Background
Since the fall of the Siad Barre government in 1991, Somalia has been wracked by civil conflict and the absence of a functioning central government. For 15 years the country’s most powerful figures were warlords who fielded private militias and often brutalized civilians while vying for influence and territory. In 2006, militia-backed Sharia courts known as the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) looked poised to bring stability to Mogadishu and elsewhere in the country.[1] But when Ethiopia began seeing the ICU as a threat to its own security, it intervened militarily in December 2006, routing the ICU militias. For two years, Ethiopia and the nominal Transitional Federal Government (TFG) engaged in a bloody and brutal armed conflict with various armed opposition groups including al-Shabaab—especially in the capital, Mogadishu.
The departure of Ethiopian armed forces from Somalia by January 2009 created cautious optimism among many Somalis that that the previous two years of intensified fighting and atrocities by all parties to the conflict might be drawing to a close.[2] But those hopes have been crushed by familiar patterns of indiscriminate warfare and a rising tide of extremist repression and abuse.
The UN-led Djibouti peace process had by late 2008 ushered in a new administration to head the country’s moribund TFG.[3] Despite the backing of the UN and almost all key governments, the TFG had long been the weakest of all the major warring parties in Somalia. But new possibilities seemed to be emerging. Ethiopian forces had withdrawn from the country. The new TFG president, Sheikh Sharif Ahmed, appeared committed to building greater legitimacy and a broader base of military support for his government. Sharif, the former head of the ICU, had spent two years in exile in Eritrea and Djibouti. He had a background that many hoped would enable him to draw elements of the formidable but diverse armed opposition to the TFG under his banner.[4]
This did not happen. During the tenuous calm that emerged in early 2009, thousands of families who had been displaced by war began returning home.[5] But by late February Somalia’s armed factions had reverted to open conflict—and the situation has deteriorated ever since.
The consequences have been dire. Fighting once again rages in the capital and civilians bear the brunt of indiscriminate attacks and other abuses. Much of southern Somalia has come under the increasingly firm control of al-Shabaab, a militant offshoot of the ICU that has been radicalized and strengthened by the last three years of warfare. Al-Shabaab now controls more of Somalia’s territory than any other faction. Much of this report documents serious human rights abuses that have proliferated in areas controlled by al-Shabaab.
Somalia is now burdened with one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world—a catastrophe that is in large part a product of conflict and related human rights abuses. Some 1.5 million people are internally displaced and more than 560,000 others are living as refugees in neighboring countries.[6] Half of the population needs urgent assistance, yet general insecurity and attacks on humanitarian operations have made it virtually impossible for aid organizations to reach many of the people in need.[7]
Major Domestic Parties to the Conflict
The following is a brief overview of the major parties to the armed conflict in Somalia as of early 2010.[8]
Transitional Federal Government
Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government (TFG), which formed in 2004, is recognized by the United Nations and almost all key foreign powers as the legitimate government of Somalia, but it controls only a small section of southern Mogadishu centered on the port, airport, and presidential palace. It is dependent for its survival on the protection provided by African Union troops stationed in Mogadishu. Other areas that were under the TFG’s influence at the beginning of 2009, such as the key towns of Baidoa and Jowhar, left its orbit or were captured by armed opposition groups during the year. The TFG provides virtually no public services and its security forces—along with some government ministers—have been accused of entrenched corruption.[9] For many Somalis, the TFG is simply one of several parties involved in the interminable battle for control of the capital.
Al-Shabaab
Al-Shabaab, which means “the youth” in Arabic, began as part of the armed wing of the Islamic Courts Union (ICU) when the courts rose to power in Mogadishu in 2006. The 2006 Ethiopian military intervention in Somalia routed the ICU and sent its leaders into exile, but a hard core of al-Shabaab fighters and commanders remained in the country to continue the fight. Since then, they have steadily emerged as the most powerful and effective armed faction on the ground, especially in southern Somalia. Initially, they benefited from significant public support as the only group mounting serious resistance to the unpopular Ethiopian military presence. They have also received material support from the Eritrean government, which is eager to undercut rival Ethiopia’s interests in Somalia and throughout the region.[10]
Al-Shabaab is not a monolithic entity but rather an alliance of factions that have rallied under its banner. To the extent that the group’s diverse leaders have a common agenda, it consists of defeating AMISOM and the TFG and extending extreme measures it justifies as Sharia, the Islamic system of laws and daily conduct, across Somalia.[11] Across a large part of southern Somalia, local administrations that identify themselves as al-Shabaab appear to answer to authorities based in Kismayo. But in other areas, “al-Shabaab” administrations may be little more than preexisting clan-based power structures assuming a different name.
In 2009 al-Shabaab moved quickly to fill the vacuum created by the withdrawal of Ethiopia’s military forces. In January the group seized control of Baidoa, formerly the seat of the TFG parliament, without a fight.[12] In May al-Shabaab forces took control of Jowhar, which had been one of TFG President Sharif’s most reliable strongholds. In October al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam, another leading opposition group, shattered their alliance as they fought each other for the strategic port city of Kismayo; a short battle ended with al-Shabaab taking undisputed control. By the end of the year, al-Shabaab controlled more territory than any other faction in Somalia.
Hizbul Islam
Like al-Shabaab, Hizbul Islam (“Party of Islam”) is an armed group that espouses a Sharia agenda and seeks to drive AMISOM and the TFG from Mogadishu. It came into being under the leadership of Hassan Dahir Aweys, a former ICU leader who broke with Sheikh Sharif when the two men were in exile. While Sharif was in Djibouti, Aweys spent his exile in Asmara and cultivated close ties with the Eritrean government.[13] Aweys returned to Mogadishu in early 2009 and instead of allying himself with Sharif’s government, joined with al-Shabaab to resume fighting.
Hizbul Islam’s tenuous alliance with al-Shabaab ended in October 2009 during the two groups’ fight for Kismayo. A month after its Kismayo defeat, Hizbul Islam also lost the key border town of Dhobley to al-Shabaab forces, which both groups had previously occupied together.
Ahlu Sunna Waljamaca
Ahlu Sunna Waljamaca (roughly translated as “Adherents to the Sunnah and Congregation”) is often described as an Islamist group rooted in traditional Somali Sufism that professes to support a “moderate” agenda, in opposition to the vision of al-Shabaab and Hizbul Islam. It is the only Somali faction that has enjoyed substantial military success against al-Shabaab and it has also been involved in clashes with Hizbul Islam forces.[14] The group exists primarily in central Somalia, where it has managed to maintain control over large swaths of territory, predominantly in Galgadud and Hiran regions. Ahlu Sunna Waljamaca in February 2010 signed a power-sharing and military unification pact with the TFG, though relations between the two groups have at points been strained. Ethiopia has also provided support to Ahlu Sunna Waljamaca and as of early 2010 some of its fighters were reportedly undergoing training in Ethiopia.[15]
The African Union Mission in Somalia
The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) is an African Union force authorized by the UN Security Council and deployed to Mogadishu to bolster the TFG.[16] It consists of roughly 5,300 Ugandan and Burundian troops. Most analysts believe the TFG would quickly collapse without the military protection that AMISOM forces provide.[17]
AMISOM has never approached its authorized troop strength of 8,000. Its forces have come under constant harassment and attack by armed opposition groups in the capital, many of whom demanded AMISOM’s withdrawal from Somalia as a precondition for negotiating with the “new” TFG in early 2009.[18] AMISOM forces sustained two devastating suicide bomb attacks in 2009, including a September attack on AMISOM’s main base of operations that claimed the lives of at least 21 people, including the deputy force commander.[19]
Al-Shabaab and International Terrorism
Al-Shabaab is often described by US and European government officials and media outlets as a Somalia-based “proxy” of al-Qaeda.[20] The reality is considerably more complex: al-Shabaab is a broad coalition of groups with diverse agendas, and while some leaders have ties to al-Qaeda, it is far from a monolithic tool of Osama bin Laden. Some analysts believe there is growing tension between al-Shabaab leaders with transnational agendas and those with purely national ambitions.[21]
While the extent of al-Qaeda’s influence on al-Shabaab remains unclear, the presence in Somalia of militants with suspected links to international terrorism is central to western governments’ intervention in Somalia and particularly their support for the TFG, especially in the case of the United States.[22]
Concern about the potential for coordination between the two groups increased after the attempted bombing on Christmas Day 2009 of a US-bound airliner. That attempt was claimed by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), an al-Qaeda affiliate based in Yemen, across the Gulf of Aden from Somalia. Following that attempt, al-Shabaab offered to send fighters to Yemen to help AQAP counter US-assisted airstrikes by the Yemeni government, and a top al-Shabaab leader affirmed support for “the international jihad of al-Qaeda.”[23] Bin Laden, in turn, has repeatedly voiced rhetorical support for al-Shabaab. However, credible analysts caution that they view those statements as posturing.[24] US government officials have also said they do not see substantive evidence of al-Shabaab-al-Qaeda coordination, or view the al-Shabaab threat as comparable to that of AQAP.[25] Moreover, many credible security analysts have long questioned the notion that al-Qaeda could establish a major presence in Somalia, given the country’s complex inter-clan dynamics and volatility.[26]
Al-Shabaab has not attacked foreign targets, although Somali immigrants charged with an attempted strike in Australia in 2009 were said by arresting authorities to have some links to the group—an allegation al-Shabaab denied.[27] Al-Shabaab leaders have reportedly threatened to attack foreign countries, particularly on the African continent, but here, again, serious doubts exist as to the seriousness and credibility of these threats.[28]
One source of concern among the United States and its allies are the foreign fighters who have come to Somalia to take up arms on al-Shabaab’s behalf. Most credible estimates agree that there are several hundred foreign fighters in Somalia, including an Alabama native nicknamed Abu Mansoor Al-Amriki (“The American”) who became a prominent al-Shabaab figure.[29]
The importance of these foreign fighters is frequently overstated.[30] However, some are members of a large Somali diaspora that includes dual nationals who can travel easily between their homeland and adoptive countries. Foreign al-Shabaab members reportedly include Europeans, Australians, Canadians, and at least 20 young men from the United States; some of these individuals have been implicated in attacks inside Somalia.[31] The US and other foreign governments fear al-Shabaab may return some diaspora members to their adoptive countries to create “sleeper cells.”[32]
One of five suicide bombers who killed at least 30 people in coordinated attacks in October 2008 in Hargeisa, a city in northern Somaliland, was an American citizen of Somali origin—the first recorded instance of a suicide attack carried out by a US national.[33] In addition, the suicide bomber whose December 2009 attack at a Mogadishu hotel killed at least 22 people was a Somali-born Danish citizen.[34]
[1] The Islamic Courts Union (ICU) brought a level of stability and peace to Mogadishu that the capital had not known in years. Even many who disagreed with the ICU’s goal of imposing Sharia, or deplored the arbitrary and harsh nature of some of the punishments it handed down, welcomed the brief period of relative normalcy. See Human Rights Watch, Shell Shocked: Civilians Under Siege in Mogadishu, vol. 19, no. 12(A), August 2007, http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2007/08/12/shell-shocked, pp. 27-42. For a contemporary analysis on the tenure of the ICU near its peak, see International Crisis Group, “Can the Somali Crisis be Contained?” Africa Report No. 116, August 10, 2006, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=4333&l=1 (accessed February 10, 2010), pp. 9-19.
[2] Human Rights Watch has documented the patterns of human rights abuse and violations of international humanitarian law that have characterized the conflict in Somalia since 2007. See Human Rights Watch, Shell Shocked; Human Rights Watch, So Much to Fear: War Crimes and the Devastation of Somalia, 1-56432-415-X, December 2008, http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2008/12/08/so-much-fear-0; and “Somalia: New Violence Highlights Need for Independent Inquiry,” Human Rights Watch news release, February 5, 2009, http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/02/05/somalia-new-violence-highlights-need-independent-inquiry.
[3] For a discussion of the Djibouti peace process, see Human Rights Watch, So Much to Fear, pp. 20-21.
[4] See, for example, Andrew Stroehlein, “Somalia: No-win military scenario leaves engagement as only option,” The National (Abu Dhabi), December 22, 2009, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=6453 (accessed February 10, 2009), noting that at the beginning of 2009 “Somalia was experiencing a rare moment of optimism” but that by the end of the year, “all traces of optimism [were] gone.”
[5] See, for example, “More than 40,000 Somalis return to Mogadishu despite renewed fighting,” UNHCR News Story, February 27, 2009, http://www.unhcr.org/49a8070b2.html (accessed February 11, 2010), estimating that some 40,000 displaced people returned to Mogadishu during the first two months of 2009.
[6] United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Somalia Fact Sheet, January 12, 2010, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2010.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/LSGZ-7ZMGXS-full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf (accessed March 17, 2010); see also “Conflict displaces 63,000 Somalis in southern Somalia so far this year,” UNHCR News Story, January 19, 2010, http://www.unhcr.org/4b55ccf76.html (accessed February 1, 2010).
[7] In January 2010 the World Food Program suspended humanitarian aid to up to one million people in southern Somalia, citing attacks and threats by al-Shabaab and other insurgent groups. See the section below on The Role of Key International Actors. Doctors Without Borders named Somalia one of the world’s 10 worst humanitarian crises in 2009. See Doctors Without Borders, “Top Ten Humanitarian Crises of 2009,” http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/publications/topten/2009/story.cfm?id=4098&cat=top-ten-humantarian-crises (accessed February 11, 2010).
[8] In the context of this report, unless otherwise noted “Somalia” refers only to south/central Somalia—excluding the semi-autonomous region of Puntland and the self-declared republic of Somaliland to the north.
[9]United Nations Security Council, Report of the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1853 (2008), S/2010/91, March 10, 2010, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2010.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/MUMA-83N2WN-full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf (accessed March 25, 2010), pp. 7, 67.
[10] See below, The Role of Key International Actors.
[11] Somalia’s Parliament in April 2009 unanimously approved a law making Sharia the country’s official judicial system. Sharif, who previously served as the ICU’s president, approved the law but said he would not permit a strict interpretation. However, his writ means little outside the small section of Mogadishu the TFG controls. See “Somalia votes to implement Sharia,” al-Jazeera.net, April 19, 2009, http://english.aljazeera.net/news/africa/2009/04/200941895049381692.html, and “Somali president bends to rebel demand for Sharia law,” CNN, February 28, 2009, http://www.cnn.com/2009/WORLD/africa/02/28/somalia.sharia/index.html (both accessed December 23, 2009).
[12] See, for example, Mohammed Ibrahim and Alan Cowell, “Islamists Overrun Somalia City as Ethiopians Leave,” New York Times, January 26, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/27/world/africa/27somalia.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all (accessed March 1, 2010). The al-Shabaab administration in Baidoa and the surrounding region is under the control of Mukhtar Robow, whose Rahanweyn clan predominates in the area.
[13] Aweys has been listed on US government terrorist lists since 2001 because of his support for al-Shabaab, itself designated a terrorist group by the US government. US Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control, “Executive Order 13224—Blocking Property and Prohibiting Transactions with Persons who Commit, Threaten to Commit or Support Terrorism,” September 24, 2001, http://www.treasury.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/programs/terror/terror.pdf (accessed January 27, 2010).
[14] Ahlu Sunna Walamaca and al-Shabaab forces have clashed repeatedly in central Somalia, with Ahlu Sunna Waljamaca managing to retain control of towns that were attacked by al-Shabaab. See, for example, Mohammed Ibrahim, “Rival Islamists Fight for Town in Somalia,” New York Times, January 2, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/03/world/africa/03somalia.html (accessed March 25, 2010). In January 2010 Ahlu Sunna Waljamaca forces clashed with Hisbul Islam fighters in Beletweyne. See, for example, “Somalia: IDPs on the run again as fighting hits Beletweyne,” IRINnews, February 11, 2010, http://www.irinnews.org/Report.aspx?ReportId=87787 (accessed February 11, 2010).
[15] Human Rights Watch interviews with western diplomatic officials, Nairobi, October 2009; Human Rights Watch telephone interview with independent regional analyst, Washington DC, January 2010.
[16] The Security Council renewed AMISOM’s mandate on January 28, 2010. See UN Security Council, Resolution 1910 (2010), S/RES/1910 (2010), http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Somalia%20S%20RES%201910.pdf (accessed March 1, 2010). The resolution is based on a Security Council finding that the situation in Somalia constitutes a threat to international peace and security in the region.
[17] See, for example, Bronwyn E. Bruton, Somalia: A New Approach, Council on Foreign Relations, March 2010, http://www.cfr.org/publication/21421 (accessed March 18, 2010), p. 3.
[18] Even if it were at full strength, many policy analysts question whether AMISOM would be effective. See, for example, Peter Pham, “When the Jihadists Take Mogadishu,” World Defense Review, January 14, 2010, http://worlddefensereview.com/pham011410.shtml (accessed February 9, 2010), noting that, “Despite the peacekeepers' valiant efforts, they cannot be expected to confer legitimacy and viability on Somalia's “Transitional Federal Government” (TFG) when it does not possess those qualities in its own right.”
[19] See discussion of suicide bomb attacks below.
[20] Al-Shabaab has been listed as a terrorist organization by the US government since 2008 and by Canada since 2010. US Department of the Treasury, “Executive Order 13224.”
[21] See, for example, “Shabab’s Mixed Messages,” Jane’s Terrorism and Security Monitor, January 27, 2010, noting that many foreign officials say that al-Shabaab leaders Ahmed “Godane” and Ibrahim Jama (“Afghani”) “have become the figureheads for the divergent agendas within the Shabab, despite their close relationship. The officials say Godane is the focal point for radical diaspora Somalis and foreigners, but has become increasingly alienated from some of his oldest comrades in arms, while Afghani is the strongest advocate of a more nationalist-Islamist agenda.”
[22] Militants who have provided training or sought refuge in Somalia includemembers of al-Qaeda’s East African network who are suspected in the 1998 bombings of the US embassies in Kenya and Tanzania that killed more than 220 people, and of an Israeli-owned hotel in Kenya in 2002 that killed 15 people. The US has repeatedly sought to capture or kill the fugitives, who allegedly used Somalia as a base from which to plan the 2002 hotel attack as well as a failed attack on a passenger jet at Nairobi’s international airport that year. In September 2009, US commandos killed one key suspect, Salih Ali Salih Nabhan, a Kenyan of Yemeni descent. US attempts to take out another key suspect, Fazul Abdullah Mohammed, a dual national of Kenya and the Comoros Islands who was indicted for the attacks, have failed. While al-Qaeda has taken credit for insurgent acts inside Somalia as long ago as the US-led, UN interventions of 1992-95, many credible security analysts believe it has grossly exaggerated its direct role there. See International Crisis Group,“Counter-Terrorism in Somalia: Losing Hearts and Minds?” Africa Report No. 95, July 11, 2005, http://www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=3555 (accessed February 25, 2010). Also see below, The Role of Key International Actors.
[23] The call, one of several in recent years pledging support for al-Qaeda or bin Laden from some al-Shabaab figures, came in January 2009 from Ahmed Abdi Godane. See “Somali rebels unite, profess loyalty to al Qaeda,” Reuters, February 1, 2010, http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSTRE6102Q720100201 (accessed February 1, 2010). Also see “Al Shabab pledges loyalty to bin Laden,” Voice of America, September 22, 2009, http://www1.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-2009-09-22-voa31-68758447.html (accessed February 6, 2010).
[24] Human Rights Watch interviews with independent analysts and journalists, Nairobi and Washington, DC, October and November 2009.
[25] See, for example, the briefing with reporters by Daniel Benjamin, US State Department coordinator for counterterrorism, January 25, 2010, http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/rm/2010/135786.htm (accessed January 25, 2010), and testimony by US National Intelligence Director Dennis Blair, “Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Community on Intelligence, “ testimony before the US House Select Intelligence Committee, February 2, 2010, http://www.dni.gov/testimonies/20100202_testimony.pdf (accessed March 1, 2010), p. 11.
[26] See “Al Qaeda’s (mis)adventures in the Horn of Africa,” West Point Combating Terrorism Center, 2007, http://ctc.usma.edu/aq/aqII.asp (accessed February 11, 2010). This view was reaffirmed by experts at a Horn of Africa panel at the Jamestown Foundation Annual Terrorism Conference in Washington, DC, on December 9, 2009.
[27] In August 2009 Australian authorities arrested five men, three of them Somalis and one with ties to al-Shabaab, on charges of planning a suicide attack on a military base. An al-Shabaab spokesman denied the group’s involvement in the plots. Some attempted plots abroad may be at most inspired rather than directed by al-Shabaab. In December 2009, for example, Danish police said a Somali immigrant charged with trying to kill an artist in Denmark whose 2005 cartoon of the Prophet Muhammad insulted many Muslims and was followed by widespread protests had ties to al-Shabaab; the group said it did not plan the attempted attack but praised it. See “Militant Group Denies Link,” ABC News, August 7, 2009, http://www.abc.net.au/news/stories/2009/08/07/2648501.htm; John F. Burns, “Cartoonist in Denmark Calls Attack ‘Really Close,’” New York Times, January 2, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/03/world/europe/03denmark.html; and “East African Terrorism Comes to Scandinavia,” Jamestown Foundation Terrorism Monitor, January 14, 2010, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=35909&tx_ttnews[backPid]=13&cHash=1272f796ee (all accessed February 5, 2010).
[28] Al-Shabaab has reportedly threatened to attack targets in Kenya, but some of its leaders contend that at least one of these threats was falsely attributed to the group. They have also reportedly threatened to strike Ethiopia, Uganda, and Burundi, the latter two for providing peacekeeping forces to Somalia. See Scott Baldauf, “It wasn't us: Somali militants disavow Kenya threat,” Christian Science Monitor, January 1, 2010, http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Africa/2010/0122/It-wasn-t-us-Somali-militants-disavow-Kenya-threat (accessed March 14, 2010). They threatened the United States after a strike on an alleged al-Qaeda member in Somalia in September 2009.
[29] Andrea Elliott, “The Jihadist Next Door,” The New York Times Magazine, January 31, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/31/magazine/31Jihadist-t.html (accessed February 1, 2010).
[30] Report of the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia, S/2010/91, March 10, 2010, http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWFiles2010.nsf/FilesByRWDocUnidFilename/MUMA-83N2WN-full_report.pdf/$File/full_report.pdf (March 23, 2010), pp. 51-53.
[31] In November 2009 US authorities indicted 14 men on terrorism-related charges for allegedly recruiting the 20 Somalis from the Minneapolis area for al-Shabaab. See “Terror Charges Unsealed in Minnesota Against Eight Defendants, Justice Department Announces,” US Department of Justice press release, November 23, 2009, http://minneapolis.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel09/mp112309.htm (accessed March 10, 2010).
[32] Blair, “Annual Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence Community for the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.”
[33] See, for example, Jason Ryan and Pierre Thomas, “Mueller: Suicide Bomber Recruited in U.S.,” ABC News, February 23, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/Terrorism/story?id=6942162&page=1. DNA tests were underway to determine whether a second suicide bomber was American, according to Katharine Houreld, “Somali Minister: Suicide Bomber Was Danish-Somali,” Associated Press, December 10, 2009, http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=9300550(both accessed February 6, 2010).
[34] See for example, “Somalia suicide bomber ‘was from Denmark,’” BBC News Online, December 10, 2009, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8406886.stm (accessed February 6, 2010).
