
fields, on paths, roads, riverbanks, and inside built-up areas. The medical care and physical and social
rehabilitation of these people is a challenge and a burden to Angola. Evacuation and medical facilities are
inadequate. At least 5,000 prostheses
will be needed each year for the foreseeable future for the amputees, far more
than are currently manufactured. Chapter
four looks at the wider social, economic and political impact of the
mines. Land mines represent a
formidable obstacle to commerce and free movement, to economic reconstruction,
and to the effective delivery of relief and other forms of aid. The chapter looks particularly at how mines
are preventing the rapid and safe return of refugees. Chapter
five provides an account of current initiatives to clear land mines. The major program has consisted of joint
clearance efforts by the two armies.
Major roads, the railways, key economic installations and towns have
been cleared or are in the process of clearance. However, the teams lack much basic equipment and have no
effective central coordination. In
addition, there are a number of foreign governments, private companies and
humanitarian organizations involved in mine clearance operations. Some of these programs are seriously flawed,
for example the British "training" program. Other governments and companies are notable by their absence or
small scale of involvement, for example the United States. Chapter
six consists in an overview of the legal regime ostensibly governing the use of
land mines, specifically the 1981 Land Mines Protocol. It is evident that the great majority of
land mines in Angola have been deployed in flagrant disregard for the
provisions of the Protocol. In fact,
the Land Mines Protocol has proved wholly irrelevant to the conflict in Angola,
as it has been shown to be unworkable elsewhere in the world. Africa Watch concludes that only a complete
ban on the use of anti-personnel land mines can remove the unreasonable danger
that they pose to civilians. This
report is based upon a visit to Angola in April-May 1992 by Rae McGrath,
director of the Mines Advisory Group and a consultant to Africa Watch. Additional material has been taken from
visits to Angola in November-December 1990 by Jemera Rone, Counsel to Human
Rights Watch, and September-October 1992 by Alex Vines, a consultant to Africa
Watch, and from material collected in the U.S. by Ben Penglase, an Associate of
Africa Watch. The chapter on the legal
regime was written by Jemera Rone. The
report was edited by Alex de Waal, consultant to Africa Watch. This
report was made possible by a grant to Africa Watch from Oxfam (UK), whose
assistance is gratefully acknowledged. 1. HISTORY OF THE
CONFLICTS IN ANGOLA Angola
has rarely known peace, and has never experienced democratically accountable
government, respect for human rights, or prosperity. The period between 1975 and 1991 saw a particularly brutal civil
war between the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), in government, and the União
Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA). This came to
an end with a peace accord signed in Lisbon on May 31, 1991. Following this, there was a period of peace
until the country's first multi-party elections were held in September
1992. The results of the Presidential
contest were inconclusive, but MPLA
leader President Eduardo Dos Santos had a significant lead over UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi. At the time of writing, fighting has
resumed, and the future of the country looks grim. Should
peace be established, Angola will face a huge struggle to heal the wounds
caused by the long and bitter civil war.
This process will be helped by Angola's vast natural wealth. In addition to large reserves of fertile
land, Angola possesses an abundance of diamonds and, above all, oil. Angola's
population is not known for sure, but is currently estimated at between nine
and ten million people. This consists
of various ethnic groups. The Ovimbundu
are the largest single group, forming about 37 percent of the population; the
Mbundu form 23 percent and the Kongo 14 percent. A number of other peoples make up the remainder. Colonial Rule Angola
was colonized by the Portuguese, initially to secure the coastline and to
obtain slaves for their possessions in Brazil.
In the late nineteenth century Portugal began to establish cotton
plantations for the benefit of its domestic textile industry, managed by
Portuguese settlers. Angola was also
the site of an important coffee industry, also run by the Portuguese settlers. Unlike
the British, French and Belgian colonial rulers, the Portuguese government
decided against granting independence to its African colonies in the 1950s and
'60s. This led to long and bloody
independence struggles in each of Portugal's colonies. The first shots in the Angolan liberation
war were fired in January 1961. Three
nationalist movements were formed. The
first was the MPLA, founded in
1956, and drawing most of its support from the Mbundu ethnic group around
Luanda, Angola's capital, and mixed-race Angolans. From early days, the MPLA
was a leftist organization and obtained support from the USSR and Cuba. It was led by Dr. Agostinho Neto until his
death in 1979. The Frente Nacional de
Libertação de Angola (FNLA) was
originally founded in 1957, drawing its support chiefly from the Kongo of the
north. Its leader was Holden Roberto, a
friend of President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire.
It had a nationalist ideology and received support from Zaire. In 1966, the foreign minister of the FNLA, Jonas Savimbi, denounced Roberto
as an agent of "American Imperialism" and broke away to form UNITA.
Savimbi drew most of his support from the Ovimbundu. UNITA
obtained outside assistance from Zambia and later South Africa, but for several
periods had no significant outside support at all. Savimbi espoused a variety of populist and nationalist
ideologies, but the dominating factor has been a personality cult built around
the leader himself. One
of the tragedies of modern Angolan history has been the inability of the three
movements to form a united front. They
each fought the Portuguese fiercely, but also attacked each other and did not
come close to achieving a military victory. Independence and Civil War Following
a military coup in Portugal in April 1974, the colonial government
precipitously announced its withdrawal from Angola. Along with the colonial government, 90 percent of the 335,000
Portuguese settlers left. As the
Portuguese had dominated all employment that required even minimal education,
this dealt a devastating economic blow.
Much of the basic functioning of government came to a halt. The resulting economic crisis was a severe
blow, made much worse by the continuation of the war. In the following ten years, the war was to do damage worth an
estimated $17.6 billion to the economy.
Diamond mining and coffee production collapsed. Only oil, most of it produced in the Cabinda
enclave to the north of the main part of the country, continued unchecked,
providing a vital economic base for the government. Oil provides 90 percent of the government's foreign exchange. In
January 1975, the three movements signed the Alvor Accord agreeing to a joint
interim government and an integrated national army. However, as the date for military integration neared, the
agreement broke down. By mid-1975, the
fronts were at war. The superpowers and
regional powers rushed to involve themselves.
The United States had already granted covert aid to the FNLA in January 1975. The USSR
and Cuba supported the MPLA,
which was able to seize control of Luanda, but little else. South Africa invaded Angola in support of UNITA and Zaire invaded in support of
the FNLA; by October, it looked
as though Luanda would be captured before the official date of independence,
November 11. However, a massive Soviet
airlift of military equipment and Cuban troops reversed the military tide. Zaire abandoned its invasion force and the
South Africans withdrew. The revelation
of South African backing for UNITA
and FNLA was disastrous for the reputation of the two movements in Africa, and
the MPLA was able to form a
one-party socialist government that obtained widespread diplomatic recognition. The US, however, refused to recognize the MPLA government. In
retaliation for Zairean support for the FNLA,
Angola backed Katangese separatist forces in their opposition to Mobutu. The Zairean rebels mounted an unsuccessful
invasion in 1978. Later that year,
Angola and Zaire signed an agreement to stop harboring each others' military
opponents. This led directly to the
effective military demise of the FNLACthough
it has remained as a small political movement.
However, in the early 1980s, UNITA
pushed northwards into areas formerly controlled by the FNLA, and began collaboration with the Zairean government. Despite
the success of the Forças Armadas Popular para a Libertação de Angola (FAPLA,
the Angolan army) in 1976, in the south and east, UNITA's resistance continued. The South African Defence Force (SADF) intermittently operated inside Angola in support of UNITA.
In 1976, the SADF also
formed 32 or Buffalo Battalion, from Angolan refugees, to fight inside
Angola. The largest South African
incursions were three invasions in 1981-3.
South African involvement was in part in retaliation for the MPLA government's support of the South
West African People's Organization (SWAPO)
in its guerrilla war against South African-occupied Namibia. South African incursions were often aimed at
SWAPO bases inside Angolan
territory. In
late 1983, the UN Security Council demanded that South Africa withdraw from
Angola. Shortly afterwards, Angola and
South Africa signed the Lusaka Accords, under which South Africa agreed to
withdraw if Angola ceased support for SWAPO. However, South African withdrawal was
extremely slow, and was reversed in 1985 when another invasion was launched, in
support of UNITA which was facing
defeat against a full-scale attack by FAPLA with Cuban support. The government clearly believed that if
South African support for UNITA
was withdrawn, it would be able to achieve a military solution to the conflict. US
covert assistance to UNITA, which
had been suspended by the Clark Amendment in 1976, was restarted after the
repeal of the Clark Amendment in 1985.
The US began to supply significant covert funding to UNITA in that year, and starting in
1986 provided Stinger anti-aircraft missiles. The
war intensified again in 1987, with major battles in the south of the
country. A major South African military
presence remained, and in November 1987 President P. W. Botha actually visited
South African troops inside Angola. The
SADF-UNITA plan was the capture
of the besieged FAPLA-Cuban forward base of Cuito Cuanavale. Despite massive conventional assaults, the
siege was lifted, and in March 1988 the South Africans decided that they could
not win. This also marked the failure
of UNITA to move from guerrilla
warfare into mobile warfare, and the end of any prospects of an outright
military victory over FAPLA. The SADF-UNITA defeat at Cuito Cuanavale
marked the beginning of negotiations to end the conflict. The South Africans began talks with their adversaries
at Brazzaville (Congo) and London. An
agreement was reached by the Angolan government, Cuba and South Africa,
mediated by the US and USSR,
whereby South Africa and Cuba were to withdraw their troops and Namibia was to
be granted its independence. These
elements of the agreement were implemented according to plan. However, despite some South African
pressure, UNITA was not included
in the talks, and no mention was made of the internal conflict between the MPLA and UNITA. Throughout
this period, US covert support for UNITA
continued, as did massive Soviet military assistance to the government. Throughout the 1980s, the government spent
approximately $1 billion per year on its military, about 20 percent of gross
national product. This level of investment
in war was only matched in Africa by the former Ethiopian government. It discouraged the government from seeking
to negotiate a solution to the conflict. Following
the South African withdrawal, UNITA
appeared weak. Its southern
headquarters at Jamba was isolated and vulnerable, and it made preparations to
launch a new guerrilla offensive in the north, operating across the border from
Zaire. This strategy was designed with
US assistance; in 1988 the US and Zairean armies conducted joint military
maneuvers "with the long term aim of providing UNITA with logistical support for a northern base to be sited close to the town of
Quimbele."[1] (In 1990, UNITA
was forced to withdraw in the face of a major FAPLA offensive in the south, but
Jamba remained safe; meanwhile intensified UNITA
operations began in the north.) The Peace Process Also
in 1988, the USSR signalled that
it was no longer prepared to continue arming the Luanda government ad
infinitum; it would be necessary for the MPLA
to negotiate an end to the war. In
January 1989, President Dos Santos made the first peace offer to UNITA.
This was a radical break with his former warlike stance, but still fell
short of recognizing that UNITA
was a political as well as a military force.
This led to a peace process brokered by eight African nations and a
meeting in Gbadolite, Zaire, on June 22, at which Dos Santos and Savimbi shook
hands and agreed on an immediate ceasefire.
However, the details of the agreement, which remained secret, were
disputed by Savimbi shortly afterwards; he denied that he had agreed to go into
exile while UNITA was integrated
into the MPLA government. By July, the war had resumed, with UNITA launching major offensives. In
August, the African leaders met again in Harare, Zimbabwe, to try to salvage
the peace agreement. President Mobutu
of Zaire, the chief mediator in the Gbadolite agreement, was heavily criticized
for his hasty and vague manner of negotiation, and was instructed to pressure
Savimbi to accept the deal. Savimbi
angrily rejected this and accused Mobutu of not being a neutral mediatorCan
ironic charge, as Zaire was now the main base for UNITA's supply, and Dos Santos was also unhappy with Mobutu's
role. Retaliating to this charge,
Mobutu briefly suspended the clandestine supply of US arms to UNITA through Zaire. The
following eighteen months were to see, simultaneously, the most sustained
efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement, and some of the fiercest fighting of
the entire war. In September and
December 1989, FAPLA launched major offensives aimed at capturing the UNITA-held town of Mavinga in Cuando
Cubango Province. UNITA was pushed back, and in February
1990, the town fell. The government
then launched air strikes on the UNITA
headquarters of Jamba, reportedly injuring Savimbi himself. In
October 1989, President Bush met with Savimbi and pressured him to resume peace
negotiations. However, covert military
assistance was continued. In March
1990, Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard
Shevardnadze met at the Namibian independence ceremony and agreed to cooperate
in the search for peace. In April, the
Portuguese government was named as mediator. Five
sets of inconclusive talks were held over the next eight months, deadlocked
over UNITA's demand for formal
recognition as a political party by the MPLA,
the question of the formation of an integrated national army, and the timing of
elections. Under pressure from the USSR, in December 1990, the MPLA announced the creation of a
multi-party system and other far-reaching political and economic reforms. This broke through the diplomatic impasse
and raised hopes for a ceasefire, and in January both sides agreed to a peace
accord. While
the final rounds of the peace talks continued in early 1991, both sides mounted
major military actions to try to secure their positions before the announcement
of a ceasefire. There was heavy
fighting in April as UNITA tried,
unsuccessfully, to seize Luena, provincial capital of Moxico. Hundreds of civilians and soldiers were
reportedly killed. In
Lisbon on May 31, 1991, President Eduardo dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi signed
the peace accord that formally brought to an end the civil war. The agreement specified that a civilian
government should be established based on the result of free multi-party
elections, monitored by the UN. The two
armiesCFAPLA and UNITA's army
Forças Armadas para a Libertação de Angola (FALA)Cwere to be integrated, with
the majority of the estimated 300,000 soldiers being demobilized. A joint military commission was established
to organize this. One of its tasks was
to coordinate the clearance of land mines. The Impact of the War During
the war, foreign powers have poured weaponry into Angola. The USSR
supplied billions of dollars worth of military equipment to Angola, including
500 battle tanks and over 150 combat aircraft.
The Cuban military presence peaked at 50,000 troops in 1988, and did not
drop below 25,000 until well after the gradual withdrawal began in April
1989. The South African military effort
was estimated to cost $2 billion in 1988 alone. The full extent of US covert assistance to UNITA has never been
disclosed, but it certainly ran in the tens of millions of dollars in the late
1980s. The
war witnessed widespread human rights abuses by both sides.[2] There was much deliberate killing and
wounding of civilians. Civilian
properties were frequently looted or destroyed. Whole villages have been burned.
Foodstuffs and other items indispensable for the survival of civilians,
such as cattle and plough oxen, were taken.
UNITA took many civilians, including children, by force to serve in its
armed forces or to be auxiliaries.
FAPLA also recruited boys and men by force. The
war was fought in a manner that reduced much of Angola's population to a state
of famine. There were no recognized
front lines, and fighting raged backwards and forwards over large areas of the
country. As a result, a very large
proportion of the population was directly affected by the war, and an even
larger number of people lived with the pervasive fear that fighting could come
to their locality at any time. The
widespread use of land mines, especially on roads and paths, was a crucial
factor in creating famine. The threat
of land mines prevented free movement of people and commerce, and proved a
serious obstacle to relief efforts. During
1990, serious food shortages threatened much of the country. According to estimates by the US Office of
Foreign Disaster Assistance, up to 10,000 people died in the first four months
of the year. In September, the United
Nations estimated that about 1.9 million Angolans in nine central and southern
provinces faced famine. About three
quarters of those at risk were in areas made inaccessible for relief. About 1.2 million people were in the central
Planalto of Huambo and Bíe provinces and the neighboring areas. This, the most fertile and densely populated
part of Angola, was the center of UNITA's war effort. UNITA aimed to destabilize the government by preventing it from
exercising any form of authority in these provinces. This strategy, together with the shifting battle lines, meant
that the delivery of relief to the Planalto by
establishing tranquil zones or safe passage agreements would be possible
only if UNITA dramatically revised its military strategy. In
1990, about 150,000 people were estimated to be at serious risk of famine in
the UNITA-controlled southeastern provinces of Moxico and Cuando Cubango, with
a much higher number suffering less extreme deprivation. Here, the chronic nature of the conflict had
worn down much of the population to the brink of complete destitution. Because the area was securely controlled by
UNITA, cross-border relief from Zambia or Namibia was a possibility (and indeed
was provided by at least one humanitarian organization). However, consent for a larger relief
operation by the UN or International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) depended upon government
permission. The Angolan government was
emphatic that it would not compromise its sovereignty by allowing cross-border
relief efforts into these areas, without a general ceasefire. It rejected UNITA plans for corridors from
Namibia, claiming that they would be used to smuggle arms. After
diplomatic pressure, the Angolan government began to consider proposals for
neutral relief corridors in July 1990.
US and UN missions to Luanda began to discuss details of how such a scheme
would work. After prolonged
negotiations between the US State Department and the MPLA government, a plan for relief corridors was announced on
September 24. Five "peace
corridors" were envisaged, including two cross-border from Namibia. The UN coordinated the deliveries, and the ICRC and private voluntary agencies
participated. The first convoy moved on
November 2. Both
sides were deeply mutually suspicious and ready to use famine relief as a
weapon. The program met repeated delays
from both sides, and on December 21 the government halted the relief corridors,
alleging that UNITA had violated the agreement by destroying a bridge. The UN immediately suspended its
operations. No more convoys moved along
the peace corridors until March 1991. The Future Under
United Nations supervision, Angola held its first multi-party elections on
September 29 and 30, 1992. In the
220-seat assembly, the MPLA won
129 seats and UNITA won 70. In the
Presidential election, Jose Eduardo dos Santos won 49.6 percent of the votes
and Jonas Savimbi received 40.1 percent.
Nine other candidates, including FNLA
leader Holden Roberto, shared the remainder.
Because dos Santos had failed to win an outright majority, a run-off
between him Savimbi was scheduled to occur within thirty days. This
did not occur. Savimbi denounced the
election as rigged. International
observers have said that although there were some irregularities, the elections
were generally conducted fairly. As
soon as the projected election results became public, Savimbi withdrew his
forces from the nascent joint army, while the MPLA
also began to make preparations for a military conflict. At this writing, UNITA now occupies large swathes or rural Angola and has
captured key towns such as Uíge.
Civilian militias loyal to the MPLA
have engaged in round-ups of suspected UNITA
supporters in Luanda and other otwns, leading to numerous summary
executions. Mixed-race Angolans, mostly
identified with the MPLA, have
been targets for UNITA
attacks. Thousands have already died in
the four months since elections.
Millions more reportedly face starvation in the next few months if the
fighting continues. [3] At
the time of writing, negotiations are just beginning in Addis Ababa, and their
outcome is uncertain. UN Secretary
General Boutros Boutros-Gali has recommended an April 30, 1993 deadline for the
warring parties to make peace, and has
said that the Security Council should withdraw its peace-keeping forces it the
deadline is not met. He has also
recommended reducing the UN force to about 60 observers, to be concentrated in
Luanda. As
soon as the projected election results became public, Savimbi withdrew his
forces from the nascent joint army, while the MPLA
also began to make preparations for a military conflict. At this writing, UNITA now occupies large swathes or rural Angola and has
captured key towns such as Uíge.
Civilian militias loyal to the MPLA
have engaged in round-ups of suspected UNITA
supporters in Luanda and other otwns, leading to numerous summary
executions. Mixed-race Angolans, mostly
identified with the MPLA, have
been targets for UNITA
attacks. Thousands have already died in
the four months since elections.
Millions more reportedly face starvation in the next few months if the
fighting continues. [4] At
the time of writing, negotiations are just beginning in Addis Ababa, and their
outcome is uncertain. UN Secretary
General Boutros Boutros-Gali has recommended an April 30, 1993 deadline for the
warring parties to make peace, and has
said that the Security Council should withdraw its peace-keeping forces it the
deadline is not met. He has also
recommended reducing the UN force to about 60 observers, to be concentrated in
Luanda. 2. TECHNICAL
ASSESSMENT OF MINELAYING This
chapter examines the types of land mine used in Angola, their origin, and the
strategies used by the parties to the conflict to disseminate them. While minelaying was practiced from 1961
onwards until 1991, the great majority of mines were laid in the period between
1975 and 1988. No detailed or reliable
records exist which could form the basis of finding out which mines were
obtained by the warring armies, in what numbers, and where and how they were
used. The information contained in this
report has been obtained entirely from Africa Watch's own investigations, and
information gathered in a piecemeal fashion by those responsible for mine
clearance activities. Mine Types and Sources Africa
Watch has confirmed that the following thirty-seven types of mine have been
deployed in Angola. This is based on
physical inspection of the mines themselves or detailed descriptions of them. It is likely that some additional types have
been used, but Africa Watch has not been able to obtain reliable evidence for
these. A. Anti-personnel
mines 1. M409
anti-personnel blast mine. This mine is
initiated by 8-30kg pressure. It has a
very low metallic content (limited to one gram in fuse and aluminum powder in
explosive charge) and is thus difficult to detect. Manufactured
by PRB of Belgium. 2 & 3. 72
and 72b anti-personnel mines These small
plastic mines have been the subject of a great amount of misinformation and
have attained almost cult status in some countries. There are actually two different devices that share the same
outer casing. The 72 is not detectable
by mine detectors, and the 72b is. The 72
(sometimes called 72a) is a small light-green colored plastic mine with a
fabric-covered pressure plate containing 34 grams of explosive and requiring
between 3 and 7kg of pressure for initiation.
Due to the extremely low metallic content the mine is virtually
undetectable using most detectors. The 72b is
identical once deployed (the arming pin ring is shaped differently but this is
discarded when the mine is deployed) but is fitted with a secondary tilt
mechanism which initiates the mine when it is tilted through more than
approximately fifteen degrees. This
mine can also be initiated by 3-7kg of pressure. The 72b is easily detected by a detector due to the high metallic
content of the tilt mechanism but presents a high risk when using manual
probing techniques. Manufactured
in China. 4. Valmara
VS-69 bounding anti-personnel mine This bounding
mine is filled with either 650 6mm steel ballbearings or 1,200 4mm steel cubes
which act as shrapnel. It can be
initiated by either 10kg of direct pressure on the fuse prongs or 6kg exerted
on a tripwire. Upon initiation, the
mine is fired to approximately 1.2 meters vertically on a tether wire before
exploding; it has a killing zone of 27 meters throughout an arc of 360
degrees. In other words, it explodes at
the height of a man's chest, and has the power to rip out the heart of anyone
standing within one hundred feet. Manufactured
by Valsella of Italy. 5. VS
Mk-2 scatterable anti-personnel mine A small
low-metallic content plastic mine designed to be scattered on the ground or
buried. It requires 10kg pressure to
initiate an explosion. Manufactured
by Valsella of Italy. 6. USK No reliable
information has been obtained about the design or operation of this mine. Manufactured
in South Africa. 7 & 8. M16
A1 and M16 A2 bounding anti-personnel mine The M16 series
of bounding anti-personnel mines employ the M605 fuse and can be initiated by
3.6-20kg direct pressure or between 1.6-3.8kg pull on a tripwire. The mine is propelled vertically to a height
of one meter when initiated. The main
charge of TNT then disperses metal fragmentation through 360 degrees with an
effective range of approximately thirty meters. Like the Valmara VS-69, it explodes at waist or chest height and
rips apart the torso of anyone within one hundred feet. Manufactured
in the USA. 9. M14
anti-personnel mine The M14 is a
small plastic blast mine, only 40mm high by 56mm diameter. It requires 9-16kg of direct pressure to
initiate an explosion. Metallic content
is limited to the tip of the firing pin, making the mine difficult to detect
using mine detectors. 10. PMN
blast anti-personnel mine The PMN is a very common mine, undoubtedly
the cause of a large percentage of mine-related deaths and amputations
throughout the world. Although easily
detected, this comparatively large device (56mm high by 112mm diameter)
requires as little as 0.25kg of direct pressure to initiate an explosion. It contains 240 grams of TNT. Manufactured
by Soviet State Arsenals. 11. PMN2 blast
anti-personnel mine A high
technology development of the PMN
requiring an initiation pressure of approximately 5kg. Manufactured
in the former USSR. 12. PMD-6 blast
anti-personnel mine This mine
employs a wooden box body with a block of cast TNT that is initiated when
1-10kg of downward pressure on the box forces the pin out of a MUV-2 fuse. The design has been widely copied. After having been buried for some time, this mine becomes
unstable and finally ineffective when the wood rots. There is a high metallic content in the fuse, aiding detection. Manufactured
by Soviet State Arsenals. 13
& 14. POMZ-2 and POMZ-2M
fragmentation anti-personnel mines Both these mines
consist of a cast iron fragmentation casing mounted on a wooden stake. The casing contains a 75 gram charge of TNT and a fuse (normally an MUV fuse) which protrudes from the top
of the casing. A tripwire is connected
to a striker-retaining pin in the fuse and a pull of approximately 1kg on the
tripwire will release the striker and initiate an explosion. The POMZ-2
has six rows of fragmentation while the later POMZ-2M
has only five. Both mines have an
effective killing range of up to 25 meters. Manufactured
by Soviet State Arsenals. 15. PP-Mi-SR
bounding anti-personnel mine A metallic cased
bounding mine which on initiation is projected to a tethered height of one
meter before detonation. The casing of
the mine acts as fragmentation. It is
initiated by a tripwire and requires a pull of between 3-8kg depending on the
fuse type fitted. Manufactured
in Czechoslovakia. 16. DM-11
anti-personnel mine The DM-11 is
37mm high by 81mm diameter with a 114 gram RDX/TNT
main charge. It requires direct
pressure of between 5-10kg for initiation. Manufactured by DIEHL Ordnance Division, Rothenbach,
(West) Germany. 17. DM-31
mine No reliable
information has been obtained about this mine, also manufactured in Germany. 18. MIN-25-ANOS anti-personnel mine No reliable
information has been obtained about this mine. B. Directional
devicesCremote or trip initiation 1. M18A1 directional
ambush mine ("Claymore") This mine
consists of a curved fiber-glass casing containing 700 steel balls mounted in
front of 682 grams of C4 plastic explosive.
The mine can be fired remotely or may be tripwire initiated. (When fired by hand and aimed at a military
objective, it is not indiscriminate.)
It has a frontal killing area of fifty meters, to a height of two
meters, through an arc of sixty degrees (when it is cited at ground
level). There is a fifteen meter danger
zone to the rear of the mine. Manufactured by
Morton Thiokol, Shreveport, Louisiana, USA, and also widely copied and produced
under license in different countries. 2. MON-50
directional ambush mine The MON-50 is a virtually identical Soviet
derivative of the Claymore. Manufactured
by Soviet State Arsenals. 3. MON-100
directional ambush mine The MON-100 is a larger version of the MON-50. The casing is cylindrical with a face diameter of 220mm. The mine contains 450 pieces of steel
fragmentation mounted in 5kg of plastic explosive. The killing area is reported to be 100 meters. Manufactured
by Soviet State Arsenals. C. Anti-tank
devices Africa Watch
recorded seventeen types of anti-tank mines in Angola, supplied from a wide
range of countries. Anti-tank mines
are generally designed to incapacitate tanks, usually by causing damage to the
tracks, final drive or idlers, although some are designed to pierce the armor
and kill the crew by secondary fragmentation. The pressure
required to initiate an anti-tank device varies from 60-500kg depending on the
make and design. Humans, animals and
light vehicles may therefore pass over them safely. Although these mines present a lesser risk to civilians than do
anti-personnel mines, the instances of cars and trucks (especially when heavily
loaded) and their passengers being blown up by anti-tank mines are still common
enough to be of serious concern. In
addition to the initiation of anti-tank mines by normal direct pressure, they
may also be initiated by lesser pressure when there is a fault in the mine or
when an anti-personnel mine is laid on top of the anti-tank mine, or another
secondary means of initiation is used. Africa Watch
recorded the following types of anti-tank mine in Angola. 1. M6 Manufactured
in USA 2. M7 USA 3. M15 USA 4. M19 USA 5. MK7 Great
Britain 6. TMA2 Yugoslavia 7. TMA3 Yugoslavia 8. TMA4 Yugoslavia 9. TMA5 Yugoslavia 10. PT-MI-BA3 Yugoslavia 11. TM46 USSR 12. TMN46 USSR 13. TM57 USSR 14. TM62 USSR 15. T72 China 16. No.8 South
Africa 17. MK3 South
Africa Dissemination Strategies Employed As
with all major military conflicts during the last thirty years, combatant
forces have used land mines in various roles. In Angola these can be classified
as follows: A. Route
denial This
is a strategy employing primarily anti-tank and anti-vehicle devices in order
to deny the use of roads and tracks to the opposing forces. In some cases, anti-tank mines are
"protected" by anti-personnel mines to hinder attempts at
clearance. Both UNITA and FAPLA used mines in this capacity. B. Ambush Ambushes
have been a common tactic throughout all phases of the Angolan conflict. The range of devices employed is dictated by
the nature of the target, i.e. whether it is a vehicle convoy, an armored
column or a foot patrol. Ambush has
been the primary use of directional devices such as the M18A1 (Claymore) and
MON-50 and MON-100. In most cases these
devices were used in the remote-detonated role and therefore present no
long-term hazard, as the remote detonators have been removed by the
combatants. However, on other
occasions, they have been deployed using tripwire initiation. There is evidence that remote mines have
been left behind, with tripwires intact, after ambushes have been abandoned or
have failed. These devices still
present hazards (the case of one tripwire initiated mine that exploded killing
a civilian and injuring another is given in the following chapter). Since many ambushes were set at key sites,
such as wells, river fords, or track junctions, the incidence of remote devices
at these locations is high. Few records
have been kept of such minelaying. C. Bridgehead
Mining All
combatant groups in Angola have commonly employed the practice of mining
bridgeheads. This now presents not only
a danger to civilians, but a serious obstacle to economic and social
rehabilitation. Bridgehead mining has
taken two forms. One is the defensive
mining of standing bridges. The second
is mining to prevent the repair or reconstruction of destroyed bridges, by
mining the damaged bridges, approach routes and adjacent river banks. Bridgehead mining is a particularly serious
problem in southern Angola and in Moxico Province. D. Defensive
Mining of Key Structures and Facilities This
was used primarily by FAPLA to
deter insurgent action against key economic installations and strategic
locations. This tactic is
well-illustrated by the use of anti-personnel mines at the base of electricity
pylons. Major roads, railroads, dams,
oil installations, diamond mines and water pipelines were also protected in
this manner. FAPLA also laid protective and nuisance minefields around the
perimeters of towns and municipal centers where UNITA attacks were expected. In
addition, FAPLA laid large
defensive minefields around the towns of Cuito Cuanavale and Cassinga to
counter UNITA advances in these
areas. This specific use of minefields
for defense against conventional ground assault was in accordance with Soviet
military doctrine. At least some of
these minefields appear to have been recorded. E. Random
Dissemination The
random dissemination of land mines can have an immediate military purpose, i.e.
to deter infantry attack and reconnaissance patrols. It can also merely have the purpose of terrorizing civilian
communities. However, after so many
years of war, it is now impossible to determine whether the randomly
disseminated mines in a particular area were originally deployed for one
purpose or the other. In the
post-combat era, any such distinction is no longer relevant. No party kept records of where such land
mines were disseminated, and the mines were laid irresponsibly without regard
for the welfare of the civilian population. Use of Improved Explosive Devices and Booby-Traps Improved
explosive devices (IEDs) and
booby traps were used by combatant forces.
UNITA and South African
forces are known to have made regular use of anti-lift devices on mines, which
explode when an attempt is made to clear the mine. These devices are typically improvised from plastic
explosive. An indication of the
emphasis placed on improvised devices by South African units operating in
Angola is illustrated by the fact that Zulu Force groups during Operation
Savannah in 1975 carried as much as two tons of plastic explosive.[5] Reports
of booby-traps are frequent but mostly unsubstantiated in detail. However, Africa Watch was shown evidence
indicating that improvised booby-traps have been employed. The evidence consisted of photographs of
several "mousetrap" pressure-release switches and some tripwire
devices linked either to plastic explosives, grenades or mines. Major M. G. Cox of the British army
completed a survey of land mines in August 1991, which formed the basis of
British army involvement in mine eradication in Angola. Major Cox wrote: The greatest problem facing UNITA mine clearance teams is that they
booby-trapped a lot of their anti-tank mines.
The traps are designed to defeat clearance operations. There are no records of their locations nor
are there techniques for their safe neutralization. As little is known about these devices, Maj. Cox has secured a
promise that inert working examples will be sent to the UK for analysis. Cox
went on to explain that he knew of two types of booby trap or anti-lifting
mechanism, one based on magnetic influence, and the other on exposure to light. However,
a US army Major at the US Liaison Office in Luanda[6]
told Africa Watch that he considered the problem of booby-traps had been
exaggerated. He said, "those mines
would have been laid a long time ago and I don't think anything too high-tech
has been used hereCit is all fairly basic technology, simple stuff." He did not deny that this "simple
stuff" remained explosive. United
States attitudes to the land mine problem have to be seen in the light of US
denials that it provided land mines to UNITA
(see below) and US non-involvement in mine clearance operations (see chapter
five). Most
sources agree that high-technology anti-lift devices have been widely employed,
especially by South African and UNITA
forces. These include light-sensitive
switches to prevent the removal of anti-tank mines (by detonating them when
they are uncovered) and magnetic proximity devices (which are initiated by mine
detectors). Again, the US army
disagrees. The Major cited above said
that the problem of magnetic proximity devices had been
"exaggerated." He explained,
"the magnetic proximity thing . . . came out of one incident which we have
not been able to confirm. The mine
could have detonated for any number of reasonsCpeople hear the story and jump
to conclusions." The Major
maintained that battery-operated magnetic devices would have decayed over time
and become inoperable. Land Mine Records Existing
records on the locations of land mines are extremely scanty. Major Cox claimed that all FAPLA minefields were recorded and
copies kept at local and national headquarters. He said that he had been given access to minefield records
classified as "secret," which he considered to be "of the
standard necessary to carry out a safe mines clearance operation." The document in question appears to be Formulário
para Campos de Minas. However, such
minefield maps only account for a small proportion of the total number of mines
laid by FAPLA, most probably the
defensive minefields laid around economic installations and important military
bases. They do not include any of those
randomly disseminated in the countryside. The
fact that FAPLA minefield maps
remain secret may indicate contingency planning on the part of FAPLA military commanders in the event
of a resurgence of hostilities. The
South African Defense Forces are known to have mapped some of the minefields
they laid on their incursions into Angola, and may now be using these records
in their clearance operations in the south of the country. UNITA
appears to have recorded very few of the mines that its forces laid. Major Cox wrote: In general, UNITA mines were laid randomly and
without record. Their minefields were
of the nuisance type designed to deny key routes and industrial mining
facilities to the MPLA. Their most extensive
mining operations were along major roads and all of the railways. In order to prevent easy clearance of these
mines, UNITA extensively used
anti-handling/booby trap devices. The
Cuban forces were also responsible for laying land mines. There are varying accounts of the practices
used by the Cubans, some claiming that most Cuban minefields were accurately
recorded, and others claiming that the Cubans kept no records at all. Assessments of the Total Land Mine Threat In
the absence of comprehensive surveys, or even systematic sample surveys, no one
knows the true extent of the land mine crisis in Angola. However, some estimates have been made of
the number of land mines in Angolan soil, and the size of the operations needed
to clear certain sectors. Brigadier
Fann Grobbelaar, a mines expert with the SADF,
has said that some mines in Angola date back to the independence struggle
against Portugal. "A mine in the
ground is still lethal," he said.
"The whole of Angola must be considered a mined area." Colonel
Bob Griffiths of the British Army Royal Engineers and chief of the British
Military Mission in Angola, told Africa Watch that there "are twenty
million mines in Angola spread over one-third of the land mass." He claimed that this figure was extrapolated
from known supplies to Angola and other intelligence. Col. Griffiths further estimated that, of the twenty million
mines, "four million are recorded and still in the ground, six million
have been lifted or have functioned and eight million are unaccounted
for." He could not give any
details or explanation for his arithmetic, nor how these figures were arrived
at, nor where the four million "recorded" mines were laid. He also estimated that 52,000 kilometers of
roads had been mined, though he also claimed that most of these roads had been
clearedCa highly contestable claim (see chapter five). Griffiths
went on to say that one hundred different mine types had been disseminated of
which forty-six had been recorded.
Africa Watch regards the presence of some of the forty-six as unproven. He was unable to explain on what basis the
initial figure was estimated, but said that mines: were supplied by twelve
different countries, of which Portugal, Russia, Cuba, South Africa and East
Germany were the prime suppliers. There
are also British and US mines and devices from many eastern bloc
countries. Many mines are thought to
have been supplied through individual commercial deals rather than as
government to government support. According
to the Joint Mine Clearance Committee, between June and September 1991, a total
of 22,124 mines were cleared.[7] The numbers have now risen. Major-General Helder Cruz, the senior
Angolan army officer responsible for mine clearance, claims that 50,000 mines
were cleared by joint FAPLA/FALA teams in the year after May
1991. He warns that "hundreds of
thousands" of mines remain, which could take up to twenty years to clear.[8] Cruz doubted whether all the mines could be
found and cleared but is reported to have said that "there is a good
chance of destroying most of them before the September elections." This was an unduly optimistic claim. Cruz also said that the South Africans have
supplied maps showing where the SADF laid mines. Of
330,000 mines believed to have been laid in the municipality of Cuito Cuanvale,
Cuando Cubango province, the location of only 80,000 is known. The remainder of the mines have not been
recorded or mapped.[9] The severe mine problem in this area forced
the government and UNITA sappers
to suspend mine clearing in early 1992, until new clearance techniques were
developed and the sappers were retrained.
Official figures up to mid-1992 indicate that at least eight soldiers were
killed and twenty-five injured in clearance operations. The true figure for casualties is probably
considerably higher.[10] United States Involvement The
United States government and Congress have been significant though inconsistent
supporters of UNITA, and have
provided financial and military support.
At least seven types of US-manufactured mines are present in Angolan
soil. Major Cox of the British army
noted that "the mines laid by UNITA
forces were mainly from the USA."
He did not, however, say who was the immediate supplier of mines to UNITA.
His fellow British officer, Col. Griffiths also declined to characterize
the US as a major direct supplier of mines. At
this writing, the United States government has not accepted that it bears any
responsibility for the large number of US-manufactured mines in Angola. 3.
THE HUMAN COST Angola
has one of the highest rates of land mine injuries per capita in the
world. For a population of about nine
million, it has tens of thousands of amputees, the great majority of them
injured by land mines. The government
claims that there are 55,000 amputees in the country. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has a more
conservative figure of 15,000, but that refers to lower-limb amputees only,
excluding those who have lost an arm or their sight or who have been otherwise
maimed or disfigured by land mines.
Even taking the extremely conservative figure of 20,000 people seriously
maimed by land mine injuries, this implies a rate of injury that would be
equivalent to 500,000 people in a country the size of the United States. The
government has produced figures only for mine fatalities among FAPLA soldiers: between 1975 and 1991,
6,728 were killed. But in reality,
there are no reliable estimates for the numbers of people killed by land
mines. Because of the scarcity of
medical care for the civilian population, the true total figure must be very
high. The
material in this chapter is derived from several sources. One is interviews carried out by and on
behalf of Africa Watch in two visits to Angola, in 1990 and 1992. Information about forty-seven land mine
incidents was obtained from interviews on the first visit, including specific
information on twenty-six victims.
Forty-five victims were interviewed on the second mission, in Kuito-Bíe,
Huambo, Viana in Luanda Province and Luanda city. It is also based on information provided by other sources, including
the ICRC, which has an extensive program of assistance to land mine
victims. A survey of 113 land mine
victims from eight provinces carried out by the ICRC in 1990 provides some of the best information available. The
chapter first recounts some of the circumstances in which Angolans fell victim
to land mines. It then goes on to
recount the medical care and rehabilitation that is provided, and some of the
problems affecting land mine victims in their attempts to live a semblance of a
normal life. Who are the Victims The
sample sizes of the three surveys are all small, and the sampling not
statistically rigorous, but the cross-section of victims represented gives an
indication of the Angolans who have suffered and continue to suffer from land
mine injuries. The
majority of those interviewed originate from just two provinces, namely Bíe and
Huambo. This is partly because the
sample over-represents these areas, because of ease of access and the
concentration of facilities for the disabled in these areas, but it is also
probably true that these provinces have suffered a disproportionate share of
land mine injuries. However, the
under-representation of people from the south and east, particularly Moxico
Province, is a serious drawback, as the land mine problem is also very severe
in these areas. Many
of the victims are soldiers. About half
of those admitted to the ICRC
center for amputees at Bomba Alto, near Huambo, are soldiers, and half are
civilians. Fourteen of those
interviewed by Africa Watch in 1992 were soldiers, and they could give details
of many of their friends and colleagues who had been wounded or killed. A.C., a soldier interviewed by Africa Watch
in 1990, estimated that during his four years in FAPLA, twenty soldiers stepped on mines from his battalion of
500 men. A.C. himself trod on a mine in
1988. The
great majority of the soldiers are of course young men. This means that overall, a disproportionate
number of those disabled by land mines in Angola are young men, a fact which
has contributed to the militancy of many amputees in demand of their rights. Among
the civilians, there is a wide distribution of casualties. Men and women of all ages are affected. The
evidence available to us suggests that most land mine casualties are adult men,
though this may not necessarily be a true reflection of reality (see
below). Twenty-three out of Africa
Watch's 1990 and 1992 civilian sample of sixty-one were adult men. Fifty-six of the ICRC's sample of 113
(almost half) were adult men. There
appear to be fewer adult women casualties.
Africa Watch's two surveys interviewed sixteen adult women out of a
total of sixty-one, and the ICRC
included twenty-eight women among 113 (i.e. about one-quarter). In December 1990, there were thirty-five
women among 120 waiting to be fitted with prostheses at Bomba Alto center for
amputees. There
are several reasons for distrusting these figures. One is that the figures are for survivors only, and there
is evidence to suggest that more women die from land mine injuries than
men. Women tend to be more severely
injured than men when they step on mines.
The ICRC survey found that
whereas only one-quarter of male amputees were amputated above the knee (forty
tibial amputations and twelve femural), the same was true for half of female
amputees (nineteen tibial and nineteen femural amputations). The damage done by a blast mine is related
to the size, design and deployment of the mine, and to the weight of the person
affected; men being heavier than women tend to suffer less severe
injuries. Extrapolating from this, it
would be expected that more women than men would be killed outright by land
mines, or subsequently die from the effect of severe injuries. There is some anecdotal information to
support this (see case 2 below). In
addition, it is possible that there is a bias in the provision of health care
for the sexes. Men may be transferred
to hospital quicker than women, and may be given better treatment. This would help more men survive. Having recovered, it is possible that men
are given priority by the family and community in access to rehabilitation and
prostheses. This would mean that male
amputees are more visible than female, and more accessible to those doing
surveys. Children
are an important minority of those affected by land mines. The 1990 and 1992 Africa Watch surveys
included twenty children (aged under eighteen) including five under the age of
ten. The ICRC included twenty-nine out of 113 (about
one-quarter). In December 1990,
fourteen children were among 120 patients at Bomba Alto. One
incident in which a child was killed occurred when a woman, aged forty-two,
stepped on a land mine, losing her right leg.
Her son, aged three, was killed in the same incident. A boy aged ten was killed when he played
with a land mine that he found on a path.
A girl of seven was injured when she trod on a mine trying to flee a UNITA attack on her village, and a girl
of eight walked on a mine on her way to school. Old
people, being less mobile, are less prone to land mine injuries. Africa Watch's two surveys included only
four people aged over fifty. The ICRC survey classified all those aged
over forty as "old" and included eighteen people in this category. Where the Mines are Planted The
great majority of mine victims interviewed had been injured by anti-personnel
mines. Africa Watch's 1992 survey found
only two anti-vehicle mine victims from a total of forty five. The ICRC
survey found that ninety-six of 113 victims had been injured by anti-personnel
mines (84 percent). However,
anti-vehicle mines typically caused many more deaths at a time; for example one
mine that had been set off by a truck killed five and injured ten passengers. The ICRC survey distinguished only three
categories of place where mines were laid: paths, roads and in villages or
towns. It found 69 percent of victims
injured on paths, 15 percent on roads and 16 percent in inhabited areas. The Africa Watch 1990 and 1992 surveys
identified the locations of mines in more detail. From
a total of fifty-seven cases of civilian injuries, three occurred in
fields. One example was F.G., a
twenty-nine-year-old farmer from Cuito Cuanavale. Case
1. F.G. stepped on a
mine in October 1990. UNITA had often laid mines close to the
river, about half a kilometer from his land, but no mines had ever been laid in
the fields before. At 8:00 a.m. F.G.
stepped on a mine in his own field. He
thinks it had probably been laid by UNITA
the night before. He was not alone in
the fields, and his fellow workers carried him to the village in a cart. He stayed there for several daysChe thinks a
total of sixCbefore being taken to hospital, first by cart and then by
car. His left leg was amputated above
the knee. A
total of thirty-five injuries happened on paths. People were walking to the field, school, market, or medical
center. Often those injured were
walking at the head of a line of people in single file, but sometimes they were
in the middle of a line of peopleCthose in front had safely passed over the
mine, or the mine had a timed explosive device. Sometimes, villagers have suffered a spate of land mine
casualties within a short space of time, usually after returning to the village
following a UNITA attack, or
after there had been a military presence in the area. This occurred in the following case. Case
2: C.B., aged sixteen, was injured by a
mine on a path to the fields in Caconda municipality, Huíla, in February
1989. On the same day that he was injured,
six others were also hurt by mines.
They were not together but on different paths in the same area. Of the six, three women died and three men
were wounded. Soldiers passed on patrol
on these paths, as well as civilians.
They think that UNITA was
the one that mined, in part because they saw UNITA-type
boot marks around the area where the mines were. This
has become so familiar to villagers that fear of land mines has led to the
wholesale desertion of villages. Case
3: The villagers of Bave, Huambo
Province, fled to Chipipa in August 1990 following a UNITA attack. FAPLA would not allow the villagers to
return because FAPLA itself did
not return. The villagers were finally
allowed to return to look for food because they were growing hungry in Chipipa. Many went back on October 23, 1990, with a
military escort. On the day of this
return, however, a woman aged forty-five, a mother of seven, was wounded in the
left leg when she stepped on a mine on a small path from the village to the
fields. She was the only person on that
path at the time. The villagers then
all returned to Chipipa, because they were frightened by this injury, and
because UNITA had burned all
their houses. Sometimes, land mine accidents happen wholly
unexpectedly. This was the case for the
injury to J.K., aged twenty-nine. Case
4: J.K. was injured by a mine on October
25, 1990, in Chavola, near Calépi in Huíla Province. He stepped on the mine when he was hunting in the bush about four
kilometers from his house. He had never
heard of anyone stepping on a mine there or in his village. He did not know who had left the mine. His left leg had to be amputated at the
knee. While
most mines on paths are buried, some are triggered by tripwires. A.Y., aged nineteen, described the explosion
of a tripwire-initiated land mine, laid by unknown persons in Sanga village,
close to the municipality of Mungo in Huambo Province. The mine detonated on October 18, 1989: Case
5: A.Y. and his 17-year-old cousin,
P.C., were walking on a path only used to walk to the fields. A.Y. was in front, when he kicked a wire
that he did not see. There was an
explosion, and his cousin took the full impact of the mine. He died immediately. A.Y. was injured in his right leg, which
fortunately did not have to be amputated. Various
types of mine, especially scatterable mines, may be left on the surface of the
ground. A boy of ten was killed by a
mine left above ground in the village of Vionga Baixo, Bíe Province, in 1989. L.C., an older man from the village,
described the context of the death: Case
6: There were eight UNITA attacks [in 1989]. The pattern was that when UNITA attacked, FAPLA would withdraw.
UNITA would sleep the
night in the village and leave mines behind when they departed. When FAPLA
reentered, soldiers would step on the mines.
UNITA would place mines on
the roads where the soldiers passed.
The problem was that the people were also using the same roads: the
larger roads were used for vehicles and the smaller roads were used for cattle. There was one FAPLA officer who died stepping on a
mine. Other FAPLA soldiers stepped on mines on a [non-asphalted] road to
the village, but luckily no civilians stepped on mines there. But cattle were killed on mines. There were no mines in the fields. A boy of ten
died from a mine in 1989. A mine was
left on top of the ground on the path where the boy was herding goats. He started playing with it and it exploded,
killing him. We believe that it was a UNITA mine because UNITA had attacked two days earlier and
had just pulled out, and FAPLA
had not yet returned. In
its survey, the ICRC
distinguishes commonly-used paths and infrequently used ones: 79.5 percent of
accidents were on often used and 6.4 percent on rarely used. (The remainder were classified as unclear.) About two-thirds of accidents occur less
than five kilometers from the village or town, giving the lie to the notion
that there is a "safe zone" close to habitations. Roads
and roadsides are the second most common sites of land mine injuries. Both anti-vehicle and anti-personnel mines
are responsible. Eleven out of the Africa
Watch samples had been injured on the roads, nine of them by anti-personnel
mines. Eleven of the seventeen people
in the ICRC survey injured on the
roads had been injured by anti-personnel mines. The greatest danger of anti-personnel mines is at the roadside,
affecting people who left the road to follow a short cut, to rest or to
urinate. Anti-personnel mines may also
be laid close to anti-vehicle mines to deter clearance operations. Case
7: A.J., a twenty-one year old farmer
from Zaire Province, was on the way to market in 1990, when she left the road
to enter the tall grass, and stepped on a mine. She screamed for help and people came to take her for some first
aid. She was transferred to hospital
the next day. At first the doctors
tried to save her foot, but it began to putrefy and had to be amputated. Case
8: C.C. stepped on a mine in Cangombe,
near Bailundo in Huambo province in 1985, when she was aged nine. She was doing domestic service in the house
of her aunt because the year before both her parents died while fleeing an
attack; they were shot outside their house.
C.C. was alone, walking from Longongu to Bailundo at about 2:00 p.m.
when she stepped on the mine. She was
on her way to the fields to look for thatch, walking along the side of the dirt
road used by trucks. She does not know
who laid the mine. Many
mines have been laid in built-up area.
Africa Watch interviewed five people injured inside towns and
villages. The ICRC survey included eighteen people injured in this way, consisting
of: * six on paths inside villages or
towns; * three in the gardens or yards of
houses; * three at entrances; * three inside houses; * two close to a well or water
point; * one on a football pitch. Case
9: A.S., a forty-one year old man returned
to his home at Camanongue, fifty-two kilometers from Luena, Moxico Province,
three weeks after the ceasefire in June 1991.
The day after returning home he stepped on a mine outside the door of a
bar in the center of town. FAPLA teams had cleared the roadways of
mines, but had failed to clear all the verges and areas adjacent to buildings. Case
10: M.C., an eight-year-old girl, was
walking to school inside the small town of Cuima, Huambo Province, when she
stepped on a land mine. Others told her
that it had been laid the day before by UNITA
forces. Case
11: M.D., aged fifty, was injured by
stepping on a mine on October 8, 1989, in Chicuma, Benguela Province. His left leg was amputated below the
knee. The mine was inside the village,
near a house, on a path. He stepped on
it at 11:00 a.m. on a Sunday morning as he was returning from church. This occurred about a week after the last UNITA attack, during which there was
fighting that lasted many hours. Many
died and many houses were destroyed. When
FAPLA withdrew, UNITA entered and was there for four
hours before leaving leisurely at 11:00 a.m., robbing the civilians' food. Many
mines have been planted on riverbanks, especially around bridges. As bridges and their approaches are a
well-known location for mines, civilians tend to be very careful. The only person interviewed by Africa Watch
who had been injured at a bridge had fallen off the bridge when it had
collapsed, after which he trod on a mine. Three
others in the Africa Watch samples were injured at riverbanks. Case
12: M.K., a twenty-four-year-old farmer
from Cutato in Bíe Province, stepped on a mine in September 1988. While working in the fields, he walked to a
nearby river for a drink. There had
been no land mine injuries on the banks of this river so he believed that it
was safe, and took no special precautions, but nonetheless he trod on a
mine. Three days later, after his
transfer to hospital in Kuito, his right leg was amputated. A FAPLA
soldier later admitted FAPLA
responsibility for the mine, saying that the area had been mined two years
earlier. After this incident, the local
people were warned. However, up until
the time of M.K.'s injury, there had been no warnings, and no markings. Africa
Watch interviewed two people who were injured while running away from villages
during UNITA attacks. One attributed the mine to UNITA, and one did not know who had
planted the mine. However it is likely
that many casualties that have occurred in this way have been caused by FAPLA defensively mining around
population centers to deter UNITA
attack. Though not set with injury to
civilians in mind, these mines had precisely that effect when they impeded
residents' flight rather than UNITA's
attack. Africa
Watch interviewed three people who had been injured very close to FAPLA military posts (two on paths and
one on a riverbank; all are included in the figures above). Though the victims tended to blame UNITA or say that they did not know who
had planted the mines, it is likely that FAPLA
units planted mines close to their posts in order to deter attack. Some
mines are left on or in the vicinity of the railroads. These are intended to disable trains, or to
catch people who use the railroad and its embankments as footpaths. There
is a train for civilians running the short distance between Lobito and
Benguela. It costs fifty kwanzas to
ride and many civilians ride it. There
are three empty cars in front, being pushed by the engine, in order to detonate
any mines. Some passengers travel on
these cars, as they are permitted to go free.
There are about twenty-five cars behind the engine, loaded with
people. The track has been mined,
although it is not used by the military.
People died in 1990 from the mining.
In July 1990, two UNITA
saboteurs were killed by their own mine as they were laying it on the tracks. Who Laid the Mines The
majority of mines are attributed to UNITA. In Africa Watch's 1990 survey, twenty
injuries and five deaths were attributed to UNITA,
and twenty injuries and two deaths to "unknown persons." It may be that in some of those
"unknown" cases, people knew who was responsible but declined to
identify them. This would be especially
the case if the perpetrator was FAPLA,
as most interviews were conducted in FAPLA-controlled
territory. In many cases, however, the
situation was genuinely too ambiguous to identify who was responsible. In
Africa Watch's 1992 survey, among a total of forty-five, six said that FAPLA was to blame (including one soldier
blown up by a mine his colleagues had planted earlier), twenty-seven said UNITA, and twelve said that they did
not know. Many of the "don't
knows," particularly the six who were interviewed in Luanda, may have been
reluctant to mention FAPLA. The 1990
ICRC survey came up with a
similar result. Eighty-three blamed UNITA (73.5 percent), fourteen blamed FAPLA (12.4 percent), one blamed the
Cubans (0.7 percent), and fifteen said that they did not know (13.3 percent). Knowledge about Minefields and Warnings Given In
very few cases were civilians warned that mines had been planted in a certain
area. Residents relied solely on
observing military activity and on the incidence of mine injuries to discover
which areas were safe and which were not. In
Africa Watch's 1992 survey, twenty-three civilians spoke about their knowledge
(or lack of it) concerning the localities of mines. Eighteen said they were not aware the area was mined, and no
warnings had been given. After having
been injured, many were able to work out when the mine had been laid and by
whom, using circumstantial clues, such as the presence of certain forces in the
area recently, boot marks close to the site of the mine, etc. Some of the mines had been laid the day
before the injury, and others had been laid months or years earlier. During a reconnaissance patrol in July 1990,
one twenty-four-year-old FAPLA
soldier stepped on a mine that his colleagues estimated had been planted by UNITA in 1978. Of
the other five civilians, one was a newcomer to the area and so, he said, could
not be expected to know which areas were mined, two were injured while using a
path that they knew was often mined, one feared land mines on the path he was
using but had no specific warning, and one man, who stood on a mine next to a
bar, said that FAPLA forces had
cleared the surrounding roadways of mines, but had not completely cleared the
verges. Africa
Watch also interviewed thirteen military victims. These included Z.A., a FAPLA
sapper. Case
13: Z.A. lost a leg after stepping on a
mine laid outside an electricity station at Dande dam, Bengo Province, in
1988. He was clearing the mines laid by
his colleagues three years previously to protect the electricity station from
attack by UNITA. Nonetheless, UNITA succeeded in destroying it in May 1988, and a FAPLA demining unit was sent to clear
the earlier mines, presumably in order to facilitate repair work. The troops who originally laid the mines
verbally warned the local population, but failed to provide any markings or
maps. Emergency Care for the Injured For
most of those injured by land mines, first aid was available within a few
hours. According to twenty-two
civilians questioned about this by Africa Watch, the average time that civilian
victims waited for first aid was just under two hours. The maximum was six hours. For soldiers, assistance was usually more
rapid, with immediate evacuation often by helicopter or vehicle. However, there was one case of a soldier who
was given emergency help by his colleagues in the bush but then had to wait
three days for evacuation. The ICRC also ran an air evacuation service
from remote areas. Since the end of the
war, air evacuation services have ceased, and those injured must rely on
overland transport. First
aid for mine victims is usually extremely rudimentary, consisting of no more
than bandaging the wound and providing comfort and perhaps some painkilling
drugs. Transport to the nearest first
aid post usually involved being carried manually or by cart; onward transport
to hospital was usually by car or sometimes by airplane. Civilians
had to wait on average for about thirty-six hours before arriving at
hospital. Three days was not an unusual
wait, and one man believed that it had been six days before he received
hospital treatment. Medical Care and Rehabilitation Care
and rehabilitation for FAPLA
soldiers has been the responsibility of the Serviço de Ajuda Médica-Militar (SAMM) of FAPLA. It functions
very well, in part because the government and military are able to attract good
people because they offer benefits and access to goods. Payment in money is little incentive in
Angola because of the depths of the economic crisis. Civilians
receive treatment in civilian hospitals.
Like everything else in Angola, adequate treatment is scarce. Drugs are often in short supply, and the
staff are less well qualified and less well motivated. When the Cuban troops departed following the
December 1988 agreement, the Cuban civilians left too. Among their number were many health
personnel, who provided a highly professional service, and their departure left
a significant gap in the medical services. The
variable quality of medical care has meant that hospitals can be dangerous for
amputees. Wounds may become infected
and there may be need for secondary or even tertiary amputations. There has also been a high incidence of
osteomyelitis, a bone-wasting disease, which may set in after a poorly-done
amputation. The
existing facilities for rehabilitating land mine victims are grossly
inadequate. The ICRC has run its center at Bomba Alto, near Huambo, since
1980. This includes eleven technicians
working solely on the manufacture of artificial limbs and seventy-eight workers
in all. Injured
people come for a five-week period to Huambo and are lodged there at the Red
Cross shelter. Ironically, those
working and receiving limbs and therapy at the Huambo shelter cannot freely go
to Bomba Alto, ten kilometers away, because of the threat of land mines on the
road. At the center they are fitted
with a prosthesis. They are measured
and wait for it to be made, while receiving physical therapy. When the prosthesis is ready and adjustments
are made, they practice with the new limb. Angolan
students are trained to become technicians at Bomba Alto; others study at the
orthopaedic school in Huambo.
Artificial feet and limbs are made from wood. Though there are woods nearby, it is not safe to enter the
forests to cut the wood, because of land mines. Hence the wood used has been brought in from Cabinda.[11] Other raw materials such as resin and nails
are hard to find because of the economic situation of the country. Between
January and November 1990, 631 new civilian and military patients were fitted
with prostheses at the center. In
total, 1,127 prostheses were manufactured in 1990, and 1,039 major repairs to
prostheses were made during the same period.
The ICRC also has a center
at Kuito, in the UNITA-controlled
areas of the southeast, which produces nearly two-thirds as many
prostheses. The ICRC would like to hand both centers over to the Angolans in
due course. However, due to lack of
money and organization in the government, there is little prospect of these
centers reaching the stage where the ICRC
can scale down its input or withdraw altogether. The
Swedish Red Cross runs an orthopaedic center at Neves Bendinha and the Dutch
Red Cross has one at Viana, Luanda Province. In
its Jamba headquarters, UNITA's
Special Department for War Wounded was set up in 1989. It has at least three units catering for war
amputees. One of these is said to
produce twenty artificial legs per month.[12] A
prosthesis can only be expected to last two to three years, and children
require a new one at least every year, as they outgrow the old one. This means that a total of over 5,000 new
prostheses is required every year, merely to cope with the existing number of amputees. This is more than twice the number currently
being manufactured. Social Rehabilitation Angola
remains a desperately poor country in which few facilities are available for
the physically disabled. Most amputees
are reluctant to leave the relative comfort of rehabilitation centers. Their future will consist of being cared for
by their families, or attempting to earn a living in one of the few occupations
open to them, such as street trading orCfor those with educationCsecretarial
work. The majority who come from
farming backgrounds are likely to remain a burden on their families for the
foreseeable future. Many have been
reduced to begging; amputee beggars are already a common sight in Angolan
towns. The
difficulties faced by female amputees are particularly severe. These are illustrated by a woman from Kwanza
Sul, named Catarina: Case
14: Catarina stepped on a land mine at the
entrance to her field in February 1986.
She was aged twenty-four, and pregnant at the time. One leg was severed in the explosion and the
other injured. Although she cannot
work, she considers herself fortunate because her husband has continued to
support her. She remarked: "Is it
difficult [for a disabled woman] to find a husband? Yes! A man runs away when
he sees that you don't have a leg. Or
it has to be a man who also lacks an arm or a leg." Maria,
aged thirty-two from Bengo Province, was less lucky. She lost her leg in 1989 after stepping on a mine. She spoke to Africa Watch at a market place
south of Luanda, where she was selling vegetables: Case
15: "It is a difficult life, because
I cannot do all I need to do. The
family members help me, but my husband found himself another woman. I am here to sell, to say 'Amiga, amiga, buy
this!' because it is necessary to earn something so that I and my children can
live." Life
is difficult for amputated men too.
J.D., a twenty-year-old former soldier, stepped on a mine shortly after
entering military service. He was
despairing about his future: Case
16: "Working with a hoe isn't
possible for me any more. It has to be
work writing . . . I've passed fourth grade, and I would like to work at a
company, non-manual work, sitting at a chair, writing. I don't have any hope for the future. I don't plan to marry; without a leg they
won't accept me, as a woman wants a man who can work. Marry an amputated woman?
That isn't possible eitherChow could we live?" Amputees
in Angola have become increasingly militant, seeking to draw attention to their
plight and their perceived neglect by the government. Former soldiers have become especially vocal. The reasons for this were explained by
Vincent Nicod, chief ICRC
delegate in Luanda:[13] They feel that they have given a
limb for the cause, for their country, and now there is very little interest in
them. Conditions for them are difficult
and when they leave the abrigo [shelter] there is very little for
them. While they are there they are
fed, they have shelter. There is a
problem when the abrigo becomes full; many of the amputees there are
equipped and should leave, but they stay and this means we are unable to take
more patients because there is no more room.
Demonstrations by amputees are becoming more common. During the war they tended to be kept in one
place but now they are within the community.
It is not surprising that they are becoming more militant. Angola
will have to live with the human cost of the land mines war for many years to
come. 4. THE SOCIAL
AND ECONOMIC IMPACT Land
mines have a significant impact on most areas of Angola's society and
economy. There are tens of thousands of
handicapped people. Thousands of acres
of farmland, pasture and forest, and thousands of miles of riverbanks are
unusable. For example, the fertile
Mavinga valley in Cuando Cubango Province of southeast Angola is largely
abandoned because of the large number of mines laid there by UNITA and SADF. Roads and paths
cannot be travelled, rivers cannot be crossed, either by bridge or ford. The return of refugees is particularly
hazardous. Commerce and movement are
obstructed, and relief supplies can only be delivered with great
difficulty. The eradication of land mines
is an essential prerequisite for peace and economic development. The
nature of the war in Angola has made the social and economic impact of land
mines particularly severe. For the most
part, it was not a positional war, with fighting confined to specific heavily
militarized areas. At one time or
another, almost every part of the country was affected, as the foci of battle
rapidly shifted backwards and forwards.
Because of this mobility, the disruption of land communications was a
major aim of UNITA, and the mining of roads, paths and bridges was consequently
an important strategy. UNITA's strategy aimed at destabilizing
the government by making any semblance of normal life impossible in as many
parts of the country as it could.
Outside its base area of the southeast, it consolidated and administered
few areas. Instead, it sought to deny
the government free use of these areas.
The wide dissemination of land mines was a central part of this
strategy. Meanwhile, FAPLA laid mines to try to prevent UNITA forces operating throughout the
country. Many
of the land mines were therefore planted as part of a strategy with the
deliberate aim of causing social and economic disruption. They will continue to have this effect long
after the end of hostilities. This
chapter does not attempt to describe the complete social and economic impact of
the land mines disaster in Angola.
Instead, it concentrates on a single issue, namely the safe return of
refugees from Zaire and Zambia. This
illustrates in a dramatic way the huge problems created by the presence of land
mines. Repatriation The
great majority of Angolan refugees originate from the eastern provinces,
particularly Moxico and Lunda Norte and Lunda Sul, and from the north,
particularly Malanje and Zaire Provinces.
In terms of density of land mines, these provinces are probably not worse
affected than, for instance, Bíe and Huambo.
However, the problems are quite severe enough to present major obstacles
to the repatriation program envisaged by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR). Virgilio
Mora, UNHCR Repatriation and Logistics
Coordinator, told Africa Watch:[14] The repatriation was scheduled
to begin this year but no date has been set, due largely to the failure of
Zaire, Zambia and Angola to sign a tripartite agreement [until March 1992] and
also due to the rainy season. However,
there has been some spontaneous movement and UNHCR
has been assisting these people. There
are essentially two "fronts"Cthe north, where the situation can be
handled, and the east, primarily Moxico Province, where the UNHCR faces a nightmare scenario. Mora
did not believe that repatriation was possible in time for the September
elections. He did not believe that
enough was being done by the international community, concluding that "I
fear, sadly, the Angolans must face many years of amputation." Moxico and the Lundas The
eastern provinces of Moxico and the Lundas are very heavily infested with land
mines, presenting almost insurmountable problems for the return of
refugees. The problems exist on the
roads, at bridges, and in the towns, villages and fields of the returnees. Some parts of Moxico are so heavily mined
that not even UNITA or FAPLA allow their men to go there. These include Caripande and Kavungo regions
of Alto Zambeze municipality. Of
twelve key roads in Moxico, two are demined, two in process of demining (from
Cazombo to Calunda and Luena to Kachipoque), and eight are out of use due to
the presence of mines. Because of mined
roads, there is no surface access to Lumbala N'guimbo or Cangamba. The latter has a population of about 65,000,
which can only be served by air. Other
concentrations of mines are at: * Caripande to Cazombo to Caianda to
Jimbe: vital roads for refugees coming from Zaire and Zambia, but heavily mined
and currently out of use. * Luau to Muconda road remains
mined. Leo
Pavillard, senior UN coordinator for Moxico, Lunda Sul and Lunda Norte
Provinces told Africa Watch: [All roads] are assumed to be
mined unless they have been cleared. . . .
Before Angolan refugees return from Zaire and Zambia, all roads, river
banks and bridges must be completely clear of mines. Otherwise the returnees will pay a high price in loss of life and
severe injuries. It is not possible to
quantify the risk. The
mining of the roads means that it is difficult and dangerous for refugees to
return home by foot or vehicle, and when they have returned, it greatly
restricts their economic opportunities. In
Lunda Sul Province, Muconda municipality, the situation is equally severe. This area illustrates the serious problems
caused by the sabotage and mining of bridges.
There are thirty major or strategic bridges down, and fifty-eight
secondary bridges destroyed. Most of
the damaged or destroyed bridges are surrounded by minefields, that must be
cleared before the bridge can be repaired. In
1992, surveys were made of bridges on the road from Saurimo to Muriege. The first major bridge over the river Mombo
at thirty-seven kilometers from Saurimo had collapsed and was covered by about
two-and-a-half meters of water. The
government civil engineer accompanying the survey said that a temporary wooden
bridge could be built about sixty meters downstream; the UNITA engineer said that the area would
have to be demined before any work could begin. In
another incident, eighty-four kilometers along the Saurimo-Cacolo road, at the
river Luangue, work started on the construction of a steel bridge but a worker
was injured by an anti-personnel mine.
Work then ceased until the area around the site had been demined. In
general, work on rebuilding the bridges can only begin when the roads have been
cleared of mines. This means that fords
have to be used to cross the rivers.
However, many river banks are hazardous due to mines. The mining of bridges is therefore in every
way as serious a problem as the mining of roads, and equally an obstacle to the
return and reintegration of refugees. In
March 1992, the government claimed that in the provinces of Moxico, Lunda Norte
and Lunda Sul, 4,000 had been deactivated, together with 377 "heavy armed
projectiles," 278 hand grenades and 27 bombs.[15] The
demining effort has to date concentrated on roads, bridges and built-up
areas. Clearing footpaths, fields and
riverbanks is a lower priority.
However, if the refugees are not only to return, but to reestablish
their former lives, it will be essential for land to be returned to the
community by means of eradicating these land mines. Zaire, Uíge and Malanje The
majority of refugees in the north of Angola originate from Zaire, Uíge and
Malanje provinces. In this area, the
problems posed by land mines are markedly less severe than in the southeast,
and the repatriation of refugees has proceeded more smoothly. Minesweeping operations ended along the
major roads in the provinces in early August 1991. In the period June-July, twenty-five anti-personnel mines and two
anti-tank mines were deactivated.[16] However, the presence of land mines still
poses a significant threat to any prospective returnees. Some
of the larger remaining land mine concentrations in Zaire province include: * M'banza Kongo- Luvo border post
mined with anti-personnel mines. * Nóqui-border area mined with
anti-personnel mines. * Tomboco to Lufico road mined. * Maquela do Zombo, Huito to Banza
Sossu mined with anti-personnel mines. * Béu-Fiscak border post area mined
with anti-personnel mines. * Quimbele and surrounding area
mined with anti-personnel mines. * Mococola-Santa Cruz-Massau mined
with anti-tank mines. * Quifuata-Cambamba road mined. The
extent of the mining of roads has meant that much of the repatriation effort
has had to be carried out by air, which is expensive. In
Malanje Province, there are many concentrations of land mines, which continued
to deter people from returning to their home areas, even before the outbreak of
hostilities in November 1992. In
October, shortly after the elections, Julia Kissanga, a peasant woman,
described conditions in her municipality: Here in Massango we are
surrounded by mines: all the fields around our town are mined. A friend of mine died by a mine a while
ago. I spend much more time getting
water from the river, as the old path is too dangerous. Some mines around our washing place were
cleared by the soldiersCthey wanted to wash too, but they do not have to carry
the water! My family has fled to
N'dalatando, Malanje and Luanda. These
mines make this no safe place for children.
They cannot play safely and our fields are far away. They are safer in the cities. Other
concentrations of land mines in Massango municipality are in Dala Samba and
Quingeungue. Elsewhere in Malanje
Province, mines continue to pose problems at: * Marimba; Quela; along power lines
Lombe-Kalandula; along the verge of the Cacuso-Capanda road. * Strategic installations, including
the airport. When a South African
clearance team set up camp in July 1992 at the airport they swept a public area
previously assumed to be safe and found two anti-personnel mines. * In Malanje's southern
municipalities there are large concentrations of land mines around Capunda,
Quimbango and Quirima. The main roads
in the province were cleared in June and July 1991 by a joint FAPLA/UNITA
brigade. A total of 320 mines were
deactivated.[17] In a
peaceful Angola, Malanje Province would be a center for tourism. However, even at the famous Kalandula
waterfalls, mines are a problem. A
former resident of Kalandula, who used to work in the hotel overlooking the
falls, told Africa Watch in September 1992: The access to the hotel is
mined, which is why we have made no attempt to return and rebuild it. It is a shame, we could be making lots of
money from the UN and other foreigners; instead we sit in Malanje city drinking,
dreaming and talking about better times. Game
parks also suffer from mines. In the
Bicuar National Park in Huíla Province, wandering elephants have set off
anti-tank mines.[18] Even after the end of conflict in Angola,
such dangers put into question a rapid restoration of game park tourism. Overall Impact Geoffery
Winfin, the UN Emergencies Coordinator in Luanda, counts land mines as the UN's
"single biggest problem."[19] In an interview with Africa Watch, he
explained in more detail the nature of the problem, and why there was
insufficient attention to it:[20] I would say that demining is an
integral part of the peace process and therefore it should be included, as far
as funding is concerned, into that process. My feeling is that to some
extent the demining has been considered as a marginal part of the peace
process, which, in my opinion, is not a reasoned approach. If you think in terms of the electoral
process, if you think in terms of the movement of people, the problems of
refugees and deslocados [displaced people], you realize that the mines
problem is at the center of all those issues.
Therefore I am a bit surprised that more attention has not been given to
that problem. I realize that recently some
countries have agreed to give assistance on a bilateral basis for mine
clearance. But if you compare the
development of the electoral process, you must come to the conclusion that the
demining part of that process is lagging behind, when, if you look at things
logically, it should lead the process in order to facilitate the other actions. I think it is interesting to
examine the different situation that exists in Angola in comparison with
Cambodia. In Cambodia the United
Nations is responsible for the implementation of an electoral process. It could be said that it is a less difficult
situation for the United Nations than exists here in Angola, where we are not
responsible for that process. Our role
is, first, to give technical assistance to the electoral process through UNDP, secondly to observe the process
and verify that the elections will be conducted in a fair and just manner. So we start with the basic principle that
the Angolan government is responsible for the electoral process rather than the
United Nations, we take a prudent role, supporting the process, but we are not
here with a mandate to implement that process in place of the proper
authorities. Therefore when we look at
some of the delays that are becoming a problem, which give us great concern,
what we can do as an observation organ is to express our concern to the Angolan
government that the process is not being implemented to the United Nations'
satisfaction. Which brings us back to
demining. In Cambodia it would be for
the UN to make sure that the job gets done because they are responsible for the
whole process. That is not the case
here in Angola. We can only call the
attention of the government to the slowness of the demining operations. In fact the government have been negotiating
with the bilateral donors to obtain assistance with the demining. 5. MINE
CLEARANCE INITIATIVES There
is a remarkable contrast between the widespread recognition that land mines
present an extremely serious threat to Angola, and the actual response to the
challenge of eradicating the mines during the pre-election period, when
relative peace prevailed and clearance initiatives were possible. There has been no systematic assessment of
the extent of the land mines problem, nor any serious attempt to coordinate
eradication in a systematic manner. The
clearance attempts by FAPLA and FALA teams were inadequately supported
in both technical, financial and logistic terms. In addition, there is at least one example of an initiative
cynically based on potential profit and future business opportunities,
predominantly arms deals. There
have been several separate initiatives to clear land mines currently in Angola. FAPLA/FALA Teams FAPLA/FALA teams consisted of soldiers from
both armies. During the pre-election
period, they were working throughout the country with varying success. Probably, their best chances of success lay
in the south of Angola, where units from SADF
were providing training and technical support to clear mines from the areas in
which SADF was formerly active
(see below). FAPLA/FALA teams were using manual clearance
methods, partly because of the lack of heavy equipment, and partly because they
considered it the most effective. The
priorities have been to demine the major roads and railways, and the interiors
of towns and villages. However, questions
have been asked about how systematically the verges of major roads have been
cleared. Leo
Pavillard, UN senior coordinator for Moxico, Lunda Sul and Lunda Norte
Provinces, told Africa Watch: [All roads] are assumed to be
mined unless they have been cleared.
Even those that have been cleared continue to be a risk because the mine
clearing techniques are insufficient.
There have been several cases of deaths on the roads that have
supposedly been cleared. Agricultural
land and pasture did not appear to be a priority for the demining teams, except
in the case of commercial plantations, where the owners are able to pay for
private demining operations. Overall,
the national mine clearance program suffered from many problems. A British military assessment of mine
clearing operations states: Mine clearing operations lack
central direction and adequate resourcing.
The Joint Mine Clearing Committee of the JVMC remains ineffective; its regional subordinate groups
lack resources; there is no comprehensive strategy or program. As things stand now, the Angolans are not
capable of gaining control of the situation and making any significant inroads
into the problem. Any assistance to the
Angolans is likely to be squandered. The document goes on to state: In mine clearing as with most
other military undertakings we have observed in Angola, a lot of talking is
being done but very little else . . . There is no quick fix to this problem
short of taking over the project from them. Ulterior
motives on the part of the British military may be detected in the concluding
assessment. The capacity, competence
and motivation of the British involvement will be examined below. There
is, however, a more general acceptance of the limited impact of the Angolan
de-mining effort. This is largely
attributed to lack of organization and support. At a meeting on March 4, 1992, the Joint Mine Clearing Commission
identified the following problems: a) Serious command, control and
communication problems at all levels. b) No mine clearing entity, national,
regional or unit-level, has a radio. c) None of the mine clearing teams nor
regional mine clearing commissions has a vehicle. d) There are no evacuation capabilities
or arrangements for personnel injured during mine clearance operations. e) Mine clearance teams lack equipment
such as helmets, flak vests, mine markers, engineer tape and demolition
materials. f) There is insufficient detection
equipment. g) There are no batteries for detection
equipment. These
problems persisted despite the involvement of British military teams in
assisting FAPLA/FALA efforts. SADF Involvement The
South African Defense Forces were active in providing technical assistance and
training to FAPLA/FALA clearance teams in the south of
the country. In mid-1992, there was a
general acceptance from almost all sources that the South African contribution
was a well-motivated project based on a good knowledge of the general problems
and the specific devices (many of which were laid by the SADF itself). All the Angolan parties responded positively to the South African
initiative. A military representative
of the US Liaison Office in Luanda was more skeptical, however. He told Africa Watch that there was
insufficient coordination and planning: I believe this was all done at a
very high level, at the Foreign Minister level I think. I believe they have some of their training
team here already but are having trouble finding Angolans to train. This was done unilaterally, it's not part of
any overall planCI do not think that is a positive step. However,
this was the only significant criticism of the South African effort that Africa
Watch was able to obtain. British Army Initiatives Colonel
Bob Griffiths, head of the British Military Mission to Angola, told Africa
Watch that British government policy is to provide a neutral source of advice
and assistance to the Angolan authorities.
He said, "We have no interests here other than to see a stable
situation in southern Africa." British
support to the Angolan mine-clearing operation has consisted of two two-man
Royal Engineer teams dispatched to instruct members of the envisaged integrated
New Angolan Army (FAA) in British
minefield clearance techniques. The
first mission was in December 1991, the second in March 1992. Some indications of the priority given to
this training can be seen by reference to the post-deployment report of the
second team: a) The team undertook six-and-a-half
hours pre-deployment training. b) The original deployment dates were
February 19 to April 4, but due to problems with the shipping of mine clearance
equipment the team was twice delayed, only departing for Angola on March
19. The completion date, however,
remained the same. c) "The period between 20 and 30
Mar 92 was spent familiarizing the team with the local area and
unloading/checking the equipment sent by the FCO [Foreign and Commonwealth
Office]." d) The students were assembled on March
30 ready to begin instruction the following day. e) Training began at 10:30 a.m. on
March 31. Eighteen students from FAPLA and FALA attended, of whom twelve had attended the previous
course in December 1991. At 4:00 p.m. a
further five untrained students from FALA
arrived. The total training period was
two-and-a-half days. f) The course finished with a mine
clearance "exercise." A
"packed-earth sports pitch was available for occasional use. This proved ideal for the final phase of the
trg [training] where four small minefields were set up to demonstrate their new
skills to the press, TV and VIP visitors." This was followed by a presentation of mine clearance equipment
to the Angolans. g) At a forum that followed, Major
Rock, a senior FAPLA
representative, "regretted that the team were not able to see some of the
problems first hand." h) The team left, as scheduled, on
April 4. Most
specialists would question whether training of this nature had any practical
value at all, especially, as Major Rock so politely intimated, the trainees had
a more intimate knowledge of live materials than their supposed trainers. A
restricted cable from the United States Liaison Office (USLO)[21]
to the US State Department shown to Africa Watch was more outspoken regarding
the British training program. It said
that although the British had obtained good public relations from their
exercise, "effectively all they had done was give the Angolans thirty-six
sets of Austrian detecting equipment." The
extent of British expertise in mine clearing in Angola can be further
questioned. The British military team's
assessment of the nature of the problem and the criteria for successful mine
clearance were explained by the team's head, Col. Griffiths. He told Africa Watch that 52,000 kilometers
of roads had been mined in Angola. Of
this, he said: Eighty percent has been cleared
to what, in British military terms, we would classify as a forty percent proof
factor. In other words, they are sixty
percent short of total clearance. Griffiths
gave no details of his sources of information, nor his justification for such
estimates. Other sources have
questioned how some forty thousand kilometers of roads could have been cleared,
given the limited extent of mine clearance operations and the lack of an
organized plan for clearance. In
addition, one specialist commented: A forty percent clearance factor
is nonsense. If a road is cleared,
there may be a five or possibly a ten percent factor of uncertaintyCbut sixty
percent, that simply means that the road is not cleared. A
secondary aspect to the British involvement also deserves mention. The British policy was described by Col.
Griffiths and his colleagues as being solely providing "neutral
advice" to the Angolans. This
claim does not stand up to close scrutiny. According
to Col. Griffiths, his "neutral advice" has so far included ensuring
that the South Africans do not gain any commercial advantage from their
assistance to the mine clearance teams in the south. He told Africa Watch, "we would cry foul if the South
Africans try to charge Angola for their work." After a brief assessment of other initiatives, he said that
"the whole clearance initiative will be under the control of a joint
Angolan-UK national coordination body which will be funded by donors such as
the EEC." Griffiths then went on to explain that the
"major work" would be undertaken by a UK company and the South
Africans. He said that he could not
reveal the name of the UK company because it was commercial-in-confidence. Further sub-contracts would be awarded to
independent companies. His
colleague later confirmed to Africa Watch that the UK company involved was
Royal Ordnance, and Africa Watch was later introduced to a Royal Ordnance
representative who said he could be contacted through the British Embassy. Royal Ordnance is the recently privatized
British arms manufacturer that is the major supplier of the British army, as
well as an aggressive promoter of arms exports. Col. Griffiths seemed unaware that anyone might question the
"neutrality" of British advice when a company so closely linked to
both the British government and the international arms market was involved. United States Involvement When
Africa Watch requested a clarification of planned US involvement in mine
eradication, the response indicated that the US does not plan to assist with
mine clearance. A US army Major at the
USLO in Luanda stated the US position clearly:[22] The State Department definitely
does not have any intention of any involvement in [mine eradication]. . .
. I think . . . that this is too low
down the chain, it is too small a problem for us to get an involvementCthat is
not to say that mines are a small problem for Angola, it's just not on the
scale that we are likely to get into.
Of course, that is unless we come under pressure internationally or at
home, then things may change. I think
that our Department of Defense does not have the same close links to commercial
interests as, say, the British Ministry of DefenceCour Administration tends not
to act as a front, an advance contact for commercial interests in these
matters. To
date there has been no initiative by the US government to train or fund
demining activities in Angola. Equator Bank, USA, Initiative The
Equator Bank has attempted to interest the Angolans in the S-TRON Cast System, an experimental
ground comparison survey method. This
would bear an approximate lease cost of $5.6 million for a minimum of ten sets
for three months. Both the USLO and the
British oppose the introduction of this system, citing its unproven
status. Both offices also point out
that the Equator Bank would be "using" Angola to test the equipment,
at Angolan expense. A British document,
assessing the offer, states: Rather than expecting the
Angolans to foot such a steep bill for an experimental system, it may be better
to bring just one of the sets here, to prove itself, and then ask the Angolans
to find a way to pay for more sets. . . . The Benguela Railroad would be a suitable location to conduct such
a test. According to Major Kapapelo,
the railroad is functional from the coast to the town of Huambo, yet only the
tracks themselves have been cleared.
The accompanying right of way, which would normally be travelled by
pedestrians from the villages that line the railroad, has not been cleared of
mines. Not only would the task of
detecting mines along a railroad pose a challenge to any system, but, if
successfully executed, it would also immediately benefit the Angolans. While
the proposal that the S-STRON
Cast System should be required to prove itself in the field is a good one, the
specific proposal is suspect. From a
technical standpoint, it proves little to test such a system over an area where
such specific problems exist as on the Benguela Railroad. The point of a survey system, if it is to be
effective, is to identify mined locations over a wide area of dissimilar ground
situations. Moreover, the high ore
content in the ballast makes the use of mine detectors unreliable. The S-STRON system is expensive. $5.6 million is a large amount to spend on a
three-month survey. This money could
fund the training, equipment and deployment of many survey teams for a year, or
the provision of three thousand mine detectors, or the mounting of many
training courses for Angolan clearance teams.
It is indicative that the USLO also opposed the Equator Bank
proposal. USLO told Africa Watch: The Equator Bank was acting on
behalf of a company called S-STRON. The State Department opposed the project because
the system isn't proven and we believe that they should bring it here and prove
that it works before they get money from the Angolans for its use. . . . In any case, it is far too high-tech for
this country, totally inappropriate.
What is needed here is basic techniques supported by expertise. The Cap Anamur Initiative The
German-based humanitarian organization Cap Anamur has been bringing
Soviet-built T-55 tanks, decommissioned from the former East German army to
Angola. The plan is to use them for
mine clearance on roads in the south of the country. The tanks are to be fitted with an array of flails, rollers and
ploughs to destroy or detonate mines.
The USLO told Africa Watch that it "imagined that it is the first
step in a plan for some future commercial involvement," though this is
mere speculation given Cap Anamur's humanitarian credentials. No
details were made available to Africa Watch.
No explanation was given why it made sense to ship unwanted European
tanks to a country that already had a surfeit of tanks (including about 200
T-55s). Surely it could be argued that
only the flails and other special equipment needed to be shipped. However,
the systematic clearance of the roads in south Angola is an important
project. If it is supported by adequate
logistics and expertise, the Cap Anamur project could prove to be a major
contribution to land mine eradication.
Some of the necessary support programs for the planned route clearance
that are needed include the parallel survey of land made accessible by the
clearance of the roads, and the marking or eradication of the minefields
discovered. If this is not done, the
road clearance program will not succeed in returning land to the community, and
may even increase land mine casualties as civilians return on cleared roads to
uncleared areas. Conclusion Major
Cox of the British army concluded his study of land mines in Angola: Angola has great agricultural
and natural resources potential.
However, after sixteen years of civil war, much of the land, resources
and arterial routes are cut off by mines.
As people are still dying of starvation, the acceptance of casualties in
mine clearance operations will continue. This
is a sober conclusion. The imperatives
of returning refugees, delivering emergency humanitarian aid, and
reestablishing the economic and political viability of Angola cannot wait. If mine clearing efforts continue to be
conducted in the present inadequate manner, then not only will there be
needless casualties during the clearance operations, but there will be
continuing large scale casualties among the civilian population. 6. LAND MINES IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW Land mines,[23]
unlike chemical and biological weapons, have never been banned. On the contrary, international law
specifically permits the use of land mines to achieve military objectives. However, the 1981 Protocol on Prohibitions
or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps, and Other Devices, otherwise
known as the Land Mines Protocol, does contain restrictions on mine warfare
which are designed to protect civilians.[24] The Land Mines Protocol is not directly applicable to
the Angolan conflict. It applies only
to international armed conflicts and to some self-determination wars. Fewer than forty countries have ratified,
accepted, approved or acceded to the UN Convention. The government of Angola has neither signed nor ratified the Land
Mines Protocol. In theory, this means
that UNITA is not bound by the
protocol either. The status of the
other main parties to the conflict and arms suppliers to Angola is as follows: * Cuba
ratified the Land Mines Protocol on March 2, 1987, together with the other two
1981 protocols. * South
Africa has neither signed nor ratified the Protocol. * The
USSR ratified the Protocol on June 10, 1982, together with the other two 1981
protocols. * The
United States has signed the Protocol (in 1982) but has not yet ratified it. However, many of the provisions of the 1981 Land
Mines Protocol are already a part of customary international humanitarian law
and thus binding on the parties to the Angolan conflict. The two key provisions in this regard are
prohibition on indiscriminate use of mines and the obligation to minimize or
avoid civilian casualties. In addition,
it provides the basic framework whereby the use of land mines can be assessed. The Basic Rule: Protecting
Civilians and Civilian Objects Under customary law, civilians and civilian objects
may not be attacked. U.N. General
Assembly Resolution 2444, Respect for Human Rights in Armed Conflict,[25]
adopted by unanimous vote on December 18, 1969, recognizes several principles
of customary law protecting civilians.
It states in part: (a)
that the right of the parties to a conflict to adopt means of injuring the
enemy is not unlimited; (b)
that it is prohibited to launch attacks against the civilian population as
such; (c)
that a distinction must be made at all times between persons taking part in the
hostilities and members of the civilian population to the effect that the
latter be spared as much as possible . . . . The Land Mines Protocol was adopted largely in
response to the large number of civilian casualties caused by mines and
unexploded munitions in Vietnam. It
derives its provisions from customary law principles, and among other things,
requires that combatants take "feasible precautions" (defined as
"practicable or practically possible") under the circumstances to
protect civilians from the effects of mines and booby traps.[26] The parties are required to keep records of
minefields so that they can be cleared once hostilities have ended.[27] It prohibits in all circumstances the use of
mines "either in offence, defence or by way of reprisals, against the
civilian population as such or against individual civilians."[28] It also prohibits the use of land mines
"in any city, town, village or other area" where civilians are
concentrated, unless combat between ground forces is taking place or imminent
in the area and the mines are placed around a military objective,[29]
or measures such as putting up warnings are taken to protect civilians from the
effects.[30] Article 3(3) of the Protocol prohibits the
indiscriminate use of land mines. It
defines indiscriminate use as any placement of mines: (a)
which is not on, or directed at, a military objective; or (b)
which employs a method or means of delivery which cannot be directed at a
specific military objective; or (c)
which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to
civilians, damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be
excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage
anticipated. If a weapon cannot with any reasonable assurance be
directed at a military objective, it is considered "blind" and, under
Article 3(3), indiscriminate. Contact
land mines are blind when left in an area through which civilians pass, since
they can be detonated by civilians as well as fighters. Experts on the laws of war also state that
"land mines, laid without customary precautions, and which are unrecorded,
unmarked, or which are not designated to destroy themselves within a reasonable
time, may also be blind weapons in relation to time."[31] Therefore a mine not programmed to self-destruct and
not removed from an area after fighting there has ceased becomes blind and
therefore indiscriminate as well. Prohibition of Disproportionate Attacks The legitimacy of a military target does not provide
unlimited license to attack it. The
customary law principles of military necessity and humanity require that the
attacking party always seek to avoid or minimize civilian casualties. The Land Mines Protocol codifies the "rule of
proportionality" in customary law as it relates to collateral civilian
casualties and damage to civilian objects.
It thus prohibits as indiscriminate any placement of mines "which
may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians,
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive
in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated." This two-pronged test of proportionality requires an
assessment of the "concrete and definite military advantage"
expected: such an advantage should be "substantial and relatively
close," and "advantages which are hardly perceptible and those which
would only appear in the long term should be disregarded."[32] Under this test, the possibility that enemy
troops may at some undefined time in the future move across a certain path may
be too remote and insubstantial to qualify as a "concrete and definite
military advantage." The second prong of this test is that the foreseeable
injury to civilians not be "excessive" in relation to the expected
military advantage. Excessive damage is
a relational concept which requires a good-faith balancing of disparate
probabilities, but there is never a justification for excessive civilian
casualties.[33] These two factors must be weighed in good faith by
the commanders responsible for mining.
In our opinion, the possible military advantage of injuring a soldier or
deterring movement of soldiers by a mine laid on a footpath, without warnings
and left for an indefinite time, is not sufficiently "concrete and
direct" to outweigh the likely injury to civilians. The objective of injuring a combatant will
not be achieved if a civilian steps on the mine first. Under this customary law rule as well, the practice
of leaving unmarked, unrecorded land mines that do not self-destruct in
civilian-traveled areas is indiscriminate. Prohibition Against Starvation of the Civilian Population By prohibiting starvation of the civilian population
as a method of warfare or combat, Article 54 of Protocol I and Article 14 of
Protocol II of 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 1949 establish a substantially
new rule which has been accepted by many governments as customary law,[34]
and which imposes important restrictions on the use of land mines, especially in
farming areas. Article 14,
Protocol II provides: Starvation
of civilians as a method of combat is prohibited. It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless,
for that purpose, objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian
population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the production of
foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking water installations and supplies and
irrigation works. This prohibits starvation
as a method of combat, "i.e., when it is used as a weapon to destroy the
civilian population."[35] While recognizing that it is still permissible to
starve the enemy army, the article imposes sharp limits on that practice. That "objects indispensable for the
survival of the civilian population" may also be of benefit to the enemy
army does not give license to attack them.
The narrow exception is where the objects are specifically intended as
provisions for combatants,[36]
which is generally taken to mean foodstuffs actually in the hands of the enemy
armed forces. It is not permitted to
destroy or render useless agricultural areas for the production of foodstuffs
because as a practical matter it is impossible to distinguish between the part
intended for military and that intended for civilian use.[37] Crops and agricultural fields may be attacked,
however, when used in direct support of military action; the ICRC Commentary provides an
example: What
is the position if such objects hinder the enemy in observation or attack? This
might be the case if crops were very tall and were suitable for concealment in
a combat zone. . . . [I]f the objects
are used for military purposes by the adversary, they may become a military
objective and it cannot be ruled out that they may have to be destroyed in
exceptional cases, although always provided that such action does not risk
reducing the civilian population to a state of starvation.[38] Neither party may destroy objects indispensable to
the survival of civilians because it suspects those civilians of supporting the
adversary. This is the rule regardless
of whether the civilians live in territory controlled by that party or its
adversary.[39] The ICRC
Commentary notes: To
deprive the civilian population of objects indispensable to its survival
usually results in such a population moving elsewhere as it has no other
recourse than to flee. Such movements
are provoked by the use of starvation, which is in such cases equivalent to the
use of force.[40] Thus the counterinsurgency
tactic of "draining the sea" -- or forcing civilians to move away
from the guerrillas who live off them -- by means of depriving the civilians of
food or rendering their fields useless for cultivation is prohibited by this
article. The article points out the most usual ways in which
starvation is brought about but the list is not exhaustive. The words "attack, destroy, remove or
render useless" are used to cover "all eventualities," including
chemicals used to pollute water or defoliants used to destroy a forest,
according to the ICRC Commentary.[41] No less than chemicals or defoliants, use of contact
land mines in agricultural areas or on paths to these fields has the effect of
rendering the areas useless for food production, because no one will be able to
plant there. The customary law
prohibition against starvation of civilians as a method of combat forbids use
of land mines to accomplish those ends. Recording Requirement The Land Mines Protocol contains a recording
requirement in article 7(1)(a). The
provision states that "[t]he parties to a conflict shall record the
location of . . . all pre-planned mine fields laid by them."[42] Although the Land Mines Protocol does not
define the term "pre-planned," an authority notes: Since
`pre-planned' means more than `planned,' a `pre-planned' minefield is, by its
nature, one for which a detailed military plan exists considerably in advance
of the proposed date of execution.
Naturally, such a detailed military plan could not exist for the vast
majority of minefields placed during wartime.
In the heat of combat many minefields will be created to meet immediate
battlefield contingencies with little `planning' or `pre-planning.'[43] The provision for recording is designed to facilitate
removal at the end of the conflict, primarily for the benefit of
civilians. Thus, at the cessation of
active hostilities, the parties are to "take all necessary and appropriate
measures, including the use of such records, to protect civilians from the effects
of minefields, mines, and booby traps."[44] CONCLUSIONS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS Conclusions There
is a very serious land mine problem throughout Angola, with certain parts of
the country, such as Huambo, Bíe, Moxico and Cuando Cubango being particularly
severely affected. All combatant
forces, including FAPLA, FALA (the armed wing of UNITA), the Cubans and have been responsible for laying large
numbers of land mines, especially anti-personnel land mines. A variety of countries, including the United
States and Italy, have manufactured land mines that have been used in Angola,
and will continue to be used in the present fighting. Most
of the mines have been laid without markings or warnings to the civilian
population, and a large proportion have been laid in such a way that their
victims are almost guaranteed to be civilians.
As a result, a very minimum of 15,000, and probably more than 20,000
Angolans, are currently amputees, as a result of land mine accidents, and many
thousands more have been killed. Even
if a lasting peace is established, the human impact of the land mines is likely
to increase in the short term, with the return home of refugees and displaced
people and attempts by civilians to reclaim their villages, fields and
pastures, and to travel along roads and paths. Facilities
for the evacuation, emergency treatment, hospital treatment and physical and
social rehabilitation of land mine victims are inadequate and not
improving. Hospital facilities are
poor. More than 5,000 prostheses are
required each year; current production is well under one third of that
number. The social needs of land mine
victims are not attended to adequately. Should
peace return, land mines will continue to present severe obstacles to the
economic development of the country, the implementation of relief programs, and
the return of refugees. Large areas of
Angola will remain out of bounds for civilians until land mines are cleared and
the community regains confidence in the land. Recent
and current initiatives to clear land mines are inadequate. Efforts by the Angolan government have
suffered from lack of equipment, finance and coordination, and the
international community does not appear to have made demining programs in
Angola a high priority. Some major
potential donors, such as the US, are almost completely absent from land mine
eradication initiatives. This is a
disgrace. The US continues to refuse to
confirm whether it supplied land mines to UNITA,
but whether it did or not, the extent of its military and political support to UNITA means that it bears a share of
the responsibility for UNITA's
abuse of land mines. Other countries,
notably Great Britain, appear to be motivated primarily by commercial
considerations. Ironically in view of
its highly destructive military interventions in Angola, the South African
clearance efforts appear to have been the best recent foreign initiative. In
theory, the use of land mines is subject to international law, namely the Land
Mines Protocol of 1981.[45] Though applicable on its face only to
international armed conflict, the main provisions of the Proctocol have the status of customary international
law and, accordingly, apply to the conflict in Angola. Accordingly, international law prohibits the
direct use of land mines against the civilian population, the
"indiscriminate" use of these weapons, and their use in such a way as
to cause civilian casualties out of proportion to the military objective
envisaged. Mines are supposed to be
marked, and the mining of built-up areas is prohibited unless the mines are
placed in or close to a military target. It
is clear from this report that, in practice, all parties to the conflict in
Angola have routinely abused these provisions.
There appear to have been no serious or systematic attempts to minimize
civilian casualties from mines. Indeed,
the very types of anti-personnel land mine used and the strategies for their
deployment suggest that the provisions of the Protocol would have been
impossible to enforce without a major change of military strategy by all sides. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that one
of the purposes of the random dissemination of these mines in inhabited areas
was precisely to cause excessive civilian casualties and thereby terrorize the
population. Anti-tank mines have proved
less dangerous for civilians, but that is merely because of their design
(specifically the fact that very heavy pressure is needed to initiate an
explosion), not because the warring parties have heeded the provisions of
international law. The experience of
Angola suggests that the Land Mines Protocol has been wholly ineffective. Recommendations I. General The
experience of Angola has shown that anti-personnel land mines present a serious
and long-term threat to civilians, far in excess of any short-term military
advantage that may be gained.
Accordingly, we believe that the use of anti-personnel land mines should
be banned altogether. II. To
the Angolan Government (1) The Angolan
government should take immediate steps to set up a systematic and coordinated
mine clearance program that will eradicate mines from all areas that are used
by civilians. Essential components of
this program involve: * The training of surveyors, mine eradication teams, and
team coordinators. * A survey of mine-infested areas and the drawing up of a
systematic national mine-eradication plan. * Clearance of areas extending beyond major roads,
railroads, bridges and built-up areas, such as minor roads and paths, the
verges of roads, riverbanks, and other areas that local communities believe to
be mined. * The clear marking of areas that remain mined, and
informing the local community of the location of these mined areas. * The destruction of all land mines in situ or after
lifting. No land mines should be
stored. (2) The Angolan
government should launch an international appeal to solicit funds and expertise
for this program to be carried out. (3) The Angolan
government should sign and ratify the 1981 Land Mines Protocol and abide by its
provisions in any future internal or international conflicts. III. To FAPLA, FALA/UNITA, and the Cuban Armed Forces (1) All combatant groups
should provide expert personnel to assist demining efforts in Angola. (2) All combatant groups
should provide all available information to the demining commission about the
types of mines they have used in Angola, the strategies of dissemination
(including methods for preventing mine clearance) and the location of mines
(including, wherever possible, minefield maps) to assist in clearance efforts. (3) In the renewed
fighting, all parties to the conflict should observe the provisions of the 1981
Land Mines Protocol under all circumstances. IV.
To the United Nations, Western
Donors and Former Eastern Bloc Countries (1) The United Nations
should take the lead in coordinating with the Angolan government, drawing up a
national mine eradication program, and soliciting funds and expertise. (2) All countries that
have provided land mines to Angola should contribute to the cost of the
national mine eradication program. (3) All countries that have manufactured land mines, or patented land mine designs that have been manufactured under license elsewhere, that have been used in Angola, should contribute to the cost of the national demining program. (4) The United States is
morally obliged to contribute to the national mine eradication program. Because the US has been one of UNITA's major backers, it bears a
special responsibility for land mine eradication in Angola. [2] Angola: Violations of the
Laws of War by both Sides, Africa Watch, New York and London, 1989, and
"Angola: Civilians devastated by 15-year war," News from Africa
Watch, February 5, 1991. [6] Africa Watch interview, May 6, 1992.
The meeting was scheduled to take place with Major Jay Garza, Jr., but
his place was taken by another uniformed Major, who refused to identify himself
but told Africa Watch that he was "as qualified to provide a briefing on
mines as Major Garza." [11] Due to the intensification of separatist activity by dissident factions
of the Frente de Libertação do Enclave de Cabinda (FLEC) this source is no longer available. [12] Steve Toussie, International Rescue Committee, "War and survival
in Southern Angola: The UNITA
assessment mission," typescript, no date, pp. 31 and 37-8. [23] Mines are as defined as "any munition placed under, on or near the
ground or other surface area and designed to be detonated or exploded by the
presence, proximity or contact of a person or vehicle. . . ." Land Mines
Protocol, Article 2(1). [24] This protocol, known as Protocol II, is one of three protocols annexed
to the 1981 United Nations Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the
Use of Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed To Be Excessively
Injurious or To Have Indiscriminate Effects, UN Doc.A/Conf.95/15 (1980)
("UN Convention"). [25] See second and third paragraphs in the preamble of G.A.Res. 2444, 23
U.N. GAOR Supp. (Wo. 18) p. 164, U.N. Doc. A/7433 (1968). [29] A military objective is defined as "any object which by its
nature, location, purpose or use makes an effective contribution to military
action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization in the
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage."Article
2(4), Protocol on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Mines, Booby Traps
and Other Devices (Protocol II). [31] M. Bothe, K. Partsch, and W. Solf, New Rules for Victims of Armed
Conflicts: Commentary on the Two 1977 Protocols Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 (Geneva: 1982) ("New Rules"), p. 305. [32] International Committee of the Red Cross, Commentary on the
Additional Protocols of 8 June 1977 to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949
(Geneva: 1987) ("ICRC
Commentary"), p. 684. [34] See Charles A. Allen, "Civilian Starvation and Relief During Armed
Conflict: The Modern Humanitarian Law," 19 Georgia Journal of
International Law and Comparative Law 1 (1989). [43] Burrus Carnahan, "The Law of Mine Warfare: Protocol II to the
United Nations Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons," 105 Military
Law Review 73,82 (1984). The recording requirement applies only to the location
of pre-planned minefields, not to the location of individual mines therein, nor
to the composition or configuration of the mines within the field. |