V. Continued Repression in Cyclone-Affected Areas

Many of the positive descriptions of the Cyclone Nargis relief and recovery operation have paid little attention to continuing human rights violations in the Irrawaddy Delta and other cyclone-affected areas of Burma. Human Rights Watch is concerned that the ongoing international recovery effort in cyclone-affected areas has not been accompanied by steps to ensure effective human rights protection, monitoring and documentation.

The major reports on post-cyclone reconstruction fail to mention human rights, and “protection” is often predicated on access to resources, not safety from abuses by the authorities.[161] Many United Nations agencies in Burma have long adopted a muted approach to human rights protection, fearing that advocacy towards the government on rights abuses would endanger their access in Burma, and could get them sent out of the country. For instance, the former UNDP resident representative and UN resident coordinator, Charles Petrie, was expelled from Burma in November 2007 following his mild, yet accurate, public criticisms that government mismanagement of the economy had caused declining living standards, which had propelled anti-government demonstrations that year.[162]

The gaps in international protection were summed up by a UNOCHA report released in late 2008. The report concluded:

[T]here were a number of protection concerns that fell outside the mandate of the protection cluster. In reality, however, resources at hub level are extremely limited and meeting minutes illustrate a distinct focus on child protection. Other issues, many of which are not necessarily politically sensitive (e.g. other vulnerable groups, documentation, access to land, displacement, resettlement, etc.) are not being adequately addressed. [163]

In July 2008, Human Rights Watch released a detailed list of concerns to donors following the cyclone, outlining key human rights issues and calling on donors to insist on the formation of an independent aid monitoring body. The Tripartite Core Group has not formed such a body, but has continued to assure the international community that monitoring systems are sufficient and other aid accountability protocols are adequate, despite ongoing concerns over aid diversion and financial irregularities as a result of Burma’s cumbersome currency conversion rates.[164]

While initial concerns of a spike in forced relocations and intensified forced labor and child soldier recruitment  in cyclone-affected areas have not been borne out, Human Rights Watch found that civilians in those areas continue to be subjected to various forms of forced labor, everyday restrictions on movements, and infringements of the rights to freedom of expression and association. In the lead-up to scheduled elections in 2010, these basic restrictions continue to deter civic participation and hamper reconstruction activities. The greater presence of foreign aid organizations and international agencies such as the International Labor Organization (ILO) has lessened the level of intimidation, but only to a limited degree.

The methods of surveillance and control of the Burmese population that authorities used before the cyclone remain in place today, including the household registration system (shi-kauk). All Burmese traveling between villages are required to check in with local authorities and sign a book of “visitors,” and that information is relayed up the chain of administration. There remain heavily armed units in predominantly ethnic Karen areas of the delta around Bogale and Laputta, which are designated as “brown” low-level conflict zones because of a failed armed action there in 1991 by the Karen National Union (KNU). The presence of Burmese army troops, particularly in ethnic minority areas, is frequently a factor in human rights violations, with troops often responsible for perpetrating forced labor, land confiscation, recruitment of child soldiers, and increased assaults and sexual abuse.

Forced Labor

The use of forced labor by local government officials, security forces and the Tatmadaw remains a widespread and serious problem throughout Burma. For more than 15 years, the ILO has been engaging with the Burmese government to end this practice and ensure Burma’s compliance with ILO Convention No. 29 on Forced Labor, which Burma ratified in 1955. Convention No. 29 states that forced labor is “all work or service which is exacted from any person under the menace of any penalty and for which said person has not offered himself voluntarily.”[165] Following pressure from the ILO, the Burmese government in 1999 enacted Order 1/99 to outlaw the use of forced labor, but this has proven insufficient to stamp out the practice. In the 2008 Constitution, the use of forced labor is expressly forbidden.[166]

On February 26, 2006, the SPDC and ILO announced an agreement on a mechanism to permit the ILO liaison officer in Burma to hear complaints of forced labor. If the liaison officer determines that a case has merit, he can then refer the case to the Burmese authorities for investigation.[167] The agreement requires that reports be filed within 12 months of the alleged use of forced labor. Complaints can be sent to the liaison officer by the victim or a private person or organization working on their behalf.[168] That mechanism, the Supplementary Understanding, has been renewed every year since its agreement.[169]

In response to Cyclone Nargis, the ILO conducted workshops to sensitize UN agencies and INGO workers on patterns of forced labor and continued to work with local officials to ensure their compliance with central government agreements. In addition, the ILO pursued projects on restoring tertiary infrastructure, creating raised footpaths between villages to be used in storms and floods, and rehabilitation of jetties and paths, footbridges, and latrines.[170]

The ILO monitored the cyclone-affected areas for reports of forced labor, and in the year following Nargis received only two verifiable reports.[171] Interviews by Human Rights Watch with residents of several townships found that forced labor on various levels continues to be practiced by Burmese authorities in the Irrawaddy Delta, but that its patterns and intensity are significantly reduced from the pre-cyclone period. Plausible reasons for this include the expanded monitoring activities of the ILO, the increased presence of UN agencies and INGOs and in some cases foreign journalists on the ground, and the reality that much large scale reconstruction is being conducted by private companies which pay their workers, even if only nominal sums. 

The types of forced labor that Human Rights Watch documented have occurred primarily at a local level, and involve basic maintenance of town and village infrastructure, preparing for official visits by dignitaries, and civilians being coerced to act as sentries or guards at night. Road building continues in the region but Human Rights Watch found in most cases that workers are either paid or rewarded with other types of in-kind assistance. 

Ye Tun, from Bogale, told Human Rights Watch researchers that he can avoid requirements to perform forced labor if he pays officials, but that arbitrary taxation by soldiers and officials is a fact of life. “We don’t need to go for louq a pay [forced labor] if we pay money [to the Ya Ya Ka] for that. Village officials collect money for different reasons as usual. We villagers built the new village school. Soldiers often asked money from the villagers who collect firewood in the forest.”[172]

Htay Win, a 38-year-old fisherman from the coast of Laputta, claimed that forced labor has diminished as a daily challenge compared to before the cyclone, but added that small levels of forced labor, or paying to get out of it, is still commonplace. He said:

Louq a pay is not as bad a problem as before. One time I was asked to wash the [nearby military] airfield. We had to louq a pay for road construction here. Workers were paid 2,000 kyat (US$2) per day for road construction after Nargis but they didn’t employ many people. We don’t need to work as forced labor for other places, only for our village. If we have some work to do for the village, the village authority calls one person per house by order. If no one could go, then that household must give money to someone who can work for that house.[173]

Local residents are called upon to stage welcoming parties for visiting officials, many of which are staged for the state-run media to broadcast.[174] Htay Win described to Human Rights Watch what he and his fellow villagers had to do when officials visited:

The Prime Minister (Thein Sein) came one time to our place, and then Senior General Than Shwe came here in December 2008. He just passed by the village. Authorities asked us to gather along the road and wave our hands showing our welcome. We had to shout ’Senior General Than Shwe healthy and wealthy!’ But before his visit, we had to prepare for one month. We had to plant trees besides the main road, although we had no water, nor good soil. We could not refuse or give any excuses to the authorities. We just had to do whatever they ordered us… We had to carry sand and water from the beach to up here and plant the trees. And we had to clear out all the bushes in the village. [175]

Pu Me Le, a young woman from Laputta, said she was made to clean up around the village, and the men were tasked with providing night security:

The forced labor we have to do is to be the guardian (nyar zar or kin sout). Three people a night, only the men. I have to do cleaning up around the village. After Nargis there was a lot of louq a pay, but not now. I don’t like it when SPDC officials come, we all have to do work for them, cook, clean and never complain. The Ya Ya Ka and kyaing phut and sit tha, they tell us ‘don’t talk to foreigners’ who come to visit.[176]

In some parts of the delta, a rat infestation caused havoc with paddy crop rehabilitation. The answer from local officials was to enforce a “rat-tail” quota. San San, a Christian pastor from Dedaye, described the response by authorities. “Rats destroyed our paddy fields. We were instructed to get rid of the rats by the authorities. We had to give five rats a week to the authorities. When we couldn’t catch them, we had to hire rat-catchers to catch them for us.”[177] Ye Tun, a farmer in Bogale had to produce a weekly quota of seven rat tails by order of the Ya Ya Ka, or villagers would be charged a fine.[178]

Preparation for the 2010 Elections

UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon visited Burma for a second time on July 3-4, 2009, and met with President Than Shwe and other senior SPDC officials. The government refused his request to meet with opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who was on trial at the time. Ban gave a speech on Burma’s human rights record to diplomats and humanitarian actors in Rangoon before his departure. Regarding the 2010 elections, Ban reported to the UN General Assembly in August on the UN’s expectations:

I believe that unless three immediate concerns are addressed, the credibility of the political process will remain in doubt: the release of all political prisoners, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and their free participation in the political life of their country; the commencement of dialogue between the Government and opposition and ethnic stakeholders as a necessary part of any national reconciliation process; and the creation of conditions conducive to credible and legitimate elections. Now is the time for the Myanmar Government to address these concerns in order to ensure that the political process serves the interest of all of the people of Myanmar, in a way that is unifying rather than divisive and that is broadly acceptable to the international community. In this regard, I expect that the Government will take the necessary steps consistent with its commitments to ensure that the elections are fully inclusive, participatory and transparent, and are prepared and conducted in accordance with international standards.[179]

There is optimism from some foreign observers that these elections will be beneficial for Burma. Surin Pitsuwan, the secretary-general of ASEAN, was positive about the process being a step forward in a February interview:

No election is perfect. It has to begin. That’s why they [the SPDC] are beginning. They promise [to conduct elections] at the end of this year… they are committed to the election. We are trying to make sure that our expectations are fulfilled. That it’s going to be credible, transparent. We [ASEAN] cannot impose every step. We cannot interfere with details. [Burma] is a different country. They [the SPDC] have a different background.[180]

The electoral process has yet to generate real popular interest within Burma.  Human Rights Watch interviewed ordinary Burmese in the delta and on the outskirts of Rangoon about the preparations for the 2010 elections. We found little knowledge or interest in the process.

This was not unique to the cyclone-affected areas. As of April 2010, the SPDC had not announced a firm date for the election and only in March released a series of five electoral laws that set out the ground rules for civic participation and provisions for political party registration and contesting the elections.[181] The series of laws fall well below international standards that would permit free, fair and credible elections. They include an Electoral Commission that is dominated by figures close to the Tatmadaw, and a ban on political parties having members who are currently serving prison terms: in effect forcing parties to expel political prisoners or forgo the ability to legally register the party.[182] UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, convening the Group of Friends of Myanmar at the UN in New York, expressed disappointment with the laws:

[T]he published electoral laws and the overall electoral environment so far do not fully measure up to what is needed for an inclusive political process… it is disappointing that we have not seen the progress that we had expected. The Group stressed the need for elections to be inclusive, participatory and transparent in order to advance the prospects of stability, democracy and development for all the people of Myanmar.[183]

Meanwhile, the government continues to arbitrarily arrest, and unfairly prosecute and sentence political activists and journalists even as some people in Burma’s cities start political mobilization and forming parties to register with the authorities.[184]

Many of those we interviewed felt excluded from the political process through lack of awareness and a general climate of intimidation, leading to deep resignation about the elections. Sein Win, the Ya Ya Ka official from a village in Dedaye township who helped to organize the referendum soon after the cyclone, outlined how his superiors had instructed him to prepare for the elections. He said:

I was instructed by the government to make sure about 50 percent vote for them. How can I do that? Nobody likes the USDA, those government thugs. They were active in cracking down on the monks in [the] September 2007 demonstrations. And, they didn't help the people when Cyclone Nargis hit our area. They didn’t even donate drinking water to us. I was asked to recruit 450 USDA party members this month [January 2010]. They will establish a party in our village. I am under pressure. In the near future, our village is going to receive a rural health facility from the government and the school would be upgraded by the government. On the other hand, how can I make the people vote for the USDA? So, I told the village elders not to blame me if we don’t get a rural health facility and a school.

I told the township authorities it would be difficult to do as they wish. Then, they said to me to make the correct choice. They asked me whether I want to live under the government ruled by only Myanmar people, or under another government partly ruled by foreigners… We will be subjects as we were and are now. As subjects, we have seen a lot of troubles. We are treated like a down-trodden class.[185]

Ye Tun, a Burmese farmer from a small village near Bogale, survived the cyclone with one of his sons because he was visiting the township capital. Forty-seven members of his extended family including his wife and his three other children were killed on May 2, 2008. Authorities compelled Ye Tun to vote in the referendum at the relocation site on May 24. He has few hopes that the 2010 elections will bring any genuine progress. He said:

I have read about the constitution a little bit. The constitution was written as they wanted. I can vote individually in the poll station, so they say, but giving pressure to us to vote means forced to vote. The voting result [in the referendum] was already prepared. Everybody knew that. Will the elections be free? If we have freedom for the elections, it would change something. If not, it will not change anything. As they announce everyday [in the media], ‘We may not get democracy if we protest; we may get democracy if we follow the constitution.’ That’s all I know. We have no choice.[186]    

Other Burmese spoke about the gradually expanding role of the USDA, which has been increasing its presence and power throughout the delta since the cyclone and looks set to play some prominent role in the elections. Toe Zaw, a 29-year-old tea shop owner in Pyapon, told Human Rights Watch that the political climate was even more restrictive in late 2009 than it was at the time of the 2008 referendum. He said:

Our freedom of speech has been denied since before the referendum. Now it is much worse than before. Now there are many once jobless [people], who turned into police informers in our town. Our town has been plagued by a gang of USDA members. We have to be very careful these days even in listening to the radio. We listen to the radio only in our house; it’s not safe to do in the streets as we did before.[187]

Since there is little electricity in outlying communities in the delta, the radio is often the only accessible media technology. Internet and television is limited to larger towns, and distribution of newspapers, magazines and books is haphazard. Many survivors of the cyclone interviewed by Human Rights Watch say the number of radios in their areas has increased partly as private donor assistance, but also to help with better warning systems in the event of another storm. Radio is still the most effective means of disseminating information in Burma, and has been a bane of the military government for years.[188]

Win Latt, a 38-year-old fisherman from Kunchangone township explained how in his village there was little access to news, apart from the radio. “Now there are some radios in our village. But, no newspapers, no journals. We heard that the national election is going to be held in 2010. If asked, we have to give a vote. But, we don’t know what to expect. We’re pawns for them [SPDC]. They can use us as they like.”[189]

Thant Myint, a young motorcycle taxi driver in Haingyi, blamed lack of knowledge about the political process to a climate of intimidation and the slow degradation of education in Burma. He told Human Rights Watch:

Nothing has been clearly said about the 2010 election. What are we going to chose and who are we voting for? In my village, the head of the USDA makes an appearance of importance. We also can’t talk about politics. People are frightened by the notion of politics. People have been made to be afraid. How could there be development in Burma when education has been so disrupted?[190]

Daw Kyaing, a small business owner in a village in Laputta, summed up the upcoming elections in this way: “The government can’t be expected to be honest in the election. Look at how they neglected us after Nargis, they did as they wanted in May 2008. They just wanted to hold (their) referendum. They didn’t think of helping us.”[191]