VIII. THE ROLE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY
United Nations
April 6, 1997 marked the official opening of the Bogotá office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights, led by Amb. Almudena Mazarrasa and staffed by five experts and a deputy director. The office continues to press the government on issues of concern to the Commission, including reforms to the military penal code and respect for international humanitarian law. Experts travel throughout the country to document abuses and hold regular meetings with government officials, representatives of human rights groups, and Colombians wishing to deliver complaints.217
During the Fifty-Fourth session of the U.N. High Commission for Human Rights, the office submitted its first report, which was considered hard-hitting. The report concluded that there was abundant evidence of continued joint military and paramilitary actions that ended with human rights violations as well as a disregard for the laws of war by all parties to the conflict.218
The Commission on Human Rights chose to show its concern about the situation in Colombia by increasing the number of experts in the Bogotá office from six to twelve. In addition, High Commissioner Mary Robinson expressed her profound concern about Colombia, and noted that most reported violations are attributed to paramilitaries often working with the tolerance of the security forces. She also announced her plans to visit Colombia in 1998, a welcome gesture of support for the office and concern over the serious human rights situation.
European Union
Some European embassies and diplomats have taken high-profile roles in attempting to lessen political violence and the suffering it causes. In April 1997, Netherlands Amb. Gysbert Bos made a three-day visit to the Middle Magdalena region, in part to draw attention to a rise in paramilitary activity and displacement. The visit was seen as especially important given that the Netherlands at the time occupied the presidency of the European Union.
For its part, the E.U. continued to pressure Colombia to improve its human rights record by issuing strong statements criticizing impunity and calling for the implementation of the recommendations of the U.N. Commission on HumanRights.219 After the murders of human rights defenders Jesús María Valle and Eduardo Umaña, the European Parliament passed resolutions condemning the killings and calling on the Colombian authorities to investigate, “take urgent, effective and preventive measures to protect and safeguard the activity of those campaigning for human, social, trade union and peasant rights and political leaders,” and dismantle paramilitary groups and CONVIVIRs.220
The European Community Humanitarian Office (ECHO) donated U.S. $5 million dollars in emergency aid to international NGOs to assist the thousands of people forcibly displaced earlier in the year in Urabá.
United States
The United States pursues a two-pronged policy in Colombia. On the one hand, the Clinton administration has made human rights an important part of U.S.-Colombia relations and is supporting peace negotiations. At the same time, the war on drugs remains the centerpiece of U.S.-Colombia relations. In fiscal year 1998, Colombia is slated to receive at least $119 million in U.S. counter-drug assistance, including equipment and training.221
In 1997, the State Department issued its most detailed and critical human rights report ever, concluding that “the [Colombian] armed forces committed numerous, serious human rights abuses.” In addition, the report noted, “the Samper administration has not taken action to curb increased abuses committed by paramilitary groups, verging on a policy of tacit acquiescence.”222
This report was followed by an April letter from Secretary of State Madeleine Albright to Sen. Patrick Leahy, co-sponsor of an amendment that placed human rights conditions on some antinarcotics aid. Section 570 of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, the so-called Leahy amendment, prohibits funds from being provided to any unit of the security forces of a foreign country if thesecretary of state has credible evidence that such unit has committed gross violations of human rights, unless the secretary determines and reports to the congressional Committees on Appropriations that the government involved is taking effective measures to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to justice.
In her letter, Secretary Albright announced that the spirit of the amendment would be applied to most anti-narcotics aid, including monies suspended after Colombia was “decertified” a second time in a row for failing to meet U.S. goals in fighting drugs.223 By mid-1998, only one Colombian army unit had been fully cleared to receive aid. U.S. officials asked the Colombian army to transfer out two officers belonging to an additional unit under consideration, the Twelfth Brigade, because they had outstanding human rights allegations against them.224
Human Rights Watch and other groups protested the idea that a simple transfer would satisfy the amendment, since it calls for “effective measures” to bring the responsible members of the security forces unit to justice. In general, the way in which the United States vets security force units for human rights violations before they receive aid remains largely secret, precluding full accountability.
While these conditions have played an important role in sending a strong message to the Colombian security forces that the United States considers respect for human rights a key part of bilateral relations, that message needs to be strengthened by aggressive U.S. monitoring of units that receive aid, including ensuring that soldiers accused of committing abuses are fully investigated and, if believed responsible, prosecuted by an independent and competent court. The procedures used to monitor these units must not be kept secret; transparency is a key part of any mechanism meant to monitor the compliance of an institution, like the Colombian military, that has amassed such a horrifying human rights record.
For its stand on the Leahy amendment, the administration was harshly criticized by some Republicans in the U.S. Congress, who argued that human rights concerns hampered the drug war. Led by the International Relations Committee and its chair, Rep. Benjamin Gilman, Republicans attempted to remove the Leahy amendment from the 1998 Foreign Operations bill, an effort that ultimately failed.
Despite the State Department’s decision to apply the spirit of the Leahy amendment to most anti-narcotics aid, to date, the U.S. Defense Department continues to train and equip Colombian army units that have not been reviewed forhuman rights abuses. According to the Washington Post, U.S. officers continue to train Colombian units in “‘shoot and maneuver’ techniques, counterterrorism and intelligence-gathering, even though their members have not been vetted.”225 After similar programs in Indonesia and Rwanda were reported, Senator Leahy proposed legislation that would bar the Pentagon from holding joint exercises with human rights abusers unless the secretary of defense finds an extraordinary need to waive the law.226
Human Rights Watch believes that U.S. policy must be consistent in its support for human rights and international humanitarian law, and that all U.S. security assistance, including training, should be subject to the full Leahy amendment.
Indeed, the Clinton administration has continued to push hard for aid to the Colombian military to fight drugs, arguing that funds would be channeled to units without bad records. After months of tense negotiations, the Colombian and U.S. governments signed an end-use monitoring agreement on August 1, 1997 freeing $70 million of the $100 million slated to reach Colombia that year, much of it for the army and navy.227 Among the items sent were communications equipment, night vision scopes, and parts for helicopters and river patrol boats.228 Police continued to receive aid throughout the year, including munitions and weapons.
After a series of army defeats at the hands of the FARC, U.S. officials began speaking of Colombia as a threat to regional security and in need of direct assistance to the military to combat guerrillas.229 In testimony before the House International Relations Committee on March 31, 1998, Gen. Charles Wilhelm, head of the U.S. Southern Command, called Colombia “the most threatened country inthe United States Southern Command area of responsibility.”230 Rather than discussing the country’s serious human rights situation however, after a visit to Colombia that same month, Wilhelm told journalists that criticism of violations by the military was “unfair” and that guerrillas abuse human rights more frequently than the security forces or paramilitaries, an assertion that not only displays a profound misunderstanding of human rights law, but also seriously misrepresents the facts, contradicting even the State Department’s grim assessment.231
217 Human Rights Watch interviews in Colombia, September 8-13, 1997.
218 Commission on Human Rights, “Report by the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,” 54th Session, E/CN.4/1998/16, March 1, 1998.
219 Declaration by E.U. president, September 25, 1997.
220 Resolution on the murders in Colombia by the European Parliament, May 14, 1998.
221 This is an estimate. All monies allocated may not ultimately be spent. Adam Isaacson and Joy Olson, Just the Facts: A civilian’s guide to U.S. defense and security assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean (Washington, D.C.: Latin America Working Group, 1998), pp. 166-168.
222 U.S. State Department, “Colombia Report on Human Rights Practices for 1997,” p. 454.
223 Letter from Sec. Madeleine Albright to Sen. Patrick Leahy, April 21, 1997.
224 Human Rights Watch interview with U.S. official, May 5, 1998.
225 Douglas Farah, “U.S. Expands Latin American Training Role,” Washington Post, July 13, 1998.
226 The bill was pending as of this writing. Tim Weiner, “Military Spending Approved With Curbs on Rights Abuses,” New York Times, August 1, 1998.
227 Washington Office on Latin America, Reluctant Recruits: The US military and the War on Drugs, Washington, D.C., August 1997, p. 4.
228 See U.S. State Department, Memorandum of Understanding, August 1, 1997.
229 Dana Priest, “U.S. May Boost Military Aid to Colombia's Anti-Drug Effort,” March 28, 1998.
230 Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, March 31, 1998.
231 Col. Vicente Ogilvy, a U.S. Southern Command spokesperson, confirmed these remarks to Human Rights Watch on May 28, 1998. “Colombia no es alarma: Wilhelm,” El Espectador, May 9, 1998.