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Chapter Six Economic and Social Rights It is in the commitment to economic rights that the Basic Law of Government charts a progressive path. At first sight, though, these codified rights do not appear to include anything new for Saudi citizens who have benefited for some time from the generous programs of a welfare state. Under Article 27 of the Basic Law, "the state shall guarantee the right of all citizens and their families in the cases of illness, disability or old age; it shall support the Social Welfare System."1 Although the text is not explicit about what this right is, it presumably refers to the right to the minimum level of livelihood guaranteed in the Social Welfare System administered by the government, which provides the needy with monthly stipends in cases of old age, disability or death of a provider. Under Article 28, "the state shall facilitate employment for all able-bodied persons and enact laws that protect workers and employers." This provision, while not gender-specific, probably does not include providing women with employment. Under Saudi labor laws, women are not allowed to work except in the rare circumstances where an employer is able to provide a totally gender-segregated work environment. Article 30 mandates that "the state shall provide public education and undertake to fight illiteracy." It does not however require compulsory education, a demand of Saudi educators and part of the trend in countries of Saudi Arabia's relatively advanced level of development. Nor does it require that access to education be equal among the sexes; under Saudi regulations, women are not allowed to enroll in certain fields. Under Article 31, "the state shall protect public health and provide health care to every citizen." In practice, access to free high-quality health care is not equal. It is one of the areas where patronage by the royal family is effective in securing care; those without it have to pay high prices for medical care in private hospitals or abroad. Part of the progressive trend is Article 32: "The state shall undertake to protect, preserve and improve the physical environment and prevent its pollution." This is especially important in light of the environmental devastation wreaked by the Iran-Iraq war (1980-88) and the more recent 1991 Gulf war. Public Scrutiny of Government Finances The Basic Law of Government seeks to regulate fiscal aspects of the state functions, an area of heated controversy in Saudi Arabia. Ever since Saudi Arabia began accumulating wealth from selling oil in 1940s, there have been persistent charges of favoritism, discrimination and outright corruption in the exploitation of natural resources. The scope of corruption indistributing public property, including state land and lucrative government contracts, is also legendary. Government financial accountability has been therefore one of the key demands of Saudi citizens petitioning for change.2 It is probably to counter such charges that the Basic Law addresses these issues in some detail. Under the Saudi brand of mixed economy, the state owns most land and all natural resources: "All God's bestowed resources and revenues from these resources, whether underground, on the surface, in territorial waters, or within territorial or maritime zones of jurisdiction of Saudi Arabia, are state property as specified by law. The law shall specify methods of exploitation and protection of these resources, and their development in accordance with the interest of the state, its security and economic benefit" (Article 14 of the Basic Law). Other articles also confirm the emphasis on public ownership: "No concession, or exploitation of resources shall take place except according to law," (Article 15); and: "The state shall protect the sanctity of public property," (Article 16). The controversy over financial accounting emanates from the less than water-tight Saudi laws of public finance. They allow for the haphazard way in which these resources have been developed, usually shrouded in secrecy outside the normal government channels. This prevents appropriate accounting before a competent body or through other methods of public scrutiny. The absence of a representative body and a free press makes effective scrutiny very unlikely. Unless the government now enacts strong laws to implement the general principles enunciated in the Basic Law, and unless it allows public examination of the way they are applied, it is doubtful that the present scope of corruption and venality among a favored elite will diminish. Article 74 of the Basic Law addresses another serious problem of public finance: "State property shall not be sold, leased or otherwise disposed of except according to law". Traditionally in Saudi Arabia, through a peculiar interpretation of Shari`a rules on public property, the King has had near absolute authority over the handling of state property. His unquestioned discretion in this respect, in many cases has meant the straightforward distribution of public property to members of the royal family or to senior government officials. Article 72 attempts to address another contentious problem of record-keeping that has traditionally been handled away from public scrutiny: "a. Revenues of the state and the manner in which they are transferred to the public treasury shall be specified by law. b. Revenues shall be recorded and spent according to principles specified by law."3 Whether these fiscal principles will have the desired effect of ensuring fairness in access to the public wealth will depend on the laws that are passed to put them into effect and on the mechanism through which supervision of their implementation is achieved. Under current laws, only the Council of Ministers has the authority to scrutinize such matters. The Council is however a body that is tightly controlled by the King; its opinions are purely advisory and it holds its meeting in secret away from the public eye. The press is forbidden from covering its activities beyond the press statements issued following meetings, usually read by the Minister of Information and distributed by the official Saudi Press Agency. The contemplated Consultative Council to be formed within the next four months would be the best forum for effecting such scrutiny. However, the powers acceded to this council in the new laws are extremely limited.4 Chapter Seven Law of Provinces The new Law of Provinces replaces a 1963 similar law that was never put into effect, but was not repealed until March 1992. Between 1963 and 1992, the old law was simply ignored by the king and his cabinet. Presented as giving the regions of the kingdom a measure of autonomy, a close reading of new law shows that this autonomy is extremely limited, much less than that envisioned in the 1963 statute. By March 1993, it is intended that provincial councils be appointed by the king. The new law also confirms the present practice of appointing governors by royal orders. No elections are contemplated in the new law, reversing an earlier provision to elect a certain proportion of regional council members.1 The scheduled provincial councils, moreover, will have a more limited mandate than what was envisaged by the 1963 law. Astonishingly, they will not be allowed to discuss government domestic policy. Most notable in the new law is the shift of some power from the Council of Ministers to the Minister of Interior. While this shift may be desirable to reduce the concentration of power, it does not bode well for human rights observance. The Ministry of Interior, the agency responsible for internal security including the police force and internal intelligence services, is the government agency most associated with human rights abuses in the country. Hailed by the government as a step forward, the new law is actually a step backwards in some respects. It continues the trend towards elimination of all forms of elections and limits the mandate granted in 1963 to regional councils.2 In an interview with Middle East Watch, a senior Saudi provincial official voiced significant concerns about the new law. With the precedent of the 1963 law in mind, he expressed concern whether the new law would be implemented in all its aspects, since there is no formal body in charge of supervising its application. The official said that while the new law appears to give regional governors some power, it mainly strengthens the hand of the Minister of Interior vis-a-vis the cabinet as a whole. He referred to Article 23 specifying the limited scope of work for a provincial council. Article 25 then sternly states: "Provincial councils are forbidden to look into any subject other than those specified in this Law. Any decisions issued by a council in violation of this provision shall be annulled by the Minister of Interior." According to the Saudi official interviewed by Middle East Watch, this prohibition is a continuation ofArticle 24 of the 1963 Law of Provinces which states: "Provincial councils are forbidden from discussing any military issues or matters of domestic policy or foreign affairs."3 The old Law of Provinces, ratified by Royal Decree No. 12 of October 8, 1963, in fulfillment of the 1962 reform program, was never implemented because the government believed it gave excessive power to regional governors and regional councils at the expense of the central government. In 1986, when Prince Mamdouh ibn Abdel-Aziz, a brother of the king who was then governor of Tabouk, the northwestern province, tried to exercise his authority as defined by the Law of Provinces, he was dismissed from his position for insubordination.4 The 1963 Law of Provinces was quite detailed in outlining the areas of competence of the provincial councils (Articles 12 through 25). By contrast, the new law is quite brief on this issue. It also gives the Interior Minister a wider authority to annul councils' decisions by virtue of the previously quoted Article 25, whenever he deems that a council has overstepped its authority. Since this authority is not clearly defined, and since the law does not envisage an independent body to settle jurisdictional disputes, it would be probably up to the Minister himself to decide when a council is acting beyond its legal power. Under the new Law of Provinces, as in the 1963 law, governors are appointed by the king. In practice, all provincial governors in Saudi Arabia are members of two families: the al-Saud family and the al-Sudairi family, King Fahd's maternal relatives. Under the new law, members of provincial councils are to be appointed by the king; local administrators are appointed by provincial governors. Chapter Eight United States Policy Towards Saudi Arabia Despite a strong and intimate relationship spanning more than half a century, the United States government has rarely criticized Saudi violations of human rights. The fact that Saudi Arabia has one of the most tightly controlled authoritarian governments, has not prompted the U.S. to voice concern over the lack of participatory government in the Kingdom. After the new basic laws were announced in March of this year, U.S. officials were unequivocal in their praise, overlooking their obvious fundamental flaws. Although the U.S. has been very well-placed to help effect an improvement in the Saudi dismal human rights record, it appears to have subordinated human rights principles to strategic, foreign policy and business interests, on the probably mistaken belief that promotion of human rights and participatory democracy in the Kingdom would have deleterious effects on those interests. The close relationship between two countries dates back to 1933, when four major U.S. companies gained concessions for the exploration of oil in Saudi Arabia. In addition to oil production and allied industries, the U.S. is the largest importer of Saudi products and the largest source of Saudi imports. The U.S. has also been the main supplier of arms to the Saudi military. It has built Saudi Arabia's military infrastructure and trained its forces. Beyond the Middle East, the two governments have also closely cooperated in military and political matters all over the globe, including Zaire, Nicaragua, Afghanistan and, more recently, the Commonwealth of Independent States. This special relationship was cemented by the war effort to oust Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. President Bush's original justification for dispatching U.S. troops to Saudi Arabia, in August 1990, was the perceived threat of an Iraqi invasion of the kingdom. Post-war cooperation has involved extensive contacts between the two countries on future security arrangements in the Gulf, Saudi defense plans, the fate of the Iraqi regime led by Saddam Hussein, and the Arab-Israeli peace process. Pledges to work toward a curb on all arms sales to the Middle East notwithstanding, the U.S. drive to arm Saudi Arabia with U.S.-made weapons has accelerated since the end of Operation Desert Storm in February 1991. It is projected to continue over the next several years. On November 8, 1991, Pentagon officials announced the Administration's plans to provide Saudi Arabia with a large package of advanced weapons. The $3.3 billion sale, if approved by Congress, would include seven hundred ground-to-air missiles for fourteen Patriot missile batteries, to be added to six batteries sold in the fall of 1990. In addition, Saudi Arabia has ordered seventy-two F-15 fighter planes from McDonnell Douglas, at a cost of $4 billion, according to an announcement by the company in November 1991. The two deals are part of a $14 billion arms package that Saudi Arabia is seeking to purchase from the United States for delivery in 1992 and 1993. The range of military cooperation between the two countries was reiterated by U.S. officials during a visit to the Kingdom in February 1992. They assured Saudi rulers that "theUnited States was determined, while preserving Israel's qualitative edge over any likely combination of aggressors, to meeting the legitimate defense needs of our friends in the Gulf. This includes sales of weapons and bilateral security arrangements such as the periodic conduct of joint military exercises, the maintenance of an enhanced naval presence in the Gulf, and access and prepositioning arrangements."1 In March 1992, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, Edward P. Djerejian, told a House subcommittee that, in addition to existing military agreements that the U.S. was seeking to renew, the U.S. government was also negotiating long-term arrangements with Saudi Arabia for the use of Saudi military facilities and the right to preposition U.S.-owned weapons in the kingdom. He expected these agreements to be concluded "in the near future."2 One reason to expect the U.S.-Saudi defense alliance to strengthen even more is the apparent failure so far to conclude regional collective security arrangements. As has been evident since the December 1991 Gulf Cooperation Council summit meeting in Kuwait, the six GCC countries -- Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates --have failed so far to agree on a military pact.3 Under the Damascus Accord of March 1991, Egyptian and Syrian troops were to provide additional security guarantees. Recently, however, the GCC countries have shown little interest in pursuing this option. Without these two options, the six Gulf states have been relying on the U.S. to provide the needed military assurance, through arms purchases and military agreements. A new area of mutual interest between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia is their concern over the future of the former Soviet Union. In a March, 1992, hearing before the House, Secretary Djerejian said that the U.S. and the Gulf states were concerned about "possibility of instability, transfers of dangerous weapons technology, and economic collapse," in former Soviet Union republics. Gulf states, principally Saudi Arabia, have allocated $3.5 billion in grants, loans and credits to the former Soviet Union, following discussions with the United States.4 The U.S. arming of Saudi Arabia, the political alliance that was strengthened by the Gulf crisis and the tremendous good will which the Saudi government has for the BushAdministration following the liberation of Kuwait, provide the Administration with a special opportunity to encourage Saudi respect for human rights. Despite these opportunities, respect for human rights in Saudi Arabia has never been a priority for the Bush Administration or its predecessors. The State Department's Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 1991, released in February 1992, catalogued in some detail human rights abuses in Saudi Arabia.5 Gross abuses mentioned in the State Department reports included denial of due process, torture, mistreatment of refugees, interference with the judiciary, and discrimination against women, foreigners and religious minorities. But the Administration has chosen not to follow its own findings with public statements indicating displeasure with those abuses. Even cases of Saudi Arabia's mistreatment of U.S. citizens -- whether businessmen, journalists or workers -- have been met with near complete silence by U.S. officials. During the entire seven-month crisis in the Gulf, the United States treated the Saudi government with kid gloves. For example, Saudi Arabia had refused to treat as prisoners-of-war Iraqi soldiers who surrendered before the start of the war on January 17, 1991. Classifying them as "military refugees" who did not fall under the protection of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949, the Saudi government did not allow prisoners to contact their families and prevented visits by the International Committee of the Red Cross. U.S. officials disagreed with this position, telling Middle East Watch at the time that they considered these soldiers to be prisoners-of-war entitled to Convention protection. They also told Middle East Watch that the two governments had signed an agreement - the provisions of which were classified - to spell out the treatment of prisoners-of-war in accordance with the Geneva Convention.6 Despite this disagreement, and the joint responsibility of the two governments to ensure compliance with the Third Geneva Convention, the United States refrained from publicly commenting on the issue. With respect to political participation, there was only one reference during 1991, for example, indicating a degree of U.S. concern about the absence of democracy in Saudi Arabia. On November 20, in a lengthy statement read by Assistant Secretary Djerejian, then newly appointed, before the House Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East -- his first appearance before the subcommittee since his appointment -- he failed to mention human rights or political participation as components of U.S. policy toward the region. Questioned later on the subject of political participation, Secretary Djerejian said that the U.S was pressing all countries in the region, including Saudi Arabia, to make democratic reforms, but did not elaborate further. U.S. Response to the New Laws Only after the Saudi laws were issued did U.S. officials disclose in more detail their views on political participation in the region. On Saudi Arabia, they went out of their way to praise the new laws, as "very important steps," asserting that these laws have expanded politicalparticipation, enumerated citizens rights and limited government interference in private lives. In the course of his March 17, 1992, testimony before the Subcommittee on Europe and the Middle East, Secretary Djerejian said that during a recent trip to the region, "I raised the US government's strong interest in the promotion of participatory government and human rights."7 Later in the hearing, in response to a question by Representative Jim Leach (R-IA), Secretary Djerejian gave what may be the first clear official statement on political participation in the region: I think what we're also urging all these countries to do is to expand participatory government. We do advocate our democratic ideals and we do urge forward movement on human rights. For example, in each one of my visits to the Gulf countries, I raised the promotion of participatory government and the promotion of human rights. And I was preceded in one of my stops by Assistant Secretary for Human Rights Dick Schifter, who visited Kuwait. So my answer to your question, Congressman, is that concomitant with and part of our policy, of course, is fostering democratization and human rights, and of course the whole concept that we have here of civilian authority over the military.8 Now, there has been some success and you have to remember the environment in the Arab world... King Fahd just made, as you know, a very important statement on expanding the participation of the citizens in the Saudi governmental structure and processes.9 This assertion that King Fahd's "very important statement" had endorsed the expansion of political participation is not supported by a close scrutiny of the newly issued laws and King Fahd's subsequent statements. The U.S. government, Secretary Djerejian added, has welcomed, "King Fahd's decision to establish a consultative council...and his reaffirmation of limits on governmental interference in citizens' private lives, in accordance with Saudi religion and tradition." President Bush, he said, had written "to the king to commend his initiatives."10 It is difficult to appreciate what the President saw worth commending. The assertion that King Fahd has reaffirmed limits on government's interference in citizens' private lives is inaccurate. It implies that these limits had always existed and that the new laws have confirmed. Neither claim is supported by evidence. We demonstrated earlier in this report, there are only two statements in all the three laws that may be taken as placing limits on government interference: one proclaiming the "sanctity of homes" and the other asserting theprivacy of communications. However, the Basic Law allows the violation of these principles "according to the law." The laws in effect in Saudi Arabia permit the regular violation of both rules. The Imprisonment and Detention Law of 1978 and its bylaws allow security forces to arrest suspects and search their homes without authorization, a situation confirmed by the manner in which recent arrests of political opponents have taken place. Nor do the new laws appear to put any curbs on the religious police authority to raid and search homes without warrants. Later in the testimony, Secretary Djerejian appeared again more charitable in his interpretation of the new laws than a close analysis would have warranted. He said that in the Basic Law of Government,"royal succession is formalized and reserved for the sons of King Abdul Aziz and their sons. The king is given the right to choose and dismiss the crown prince, and rights of Saudi citizens are enumerated."11 While it is true that the line of succession is more formalized in the new Basic Law, citizen rights are not enumerated, as we saw earlier in our discussion of civil and political rights in the Basic Law; only a few rights are recognized and even those are qualified and circumscribed. The fact that the Consultative Council is not going to be elected was conceded but not criticized by the U.S. official. It is remarkable that although the Bush Administration has on other occasions elsewhere put much emphasis on elections, in the case of Saudi Arabia it apparently does not deem elections as important. For example, against the objections of representatives of some Third World dictatorships, U.S. representatives at the United Nations have urged that "genuine periodic elections" representing "the will of the people" be considered a high priority in the work towards human rights.12 The same administration, however, appears to endorse a Saudi system which has just been codified to rule out elections altogether. Secretary Djerejian further acknowledged that the mandate of the proposed Consultative Council is limited to merely "consider national policies referred to it and recommend legislation to the Council of Ministers." When questioned repeatedly on whether the new laws indicate that the king has given up any power, the Secretary replied, "Given up power? I think he's -- perhaps it's a question of delegation, not giving up power." Asked to demonstrate to whom the king has delegated power, the Secretary said, "I would have to look at that. It's a bit of a constitutional question. I don't know if the legal term applies." He later conceded that, "Well I think the decrees emphasize, certainly emphasize the continuing authority, strong authority of the king, who can modify any of the decrees by a subsequent decree."13 Apparently responding to implications that the new laws were issued in part as a response to U.S. pressure, King Fahd himself has denied that there was any pressure from abroad or inside Saudi Arabia. On March 28, 1992, he told a Kuwaiti newspaper: To say that they came as a result of pressure from one place or another is just hearsay that is totally baseless. Those who say such things do not know the reality of our people, our society and its traditions...Saudi Arabia and its people do not take lessons or pressure from any body. We respect the others' internal affairs and expect that they would respect ours...14 If, in fact, issuing the new laws can be credited in part to U.S. advocacy and persuasion, such pressure must not have been convincing enough to induce the Saudi royal family to give up any real power, as Secretary Djerejian rightly conceded. The fact that the Basic Law was issued almost sixty years after it was first promised, and the fact that the new laws in many respects represent backward steps towards less participatory government, are other indications that there is not much credit to be claimed by any side. 2 See, e.g., the two petitions for reform, in the appendix of this report. 3 Article 73 aims at streamlining public expenditure: "No Public Treasury funds shall be committed except according to the principles specified in the state budget. If the budget does not allow the spending of the additional funds, such commitment may be made through a royal decree." 4 See the chapter on the Consultative Council, above. 1 The 1940 Law of Regional Governors and Administrative Councils stipulated the election of members of administrative councils in every region of the Kingdom (Articles 29-34). 2 Only limited municipal elections are now sanctioned. Article 9 of the 1977 Municipalities and Villages Law still allows for the election of half the members of a municipal council. However, since that law came into effect, no election has ever been held. See the section on elections, above, for more details. 3 Middle East Watch interview, March 27, 1992. 4 Middle East Watch interview in Jiddah, Saudi Arabia, October 16, 1990. 1 From Assistant Secretary Edward P. Djerejian's March 17, 1992 testimony before the House Foreign Relations Europe and Near East Subcommittee [hereinafter Testimony], transcript as provided by the State Department, p.13 2 March 17, 1992 Testimony, p.18 3 Secretary Djerejian conceded that the military alliance contemplated by the GCC "is not moving forward as rapidly as I think we would like to see it move forward." (From his Testimony, p. 25.) On March 28, 1992, King Fahd also indicated that an agreement was not near, when he told a Kuwaiti newspaper, that instead of discussing a unified military force, "coordination of armament policy and training must be agreed upon, so that types of weapons and equipment are compatible if not unified." From an interview with al-Siyassah, text in Arabic distributed by the official Saudi Press Agency, March 28, 1992. 6 Middle East Watch interview with Maj. Arthur Gorman, special advisor for POW/MIA affairs at the U.S. Department of Defense; and with Edward Cummings, assistant legal adviser for Politico-Military Affairs at the U.S. Department of State, January 1991. 8 Some have questioned the potential harmful effects of building a large military and a police force on the free exercise of civil and political rights. In the course of the March 1992 hearing, Rep. Jim Leach (R-IA) alluded to this issue when he questioned Secretary Djerejian on the "effects of building a large army and a police force in a sparsely populated country." 10 Testimony, pp. 3-4 and 47-48. 12 See the draft resolution and the statement made by Thomas R. Pickering, United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations, before the Third Committee at the 45th session of the General Assembly, agenda item 110. 14 From an interview with al-Siyassah, text distributed by the Saudi Press Agency, March 28, 1992. |