Forces of
the Conflict
The
Serbian and Yugoslav government security forces are a complex combination
of republican and federal institutions, along with more clandestine groups
of irregulars and paramilitaries. The Yugoslav Army's military police and
army special forces, antiterrorist units of the Serbian police and special
police, special forces of the secret police, paramilitary groups, international
mercenaries, and armed local Serbs were all active in Kosovo in 1998 and
1999 in operations coordinated by Belgrade.1
The various forces often engaged in joint operations,
in close coordination, and at times used interchangeable uniforms. Insignias
were not always displayed, and name tags or identification numbers were
rarely visible.2 Many of the government's forces came from outside Kosovo,
making it difficult for Kosovar Albanians to identify either a particular
force or individuals, compounded by the difficulties of observation in
a violent and shocking environment.
There were some exceptions, particularly in the
areas where Albanians and Serbs lived in closer proximity, such as in and
around Pec, Orahovac, and Lipljan. Forces of the Yugoslav Army were more
easily identified due to their more standarized procedures, equipment,
and uniforms. But the army's soldiers usually came from outside of Kosovo,
and were therefore unknown to the local population.
The Yugoslav Army, Serbian police, and paramilitaries
were all responsible for war crimes in Kosovo. In general, however, paramilitaries
appear to have been more extensively involved in the most violent abuses,
specifically the executions and rapes. While police and army units are
by no means exempt from responsibility in this regard, the paramilitaries
were more commonly engaged in arbitrary killings and sexual violence.
But paramilitary forces were not operating on their
own. On the contrary, paramilitary units were operating in close concert
with the police, army, and secret police (known as the state security sevice).
There may have been specific incidents when paramilitary units or individuals
got out of control, but the general deployment of paramilitary units and
their coordination with other sectors of the security apparatus were planned
components of the Kosovo campaign.
In general, it appears that the Yugoslav Army was
in command during the war, with the police and paramilitaries subordinate
to its orders, although top officials of the Serbian Ministry of Internal
Affairs exercised significant influence over the campaign. The army controlled
the main roads and the borders, coordinating and facilitating the "ethnic
cleansing." The police and paramilitaries were more directly involved in
expulsions and the destruction of villages, with artillery support from
the army. It is during these operations that men were separated from women
and children, interrogated about the KLA, and sometimes executed.
Typically, as told by witnesses from all over Kosovo,
the army and special police forces surrounded a village and shelled it
from a distance. Regular and special police forces then moved in, swept
the village, and gathered the villagers in a centralized location. Men
were separated from women and children for interrogation about the KLA.
Regular police and paramilitaries then looted the village, as well as stealing
whatever the villagers carried with them and destroying their identity
documents. The village was then left to the police, paramilitaries, and
local Serbian militias, who looted and burned the remains. The women, children,
and elderly were often expelled, and men with suspected ties to the KLA
were sometimes executed.
There are a few examples of police officers and
soldiers having tried to treat civilians fairly, and even going out of
their way to protect them. In a few cases documented by Human Rights Watch,
Kosovar Albanians reported that police or soldiers gave them food or medical
assistance, or warned them to hide from oncoming paramilitaries. In one
example, army officers tried to investigate women's allegations of sexual
abuse.3 In another case, a witness to the April 30 killings in Vrbovac
(see Drenica Region) said that he had heard VJ soldiers pleading with paramilitaries
not to fire on civilians.4 But these examples are the exceptions. Too often,
the police and army either tolerated paramilitary behavior, facilitated
it, or engaged in criminal acts themselves.5
The Serbian and Yugoslav security structure, especially
Serbian state security, was also strongly linked to criminal activity in
Kosovo and the rest of the country, such as illicit trade in cigarettes,
arms, and drugs. "Volunteers" to fight in Kosovo were sometimes recruited
directly from Serbian prisons. Funding for the police and army also came
from unorthodox sources within Serbia, such as the Federal Customs Agency,
run by long-time Milosevic ally Mihalj Kertes, who was arrested for embezzlement
in December 2000.6
The sections below describe in more detail the various
forces that operated in Kosovo, including the responsible officers, when
known. All information is from open sources and is cited. Two official
sources are used heavily: Vojska
magazine, the official publication of the Yugoslav Army, and Policajac
magazine, the official publication of the Serbian Ministry of Internal
Affairs.
In addition to the forces of the conflict, this
section identifies the key political and military leaders in Serbia and
Yugoslavia, some of them no longer in their positions, who have the highest
level of responsibility for the war crimes committed in Kosovo. These people
either directed the campaign against ethnic Albanians or in full awareness
of the events did nothing to stop it. They can be held legally accountable
for both.
Forces of the Federal Republic _of Yugoslavia
The two principal
military forces in Yugoslavia in 1998 and 1999 were the Yugoslav Army (Vojska
Jugoslavija, or VJ) and the Republic of Serbia's Ministry of Internal Affairs
(Ministarstvo Unutrasnjih Poslova, or MUP). The Republic of Montenegro's
Ministry of Internal Affairs remained loyal to the Montenegrin government
and were not active in Kosovo.
From the time he became president of Serbia in 1989,
Slobodan Milosevic gradually strengthened and expanded the MUP over the
VJ and the Yugoslav federal police, both of which he viewed as less loyal
forces. Friction between the MUP and VJ occasionally emerged over the increased
resources and prestige provided to the former. One noted incident regarding
Kosovo occurred after the first police attacks on Drenica in late February
and early March 1999, in which more than eighty people were killed, including
twenty-four women and children (see Background). An unnamed high official
of the Yugoslav Army cited in the Serbian press criticized the police for
their "completely amateurish manner," saying that the operation had acquired
"the dimensions of a massacre" because the police "succumbed to emotions."7
Only the Serbian regular police, special police,
and possibly state security special forces were active in Kosovo in the
first half of 1998. The army, although present in the province, was restricted
to maintaining security along the borders with Macedonia and Albania. This
changed in April 1998, when the army participated in military actions in
southwestern Kosovo along the border with Albania. The army and the police
cooperated from that point on, but for the most part, actions against the
KLA remained the responsibility of the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs
throughout 1998.
The primacy of the MUP began to change in late 1998
and early 1999 when President Milosevic reshuffled some key members of
the police and army, placing known loyalists in top positions. Among other
changes, Dragoljub Ojdanic replaced Momcilo Perisic8 as Chief of General
Staff of the Yugoslav Army and Nebojsa Pavkovic was promoted to commander
of the VJ's Third Army, which had responsibility for southern Serbia and
Kosovo. Radomir Markovic replaced Jovica Stanisic as head of Serbia's security
service (for more details, see Background). In late March 1999, when faced
with attacks by NATO, the police, army, paramilitaries, and other irregulars
units coordinated their attacks on the KLA and their defense against air
strikes.9
It should also be noted that Serbian state security
played a major role in Kosovo throughout the 1990s, monitoring Kosovar
Albanian political circles, especially the KLA. State security also had
a special operations unit called the JSO (Jedinice za Specijalne Operacije-Special
Operations Unit), which was active in Kosovo in 1998 and 1999.
Yugoslav Army (Vojska Jugoslavije)
According to
the OSCE report Kosovo/Kosova: As Seen,
As Told-Part I, the VJ had from 85,000 to 114,000
total personnel with a reserve
force of as much as 200,000. In Kosovo, there were
an estimated 15,000 troops in early 1999, increased to 20,000 by the end
of April. This does not include the additional 30,000 police, paramilitaries,
and other irregulars also in the province.10
According to the Yugoslav Constitution, the VJ is
under the command of the Yugoslav president in both wartime and peace.
The president is also empowered to appoint, promote, and dismiss officers
as stipulated by law.11
The controlling body of the army is the Supreme
Defense Council (SDC), of which the Yugoslav president is chairman. The
other members of the SDC are the presidents of Serbia and Montenegro. Secretary
of the council was Slavoljub Susic.12 According to the Serbian media, the
SDC rarely if ever met to consult on Kosovo, presumedly because Montenegrin
President Milo Djukanovic would not have agreed to Milosevic's plans.13
Although the Yugoslav president is entitled to command
the VJ only "pursuant to decisions of the Supreme Defense Council," in
reality Milosevic took personal command of the army, as he did with all
of Yugoslavia's governing structure. At times, the VJ undertook actions
without the approval of the SDC, provoking criticism from Montenegrin President
Djukanovic. In March 1999, for instance, when the VJ increased its presence
in Kosovo, Djukanovic denounced the action and proclaimed: "Any decision
made by the [Supreme] Defense Council without me would be illegal."14
The main organ of the VJ is the General Staff, headed
during the 1999 war by Gen. Dragoljub Ojdanic, who was chief of the VJ
General Staff.15 The deputy chief of the General Staff was Gen. Svetozar
M. Marjanovic.16
The VJ is divided into three armies, as well as
the Navy, Air/Air Defense Forces, and the Counter Intelligence Service
(known as KOS-Kontraobavestajna Sluzba).17 The First Army covers northern
Serbia, the Second Army covers central Serbia and Montenegro, and the Third
Army covers southern Serbia and Kosovo.18 In addition, the VJ has a Special
Forces Corps, known as the Red Berets, specially trained for anti-terrorist
actions.19
The Third Army, headquartered in Nis, was further
broken down into the Timok Tactical Group, the Nis Corps, the Leskovac
Corps, and the Pristina Corps (also known as the 52 Corps).20 The Pristina
Corps, which covered Kosovo, is comprised of the following:21
· 15th Armored Brigade (Pristina), commanded
by Col. Mladen Cirkovic.22
· 125th Motorized Brigade (Kosovo Mitrovica
and Pec), commanded by Col. Dragan Zivanovic.23
· 549th Motorized Brigade (Prizren and Djakovica),
commanded by Col. Bozidar Delic.24
· 243rd Mechanized Brigade (Urosevac and
Gnjilane), commanded by Col. Krsman Jelic.25
· 52nd Mixed Artillery Brigade (Gnjilane)
commanded by Col. Radojko Stefanovic.26
· 52nd Military Police Unit, (Pristina) commanded
by Maj. Zeljko Pekovic.27
· 83rd Aviation Regiment28
· 52nd Engineers Regiment (Krusevac)
· 311th Air-Defense Regiment (Djakovica)
· 53rd Border Guard Battalion (Djakovica)
· 55th Border Guard Battalion (Prizren)
· 57th Border Guard Battalion (Urosevac)
During the war, the Third Army was commanded by
Col. Gen. Nebojsa Pavkovic, who was promoted to the position in November
1998-at the same time Ojdanic became Chief of the VJ General Staff.29 Until
then, Pavkovic had commanded the Pristina Corps of the Third Army. The
commander of the Third Army before Pavkovic had been Col. Gen. Dusan Samardzic,
with Col. Mirko Starcevic in a subordinate position to him.30
The Pristina Corps was commanded during the war
by Maj. Gen.Vladimir Lazarevic, who was assigned to the post at the end
of 1998 by President Milosevic.31 Other generals in the Third Army included
Ljubisa Stojimirovic, chief of staff of the Third Army,32 Negoslav Nikolic,
commander of the Nis Corps,33 Tomislav Mladenovic, and Milan Djakovic.34
The Pristina Corps was deployed in the following
cities: Pristina, Pec, Prizren, Kosovska Mitrovica, Urosevac, Djakovica,
and Gnjilane. The total strength of the corps was approximately 15,000.35
The evidence suggests that the VJ's Special Forces
Corps was also active in the province during the Kosovo conflict. According
to Western defense and intelligence officials cited in the Washington
Post, the 72nd Special Operations Unit was conducting
operations in the Rogovo mountains in June 1999.36 The longtime commander
of the Special Forces Corps, Maj. Gen. Ljubisa Stojimirovic,37 was appointed
Chief of Staff of the Third Army by President Milosevic in the end of 1998.38
His replacement as commander of the Special Forces Corps is unknown.
According to Vojska
magazine, the Special Forces Corps in April 1998 included:39
· Guards Brigade;
· 63rd Parachutist Brigade, commanded by
Lt. Col. Ilija Todorov;40
· 72nd Special Brigade commanded by Col.
Branislav Lukic;41
· Anti-terrorist units of the Military Police
- Cobras and Falcons;
· Armored Brigade.
According to the Federation of American Scientists
(a non-profit, non-governmental organization based in the United States),
which has monitored the Yugoslav security structure, the Falcons (Sokolovi)
and the Cobras (Kobre) were special units of the Special Forces Corps'
Military Police. These highly trained units were reportedly used for anti-terrorist
operations; the Cobras consist of two platoons with a total of sixty members.42
According to Vojska,
their use was regulated by the Chief of the VJ General Staff.43
Regular VJ soldiers were usually identifiable by
their green camouflage uniforms and the red and white, double-headed eagle
insignia on the shoulder. The soldiers tended to be younger-often conscripts.
Some volunteers also fought with the VJ. In an interview
with the Serbian newspaper Vecernje Novosti,
Col. Gen. Nebojsa Pavkovic confirmed that "there were about 1,000 volunteers,
but they were under the strict command and control of our officers."44
The presence of volunteers was confirmed by a document obtained by Human
Rights Watch in Pec, which lists by name twelve volunteers coming from
Vojvodina. The one-page document from the Department of General Management
and Public Service in Debeljaca, Vojvodina, is to allow public transportation
free of charge from Debeljaca to Bubanj Potok and back for the "below cited
volunteers."45 The document does not, however, specify whether the listed
individuals were volunteers for the army or a paramilitary unit.
In an interview with the
Guardian newspaper (London), a VJ volunteer
named Milan Petrovic said he had gone to Kosovo to "cleanse" Albanians,
along with 2,000 other volunteers. "We gave most of them [the Albanians]
twenty-four hours to get out," he told the paper. "The rich ones, and they're
all criminals you know, with satellite TVs and big houses were tougher
to move. But if you push hard enough, they all go in the end. They're cowards,
those Albanians, they run like rabbits."46 According to Petrovic, normally
a truck driver, "one in a hundred" of the volunteers committed some rapes
or killing. He said:
About six guys in my unit got out of hand one night
and started killing Albanians. But they only killed three or four of them
before they started taking stuff out of their houses. The next day our
army came and took the six of them away.47
Another volunteer, identified as "K," was interviewed
by the United States documentary program Frontline. In a filmed interview,
he said that the volunteers were strictly following VJ orders:
Every action that was about to be done, there was
an order . . . in writing. I had principles. I saw every order before going
into action. We had orders for V., M., and G [referring to Kosovo villages].
. . . those were the actions of "cleaning" that I participated in. . .
. We had an order to get them from the hills, and that's what we did.48
At the same time, "K." admitted that some volunteers
went out of control, although he claimed they were stopped by the VJ commander.
He told Frontline:
[T]here were groups of people that wanted to go
into cleaning actions of their own accord. That's not cleaning. That's
theft, robbery. . . . A few villages were done without orders until [a]
general saw one of the unauthorized actions. He ordered the soldiers to
stop, he told [those] that have already formed a column to go because there
was fear already and he couldn't have guaranteed them safety. When volunteers
are being accepted, sometimes even thieves turn up. You can't control everything.
We were careful that the group of volunteers that joined for patriotic
reasons, the good people, were following orders to defend themselves and
act against the terrorists.49
According to NATO and the U.S. State Department,
some other army forces outside of the Third Army's Pristina Corps were
also active in Kosovo between March and June 1999. On April 7, the State
Department issued a statement that named nine commanders in the Yugoslav
Army, placing them on notice, with the International Criminal Tribunal
for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) in mind, that "VJ and MUP forces are committing
war crimes and crimes against humanity in Kosovo."50 Among those named
as commanders of such forces was Col. Milos Mandic, commander of the 252nd
Armored Brigade, with a home garrison in Kraljevo, Serbia.
At some time during the air war, NATO dropped leaflets
on Kosovo as part of its psychological operations (Psyops) campaign. One
leaflet was addressed to the 78th Motorized Brigade, the 211th Armor Brigade,
the 52nd Mixed Artillery (known to be in the Third Army), and the 78th
Mixed Artillery Brigade, suggesting NATO's belief that these brigades were
also active in Kosovo.
According to Jane's
Defense Weekly, a reinforced brigade from the
Nis Corps and a brigade from the Leskovac Corps were believed to have moved
into Kosovo on the weekend of March 20-21, just before the NATO bombing.
In addition, two reinforced brigades, one from the First Army and one from
the Second Army were believed to have moved into Kosovo around that time.51
The precise number of VJ casualties remains unknown.
According to former commander of the Third Army Pavkovic, 161 soldiers
died and 299 were wounded during the NATO bombing. Nine others went missing.
Regarding equipment, Pavkovic said in a June 1999 statement published in
Vojska,
that NATO had destroyed thirteen VJ tanks, six armored personnel carriers,
eight artillery pieces, nineteen anti-aircraft guns, and one radar.52
Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP)
The structure
of the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs (MUP) is far more complicated
than that of the VJ, which has a transparent chain of command. The profusion
of units and groups within the MUP make such a hierarchy less discernible,
although it is clear that, according to law, ultimate authority for the
MUP during the war rested with then-Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic.
Although he was not at the top of the MUP's de jure chain of command during
times of peace, a position nominally held by the Serbian Minister of Internal
Affairs, he was the indisputable de facto commander of its forces. According
to Yugoslavia's Law on Defence, during a state of war, the republican police
come under the jurisdiction of the Yugoslav Army. A state of war existed
in Yugoslavia between March 24 and June 10, 1996.
The security apparatus of the Serbian MUP is divided
into three branches: the public security service, the state security service
(known as the SDB-Sluzba Drzavne Bezbednosti), and educational institutions,
such as the police academy.53 The public security service has eleven departments,
including the police department. The state security service, or SDB, is
also known as the secret police. There is also a Yugoslav Ministry of Internal
Affairs, run by Zoran Sokolovic, but all evidence suggests that he and
the federal ministry had a limited role.54
From April 1997 to October 2000, the minister of
the MUP was Vlajko Stojiljkovic, known informally as "Deda" ("Grandpa").
On May 27, 1999, he was indicted by the ICTY along with four other top
Serbian and Yugoslav officials for crimes against humanity committed in
Kosovo.55 Legally, Stojiljkovic reported to the Serbian government and
the National Assembly. It is not clear how muchde facto power he wielded
within the ministry.
Until January 2001, the head of the public security
service was Col. Gen. Vlastimir Djordjevic, known informally as "Rodja"
("Cousin"), who was also an assistant to the minister. Djordjevic was replaced
by Sreten Lukic, who commanded the uniformed police in Kosovo during the
war (see below). Head of the state security service during the war was
Col. Gen. Radomir Markovic. Markovic was fired by the new Serbian government
on January 25, 2001. On February 23, he was arrested along with three other
officials in the state security service for their alleged involvement in
the 1999 car crash that injured opposition politician Vuk Draskovic and
killed four of his associates.56 According to the MUP's own website, www.mup.sr.gov._yu/domino/mup.nsf/pages/index-e
(April 22, 2001), the other assistants to Minister Stojiljkovic were: Maj.
Gen. Nikola Curcic, deputy of the state security service and director of
the Security Institute, Lt. Gen. Obrad _Stevanovic, Maj. Gen. Stojan Misic,
and Maj. Gen. Petar Zekovic.
Until January 2001, Col. Gen. Obrad Stevanovic commanded
the police department of the public security service.57 The department
was broken down into various groups: the regular police, the special police,
and the antiterrorist special forces.
The special police units were most frequently known
as the PJP (Posebne Jedinice Policije). They surpassed the regular police
in the specialization and intensity of their training and the sophistication
of their equipment, which included mortars and heavy machine guns. According
to the Federation of American Scientists and a leading Belgrade police
analyst, the PJP had an estimated 7,000 men, although their numbers could
be quickly expanded by recruiting from the regular police.58 The U.K. Ministry
of Defense, however, claimed that the PJP had 5,000 members in 1999 divided
into six detachments in Serbia, as well as 8,000 reservists.59 It is believed
that Obrad Stevanovic, head of the police department, also commanded the
PJP.
The police department also had special antiterrorist
units, known as the SAJ (Specijalna Antiteroristicka Jedinica), and commanded
by Col. Zivko Trajkovic.60 The unit used to be commanded by Radovan Stojicic,
a.k.a. Badza, who was killed by unknown assailants in downtown Belgrade
in 1996.
The SAJ had three units: in Batajnica (near Belgrade),
Pristina, and Novi Sad.61 The units are reportedly well equipped and enjoy
support from helicopter units. Their uniforms are often black and the emblem,
according to the Serbian newspaper Blic,
was a double-headed white eagle with a red shield and the Serbian symbol
of four Cs.62
Serbia also had the regular police stationed throughout
the republic, all under the command of Col. Gen. Obrad Stevanovic. In Kosovo,
there were seven regional police centers, known as SUPs (Sekretarijat Unutrasnjih
Poslova, or Secretariat for Internal Affairs) in Pristina, Kosovska Mitrovica,
Pec, Prizren, Urosevac, Gnjilane, and Djakovica. Each of these SUPs were
broken up into smaller OUPs (Odeljenje Unutrasnjih Poslova, or Unit of
Internal Affairs), within which were the local police stations in towns
and villages. Spokesman for the MUP in Kosovo was Col. Ljubinko Cvetic.
A central figure in the regular police was Sreten
Lukic, who commanded the force in Kosovo.63 His precise position in the
MUP chain of command during the war remains somewhat unclear, although
his importance in the province is undisputed. In various MUP documents,
he is referred to as the Chief of the Headquarters of the Ministry of Interior
in Pristina.64 He is also related to Milan Lukic and Sredoje Lukic, both
under indictment by the war crimes tribunal for abuses in Bosnia,65 as
well as Mikailo Lukic, the former secret police chief in Bajina Basta.66
On numerous occasions, Lukic was presented by the
MUP in Kosovo as its main interlocutor with foreigners. On June 7, 1998,
Lukic met a large delegation of foreign diplomats and defense attaches
who were on a Yugoslav government-organized tour of western Kosovo after
the government's first large offensive against the KLA. In response to
a question from a Dutch diplomat about the whereabouts of the villagers,
Lukic replied, "The ter-rorists evacuated their nearest and dearest, their
wives, children and old people . . ."67 Lukic denied the rumors that thousands
of ethnic Albanian civilians had been forced to flee.
Some journalists also covered the tour. According
to one account, Lukic claimed that the KLA had deliberately blown up their
own houses. He attributed the damage to some mosques in the area to the
Albanians' "misuse of religious facilities during shooting."68 According
to the MUP website, Lukic said:
[S]ome 5,000 people left the areas around the road.
But instead of going to Albania, as reported in some media, they fled for
Djakovica, Prizren, and a smaller number of them went to their relatives
working in Western Europe and a significant number of those along the border
went to their cousins and to their mountain sheds on the slopes where they
graze their cattle in summer. Following the unblocking of the road, all
the conditions have been created for people to return to their homes.69
Human Rights Watch visited northern Albania in July
1999 to interview the refugees who had fled the offensive. They reported
indiscriminate shelling of villages, widespread looting, and burning of
private property by Serbian forces. Fifteen thousand people fled to Albania
and an estimated 30,000 fled north to Monte-negro.70
Lukic was also the main contact person with the
police for the KDOM observer mission. In one incident, on August 21, 1998,
a joint U.S. and Canadian KDOM team was stopped and detained by three drunken
police officers near Pec, according to the internal KDOM daily report from
that day, which was viewed by Human Rights Watch. After thirty minutes
of verbal abuse and harassment, the KDOM team was released. U.S. KDOM immediately
contacted Kosovo administrator Veljko Odalovic and "provincial MUP commander
General Lukic." Lukic was reportedly in Belgrade but Odalovic apologized
and guaranteed that the individuals responsible would be punished. Three
hours later, according to the KDOM report, Odalovic called back to say
that the MUP official responsible had been fired and that the two other
officers would be dealt with. He also advised that, "General Lukic would
ensure that MUP units in the field would be advised and instructed to maintain
discipline."71 This statement supports a conclusion that the MUP rank and
file was under the control of its superiors.
Lukic's name appeared again in January 1999, after
the killing of forty-five ethnic Albanians in Racak. According to the Washington
Post, Western governments had intercepted conversations
between "Serbian Interior Minister General Sreten Lukic" and Yugoslav Deputy
Prime Minister Nikola Sainovic (who was indicted by ICTY on May 24, 1999).
Western sources familiar with the intercepts claimed that the two officials
ordered their forces to "go in heavy." In a series of conversations after
the attack, Lukic and Sainovic allegedly discussed ways to cover up the
massacre.72
After Milosevic's fall in October 2000, Lukic reportedly
became head of the Ministry of Internal Affair's Department for Border
Affairs, which deals with passports and visas.73 But on January 30, 2001,
the new Serbian government appointed him the ministry's new chief of public
security, replacing Vlastimir Djordjevic, as well as Deputy Minister of
Internal Affairs.74
The commanders of the regional Kosovo SUPs were
under Lukic. The commander of the Djakovica SUP, established in early 1996,
was Dragutin Adamovic.75 The commander of the Pec SUP, which covers the
municipalities of Pec, Klina, and Istok, was Col. Boro Vlahovic.76 The
commander of the Klina OUP, within the Pec SUP, was Sgt. Maj. Jovica Mikic.77
Lt. Vukmir Mircic was the commander of the Decani OUP. 78
SUP Prizren covers the municipalities of Prizren,
Orahovac, Suva Reka, and Gora, each of which has its own OUP. Based on
a February 1998 Policajac
article, as well as awards issued to MUP officers after the war, the commander
of Prizren SUP was Col. Gradimir Zekavica (and Lt. Milan Djuricic was section
head of Prizren SUP's police department).79 But there is conflicting information
because, according to Policajac,
in January 1999 a new Prizren SUP head was appointed: Col. Milos Vojnovic,
who was also assistant chief of the police department in the Ministry of
Internal Affairs.80 As of February 1998, the chief of police in OUP Suva
Reka was Lt. Dobrivoje Vitosevic and Sub-Lt. Radojko Repanovic was his
deputy.81
Kosovska Mitrovica SUP covers Kosovska Mitrovica,
Leposavic, Zvecane, Zubin Potok, Vucitrn, and Srbica, with OUPs in Srbica,
Leposavic, and Vucitrn. The head of the SUP in 1998 (since 1996) was Col.
Ljubinko Cvetic, formerly the police chief in Kragujevac and later also
a spokeman of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Kosovo. Section head
of the Kosovo Mitrovica police department was Lt. Milorad Radevic.82 In
OUP Srbica, Major Branko Jaredic was the head and Capt. Milenko Bozovic
was commander of the police.83
SUP Gnjilane covers the municipalities of Gnjilane,
Kosovska Kamenica, Vitina, and Novo Brdo. Up to January 1999, the head
of the Gnjilane SUP was Col. Vlada Milicevic. He was then replaced by Col.
Dusan Gavranic, former head of the SUP in Zrenjanin (in Vojvodina, Serbia).84
The Pristina SUP covered Pristina, Glogovac, Kosovo
Polje, Lipljan, Obilic, and Podujevo. The Glogovac OUP head was Petar Damjanac,
and his deputy was Nebojsa Trajkovic ("Lutka"). The Urosevac SUP covered
Urosevac, Stimlje, Strpce, and Kacanik, and was run by Bogoljub Janicijevic,
according to residents of Urosevac.
In addition to these seven SUPs, individual policemen
and probably police units from outside the province were also active in
Kosovo, as shown by the list of policemen killed in Kosovo during 1998
and 1999 that is provided on the MUP website. In September 1998, for instance,
five policemen were killed in a landmine incident near Likovac. All of
them were from the Novi Sad SUP, although it is not clear whether they
were regular or special police (either the PJP or SAJ).85 Police units
from Pozarevac were apparently also engaged in Kosovo, as evidenced by
the killing of a policeman from Pozarevac, Milan Tenic, in Kosovo on April
24, 1998.86 Policemen from Pancevo, Serbia were also killed in Kosovo in
1998.87
Within the MUP were also many local militia and
reservist groups, such as Munja ("Lightning") in Pec, which was responsible
for the massacre in Cuska village on May 14, 1999 (see Pec Municipality).
The group had a reputation for violence and criminality. According to Munja
members who spoke with journalists from the United States radio documentary
company American RadioWorks, the Yugoslav Army supplied them with food
and ammunition, as well as travel documents to allow them to pass checkpoints.
One Munja member called "Branko" said:
We would get a list of names of people to arrest.
If they resisted, we killed them. Some Albanians paid money, protection
money. We knew who we should move out and those we shouldn't.88
The Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs also contains
the state security service (SDB), otherwise known as the secret police,
which was organized into directorates and sectors. The state security's
role in the wars of the former Yugoslavia generally and Kosovo in particular
should not be underestimated. The SDB maintained a large network of operatives
and informants in Kosovo, among them many ethnic Albanians. KLA commanders
claimed the SDB had in some cases successfully infiltrated the KLA (and
sometimes used these claims to justify the torture and summary executions
of suspected ethnic Albanian spies).
During late 1998 and 1999, the director of state
security was Col. Gen. Radomir Markovic, formerly head of the Belgrade
SUP. (As mentioned above, Markovic was arrested in February 2001.) Markovic's
deputy was Maj. Gen. Nikola Curcic, who was also the director of the Institute
for Security, according to the MUP website at the time. In Kosovo, the
head of the SDB was David Gajic.89 According to the U.K. Ministry of Defense,
there were three main SDB centers in Kosovo: Pristina, Prizren, and Gnjilane.90
According to Suva Reka residents, the head of the local SDB in Suva Reka
was "Misko" Nisevic (see Suva Reka Municipality). According to Djakovica
residents, the local head of state security was Sreten Camovic (See Djakovica
Municipality).
Radomir Markovic was appointed SDB head on October
27, 1998, replacing Jovica Stanisic, a long-time confidante of President
Milosevic. There is speculation that Stanisic's dismissal was related to
his disapproval of policy in Kosovo. Some analysts also believe that Stanisic
was at odds with Milosevic's powerful wife, head of the Yugoslav United
Left Party (JUL) Mira Markovic.
The precise role and organization of the SDB remains
murky, although its surveillance and military activities in Kosovo are
indisputable, both before and during the war. Most notorious was the SDB's
special operations force, the JSO (Jedinice za Specijalne Operacije-Special
Operations Unit), which was very active in Kosovo. The commander of the
unit during the war was Milorad Lukovic, a man better known as "Legija."91
According to Serbian press reports, Ulemek changed his last name in 1997
from Ulemek to Lukovic.92 A central figure in the JSO organization, if
not its founder, was Franko "Frenki" Simatovic: a common nickname for JSO
fighters was "Frenki's Boys." The JSO was also sometimes called the "Red
Berets" which has caused some confusion, because the VJ's Special Forces
Corps has gone by the same name.
The JSO often appeared in the uniforms of other
military or police units, and were known for carrying large knives, as
well as their distinctive Australian-style cowboy hats, something many
witnesses reported seeing. The JSO also had a reputation for ruthlessness.
In the words of a Serbian policeman who spent six months in Kosovo in 1998,
interviewed by Human Rights Watch in Belgrade, "Frenki's Boys kill everything.
Believe me, you do not want to see them."93 According to a VJ soldier who
spoke with Human Rights Watch in September 1998, the JSO was operating
on the border with Albania around Decani.94
According to the U.K. Ministry of Defense, the JSO
had between 400 and 500 men, mostly recruited from the VJ's special forces.95
The Serbian media has written that the JSO was a unit assembled in special
circumstances whose members wear "a variety of uniforms with emblems that
are officially not in use by any police or army units in the province."96
Vreme
magazine claimed that the JSO, formed in 1991, did not have more than 300
members. Armed with the most up-to-date weapons, the group reportedly trained
at Kula (near Vrbas), which was bombed by NATO during the war, as well
as at other camps near the Tara river.97 Unconfirmed reports claim that
during the NATO bombing the JSO was based at the Dubrava prison near Istok,
which NATO bombed on May 19 and 21 (see Istok Municipality).
The background of Frenki Simatovic is enigmatic.
Various reports on Kosovo have cast him as a commander of the state security's
special operations or an assistant head of the state security service.98
An article on the JSO by Belgrade-based journalist Dejan Anastasijevic
and Andrew Purvis for Time.com claims that Simatovic, then a young Yugoslav
intelligence officer, was tasked in 1991 with setting up a paramilitary
force closely connected to the state security apparatus for Belgrade to
use in Croatia. The article concludes: "Simatovic's solution was to set
up a small unit of ex-policemen, ex-convicts and other self-proclaimed
volunteers who would answer only to Serbian secret police."99
Milorad Lukovic (or Ulemek) remained in charge of
the JSO after the fall of the Milosevic government in October 2001, raising
suspicions about the organization's role in the country's political changes.
Serbian newspapers suggested that Lukovic (or Ulemek) had pledged his support
to the new Serbian Prime Minister Zoran Djindic. On May 6, 2001, however,
the Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs announced that JSO commander "Milorad
Lukovic" had been suspended from duty due to a violent incident at a disco
club in the town of Kula. Disciplinary proceedings and a criminal suit
are to follow, the ministry announced.100 According to the newspaper Danas,
a group of JSO members had gathered in the club to celebrate the JSO's
tenth anniversay.101
The Serbian SDB is also believed to have assisted
and armed paramilitary forces in Kosovo, as they did in Bosnia and Croatia,
although the nature of this work remains unclear. The U.K. Ministry of
Defense has maintained that Simatovic has a "long history of organizing,
arming, and directing Serbian paramilitaries in the Bosnian war and now
in Kosovo."102
In an interview, a former member of the Serbian
state security told American RadioWorks that the SDB had helped strengthen
command and control over paramilitary forces in Kosovo through the provision
of communications equipment:
Initially, we received orders from the high command
to provide some things for leaders of the paramilitary groups. Mobile phones,
radio links, satellite communications. They already had weapons and ammo
from the army. The communications were so they could be in direct contact
with the command in Pristina.103
According to KLA commanders who spoke with Human
Rights Watch, the SDB had a good knowledge of KLA personalities and activities,
largely from informants and infiltrators. Evidence suggests that the Serbian
government was well aware of the militant movement among Kosovar Albanians
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, including the first organized KLA actions
in 1996.
Paramilitaries
In an interview
with the Serbian newspaper Vecernje Novosti,
former head of the Third Army Col. Gen. Nebojsa Pavkovic denied that there
were any paramilitaries in Kosovo.104 Witness statements collected by Human
Rights Watch, OSCE reports, and numerous articles in the international
media convincingly counter this claim. The composition and command structure
of the various paramilitary forces and the precise connections they each
had to the Serbian and Yugoslav governments remains unclear. But the evidence
reveals that they operated in Kosovo with the approval and ongoing political
and logistical support of the government, and often in close coordination
with regular forces. There is little, if any, evidence to suggest attempts
by the government to hinder paramilitary operations, despite repeated and
credible reports that they had committed atrocities.
The paramilitary forces believed active in Kosovo
include, but are not limited to, Arkan's Tigers,105 Seselj's White Eagles,106
and the Republika Srpska Delta Force, a group of police from Republika
Srpska.107 It is believed that many of these groups were armed and organized
with assistance from the SDB. Unlike in Croatia and Bosnia, however, in
Kosovo these paramilitary groups were mostly integrated into VJ or MUP
units, rather than allowed to operate on their own.
According to the OSCE report on Kosovo, Arkan's
Tigers are believed to have had a training camp between Leposavic and Kosovska
Mitrovica, and the forces supposedly operated around Kosovska Mitrovica,
Pec, Djakovica, and Prizren. The Republika Srpska Delta Force reportedly
operated to the south of Gnjilane in early April.108 The SDB unit known
as Frenki's Boys are also sometimes referred to as paramilitaries.
According to witnesses, paramilitaries wore an array
of uniforms-they were sometimes recognizable due to the lack of uniformity.
Some had shaved heads while others had long hair with beards. They often
wore black or red head scarves or bandannas, and carried hand axes or long
knives on their belts.
Aside from being among the most violent forces in
Kosovo, one of their primary activities was looting and theft. According
to the OSCE report, some paramilitaries may have arrived in Kosovo in mid-February
to prepare for the transportation of looted goods back to Serbia.109
At times, the police or army tried to warn or protect
ethnic Albanian civilians from paramilitaries, although this was rare.
One ethnic Albanian man who was forced to walk with a group of prisoners
from Lipljan prison back to Pristina in May said that a policeman saved
him from threatening paramilitaries. He told Human Rights Watch: "When
we were coming back, we were stopped by paramilitaries and they wanted
to kill us. A police officer hit one of the paramilitaries over the head
with a gun. The police officer spoke Albanian to us, gave us water, and
told us to hide in Pristina."110
After the war, some paramilitaries spoke with foreign
journalists about their time in Kosovo. One man named "Dragan" said he
fought with the Pitbull Terrier paramilitary unit, which was comprised
of boxers from his home town in Niksic, Montenegro, who had also fought
in Bosnia. Dragan said that his group killed fifty Albanians in retaliation
for losing seven of their men.111
A Wall Street
Journal reporter interviewed eight paramilitaries,
ranging from a thug who was released from prison to fight to a Serbian
nationalist who believed he was defending the homeland. One man, "Tony,"
said he fought with Arkan's Tigers. Local Kosovo officials, he said, gave
his unit computer printouts with the names and assets of wealthy Albanians.
Other units got lists of those to be executed. Another man identified as
"Il Montenegrino" was offered early release from prison if he went to fight
in Kosovo. He accepted along with sixteen of his twenty-five cell mates.
A third paramilitary called "Jacques" said his unit acted on information
from the army, the police, local Serbs, and Albanian collaborators.112
Another article in the U.S. press, based on more
than a dozen interviews with paramilitary members, said that the units
were acting on orders from state security, the MUP, and the VJ. In return
for their services, paramilitaries were reportedly allowed to keep 10 percent
of the goods they stole. Some of the fighters showed the journalist official
MUP documents that allowed them to transport stolen goods back into Serbia.
Some of the men denied that they had orders to rape women, but claimed
that their commanders had done nothing to stop it.113
American RadioWorks produced a series of radio programs
on war crimes in the Pec area, especially the massacre at Cuska village.
Its reporters spoke with Serbian militia members, some of whom admitted
taking part in the Cuska killing. One man, identified as "Marko," said
that he had been released from a Serbian prison to fight in Kosovo with
Arkan's Tigers. He said:
Formally, Arkan didn't come to the prison. It was
one of his men. He had a list of prisoners and their dossiers. They had
to be the right profile. All he asked was if you were ready to go, to Kosovo
. . . this wasn't a judge's, or a prison warden's decision. It was Arkan's.
He is the law in Serbia.
We would receive a list of names. Bring this person
in alive or dead. I was assigned to arrest people, and had permission to
kill them if necessary. You look at the guy, his attitude. If there's attitude,
you might just kill him. _I mean, there's no point in taking someone in
who's just going to cause _trouble . . .
We interacted a lot with certain people at the MUP.
There was a kind of crisis council, and some of the information came from
there. The lists came from all over, police, city authority, because they
had been collecting this kind of information for years. Who were the rich
ones, where they lived, who were the important ones, where they lived.
And we had local spies to help us on operations. We would use locals from
a particular village to guide us, tell us where so-and-so lived, and they
might get some money, if they were Serbs. We also had Albanian spies and
Gypsies, too.114
In some places, local Serbs also participated in
the "cleansing" campaign, although in no way can this be said for the Serbian
population in Kosovo as a whole. Some local Serbs were reservists in the
police, but village defense groups were also formed. Some Serbian villages
in Kosovo had complained to the Serbian government in 1998 about the lack
of protection from armed Albanians. The government responded by arming
these individuals and groups. Armed local Serbs were apparently coordinated
through the police, although some also joined paramilitary forces.
Although some of the most violent behavior was by
local Serbs, there were also examples of local Serbs providing assistance
to Albanians. Around Pec and Orahovac, for example, especially near the
all-Serbian village of Velika Hoca, armed Serbs participated in the looting
and burning of private property, as well as executions.
The most common criminal activity by local Serbs,
however, was probably looting Albanian homes after security forces had
swept through an area and the population had either fled or been expelled.
Perhaps the most telling proof of looting comes from the diary of a Serbian
woman from Pec, who recorded her observations during the war. The diary,
found after the war by international journalists, says:
They say these [the looters] are patriots who are
breaking into the houses of Shiptars [derogatory word for Albanians], and
a traitor is he who does not do that. Let them call me a traitor, but I
will not stain my hands. I fear for the future of children whose parents
teach them how to steal, how to loot, and to set houses on fire. What will
come out of those kind of persons in the future? What recollections will
they have of their childhood? They do not play soccer or roller-skate.
Their play consists of breaking into homes and taking all they can carry,
and then, with a liter of gasoline, destroying everything.115
According to many ethnic Albanians, members of Kosovo's
Roma population also participated in crimes, and this is the justification
most often given for their expulsion from post-war Kosovo (see Abuses After
June 12, 1999). Indeed, the evidence collected in this report includes
descriptions of a number of cases where local Roma collaborated with the
police, army, or paramilitaries, either by guiding them through Albanian
villages or by actively participating in crimes. But many Roma were also
victims in the offensive, and it is patently wrong to blame the group as
a whole for crimes during the war. A substantial number of Roma were expelled
to Albania and Macedonia. Others were killed by the government's security
forces. Some Roma were forced by the government's security forces to work,
such as the group in Djakovica that was ordered to pick up and bury bodies
in the city. According to a report by the Humanitarian Law Center: "The
Serbian police and local authorities forced Roma civilians, including minors,
to bury _the bodies of Albanian civilians and Kosovo Liberation Army members,
to dig trenches for the military, and to pillage and destroy ethnic Albanian
property."116
The local Serbs and Roma who committed crimes or
collaborated with the security forces during the war are generally believed
to have left Kosovo with the departing forces in early June 1999. Those
who remained did so either because they believed in their innocence or
because they were too old or poor to flee. They face exceedingly difficult
conditions in post-war Kosovo, including harassment, abductions and murder
(see Abuses After June 12, 1999).
Lastly, there are many reports of foreigners fighting
with the Serbian and Yugoslav forces, as well as a few with the KLA. It
is not known whether any of these individuals was paid for their services.
Human Rights Watch interviewed more than a dozen witnesses who claimed
to have seen Russian fighters among the Serbian forces, although no evidence
has emerged to suggest official involvement by the Russian government.
Some reports in the international media also described the presence of
foreign fighters from Russia as well as from other countries.117 An article
in an Israeli newspaper, Tel Aviv Yedi'ot
Aharonot, claimed that some forty Israeli citizens
joined the "Serb foreign volunteers unit," most of them originally from
the former Soviet Union and veterans of the wars in Afghanistan or Chechnya.118
A male Danish citizen who claimed that he had fought with Serbian forces
in Kosovo was arrested in Denmark after telling a Danish newspaper, Extra
Bladet, that he had taken part in "ethnic cleansing."
He was later released for lack of evidence.119
Chain of Command and Superior Responsibility
The chain of
command for the Yugoslav Army is public. As set out in this chapter, local
commanders in Kosovo reported to the commanders of the Pristina Corps,
led by Maj. Gen. Vladimir Lazarevic. The Pristina Corps reported to the
Third Army, commanded by Col. Gen. Nebojsa Pavkovic, who reported to the
General Staff, commanded by Gen. Dragoljub Ojdanic. The overall commander
of the VJ was Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, who chaired the Supreme
Defense Council.
The chain of command for the MUP is considerably
less clear. While much of the de jure hierarchy has been presented in this
chapter, there are still gaps, such as the relationship between the state
security and paramilitary forces and the roles of the various MUP formations.
Additional structures of command and control with the MUP and VJ probably
existed.
In addition, the MUP's de jure structure does not
necessarily reflect the de facto reality. The role of Serbia's Minister
of Internal Affairs Vlajko Stojiljkovic, for instance, is considered by
Serbian and foreign observers of the Serbian security structures to have
been subordinate to that of President Milosevic and perhaps also to Yugoslav
Deputy Prime Minister Nikola Sainovic, widely considered Milosevic's point-man
on Kosovo.120 Various lines of command and control within and between state
security, public security, the paramilitary forces, and the president are
still unknown. Lastly, the methods and structure of cooperation between
the MUP and VJ also remain unclear, including a possible coordination center
in Pristina.
Despite this, the case against the Serbian and Yugoslav
leadership is convincing. The ICTY statute is clear on individual criminal
responsibility for the leaders who organize or allow the commission of
serious crimes. Article 7 of the statute says:
1. A person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed
or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning, preparation or execution
of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, shall
be individually responsible for the crime.
2. The official position of any accused person,
whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible Government official,
shall not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment.
3. The fact that any of the acts referred to in
articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute was committed by a subordinate does
not relieve his superior of criminal responsibility if he knew or had reason
to know that the subordinate was about to commit such acts or had done
so and the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures
to prevent such acts or to punish the perpetrators thereof.
4. The fact that an accused person acted pursuant
to an order of a Government or of a superior shall not relieve him of criminal
responsibility, but may be considered in mitigation of punishment if the
International Tribunal determines that justice so requires.121
In other words, both the direct perpetrator of a
crime as well as the military or political leaders who ordered that crime
can be prosecuted. Paragraph three adds that a superior is accountable
for crimes committed if he or she failed to take steps to prevent such
acts or to punish the perpetrators.
The extent and systematic nature of the crimes in
Kosovo make it highly implausible that the Serbian and Yugoslav leadership
did not know that crimes were being committed, despite their public denials.122
Numerous statements by the Serbian and Yugoslav government or military
demonstrate that the top leadership was regularly apprised of the security
situation in Kosovo. Well distributed reports by the media and nongovernmental
organizations, including Human Rights Watch, were repeatedly documenting
abuses by Serbian and Yugoslav forces.
At the beginning of the war, on March 26, 1999,
for example, President Milosevic received top officials from the army and
police, including Zoran Sokolovic, Yugoslav minister of internal Affairs,
Vlajko Stojiljkovic, Serbian minister of internal affairs, Col. Gen. Vlastimir
Djordjevic and Radomir Markovic, chiefs of public security and state security,
respectively, as well as Col. Gen. Geza Farkas, chief of Yugoslav Army
counterintelligence. In a statement issued after the meeting, the government
said:
The officials of internal affairs and security notified
President Milosevic that all service organs as well as security services
are functioning very well, and that their members perform the necessary
tasks efficiently, responsibly and highly professionally. . . . It is estimated
that the moral, patriotic consciousness and readiness of all the members
of the internal affairs organs are on the highest level.123
On May 4, 1999, President Milosevic met with Gen.
Ojdanic, Gen. Pavkovic, Maj. Gen. Sreten Lukic, and Serbian President Milutinovic,
among others. The Ministry of Internal Affair's statement after the meeting
said: "[I]t was concluded that all tasks directed towards the defense of
the country, anti-terrorist combat and the establishment of the general
security in Kosovo and Metohija are being successfully realized."124
In an interview with the U.S. television news show
Frontline conducted after the war, General Pavkovic was asked if, during
the NATO war, he had met with his political counterparts, like President
Milosevic. The following exchange ensued:
Pavkovic:
Of course, I was present as a member of the top brass on many occasions,
and I can tell you that there was a feeling of unity in the headquarters
and amongst the people.
Frontline:
What impression did Milosevic give you?
Pavkovic:
He is the top command, and as such, he knows the political and the military
climate very well. He gave optimism to us soldiers as well as the people.
Frontline:
Did you partake in the military planning of the pullout?
Pavkovic:
No, but I was in constant touch with the team that did. No decision could
have been put through without our participation.125
In addition, all evidence suggests that, with a
few localized exceptions, the police, army, and paramilitary units were
under strict control, only operating with written orders from their commanders.
The fact that all security forces withdrew from Kosovo in an orderly manner
after the Military Technical Agreement with NATO was signed on June 10
further suggests that the forces were under the strict and effective command
of their superiors. Indeed, in an interview given on January 16, 2001,
to Belgrade's Radio B92, General Pavkovic said, referring to military operations
in Kosovo, "everything was well orchestrated over there."126
There is also evidence to prove that local police
stations were functioning during the war, dispelling claims that the governing
structures had broken down. In Pec, for instance, the police kept careful
records of deaths in the city, attributing most of them to "NATO bombs"
or "terrorist acts", referring to the KLA.127 Witnesses in various parts
of Kosovo told Human Rights Watch that they saw police investigators inspecting
crime scenes, such as in the village of Sudimlja after the killing of the
Gerxhaliu family on May 31 (see Vucitrn Municipality).
The Serbian and Yugoslav leadership also had to
have known about the actions of paramilitary forces operating in Kosovo.
At the very least, the leadership knew of these forces' reputations for
brutality in Croatia and Bosnia. Despite this, the authorities either deployed
paramilitaries or allowed them to operate in Kosovo without taking any
precautions to prevent their committing war crimes. With their reputations
for brutality, dispatching a paramilitary force under certain leaders was
tantamount to ordering excessive violence without having to issue an explicit
command to do so.
This was reflected in the interview given on page
84 by a self-proclaimed member of "Frenki's Boys" to American RadioWorks.
In the interview, the man identified as "Milos" says:
We [Frenki's Boys] were a special unit. But the
paramilitary groups-I call them gangs. Everything below us, the army and
the police, they were gangs. Nevertheless, there was some control. These
groups were all given their zones of operation. They were allowed to do
what they wanted. They were put into places intentionally and told to do
what they wanted to get the job done. It was their job to kill and rape
and do what they liked.128
With a handful of exceptions at the lower levels,
there were few cases in which the Milosevic government punished security
forces for serious crimes or even placed anyone under investigation.129
On the contrary, the postwar period saw hundreds of promotions and awards
for police and army personnel who had served in Kosovo, including some
of the top leadership. A more complete list of promotions and awards is
provided as an appendix to this chapter. But some of the more prominent
individuals commended or promoted for their work in Kosovo include:
· Dragoljub Ojdanic, Chief of the Army's
General Staff, promoted to General of the Army (four stars) and, subsequently,
Yugoslav Minister of Defense (a position he held until October 2000).
· Nebojsa Pavkovic, commander of the Third
Army, promoted to Chief of the Army's General Staff.
· Maj. Gen. Vladimir Lazarevic (one star),
commander of the Pristina Corps, promoted to Major General (two star).
· Col. Bozidar Delic, commander of the 549th
Motorized Brigade, promoted to One Star General.
· Col. Radojko Stefanovic, commander of the
52nd Mixed Artillery Brigade, promoted to Brigadier General.
· The Order of the War Flag was given to
the 243rd Mechanized Brigade, the 211th Armored Brigade, and the 15th Armored
Brigade.
· President Milosevic presented the Order
of Freedom to Army General Dragoljub Ojdanic and Col. General Nebojsa Pavkovic,
Commander of the Third Army.
· President Milosevic presented the Order
of the National Hero to the following VJ brigades: the 125th Motorized
Brigade (accepted by Commander of the Brigade, Col. Dragan Zivanovic),
the 549th Motorized Brigade (accepted by commander of the Brigade, Col.
Bozidar Delic), and the 37th Motorized Brigade (accepted by commander of
the Brigade, Col. Ljubisa Dikovic).
· The Order of the Yugoslav Flag of the First
Degree was given to Col. General Vlastimir S. Djordjevic, head of MUP Public
Security, Obrad M. Stevanovic, head of police special forces, and Sreten
Lukic, head of MUP forces in Kosovo.
· Obrad Stevanovic and Sreten Lukic were
promoted to Major Generals in the police.
· Assistant Ministers of Internal Affairs
Nikola Curcic, Stojan Misic, and Petar Zekovic, were all promoted.
· The Order of the Yugoslav Flag of the Third
Degree was given to Col. Zivko Trajkovic, commander of the SAJ.
· The Order of Merit in Matters of Defense
and Security of the First Degree was given to Col. Dragutin Adamovic, Djakovica
SUP; Col. Dusan B. Gavranic, Gnjilane SUP; Col.Gradimir R. Zekavica, Prizren
SUP; Lieutenant Col. Milan S. Djuricic, Prizren SUP; and Maj. Milenko M.
Bozovic, Srbica police commander.
· President Milosevic awarded the Order of
the Yugoslav Flag to Zoran Andjelkovic, president of the Temporary Executive
Council of Kosovo and Metohija, Nikola Sainovic, Deputy Prime Minister
of the Yugoslav Government, Col. Gen. Vlastimir Djordjevic, Maj. Gen. Obrad
Stevanovic, and Maj. Gen. Sreten Lukic.
· Decoration of the Yugoslav Flag First Class
was given to Vlajko _Stojiljkovic, Serbian minister of internal affairs,
and Col. Gen. Radomir Markovic, assistant to the minister and chief of
state security.
In addition to these promotions, public statements
by Milosevic, both while he was president and afterwards, repeatedly praised
the security forces for their actions in Kosovo without any mention of
crimes that were committed. On November 25, 2000, at a special congress
of the Serbian Socialist Party, Milosevic declared that the four other
Serbian and Yugoslav leaders indicted by the war crimes tribunal were "national
heroes."130 On May 13, 1999, known as "Security Day" in Serbia, then-President
Milosevic extended congratulations to the country's security forces.
You have achieved great success in crushing the
separatist movement and its terrorist gangs in Kosovo and Metohija, which
had the support of the foreign powers which have also committed criminal
aggression on our country. Many members of the security authorities and
services have bravely died in that battle and they are a shining example
of courage and loyalty to their people and their country.
With your high sense of patriotism, loyalty and
professionalism, you have thwarted the activities of the enemy forces and
prevented them from undermining the strength of our defense.
Congratulating you on your holiday, I wish to express
my conviction that you will continue, just as so far, honorably, professionally
and in the spirit of the freedom-loving traditions of our people to carry
out your duties in the defense of the sovereignty, territorial integrity,
independence and the constitutional order of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.131
After the war, there was very limited discussion
within Serbia of crimes committed by government forces, although this is
changing with the fall of the Milosevic government in October 2000. Two
individuals who attempted to present the issue in public while Milosevic
was still in power both faced retaliation by the government. On July 26,
2000, a journalist with Agence France Presse, Danas
newspaper, and the Institute for War and Peace Reporting, Miroslav Filipovic,
was sentenced to seven years in prison by a military court for espionage
and spreading false information. He was released on October 10. Filipovic
had written about the role of government forces in abuses against Albanians
in Kosovo. In July 2000, an outspoken and well-respected human rights activist,
Natasa Kandic, was threatened with legal action by the Yugoslav Army after
she condemned the Filipovic verdict and spoke out about "the horrors [VJ]
generals sent young recruits to witness in Kosovo."132
Although the process of dealing with the past will
take time, there have been some promising steps inside Serbia since Milosevic's
fall. The local media is beginning to report more openly-and without fear
of retribution-on atrocities by Serbian forces, a truth commission sponsored
by new Yugoslav President Vojislav Kostunica has been initiated, and the
VJ has begun legal proceedings against more than 150 VJ soldiers for their
actions in Kosovo. Most notably, in April 2001, Serbian police arrested
Slobodan Milosevic on charges of corruption. On June 28 he was transferred
to the war crimes tribunal in The Hague.
Structure and Strategy of the KLA
Since World
War II, small groups of militant Albanians had sought Kosovo's independence
from Yugoslavia, although their activity and impact were minimal. Some
of these organizations, such as the Levizja Popullore per Republiken e
Kosoves (People's Movement for the Republic of Kosovo) and later the Levizja
Kombetare per Clirimin e Kosoves (National Movement for the Liberation
of Kosovo) gained strength in the 1980s, especially after the government's
crackdown in 1981. Support was provided _by Kosovar Albanians living abroad,
as well as through illegal activities by Kosovar Albanians in the Balkans
and Western Europe.
Throughout the 1990s, the majority of the population
pursued the peaceful politics of Ibrahim Rugova, but a fringe element of
militants was active in some areas, especially Drenica. As repression in
Kosovo continued, the movement gradually gained members and, as noted above,
the initial fragments of the Kosovo Liberation Army were, by 1996, attacking
police outposts in Kosovo. The flow of weapons from Albania in 1997, after
the government there fell, greatly assisted the nascent insurgency.
A crucial turning point came with the police crackdown
in Drenica in February and March 1998, in which more than eighty civilians
were killed. The brutality of the Serbian government radicalized the Albanian
community. Many villagers turned to the KLA either out of frustration with
Rugova's ineffective nonviolent approach or because they saw the KLA as
their only means of protection. At the same time, some villages clearly
did not encourage the presence of the armed group, since they feared it
would provoke a government response, which it often did.
Throughout early 1998, the KLA was primarily a disorganized
collection of armed villagers, often built around family structures, without
a clear chain of command. Strong regionalism dominated the organization,
as evidenced by the post-war splintering of the insurgency. Operational
areas raised their own funds and purchased their own weapons.
This changed gradually throughout the year as the
KLA secured a steadier arms supply and organized itself into a more centralized
structure.133 Ethnic Albanians with experience in the Yugoslav Army or
its predecessor in the former Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav National Army (Jugoslovenska
Narodna Armija, or JNA), gradually joined the insurgency. Contacts with
Western governments, mostly through KDOM or the KVM, were strengthened.
The ceasefire period from December 1998 to March 1999 was used to strengthen
the central command and to reorganize operations. By March 1999, the KLA
was a better organized rebel force, albeit with strong personalities in
the various regions who did not always agree with one another. A military
police force and military courts were more firmly established with detention
facilities, along with civilian political structures that issued decrees
in areas under KLA control.
By 1999, the main political representative of the
KLA was Hashim Thaci (a.k.a. Snake), who represented the insurgency at
political negotiations such as the Rambouillet conference in February 1999.
In April 1999, Agim Ceku, an ethnic Albanian former brigadier general in
the Croatian Army with close ties to the United States government and military,
was appointed head of the KLA's General Staff, making him the chief military
commander.134 He replaced Syleman Selimi (a.k.a. Sultan). Both Ceku and
Thaci sat on the KLA's General Staff (Stafi i Pergjithshem), the main decision-making
body of eighteen people, along with many of the other key members of the
insurgency.135
The KLA was organized into seven operational zones,
each with a regional commander and chief of staff: Drenica (Glogovac, Srbica,
Malisevo, and Klina municipalities), Shala (Kosovska Mitrovica), Dukagjin
(Pec, Prizren, Decani, and Djakovica municipalities), Llap (Podujevo),
Nerodine (Urosevac), Kacanik, and Pastrik. Prominent among the regional
commanders were Ramush Haradinaj in the Dukagjin zone, Ekrem Rexha (a.k.a.
Commander Drini) in the Pastrik zone,136 Rrustem Mustafa (a.k.a. Remi)
in the Llap zone, and Sami Lushtaku in Drenica. Each region had brigades
and companies, usually based around a village or series of villages.137
Rexhep Selimi was head of the military police and Kadri Veseli (a.k.a.
Luli) was head of the KLA's secret service, that later became known as
the Sherbimi Informativ i Kosoves (SHIK).
Given the regional divisions within the KLA, a central
chain of command was sometimes difficult to discern. Even within the operational
zones, it was not always clear how much control the various commanders
had over their troops.
On the other hand, as 1998 progressed, regionally-based
and central command structures were increasingly discernible. Local commanders
initiated military actions and issued decrees within their areas of responsibility.
The military police and courts were functioning, albeit haphazardly, in
areas of KLA control. The General Staff coordinated military actions and
political activities to an extent throughout Kosovo, a structure which
allowed decisions to be transmitted down to the fighters. It also coordinated
logistical and financial support from Albania and the Albanian diaspora
in Western Europe and the United States.
Although there were often examples to the contrary,
KLA fighters in late 1998 and early 1999 displayed discipline, manning
checkpoints, checking identification papers, and adhering to orders from
their commanders. A KLA office in Pristina (allowed to function by the
authorities) distributed passes to allow foreign journalists and human
rights researchers access to areas under KLA control.
Despite these structures, there are no known cases
of KLA soldiers having been punished for committing abuses against civilians
or government forces no longer taking active part in hostilities. It is
clear that in certain cases, such as the September 1998 murder by KLA forces
of thirty-four people near Glodjane, that the local commanders must have
known, if not directly ordered, the killings. There were, however, reported
but unconfirmed cases of KLA soldiers being disciplined by their own commanders
for having harassed or shot at foreign journalists.
In interviews and public statements, KLA spokesmen
repeatedly expressed the organization's willingness to respect the rules
of war. In an interview given to the Albanian-language newspaper Koha
Ditore in July 1998, KLA spokesman Jakup Krasniqi
said:
From the start, we had our own internal rules for
our operations. These clearly lay down that the KLA recognizes the Geneva
Conventions and the conventions governing the conduct of war.138
KLA Communique number 51, issued by the KLA General
Headquarters on August 26, 1998, stated that, "The KLA as an institutionalized
and organized army, is getting increasingly professional and ready to fight
to victory."139
In November 1998, Human Rights Watch representatives
had a meeting in Banja village near Malisevo with Hashim Thaci and Fatmir
Limaj to discuss the KLA's commitment to the laws of war generally and,
specifically, the treatment of Serbian civilians in KLA custody. The KLA
representatives informed Human Rights Watch that the KLA had a soldiers'
code of conduct but that it could not be made public. Disciplinary measures
for abusive soldiers were in place, they said, but no details were provided.
The precise size of the KLA was difficult to calculate
given its loose organization, the participation of village defense forces,
and the continual ebb and flow of Albanians from abroad. Perhaps the best
indication comes from the International Organization for Migration (IOM),
which was mandated after the war with registering and assisting former
combatants. According to the IOM, as of March 2000, it had registered 25,723
ex-combatants, although it's certainly possible that this number was inflated
by noncombatants looking for assistance.140 Some international volunteers
are known to have fought with the KLA.141
After the Drenica killings in March 1998, major
fundraising for the KLA was conducted among the Albanian diaspora communities
in Europe and the United States, with money flowing through the Homeland
Calling Fund. Various reports in the media have also linked the KLA's fundraising
to drug trafficking, money laundering, and migrant smuggling.142
Lightly armed in comparison to Serbian and Yugoslav
forces, the KLA remained a mobile guerrilla force throughout 1998 and 1999,
choosing mostly to attack police or army checkpoints or lay ambushes, and
then retreat. The only large scale offensive, an attack on Orahovac in
July 1998, failed miserably, as the government retook the town after two
days.
Throughout the conflict, the KLA engaged in military
tactics that put ethnic Albanian civilians at risk; specifically, attacking
Serbian checkpoints or patrols near ethnic Albanian villages, exposing
civilians to revenge attacks. It is a troubling fact that the 1998 and
1999 Kosovo war was marked by well-publicized massacres of civilians, such
as in Prekaz, Gornje Obrinje, and Racak, which were all turning points
in the war. All of the evidence shows that these crimes were committed
by habitually brutal Serbian and Yugoslav forces, but it is clear that
the KLA understood the political benefit of publicizing civilian deaths.
A number of top KLA officials and officers hold
important positions in post-war Kosovo. Hashim Thaci became head of the
Democratic Party of Kosovo. Agim Ceku was named head of the Kosovo Protection
Corps (Trupat e Mbrojtjes se Kosoves (TMK) in Albanian), the successor
to the KLA, where some other former KLA commanders also hold important
positions, such as Sylejman Selimi. Ramush Haridinaj left the Kosovo Protection
Corps in 2000 to form a political party, Alliance for the Future of Kosova.
Some KLA commanders and fighters have continued their military activities
in Macedonia with the National Liberation Army (Ushtria Clirimtare Kombetare).
Appendix: POST-WAR PROMOTIONS OF SERBIAN
POLICE _AND YUGOSLAV ARMY MEMBERS
On May 13,
1999, then-Serbian President Milan Milutinovic promoted Sreten Lukic (identified
as "Leader of the Headquarters of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in Pristina")
to Police General (two star). On the same occasion, then-Minister of Internal
Affairs Vlajko Stojiljkovic promoted seventy-two officers and 307 sub-officers
of the police.143
On June 7, 1999, Yugoslav President Milosevic commended
911 members of the MUP for "the suppression of terrorism in Kosovo and
defense of the country from aggression." Among those who received awards
were three generals, seventeen colonels, seventeen lieutenant colonels,
twenty majors, thirty captains, forty-five lieutenants, thirty-seven sub-lieutenants,
fifty sergeant majors, 652 noncommissioned officers and forty members of
other parts of MUP.144
Some of the leadership was honored in particular.
The Order of the Yugoslav Flag of the First Degree was awarded to Col.
Gen. Vlastimir S. Djordjevic, Col. Gen. Obrad M. Stevanovic, and Col. Gen.
Sreten D. Lukic.
The Order of the Yugoslav Flag of the Third Degree
was awarded to Col. Zivko Trajkovic, commander of the SAJ. The Order of
Merit in Matters of Defense and Security of the First Degree was awarded
to Col. Dragutin Adamovic, head of Djakovica SUP (also listed as Novi Sad
SUP) and Jr. Sgt. of the First Order Vidomir N. Salipur, who was notorious
in and around Pec for his brutality against ethnic Albanians (see Pec Municipality).
Also in June 1999, former president and "supreme
commander" Slobodan Milosevic issued a decree on promotions, decorations,
and appointments for three thousand officers, noncommissioned officers,
soldiers, and civilians serving the Yugoslav Army.145 This included giving
the Order of the National Hero to the following VJ brigades: the 125th
Motorized Brigade, the 549th Motorized Brigade, and the 37th Motorized
Brigade.
Among the notable promotions, Dragoljub Ojdanic
was promoted to General of the Army. Vladimir Lazarevic, commander of the
Pristina Corps, and Ljubisa Stojimirovic, Chief of Staff of the Third Army,
were both promoted to the rank of Major General.
"For the phenomenal successes and exceptional results
in directing and commanding over the VJ in combat for defense of the freedom
and sovereignty of the homeland against aggressors," the Order of Freedom
was awarded to General of the Army Dragoljub Ojdanic and Col. Gen. Nebojsa
Pavkovic.146
"For manifestations of bravery, determination, self-sacrifice,
discipline and responsible execution of martial tasks, in which they served
as an example to other members of their units," the Order of Bravery was
awarded to Maj. Gen. Vladimir Lazarevic, commander of the Pristina Corps.
Lazarevic also received the Order of the War Flag of the First Degree two
months prior to receiving this reward. The Order of Bravery was also given
to the following members of the Third Army:
· Bgd. Gen. Milan N. Djakovic, Member of
the Third Army
· Col. Milivoje P. Branic, Member of the
Third Army
· Col. Zoran M. Jablanovic, Member of the
Third Army
· Col. Miloje R. Miletic, Member of the Third
Army
· Col. Dragan S. Petrovic, Member of the
Third Army
· Col. Radojko M. Stefanovic, Member of the
Third Army
· Col. Veroljub J. Zivkovic, Member of the
Third Army
· Lt. Col. Simo R. Ivosevic, Member of the
Third Army
· Lt. Col. Stojan O. Konjikovac, Member of
the Third Army
· Lt. Col. Pera V. Petrovic, Member of the
Third Army
· Maj. Zoran M. Bojkovic, Member of the Third
Army
· Maj. Uros V. Nikolic, Member of the Third
Army
· Maj. Radivoje Dj. Paravinja, Member of
the Third Army
· Maj. Ljubisav D. Stojanovic, Member of
the Third Army
· Cpt. of the First Order Ljubisa S. Vucetic,
Member of the Third Army
· Cpt. of the First Order Zoran R. Raseta,
Member of the Third Army
· Cpt. of the First Order Boban R. Rajkovic,
Member of the Third Army
· Cpt. Dragan L. Lukic, Member of the Third
Army
· Cpt. Jovica L. Milak, Member of the Third
Army
· Cpt. Perica B. Nastasijevic, Member of
the Third Army
· Cpt. Milos R. Ralevic, Member of the Third
Army
· Cpt. Cedo S. Trpkovski, Member of the Third
Army
· Cpt. Sladjan D. Hristov, Member of the
Third Army
· Lt. Boban S. Kuzmanovic, Member of the
Third Army
· Lt. Nikola M. Mijatovic, Member of the
Third Army
· Sub. Lt. Nenad M. Popovic, Member of the
Third Army
· Snr. Sgt. of the First Order Radisa V.
Ilic, Member of the Third Army
· Snr. Sgt. Zeljko J. Alar, Member of the
Third Army
· Snr. Sgt. Branko N. Vukovic, Member of
the Third Army
· Sgt. Aleksandar R. Rakovic, Member of the
Third Army
· Jr. Sgt. Ivan S. Niciforovic, Member of
the Third Army
· Cor. Branislav M. Fungerhut, Member of
the Third Army
· Soldier Dragan R. Belosevic, Member of
the Third Army
· Soldier Milan M. Bogdanovic, Member of
the Third Army
· Soldier Veroljub M. Mijatovic, Member of
the Third Army
· Soldier Sasa T. Pejic, Member of the Third
Army
· Soldier Milinko M. Pendic, Member of the
Third Army
· Soldier Nikola R. Popovic, Member of the
Third Army
On July 7, 1999, another batch of MUP employees
was decorated, according to Politika,
for "outstanding results accomplished in direction of units of the police,
manifestations of bravery, determination and discipline in carrying out
security tasks by stopping terrorism in Kosovo and Metohija and in defense
of the country from aggression, in which they acted as an example to other
individuals and members of the police."147 In particular, the Order of
the National Hero was awarded to the 124th Intervention Brigade of the
Special Police Units. The Order of the Yugoslav Flag of the Third Degree
was awarded to Col. Zoran B. Simovic, former commander of the SAJ, and
Col. Zivko T. Trajkovic, commander of the SAJ. The Order of Merit in Matters
of Defense and Security of the First Degree was awarded to the following
MUP official in Kosovo:
· Col. Dragutin R. Adamovic-Djakovica SUP
· Col. Dusan B. Gavranic-Gnjilane SUP
· Col. Gradimir R. Zekavica-Prizren SUP
· Lt. Col. Milan S. Djuricic-Prizren SUP
(head of police department)
· Maj. Milenko M. Bozovic-Srbica police commander
Former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic, by
decree, appointed Bgd. Gen. Radojko Stefanovic to the post of commander
of the Pristina Corps of the Third Army of the Yugoslav Military. The man
who had been occupying this post, Maj. Gen. Vladimir Lazarevic was promoted
to the Chief of Command Headquarters of the Third Army.148
Many other members of the VJ were promoted and appointed
to new posts by decrees of President Milosevic. They included Negosav Nikolic,
commander of the Nis Corp from the Third Army, promoted to Maj. Gen., Col.
Bozidar Delic, commander of the 549th Motorized Brigade, promoted to Brigadier
General, and Col. Radojko Stefanovic, commander of the 52 Mixed Artillery
Brigade, promoted to Brigadier General.
Maj. General Ljubisa Stojimirovic was appointed
as the Chief of Staff of the First Army. The Order of the War Flag was
awarded to the following brigades:
· The 243rd Mechanized Brigade
· The 211th Armored Brigade
· The 15th Armored Brigade
President Milosevic also presented the highest possible
decorations of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia-The Order of Freedom,
The Order of the National Hero, The Order of the Yugoslav Flag, and The
Order of the War Flag of the First Degree to top commanders in Kosovo.149
The Order of Freedom was awarded to:
· General of the Army Dragoljub Ojdanic.
· Col. Gen. Nebojsa Pavkovic, Commander of
the Third Army.
The Order of the National Hero was awarded to:
· The 125th Motorized Brigade of the VJ;
accepted by commander of the Brigade, Col. Dragan Zivanovic.
· The 549th Motorized Brigade of the VJ;
accepted by commander of the Brigade, Col. Bozidar Delic.
· The 37th Motorized Brigade of the VJ; accepted
by commander of the Brigade, Col. Ljubisa Dikovic.
· The 63rd Parachuting Brigade of the VJ;
accepted by commander of the Brigade, Lt. Col. Ilija Todorov.
· The 124th Intervention Brigade of the Police;
accepted by commander of the Brigade, Col. Zarko Brankovic.
The Order of the Yugoslav Flag was awarded to:
· Zoran Andjelkovic, President of the Temporary
Executive Council of Kosovo and Metohija
· Nikola Sainovic Deputy Prime Minister of
the Yugoslav Government
· Col. Gen. of the Police Vlastimir Djordjevic.
· Maj. Gen. of the Police Obrad Stevanovic.
· Maj. Gen. of the Police Sreten Lukic.
On May 13, 2000, Security Day, President Milosevic
decorated 135 members of the MUP. Decoration of the Yugoslav Flag First
Class was given to Vlajko Stojiljkovic, Serbian minister of internal affairs,
and Col. Gen. Radomir Markovic, assistant to the minister and chief of
state security.150
1 For an indication of the diversity
of Serbian and Yugoslav forces, see the Military Technical Agreement signed
between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the Governments of
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia on June 9,
1999. The agreement says that "FRY forces" refers to: "regular army and
naval forces, armed civilian groups, associated paramilitary groups, air
forces, national guards, border police, army reserves, military police,
intelligence services, federal and Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs
local, special, riot and anti-terrorist police, and any other groups or
individuals so designated by the international security force ("KFOR")
commander."
2 Photographs of members of security
forces obtained by Human Rights Watch show that government troops often
wore colored ribbons on their arms. Countless witness statements also describe
this. The ribbons may have served to identify units engaged in particular
operations or to reduce the possibility of KLA infiltration.
3 Human Rights Watch interview, name
and place witheld, July 19, 1999.
4 Human Rights Watch interview with
R.N., Cegrane, Macedonia, May 18, 1999.
5 After the change in Serbian and
Yugoslav governments in late 2000, Serbian courts began to try some VJ
soldiers for crimes committed in Kosovo during the war. See "The Work of
the War Crimes Tribunal."
6 In mid-December, 2000, Kertes gave
an interview to Nedeljni Telegraf,
in which he admitted providing funds to the ruling parties, as well as
to the army and the police (see
Danijela Bogunovic, "They Always Asked! More for More!," Nedeljni
Telegraf, December 13, 2000). He was arrested
two days later and charged with embezzling $2 million and $700,000 in separate
cases (see
"Serbia Police Seize Milosevic Ally," Associated Press, December 15, 2000).
7
Beta, April 9, 1998. Commander of the Yugoslav
Third Army Gen. Nebojsa Pavkovic, with responsibility for Kosovo, later
defended the killings in Drenica by calling them "the liquidation of a
few members, a consequence." See General Pavkovic's interview with Frontline,
available at: www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/_interviews/pavkovic.html,
(March 20, 2001).
8 Momicilo Perisic was Chief of the
VJ General Staff from August 1993 to November 1998, during which time he
commanded the VJ and is believed to have remained in close contact with
his Serbian counterparts in the Republika Srpska Krajina and the Republika
Srpska.
From 1990 to 1991, Perisic
was commander of the Yugoslav National Army's (JNA) artillery school in
Zadar, Croatia. Thereafter, he became chief of staff of the JNA's newly
formed Bileca Corps and commanded that Corps until 1992. In 1992, he became
chief of staff and deputy commander of the 3rd Army. In August 1993, he
was promoted to Colonel General and appointed VJ Chief of Staff, replacing
Zivota Panic.
In 1997, Perisic was tried in absentia
by a Zadar court and sentenced to twenty years in prison for war crimes
and atrocities allegedly committed during the VJ attack on Zadar. In January
2001, Perisic was appointed a Deputy Prime Minister of the new Serbian
government, prompting a protest from the Croatian Foreign Minsitry.
9 In addition to extensive witness
testimony collected by Human Rights Watch, the extent of the cooperation
between MUP and VJ was reflected in a Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs
statement released after the war regarding a meeting of the MUP and VJ
leadership:
The extremely successful and efficient
cooperation during the previous period was emphasized, particularly regarding
the fight against Albanians separatists and terrorists in Kosovo and Metohija,
as well as special unity between the Yugoslav Army and the police forces
in the defense from NATO aggression. (Announcement, MUP website, April
10, 2000.)
10 OSCE/ODIHR, Kosovo/Kosova:
As Seen, As Told, Part I, p. 21.
11 Constitution of the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, articles 135 and 136.
12 FreeB92 News, November 1, 2000.
13 Although there is no express provision
in the Yugoslav constitution or any federal law that SDC decisions must
be unanimous, this interpretation has been generally accepted and follows
from the provisions of the Yugoslav constitution, in particular Article
1, which defines the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia as a sovereign state
founded on the equality of citizens and the equality
of the constituent republics (emphasis added).
The SDC rules of procedure are not public.
14 "Djukanovic: Milosevic not Supreme
Commander," Radio B92, March 16, 1999.
15 Ojdanic replaced Col. Gen Momcilo
Perisic on November 3, 1998. He retired from military service on December
30, 2000.
16 "Three Thousand Officers, Non-Commissioned
Officers, Soldiers and Civilians Employed in the Services of the VJ," Politika,
June 16, 1999.
17 According to the United Kingdom
Ministry of Defence, the chief of the VJ's counter intelligence service
was Col. Gen. Geza Farkas. See www.mod.uk/news/kosovo/_yugoforces.htm,
April 20, 2001.
18 The First Army was commanded by
General Srboljub Trajkovic. At the outset of the NATO bombing, the Second
Army was commanded by General Radosav Martinovic. He was replaced by Colonel
General Milorad N. Obradovic just after the start of the air strikes and
subsequently placed on pension.
19 See the following for more information:
the website of the Federation of American Scientists (www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/kosovo.htm,
March 20, 2001), the United Kingdom's Ministry of Defense website (www.kosovo.mod.uk/,
March 20, 2001), and the Jane's Defense Weekly website (www.janes.com/regional_news/europe/news/_kosovo/jwa990401_01_n.shtml,
March 20, 2001), as well as a report by the International Crisis Group,
Reality Demands,
June 2000.
20 Ibid.
21 See Jane's World Armies at www.janes.com/regional_news/europe/news/kosovo/_jwa990401_01_n.shtml,
March 2001.
22 Zoran Miladinovic, "Always Among
the Prominent," Vojska,
October 29, 1998. Cirkovic was also the commander of the Kosovski Junaci
barracks in Pristina. B.K., "Dedication to the Call," Vojska,
November 5, 1998. Cirkovic was also publicly named as commander of the
15th Armored Brigade by the U.S. State Department on April 7, 1999.
23 A June 25, 1998, article in Vojska
(Vladica Krstic, "Write a Letter, Soldier,") said that Zivanovic was scheduled
to replace Col. Srba Zdravkovic. Zivanovic was also publicly named as commander
of the 125th Motorized Brigade by the U.S. State Department on April 7,
1999. An armored mechanized unit based in the Vojvoda Petar Bojovic barracks
in Pec belonged to the brigade under the command of Major Milicko Jankovic.
Ljiljana Bascarevic, "The Harmony Between Knowledge and Experience," Vojska,
October 22, 1998.
24 Zoran Miladinovic, "Care for the
Soldiers is the Priority,"Vojska,
November 12, 1998, refers on page nineteen to the "motorized unit of Pristina
Corps, from Prizren, under the command of Bozidar Delic." According to
the article, the unit "conducts complex tasks of securing the frontier,
control of communications in the border area. . . . Since the beginning
of the conflict in Kosovo and Metohija, the unit has had many clashes with
terrorist bands which have tried to penetrate our country from the territory
of the Republic of Albania." Delic was also publicly named as commander
of the 549th Mechanized Brigade by the U.S. State Department on April 7,
1999.
25 Jelic was publicly named as commander
of the 243rd Mechanized Brigade by the U.S. State Department on April 7,
1999.
26 "Human Factor Makes No Mistakes,"
Vojska, September
10, 1998. This is one of three artillery brigades in the Third Army, with
others in Aleksinac and Vranje. It was based in Gnjilane in the Knez Lazar
barracks. Stefanovic was also publicly named as commander of the 52nd Mixed
Artillery Brigade by the U.S. State Department on April 7, 1999. The State
Department also identified Col. Milos Djosan as commander of the 52nd Light
Air Defense Artillery-Rocket Regiment, based in Djakovica.
27 Zoran Miladinovic, "Right Fighters
at the Right Place," Vojska,
May 7/14, 1998. Pekovic was also publicly named as commander of the 52nd
Military Police Battalion by the U.S. State Department on April 7, 1999.
According to Vojska,
the Military Police of the Pristina Corps have a special antiterrorist
unit, commanded by Second Lieutenant Milija Vukanic. Zoran Miladinovic,
"Terrorists Have No Chance," Vojska,
May 7/14, 1998, and Branko Kopunovic, "People Who Pass Their Shadow," Vojska,
May 7/14, 1998.
28 According to a researcher on the
VJ at Belgrade's Institute of Contemporary History, one of the VJ's two
fighter regiments (Lovacki Puk) at Pristina's Slatina airport consisted
of two squadrons of MIG-21 planes. "Units Filled to the Maximum,"
Nasa Borba, May 4, 1998.
29 "Decrees on Promotions and Appointments,"
Vojska, December
31, 1998, and January 7, 1999.
30 Zoran Miladinovic, "In Challenge
You See a Hero," Vojska,
October 8, 1998. Mirko Starcevic's position in the Third Army was also
evident by his appearance at a press conference in Pristina on April 24,
1998, when he informed journalists about recent attacks on the army near
the border with Albania. He was presented as "a representative of the Yugoslav
Army Corps in Pristina."
31 "Decrees on Promotions and Appointments,"
Vojska, December
31, 1998 and January 7, 1999.
32 "General Stojimirovic Vows to
Defend FRY," Tanjug, March 26, 1999.
33 "General: Kosovars Have `Nothing
But Praise' for Serb Army," Beta, July 17, 1999.
34 In a letter published on August
24, 1999, in Blic,
these "generals of the Yugoslav Army's Third Army," together with Vladimir
Lazarevic, countered claims that they had threatened some members of Serbia's
political opposition. Reported by Radio B2-92, August 24, 1999.
35 United Kingdom Ministry of Defense
website, www.kosovo.mod.uk/, accessed March 2001.
36 R. Jeffrey Smith and Dana Priest,
"Yugoslav Eviction Operation `Basically Done'; Government Forces in Kosovo
Digging In For an Extended Stay," Washington
Post, May 11, 1999.
37 Branko Kopunovic, "With Sword
and Shield," Vojska,
April 23, 1998, and "Who are the New Generals," Vojska,
January 22, 1998, which describes Stojimirovic as having been the commander
of the Corps' motorized brigade and then its chief of staff before becoming
overall commander.
38 "Decrees on Promotions and Appointments,
Vojska, December
31, 1998 and January 7, 1999. Stojimirovic replaced Major General Miodrag
Simic. Zoran Miladinovic, "Well Based Confidence of the People," Vojska,
January 15, 1998, and Zoran Miladinovic, "Practical Modes of Training,"
Vojska, January
15, 1998. See also,
"General Stojimirovic Vows to Defend FRY," Tanjug, March 26, 1999.
39 Branko Kopunovic, "With Sword
and Shield," Vojska,
April 23, 1998.
40 "The War That We Were Involved
in Was the Most Unequal War Ever Known," Politika,
November 27-30, 1999. Evidence that the 63rd Parachutist Brigade was active
in Kosovo comes from various sources. On October 15, 1999, President Milosevic
awarded the 63rd Parachutist Brigade with the Order of the National Hero,
which was accepted by Lieutenant Colonel Todorov. In his acceptance speech,
Todorov said that his forces has lost many men "in the defense of Yugoslavia
from European and domestic forces, and in the fight against Shiptar (a
pejorative term for Albanians) terrorists in the year 1998 and in the defense
of the last defensive war." Politika,
October 15, 1999. In addition, a colonel from the 63rd Parachutist Brigade,
Goran Ostojic, was reported to have died in August 1998 after being sent
"to the front." Srboljub Bogdanovic and Daniel Bukumirovic, "Special Upbringing,"
Evropljanin, August 27, 1998. Lastly, in a October
1998 speech, former Chief of the VJ General Staff Momcilo Perisic said:
"I congratulate the soldiers, sub-officers, officers, and civilians in
the service of the 63rd Parachute Brigade of the Special Forces Corps.
. . . In complex circumstances, remaining faithful to the traditions of
parachuting and keeping the pride of the profession, you have shown how
the motherland is to be protected and preserved. With professional responsibility
and readiness to withstand all efforts, in the best possible manner you
have confirmed the status of an elite unit of the Yugoslav Army." "They
Confirm the Sattus of an Elite VJ Unit," Vojska,
October 15, 1998.
41 B. Kopunovic, "When `Otters' Fly
with Falcons," Vojska,
May 7/14, 1998. The article also says that, among the members of the 72nd
Brigade are "the popular and well known Falcons [Sokolovi]."
42 Federation of American Scientists
website, www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/kosovo._htm, (March 2001).
43 Branko Kopunovic, "People Who
Pass Shadows," Vojska,
May 7/14, 1998.
44
Vecernje Novosti, June 30, 1999.
45 Republic of Serbia, Autonomous
Province of Vojvodina, Kovacica District, Department of General Management
and Public Service, Local Office of Debeljaca, Number III-111/99-05, March
26, 1999, 2621 Debeljaca.
46 Maggie O'Kane, "Kosovo `Cleaner'
Tells How Villages Were Emptied," Guardian
(London), April 27, 1999.
47 Ibid.
48
Frontline, Public Broadcasting System, available
at: http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/_frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/pavkovic.html,
(March 20, 2001).
49 Ibid.
50 U.S. Department of State, Press
Statement by James P. Rubin, Spokesman, April 7, 1999, "Responsibility
of Individual Yugoslav Army and Ministry Of Internal Affairs Commanders
for Crimes Committed By Forces Under Their Command in Kosovo." The other
named commanders were: Major General Vladimir Lazarevic, Commander, Pristina
Corps; Colonel Mladen Cirkovic, Commander, 15th Armored Brigade, HQ Pristina;
Colonel Dragan Zivanovic, Commander, 125th Motorized Brigade, HQ Kosovska
Mitrovica and Pec; Colonel Krsman Jelic, Commander, 243rd Mechanized Brigade,
HQ Urosevac; Colonel Bozidar Delic, Commander, 549th Motorized Brigade,
HQ Prizren and Djakovica; Colonel Radojko Stefanovic, Commander, 52nd Mixed
Artillery Brigade, HQ Gnjilane; Colonel Milos Djosan, Commander, 52nd Light
Air Defense Artillery-Rocket Regiment, HQ Djakovica; and Major Zeljko Pekovic,
Commander, 52nd Military Police Battalion, HQ, Pristina.
51 Jane's World Armies (www.janes.com/defense/news/kosovo/jwa990401_01_n.shtml/,
March 2001.)
52 "The Yugoslav Army's Third Army
Commander Lieutenant General Nebojsa Pavkovic: Kosmet is not Lost," Vojska,
June 16, 1999.
53 For details on the MUP, see its
website, also in English, at www.mup.sr.gov.yu/_domino/mup.nsf/pages/index-e,
(March 20, 2001).
54 On February 7, 2001, Sokolovic
was found dead in his car in Zajecar, Serbia, with a bullet wound to his
head. Initial autopsy reports concluded the death was a suicide. "Solokovic
Postmortem Indicates Suicide," Radio B92, February 8, 2001.
55 The Indictment of Milosevic et
al., Case IT-99-37-I, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
May 24, 1999.
56 For details on the Draskovic incident,
see Human Rights Watch report, "Curtailing Political Dissent: Serbia's
Campaign of Violence and Harassment Against Government Critics," April
2000.
57 Milanka Ivezic, "Successfully,
Professionally, Responsibly, and with Discipline," Policajac,
No. 4/97, April 1997, "Appointments and Assignments in the Ministry," Policajac,
No. 4/97, April 1997, and Filip Svarm, "Go to Kosovo," Vreme,
March 28, 1998.
58 Svarm, "Go to Kosovo," and the
Federation of American Scientists website: www.fas.org/man/dod-101/ops/kosovo.htm,
accessed March 2001.
59 United Kingdom, Ministry of Defense,
www.kosovo.mod.uk/mupstruct.htm, accessed March 2001.
60 Dejan Anastasijevic, "How the
Police Renounced Slobodan Milosevic," Vreme,
October 19, 2000.
61 "SAJ Belgrade Won First," Policajac,
No. 6/97, June 1997.
62 Gradisa Katic, "They Train for
Years for an Operation That Takes Several Seconds," Blic,
March 15, 1998, which reports that the SAJ took part in the March 1998
attack on Donji Prekaz, along with the PJP and regular police.
63 Prior to this, Lukic was assistant
chief of police in Belgrade. On August 2, 1997, he accompanied Serbian
Minister of Internal Affairs Vlajko Stojiljkovic on a visit to the SAJ
in Belgrade. "Adroitness, Skillfulness and Professionalism," Policajac,
No. 9/97, August 1997.
64 "Sreten Lukic Promoted to the
Rank of Two-Star General of the Police," Politika,
May 13, 1999.
65 Milan and Sredoje Lukic have been
charged, together with Mitar Vasiljevic, for the mass murder of approximately
135 Bosnian Muslims around the eastern Bosnian town of Visegrad between
May 1992 and October 1994.
66
See Chuck Sudetic, "The Reluctant Gendarme,"
Atlantic Monthly,
April 2000.
67 What's New: Foreign Diplomats
Visit Kosovo and Metohija, MUP website (March 20, 2001).
68 Tom Walker, "Belgrade Pledges
to Wipe Out `Terrorists' in Kosovo,"
Times (London), June 11, 1998.
69 What's New: Foreign Diplomats
Visit Kosovo and Metohija, MUP website (March 20, 2001).
70
See Human Rights Watch,
Humanitarian Law Violations in Kosovo, October
1998.
71 KDOM, Daily Report for August
21, 1998.
72 R. Jeffrey Smith, "Taps Reveal
Coverup of Kosovo Massacre," Washington
Post, January 28, 1999.
73 Dejan Anastasijevic, "How the
Police Renounced Slobodan Milosevic," Vreme,
October 19, 2000.
74
See "Serbian Government Promotes Rights Abuser:
New Interior Ministry Appointee Commanded Police in Kosovo," Human Rights
Watch press release, February 2, 2001.
75 Z. Miladinovic, "Gift From the
People," Vojska,
No. 331, December 10, 1998.
76 M. Manic and S. Kovacevic, "Will
and Readiness to Carry Out All Security Tasks," Policajac,
No. 18/98, October 1998.
77 "Everything Binds Us to This Land,"
Policajac,
No. 18/98, October 1998.
78 "We Are Doing the Best We Can,"
Policajac,
No. 4/97, April 1997.
79 "In Complex Security Circumstances,
They Fulfill Their Obligations With Success," Policajac,
No. 3/98, February 1998. Col. Zekavica was awarded the Order of Merit in
Matters of Defense and Security of the First Degree on July 7, 1999 (see
"Examples of Heroism and Patriotism," Politika,
July 11, 1999).
80 "At New Duties," Policajac,
No. 1/99, January 1999.
81 "Confidence Arrived Through Work
and Good Results," Policajac,
No. 3/98, February 1998.
82 "Good and Alert," Policajac,
No. 8/98, April 1998.
83 "Ability to Persevere in the Fight
Between Good and Evil," Policajac,
No. 8/98, April 1998.
84 "At New Duties," Policajac.
85
See Human Rights Watch, A
Week of Terror in Drenica, February 1999.
86 "Policeman Milan Tenic Killed,"
Policajac,
No. 8/98, April 1998.
87 Milanki Mijatov, "We Are Capable
of More and Better," Policajac,
No. 4/99, February 1999, and Dejan Anastasijevic, "Bloody Weekend in Drenica,"
Vreme, March
7, 1998.
88 See "Justice for Kosovo" on the
American RadioWorks website: www._americanradioworks.org, (March 20, 2001).
89 Gajic was with Sreten Lukic for
the meeting with foreign diplomats in Pec on June 7, 1999. According to
one press account, after the public affairs debacle in March 1998, when
Albanian families were massacred in Drenica, Gajic was appointed to oversee
security in the western region of Kosovo during the spring offensive. Tom
Walker, "Belgrade Pledges to Wipe Out `Terrorists' in Kosovo," The
Times (London), June 11, 1998.
90 United Kingdom, Ministry of Defense,
www.kosovo.mod.uk/mupstruct.htm, (March 20, 2001).
91 Dejan Anastasijevic, "The Boys
From Brazil," Vreme,
October 19, 2000, and "How the Police Renounced Slobodan Milosevic," Vreme,
October 19, 2000; Robert Block and Matthew Kaminski, "Was Serbian Revolt
the People's Alone?" Wall Street Journal,
October 23, 2000.
92
See VIP Report 1975, February 28, 2001, which
cites the newspaper Vecernje Novosti,
as well as the VIP Report from May 7, 2001. Milorad Ulemek's (or Lukovic's)
nickname "Legija" has also caused confusion because there are at least
two other men known as "Legija" in Serbia's paramilitary structures.
93 Human Rights Watch interview with
J.J., Belgrade, Yugoslavia, November 2, 1998.
94 Human Rights Watch interview with
VJ soldier, Decan, Kosovo, September 24, 1998.
95 United Kingdom, Ministry of Defense,
www.kosovo.mod.uk/mupstruct.htm, March 20, 2001.
96 Srboljub Bogdanovic and Daniel
Bukumirovic, "Special Upbringing," Evropljanin,
August 27, 1998, and Filip Svarm, "Go To Kosovo," Vreme,
March 28, 1998.
97 Anastasijevic, "The Boys from
Brazil."
98 See, for example, Zoran B. Mijatovic,
"How the SPS and JUL Destroyed the State Security Service," Nedeljni
Telegraf, November 8, 2000.
99 Andrew Purvis and Dejan Anastasijevic,
"The Bloody Red Berets," Time.com, March 12, 2001.
100 VIP Report, May 7, 2001.
101 Ibid.
102 United Kingom, Ministry of Defense,
www.kosovo.mod.uk/mupstruct.htm, March 20, 2001.
103 See "Justice for Kosovo," American
RadioWorks website.
104
Vecernje Novosti, June 30, 1999.
105 Arkan's Tigers were also known
as the Serb Volunteer Guard. They were founded by Zeljko Raznatovic ("Arkan"),
who was indicted by the ICTY on September 30, 1997, for crimes in Bosnia.
He was killed by gunmen in a Belgrade hotel in January 2000.
106 The White Eagles were a paramilitary
formation under the command of Vojislav Seselj, a deputy prime minister
in the Serbian government and head of the Serbian Radical Party.
107 According to the OSCE, the Republika
Srpska Delta Force came from the Ministry of Internal Affairs of the Republika
Srpska. See OSCE/ODIHR, Kosovo/Kosova:
As Seen, As Told, Part I. p. 24.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid.
110 Human Rights Watch interview
with M.J., Dobratin, Kosovo, July 13, 1999.
111 Philip Sherwell, "Focus the Ethnic
Cleansing Business: "We Didn't Rape or Kill Enough._. . ," Sunday
Telegraph (London), June 27, 1999.
112 James M. Dorsey "Death Factory:
For These Serbs, Ethnic Cleansing Was a Business Proposition,"
Wall Street Journal Europe, August 31, 1999.
113 Jack Kelley, "Remorseless Troops
Tell About Pillaging Kosovo," USA Today,
July 22, 1999.
114 See "Justice for Kosovo," American
RadioWorks website.
115 Ibid.
116 Humanitarian Law Center,
Kosovo Roma: Targets of Abuse and Violence, March 24-September 1, 1999,
1999.
117 See the following: Roy Gutman,
"Russian `Volunteers' Allegedly Helped Serbs," Newsday,
June 22, 1999; Maggie O'Kane, "Russian Soldiers' Peace Role Gives Refugees
Chills," Guardian (London),
June 24, 1999; "Retour des Russes sous l'habit de la KFOR: Tusus n'y croit
pas," France 3 Infos, June 21, 1999.
118 Ron Ben-Yishay, "The Israeli
Soldiers of the Serb Army," Tel Aviv
Yedi'ot Aharonot, June 11, 1999.
119 "Danish Mercenary Set Free With
Charges," Agence France Presse,
August 31, 1999.
120 Sainovic chaired the commission
for cooperation with the OSCE's KVM mission and was a member of the Serbian
delegation at the Rambouillet talks in February 1999. On May 11, 2001,
the Yugoslav parliament voted to lift the immunity of Sainovic and Jovan
Zebic, both former Yugoslav Deputy Prime Ministers. Sainovic and Zebic
are wanted by the Belgrade District Court to answer charges that they abused
their official position to help President Milosevic siphon off state funds.
121 Statute of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Adopted May 25, 1993, amended
May 13, 1998. Articles two through five of the statute list the punishable
crimes: Grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, violations of
the laws or customs of war, genocide, and crimes against humanity (such
as murder, deportation, torture, and rape).
122 In a January 16, 2001, interview
with Belgrade's Radio B92, General Pavkovic was asked directly about civilian
casualties and mass graves in Kosovo. He answered: "The thing I do know
is that the Army firmly observed all the terms of the Geneva Convention
and the international agreements." When asked "How about war crimes?" Pavkovic
responded, "I am not aware of any such thing." See http://www.b92.net/intervju/eng/_2001/0116.phtml,
April 28, 2001.
123 March 26, 1999, Announcement,
MUP website, March 20, 2001.
124 May 4, 1999, Announcement, MUP
website, March 20, 2001.
125 See www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/kosovo/interviews/pavkovic.html
(March 20, 2001).
126 Radio B92 interview with Gen.
Nebojsa Pavkovic, available at http://www.b92.net/_intervju/eng/2001/0116.phtml,
April 22, 2001.
127 The police records were left
behind in Pec district offices and were viewed by Human Rights Watch in
July 1999.
128 See "Justice for Kosovo," American
RadioWorks website.
129 In 2001, the new Serbian government
and the VJ began prosecuting some cases. See Work of the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.
130 Dusan Stojanovic, "Milosevic
Makes Public Appearance," Associated Press, November 25, 2000.
131 Members of the Security Organs
and Services on the Security Day May 13, MUP website, (March 20, 2001).
132 "Humanitarian Law Center Director's
letter to the Yugoslav Army's General Staff," Danas,
August 21, 2000.
133 In 1998, a splinter group tried
to form a parallel fighting force: FARK-Forcave Armatosure e Republikes
e Kosovos (Armed Forces of the Republic of Kosova), under the command of
Bujar Bukoshi, prime minister of the self-proclaimed Kosovo government.
FARK was disbanded and, by March 1999, its members were fighting alongside
the KLA.
134 The British press published unconfirmed
reports in October 1999 that Ceku was under investigation by the war crimes
tribunal for crimes committed by Croatian Army forces against ethnic Serbs
in 1993. The tribunal neither confirmed nor denied the speculation, in
accordance with its policy of not commenting on investigations. See, "Kosovo
Commander Denies War Crimes in Croatia," Agence France Presse, October
12, 1999.
135 Other members of the KLA's General
Staff included Jakup Krasniqi, Azem Syla, Xhavit Haliti, Rame Buja, and
Sokol Bashota, all in the political directorate, as well as Fatmir Limaj
and Rexhep Selimi.
136 Rexha was gunned down by unknown
assailants in front of his home in Prizren on May 8, 2000.
137 For details on some of the KLA
personalities, see reports by the International Crisis Group, Critical
Implementation Issues and a "Who's Who" of Key Players,
March 1999, Who's Who in Kosovo,
August 1999, and What Happened to the
KLA?, March 2000. See also Zoran Kusovac, "The
KLA: Braced to Defend and Control," Jane's
Intelligence Review, April 7, 1999.
138
Koha Ditore, July 12, 1998.
139 KLA Communique Nr. 51, as published
in Koha Ditore,
August 26, 1998.
140 "Kosovo Reintegration Efforts
are Bearing Fruits," IOM release, March 16, 2000.
141 The demilitarization agreement
signed by the KLA on June 20, 1999, tended to confirm that non-Kosovo Albanians
had participated in the KLA. Point 23(e) stipulated the withdrawal from
Kosovo of "all UCK personnel, who are not of local origin, whether or not
they are legally within Kosovo, including individual advisors, freedom
fighters, trainers, volunteers, and personnel from neighboring and other
States." (The "Undertaking of Demilitarization and Transformation by the
UCK" is available at www.kforonline.com/resources/documents/uck.htm, March
20, 2001.)
142 For details, see, Roger Boyes
and Eske Wright, "Drugs Money Linked to the Kosovo Rebels," The
Times (London), March 24, 1999; Frank Viviano,
"Separatists Supporting Themselves with Traffic in Narcotics," San
Francisco Chronicle, June 10, 1994; "Speculation
Plentiful, Facts Few About Kosovo Separatist Group," Baltimore
Sun, March 6, 1998; Zoran Kusovac, "Another
Balkans Bloodbath?-Part One, Jane's Intelligence
Review, February 1, 1998; "TV report says Kosovo
Albanians involved in Illegal Business in Germany," BBC Worldwide Monitoring,
AND news agency, Berlin, June 28, 1999.
143 "Sreten Lukic Promoted to the
Rank of Two-Star General of the Police," Politika,
May 13, 1999. See also the MUP website.
144 "Awards for the Defense of the
Homeland," Policajac,
July 1999.
145 "Three Thousand Officers, Non-commissioned
Officers, Soldiers and Civilians Employed in the Services of the VJ," Politika,
June 16, 1999.
146 Ibid.
147 "Examples of Heroism and Patriotism,"
Politika,
July 11, 1999. See also the MUP website. There Djordjevic is called a Lieutenant
General, Stavanovic is a Major General, and Lukic is a Major General.
148 "Radojko Stefanovic New Commander
of the Pristina Corps," Hronika,
December 30, 1999.
149 "The War That We Were Involved
in Was the Most Unequal War Ever Known," Politika,
November 27-30, 1999.
150 May 13, 2000 Announcement, MUP
website (March 20, 2001).
151 July 5, 2000, Announcement, MUP
website (March 20, 2001).
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