IV. Treason Law

On October 23, 2012, the State Duma speedily adopted Law No. FZ-190, which expanded the Criminal Code’s definitions of treason and espionage. The draft was endorsed by the Federation Council on October 31.[127] Responding to concerns about the scope for overly broad interpretation of the law (see below), on November 12 President Putin told his human rights council he would review the law himself.[128] However he signed it into law on the same day.[129]

Summary of Provisions

The law broadened the definition of treason by:

• Adding to the list of actions that can constitute state treason the provision of “financial, material and technical, consultative or other assistance to a foreign state, an international or foreign organization, or their representatives in activities against the security of the Russian Federation” [130]
• Adding international organizations to the list of subjects to whom Russian citizens can transfer “state secret” information for their actions to be qualified as treason;
• Expanding the list of situations in which Russian citizens can be said to have obtained information that constitutes a state secret to include “study or other cases” (previously, only “service and work” were listed);[131]
• Requiring that the actions constituting state treason be directed against “the security of the Russian Federation” (previous wording was “external safety of the Russian Federation”).[132]

Treason is punishable by a fine of up to 500,000 rubles (approximately US$16,280) and a prison term of up to 20 years.[133]

The law also changed the definition of espionage in several ways:

• It includes international organizations among the list of subjects that can be recipients of state secrets, providing that the crime was committed by a foreign citizen or a stateless person;
• An explicit order from a foreign intelligence service is no longer required in order for the transfer of “other” information (that is, information that does not constitute a state secret) for use against Russia’s security by a foreign national or a stateless person to be considered “espionage.” [134]

Potential Impact on Freedom of Expression and Association Before the law was adopted, the Presidential Council for Civil Society and Human Rights found that it contradicted Russia’s domestic legislation and international obligations and called its provisions “repressive” and “unreasonably broad.”[135] The council said that the law could be used to penalize unintentional actions of a person who was not aware at the time that the information they obtained was deemed a state secret, especially if it was publicly available.

With the new law entering into force, Russian human rights activists and lawyers expressed concern that the authorities could use it to silence and retaliate against its critics. Some dubbed the law “the sword of Damocles.”[136] The International Center for Not-for-Profit Law called the new amendments “so vague, that it allowed the government to brand any inconvenient figure as a traitor.”[137]

Many were alarmed that the legislation could criminalize actions of activists and human rights defenders that have been part of normal practice for them both in Russia and around the world, such as routine working meetings and discussions with foreign counterparts or presenting human rights reports at international conferences.

For example, the United Nations Committee Against Torture stated that the new law “could affect persons providing information to the Committee Against Torture … which could be interpreted as prohibiting the sharing of information on the human rights situation in the Russian Federation with the Committee or other United Nations human rights organs.”[138]

Catherine Ashton expressed concern at the new law “potentially penalizing contacts with foreign nationals with up to 20 years in prison” and reducing “the burden of proof for charges of treason and espionage.”[139] The United States mission to the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) warned that such a law could have a “chilling effect on legitimate information-sharing and cooperation between Russian civil society organizations, foreign NGOs, the media, foreign governments, and international bodies, including the OSCE itself.”[140]

Implementation

Human Rights Watch is not aware of any cases in which treason charges have been brought under the new amendments. However, the case of Ivan Moseev, an academic from Archangelsk, illustrates how the treason law can be used arbitrarily to justify intrusive surveillance of individuals. The Federal Security Service (FSB) obtained a court order to tap Moseev’s phone lines in June 2012.

Moseev is an expert on the ancient Pomor peoples that used to populate Russia’s northern White Sea region. He heads an NGO, the Association of Pomors of the Arkhangelsk Region, directs the Institute of Indigenous Peoples and Minorities at the University of Archangelsk, and is in frequent contact with Norwegian diplomats and academics.

In October 2012 Moseev was charged with inciting ethnic hatred after a comment attributed to him and containing a derogatory comment about ethnic Russians was posted to the Echo of the Russian North news portal in April 2012.[141]  The website's editors traced the comment to the IP address of Moseev’s computer, which they reported to the FSB. Moseev denies posting the comment, claiming that his computer was not turned on at the time.[142]

In summer 2012 the FSB searched Moseev’s home, confiscated his computers, hard drives, and research documents, and questioned him about how often he visited Norway.

On June 25, 2012, a court issued a warrant for the FSB to tap Moseev’s telephone for 180 days, referring to evidence that suggested he was suspected of state treason. The warrant stated, “Norwegian secret services are using Ivan Moseev to destabilize the social-political situation in Arkhangelsk … With support from foreign networks Moseev has been carrying out activities aiming at making federal Russian authorities recognize the Pomors as an indigenous minority of the North, and including their territory of residence under the jurisdiction of international law, which could lead to a violation of Russia’s territorial integrity.” It also states that, “with financial support from Norway Moseev produced a dictionary of the language of the Pomors, published a series of articles and conducted activities aimed at harming Russia’s safety.”[143]

Moseev’s lawyer is convinced that the FSB invoked the “possible evidence of state treason” to obtain permission for the phone tap, as it would be impossible to do so under charges of inciting hatred.[144]

Moseev appealed the court order, unsuccessfully; on January 17, 2013, the Supreme Court affirmed the legality of the phone tap.[145]

On March 1, 2013, a court sentenced Moseev to a 100,000 fine for insult, a milder crime than incitement.[146] No alleged evidence of treason was mentioned at trial.

FSB surveillance against Moseev continues. On March 11, the Echo of the Russian North website reported on a meeting Moseev had with Norwegian friends. “I told no one about this meeting,” Moseev told Human Rights Watch. “So it seems that the FSB surveillance is still on. They would not leave me alone.” [147]