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Africa Watch

Africa Watch was established in May 1988 to monitor and promote observance of internationally recognized human rights in Africa. The chair of Africa Watch is William Carmichael. Alice Brown is the vice chair. Janet Fleischman and Karen Sorensen are research associates. Urmi Shah and Ben Penglase are associates.

Human Rights Watch

Human Rights Watch is composed of Africa Watch, Americas Watch, Asia Watch, Helsinki Watch, Middle East Watch and the Fund for Free Expression.

The executive committee is comprised of Robert L. Bernstein, chair; Adrian W. DeWind, vice chair; Roland Algrant, Lisa Anderson, Peter Bell, Alice Brown, William Carmichael, Dorothy Cullman, Irene Diamond, Jonathan Fanton, Jack Greenberg, Alice H. Henkin, Stephen Kass, Marina Pinto Kaufman, Jeri Laber, Aryeh Neier, Bruce Rabb, Harriet Rabb, Kenneth Roth, Orville Schell, Gary Sick and Robert Wedgeworth.

The staff includes Aryeh Neier, executive director; Kenneth Roth, deputy director; Holly J. Burkhalter, Washington Director; Gara LaMarche, associate director; Ellen Lutz, California director; Susan Osnos, press director; Jemera Rone, counsel; Kenneth Anderson, Arms Project director; Joanna Weschler, Prison Project director; Dorothy Q. Thomas, Women's Rights Project director; and Allyson Collins, research associate.

Executive Directors

Africa Watch Americas Watch Asia Watch

Juan E.Méndez Sidney Jones

Helsinki Watch Middle East Watch Fund for Free Expression

Jeri Laber Andrew Whitley Gara LaMarche

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For information on publications please contact our New York office.

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY............................................................................ 1

1. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICTS IN ANGOLA......................................................... 4

Colonial Rule..................................................................................................... 4

Independence and Civil War.......................................................................... 5

The Peace Process............................................................................................ 8

The Impact of the War..................................................................................... 9

The Future....................................................................................................... 11

2. TECHNICAL ASSESSMENT OF MINELAYING.................................................. 13

Mine Types and Sources.............................................................................. 13

Anti-personnel mines..................................................................... 13

Directional devicesCremote or trip

initiation........................................................................................... 17

Anti-tank devices........................................................................... 18

Dissemination Strategies Employed............................................................ 19

Route denial..................................................................................... 19

Ambush............................................................................................ 19

Bridgehead Mining......................................................................... 20

Defensive Mining of Key Structures and

Facilities........................................................................................... 20

Random Dissemination.................................................................. 21

Use of Improved Explosive Devices and

Booby-Traps................................................................................................... 21

Land Mine Records........................................................................................ 22

Assessments of the Total Land Mine Threat............................................ 23

United States Involvement............................................................................ 25

3. THE HUMAN COST.................................................................................................. 26

Who are the Victims....................................................................................... 26

Where the Mines are Planted....................................................................... 28

Who Laid the Mines...................................................................................... 34

Knowledge about Minefields and Warnings

Given................................................................................................................. 35

Emergency Care for the Injured.................................................................... 36

Medical Care and Rehabilitation.................................................................. 36

Social Rehabilitation....................................................................................... 38

4. THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACT............................................................ 41

Repatriation..................................................................................................... 42

Moxico and the Lundas................................................................................. 42

Zaire, Uíge and Malanje................................................................................. 44

Overall Impact................................................................................................. 47

5. MINE CLEARANCE INITIATIVES......................................................................... 49

FAPLA/FALA Teams.................................................................................... 49

SADF Involvement......................................................................................... 51

British Army Initiatives.................................................................................. 52

United States Involvement............................................................................ 54

Equator Bank, USA, Initiative....................................................................... 55

The Cap Anamur Initiative............................................................................ 56

Conclusion....................................................................................................... 57

6. LAND MINES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW.......................................................... 58

The Basic Rule: Protecting Civilians and Civilian

Objects............................................................................................................. 59

Prohibition of Disproportionate Attacks.................................................... 61

Prohibition Against Starvation of the Civilian

Population........................................................................................................ 62

Recording Requirement................................................................................. 64

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS........................................................ 66

Conclusions..................................................................................................... 66

Recommendations.......................................................................................... 68

I. General.............................................................................................. 68

II. To the Angolan Government........................................................ 68

III. To FAPLA, FALA/UNITA, and the Cuban

Armed Forces.................................................................................................. 69

IV. To the United Nations, Western Donors and Former Eastern Bloc Countries 69

INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY

To the homes, to our camps, to the beaches, to our fields, we shall return.

Agostinho Neto, 1960

When Agostinho Neto, the first leader of Angola's liberation struggle, spoke those words, he cannot have imagined that more than three decades later, hundreds of thousands of Angolans would still be waiting to return to their homes, camps, beaches and fields. Even during the relative peace that prevailed between the signing of the ceasefire in May 1991 and the elections in September 1992, much of the country remained uninhabitable or dangerous. One of the main reasons for this is the vast number of land mines in Angola. These mines have claimed tens of thousands of victims.

At the time of writing, the future of Angola looks bleak. A return to fighting, following the disputed election results of September 1992, has claimed thousands of lives. No doubt, the widespread and indiscriminate use of anti-personnel land mines will continue to be a significant feature of the war, as it has in the past. This report demonstrates that the use of land mines by both sides represents a gross violation of basic human rights. Both parties to the conflict deserve international opprobrium if they return to their former tactics of land mine usage and do not clear mines laid in the past.

If peace returns, civilian casualties due to land mines will continue. One victim interviewed by Africa Watch is A. da S., who stepped on a mine outside a bar in his home town of Camanongue in Moxico Province, the day after returning home just weeks after the ceasefire was signed in May 1991. If normality returns, and Angolans begin to reclaim the use of their land, casualties will mount. Mines have rendered large areas of arable land and pasture, many roads, bridges, riverbanks and villages, and some important economic installations, off-limits to people. This report documents how this tragedy came about and its devastating consequences for the Angolan people. It also documents what efforts are being made to undo some of the damage. The value of these efforts is extremely uneven, and a more concerted attempt to eradicate land mines in Angola will be needed in the future.

Chapter one consists of a brief history of Angola and the wars that have ravaged the country for the last thirty years.

Chapter two is a technical assessment of minelaying in Angola. It examines the makes and types of mines that have been used, and the methods of their use. Angola itself does not manufacture mines; all the devices found in the country have been supplied from abroad by manufacturers, governments and arms dealers who are thereby complicit in the maiming and death of tens of thousands of Angolan civilians. Africa Watch has confirmed that thirty-seven types of mine have been used in Angola, and the number is probably greater. The total number of mines in Angolan soil cannot be known, but runs into the hundreds of thousands or millions. Mines have been laid for a variety of military purposes, such as protecting key installations and denying the use of roads and bridges to the enemy. Few of these minefields have been recorded or marked; there have rarely been any attempts to protect civilians from the dangers they pose. Perhaps the most common use of mines has been their random dissemination in and around villages. While there may have been a slender military rationale for this use, its main impact has been to render paths, fields and villages unusable to civilians except at great personal danger, thereby terrorizing the community. This use of land mines is illegal.

Chapter three examines the human impact of the land mines. Angola suffers from one of the highest per head ratios of land mine victims in the world. At least 15,000 Angolans are amputees as a consequence of stepping on land mines; about half of these are soldiers and half civilians. There are more disabled men than women on account of land mines, but this may reflect higher fatality rates for women during and after land mine accidents. Children are also victims. Civilians are injured in their fields, on paths, roads, riverbanks, and inside built-up areas. The medical care and physical and social rehabilitation of these people is a challenge and a burden to Angola. Evacuation and medical facilities are inadequate. At least 5,000 prostheses will be needed each year for the foreseeable future for the amputees, far more than are currently manufactured.

Chapter four looks at the wider social, economic and political impact of the mines. Land mines represent a formidable obstacle to commerce and free movement, to economic reconstruction, and to the effective delivery of relief and other forms of aid. The chapter looks particularly at how mines are preventing the rapid and safe return of refugees.

Chapter five provides an account of current initiatives to clear land mines. The major program has consisted of joint clearance efforts by the two armies. Major roads, the railways, key economic installations and towns have been cleared or are in the process of clearance. However, the teams lack much basic equipment and have no effective central coordination. In addition, there are a number of foreign governments, private companies and humanitarian organizations involved in mine clearance operations. Some of these programs are seriously flawed, for example the British "training" program. Other governments and companies are notable by their absence or small scale of involvement, for example the United States.

Chapter six consists in an overview of the legal regime ostensibly governing the use of land mines, specifically the 1981 Land Mines Protocol. It is evident that the great majority of land mines in Angola have been deployed in flagrant disregard for the provisions of the Protocol. In fact, the Land Mines Protocol has proved wholly irrelevant to the conflict in Angola, as it has been shown to be unworkable elsewhere in the world. Africa Watch concludes that only a complete ban on the use of anti-personnel land mines can remove the unreasonable danger that they pose to civilians.

This report is based upon a visit to Angola in April-May 1992 by Rae McGrath, director of the Mines Advisory Group and a consultant to Africa Watch. Additional material has been taken from visits to Angola in November-December 1990 by Jemera Rone, Counsel to Human Rights Watch, and September-October 1992 by Alex Vines, a consultant to Africa Watch, and from material collected in the U.S. by Ben Penglase, an Associate of Africa Watch. The chapter on the legal regime was written by Jemera Rone. The report was edited by Alex de Waal, consultant to Africa Watch.

This report was made possible by a grant to Africa Watch from Oxfam (UK), whose assistance is gratefully acknowledged.

1. HISTORY OF THE CONFLICTS IN ANGOLA

Angola has rarely known peace, and has never experienced democratically accountable government, respect for human rights, or prosperity. The period between 1975 and 1991 saw a particularly brutal civil war between the Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola (MPLA), in government, and the União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola (UNITA). This came to an end with a peace accord signed in Lisbon on May 31, 1991. Following this, there was a period of peace until the country's first multi-party elections were held in September 1992. The results of the Presidential contest were inconclusive, but MPLA leader President Eduardo Dos Santos had a significant lead over UNITA leader Jonas Savimbi. At the time of writing, fighting has resumed, and the future of the country looks grim.

Should peace be established, Angola will face a huge struggle to heal the wounds caused by the long and bitter civil war. This process will be helped by Angola's vast natural wealth. In addition to large reserves of fertile land, Angola possesses an abundance of diamonds and, above all, oil.

Angola's population is not known for sure, but is currently estimated at between nine and ten million people. This consists of various ethnic groups. The Ovimbundu are the largest single group, forming about 37 percent of the population; the Mbundu form 23 percent and the Kongo 14 percent. A number of other peoples make up the remainder.

Colonial Rule

Angola was colonized by the Portuguese, initially to secure the coastline and to obtain slaves for their possessions in Brazil. In the late nineteenth century Portugal began to establish cotton plantations for the benefit of its domestic textile industry, managed by Portuguese settlers. Angola was also the site of an important coffee industry, also run by the Portuguese settlers.

Unlike the British, French and Belgian colonial rulers, the Portuguese government decided against granting independence to its African colonies in the 1950s and '60s. This led to long and bloody independence struggles in each of Portugal's colonies. The first shots in the Angolan liberation war were fired in January 1961. Three nationalist movements were formed. The first was the MPLA, founded in 1956, and drawing most of its support from the Mbundu ethnic group around Luanda, Angola's capital, and mixed-race Angolans. From early days, the MPLA was a leftist organization and obtained support from the USSR and Cuba. It was led by Dr. Agostinho Neto until his death in 1979. The Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola (FNLA) was originally founded in 1957, drawing its support chiefly from the Kongo of the north. Its leader was Holden Roberto, a friend of President Mobutu Sese Seko of Zaire. It had a nationalist ideology and received support from Zaire. In 1966, the foreign minister of the FNLA, Jonas Savimbi, denounced Roberto as an agent of "American Imperialism" and broke away to form UNITA. Savimbi drew most of his support from the Ovimbundu. UNITA obtained outside assistance from Zambia and later South Africa, but for several periods had no significant outside support at all. Savimbi espoused a variety of populist and nationalist ideologies, but the dominating factor has been a personality cult built around the leader himself.

One of the tragedies of modern Angolan history has been the inability of the three movements to form a united front. They each fought the Portuguese fiercely, but also attacked each other and did not come close to achieving a military victory.

Independence and Civil War

Following a military coup in Portugal in April 1974, the colonial government precipitously announced its withdrawal from Angola. Along with the colonial government, 90 percent of the 335,000 Portuguese settlers left. As the Portuguese had dominated all employment that required even minimal education, this dealt a devastating economic blow. Much of the basic functioning of government came to a halt. The resulting economic crisis was a severe blow, made much worse by the continuation of the war. In the following ten years, the war was to do damage worth an estimated $17.6 billion to the economy. Diamond mining and coffee production collapsed. Only oil, most of it produced in the Cabinda enclave to the north of the main part of the country, continued unchecked, providing a vital economic base for the government. Oil provides 90 percent of the government's foreign exchange.

In January 1975, the three movements signed the Alvor Accord agreeing to a joint interim government and an integrated national army. However, as the date for military integration neared, the agreement broke down. By mid-1975, the fronts were at war. The superpowers and regional powers rushed to involve themselves. The United States had already granted covert aid to the FNLA in January 1975. The USSR and Cuba supported the MPLA, which was able to seize control of Luanda, but little else. South Africa invaded Angola in support of UNITA and Zaire invaded in support of the FNLA; by October, it looked as though Luanda would be captured before the official date of independence, November 11. However, a massive Soviet airlift of military equipment and Cuban troops reversed the military tide. Zaire abandoned its invasion force and the South Africans withdrew. The revelation of South African backing for UNITA and FNLA was disastrous for the reputation of the two movements in Africa, and the MPLA was able to form a one-party socialist government that obtained widespread diplomatic recognition. The US, however, refused to recognize the MPLA government.

In retaliation for Zairean support for the FNLA, Angola backed Katangese separatist forces in their opposition to Mobutu. The Zairean rebels mounted an unsuccessful invasion in 1978. Later that year, Angola and Zaire signed an agreement to stop harboring each others' military opponents. This led directly to the effective military demise of the FNLACthough it has remained as a small political movement. However, in the early 1980s, UNITA pushed northwards into areas formerly controlled by the FNLA, and began collaboration with the Zairean government.

Despite the success of the Forças Armadas Popular para a Libertação de Angola (FAPLA, the Angolan army) in 1976, in the south and east, UNITA's resistance continued. The South African Defence Force (SADF) intermittently operated inside Angola in support of UNITA. In 1976, the SADF also formed 32 or Buffalo Battalion, from Angolan refugees, to fight inside Angola. The largest South African incursions were three invasions in 1981-3. South African involvement was in part in retaliation for the MPLA government's support of the South West African People's Organization (SWAPO) in its guerrilla war against South African-occupied Namibia. South African incursions were often aimed at SWAPO bases inside Angolan territory.

In late 1983, the UN Security Council demanded that South Africa withdraw from Angola. Shortly afterwards, Angola and South Africa signed the Lusaka Accords, under which South Africa agreed to withdraw if Angola ceased support for SWAPO. However, South African withdrawal was extremely slow, and was reversed in 1985 when another invasion was launched, in support of UNITA which was facing defeat against a full-scale attack by FAPLA with Cuban support. The government clearly believed that if South African support for UNITA was withdrawn, it would be able to achieve a military solution to the conflict.

US covert assistance to UNITA, which had been suspended by the Clark Amendment in 1976, was restarted after the repeal of the Clark Amendment in 1985. The US began to supply significant covert funding to UNITA in that year, and starting in 1986 provided Stinger anti-aircraft missiles.

The war intensified again in 1987, with major battles in the south of the country. A major South African military presence remained, and in November 1987 President P. W. Botha actually visited South African troops inside Angola. The SADF-UNITA plan was the capture of the besieged FAPLA-Cuban forward base of Cuito Cuanavale. Despite massive conventional assaults, the siege was lifted, and in March 1988 the South Africans decided that they could not win. This also marked the failure of UNITA to move from guerrilla warfare into mobile warfare, and the end of any prospects of an outright military victory over FAPLA.

The SADF-UNITA defeat at Cuito Cuanavale marked the beginning of negotiations to end the conflict. The South Africans began talks with their adversaries at Brazzaville (Congo) and London. An agreement was reached by the Angolan government, Cuba and South Africa, mediated by the US and USSR, whereby South Africa and Cuba were to withdraw their troops and Namibia was to be granted its independence. These elements of the agreement were implemented according to plan. However, despite some South African pressure, UNITA was not included in the talks, and no mention was made of the internal conflict between the MPLA and UNITA.

Throughout this period, US covert support for UNITA continued, as did massive Soviet military assistance to the government. Throughout the 1980s, the government spent approximately $1 billion per year on its military, about 20 percent of gross national product. This level of investment in war was only matched in Africa by the former Ethiopian government. It discouraged the government from seeking to negotiate a solution to the conflict.

Following the South African withdrawal, UNITA appeared weak. Its southern headquarters at Jamba was isolated and vulnerable, and it made preparations to launch a new guerrilla offensive in the north, operating across the border from Zaire. This strategy was designed with US assistance; in 1988 the US and Zairean armies conducted joint military maneuvers "with the long term aim of providing UNITA with logistical support for a northern base to be sited close to the town of Quimbele."[1] (In 1990, UNITA was forced to withdraw in the face of a major FAPLA offensive in the south, but Jamba remained safe; meanwhile intensified UNITA operations began in the north.)

The Peace Process

Also in 1988, the USSR signalled that it was no longer prepared to continue arming the Luanda government ad infinitum; it would be necessary for the MPLA to negotiate an end to the war. In January 1989, President Dos Santos made the first peace offer to UNITA. This was a radical break with his former warlike stance, but still fell short of recognizing that UNITA was a political as well as a military force. This led to a peace process brokered by eight African nations and a meeting in Gbadolite, Zaire, on June 22, at which Dos Santos and Savimbi shook hands and agreed on an immediate ceasefire. However, the details of the agreement, which remained secret, were disputed by Savimbi shortly afterwards; he denied that he had agreed to go into exile while UNITA was integrated into the MPLA government. By July, the war had resumed, with UNITA launching major offensives.

In August, the African leaders met again in Harare, Zimbabwe, to try to salvage the peace agreement. President Mobutu of Zaire, the chief mediator in the Gbadolite agreement, was heavily criticized for his hasty and vague manner of negotiation, and was instructed to pressure Savimbi to accept the deal. Savimbi angrily rejected this and accused Mobutu of not being a neutral mediatorCan ironic charge, as Zaire was now the main base for UNITA's supply, and Dos Santos was also unhappy with Mobutu's role. Retaliating to this charge, Mobutu briefly suspended the clandestine supply of US arms to UNITA through Zaire.

The following eighteen months were to see, simultaneously, the most sustained efforts to achieve a peaceful settlement, and some of the fiercest fighting of the entire war. In September and December 1989, FAPLA launched major offensives aimed at capturing the UNITA-held town of Mavinga in Cuando Cubango Province. UNITA was pushed back, and in February 1990, the town fell. The government then launched air strikes on the UNITA headquarters of Jamba, reportedly injuring Savimbi himself.

In October 1989, President Bush met with Savimbi and pressured him to resume peace negotiations. However, covert military assistance was continued. In March 1990, Secretary of State James Baker and Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze met at the Namibian independence ceremony and agreed to cooperate in the search for peace. In April, the Portuguese government was named as mediator.

Five sets of inconclusive talks were held over the next eight months, deadlocked over UNITA's demand for formal recognition as a political party by the MPLA, the question of the formation of an integrated national army, and the timing of elections. Under pressure from the USSR, in December 1990, the MPLA announced the creation of a multi-party system and other far-reaching political and economic reforms. This broke through the diplomatic impasse and raised hopes for a ceasefire, and in January both sides agreed to a peace accord.

While the final rounds of the peace talks continued in early 1991, both sides mounted major military actions to try to secure their positions before the announcement of a ceasefire. There was heavy fighting in April as UNITA tried, unsuccessfully, to seize Luena, provincial capital of Moxico. Hundreds of civilians and soldiers were reportedly killed.

In Lisbon on May 31, 1991, President Eduardo dos Santos and Jonas Savimbi signed the peace accord that formally brought to an end the civil war. The agreement specified that a civilian government should be established based on the result of free multi-party elections, monitored by the UN. The two armiesCFAPLA and UNITA's army Forças Armadas para a Libertação de Angola (FALA)Cwere to be integrated, with the majority of the estimated 300,000 soldiers being demobilized. A joint military commission was established to organize this. One of its tasks was to coordinate the clearance of land mines.

The Impact of the War

During the war, foreign powers have poured weaponry into Angola. The USSR supplied billions of dollars worth of military equipment to Angola, including 500 battle tanks and over 150 combat aircraft. The Cuban military presence peaked at 50,000 troops in 1988, and did not drop below 25,000 until well after the gradual withdrawal began in April 1989. The South African military effort was estimated to cost $2 billion in 1988 alone. The full extent of US covert assistance to UNITA has never been disclosed, but it certainly ran in the tens of millions of dollars in the late 1980s.

The war witnessed widespread human rights abuses by both sides.[2] There was much deliberate killing and wounding of civilians. Civilian properties were frequently looted or destroyed. Whole villages have been burned. Foodstuffs and other items indispensable for the survival of civilians, such as cattle and plough oxen, were taken. UNITA took many civilians, including children, by force to serve in its armed forces or to be auxiliaries. FAPLA also recruited boys and men by force.

The war was fought in a manner that reduced much of Angola's population to a state of famine. There were no recognized front lines, and fighting raged backwards and forwards over large areas of the country. As a result, a very large proportion of the population was directly affected by the war, and an even larger number of people lived with the pervasive fear that fighting could come to their locality at any time. The widespread use of land mines, especially on roads and paths, was a crucial factor in creating famine. The threat of land mines prevented free movement of people and commerce, and proved a serious obstacle to relief efforts.

During 1990, serious food shortages threatened much of the country. According to estimates by the US Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance, up to 10,000 people died in the first four months of the year. In September, the United Nations estimated that about 1.9 million Angolans in nine central and southern provinces faced famine. About three quarters of those at risk were in areas made inaccessible for relief. About 1.2 million people were in the central Planalto of Huambo and Bíe provinces and the neighboring areas. This, the most fertile and densely populated part of Angola, was the center of UNITA's war effort. UNITA aimed to destabilize the government by preventing it from exercising any form of authority in these provinces. This strategy, together with the shifting battle lines, meant that the delivery of relief to the Planalto by establishing tranquil zones or safe passage agreements would be possible only if UNITA dramatically revised its military strategy.

In 1990, about 150,000 people were estimated to be at serious risk of famine in the UNITA-controlled southeastern provinces of Moxico and Cuando Cubango, with a much higher number suffering less extreme deprivation. Here, the chronic nature of the conflict had worn down much of the population to the brink of complete destitution. Because the area was securely controlled by UNITA, cross-border relief f