V. CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

After March 1995, high-level Chinese officials logged considerable mileage traveling to the Russian Federation and to two former Soviet republics, Belarus and the Ukraine. All three countries were to be 1996 commission members, Belarus for the first time, and the Ukraine for the first time since 1990.

In 1995, after Russia helped to defeat a no-action motion, its delegates switched their vote and the resolution itself failed as a result. It seemed logical in 1996, that if China were to avoid another near embarrassment, it would have to guarantee Russia's vote on the no-action motion itself. Not since 1990 had Russia voted not to send a resolution to the floor. Furthermore, it was generally agreed that the Belarussian president, anxious for reunification with Russia, would vote with Russia. Of course China had other political and economic stakes in its relations with Central and Eastern Europe that may have been the driving force behind much of the activity outlined below; but with the Geneva vote so important to Beijing, lining up commission members was a likely factor.

In June 1995, Li Peng visited all three states. During his visit to Belarus, there was agreement on bilateral cooperation in trade, science, technology, manufacturing, and agriculture. In the Ukraine, he signed a note worth 8.5 million renminbi (approximately US$1.7 million) in economic assistance. In August, as a follow-up to the June visits, the vice-minister of the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic Cooperation (MOFTEC) led a trade delegation to the region.

The direction of the visits reversed in September when the vice-prime minister of Russia went to Beijing, followed in November by a vice-minister from the Belarussian Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, and in December by the Ukrainian president. During a meeting with Jiang Zemin, the two signed a joint communiqué furthering bilateral economic and political cooperation. In April 1996 while the Human Rights Commission was in session, Qiao Shi, chairman of Standing Committee of China's National People's Congress (parliament), traveled to Moscow to meet with top Russian officials in preparation for meetings later in the month with three central Asian republics. That same month, China exchanged ministerial visits with both Belarus and the Ukraine. At the invitation of Qian Qichen, the Belarussian foreign minister traveled to Beijing. During a meeting with Li Peng, he thanked him for China's support of Belarus on international issues and described as "encouraging" the 60 percent growth in bilateral trade in 1995. Qiao Shi traveled to the Ukraine for a four-day visit aimed at expanding cooperation between the two countries. Shipbuilding, aircraft manufacturing and instrument products were cited as industries for cooperation.

In the wake of all this activity, Russia abstained and Belarus and Ukraine voted with China in favor of no action on the resolution at the 1996 commission session. Two days after the vote, President Boris Yeltsin was warmly welcomed in Beijing by Jiang Zemin, Li Peng, and Qiao Shi. The major accomplishments of the meetings included an agreement signed by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan strengthening border confidence, a Sino-Russian joint communiqué to serve as "the principled basis for the two countries' constructive partnership during the 21st century"11 and a dozen cooperation agreements, including ones on intellectual property rights, cooperation on the peaceful use of nuclear energy, and development for mutual prosperity. In addition, representatives from both countries discussed cooperation on military technologies. By December 1996, when Li Peng visited Moscow, plans were being laid for an April 1997 summit on security. At the same time, Russia agreed to lend China US$2.5 billion for nuclear power plant construction and to sell arms to Beijing. And Li and Viktor Chernomyrdin discussed raising bilateral trade volume and cooperation on large-scale projects.

In November, the Belarussian president told Li Lanqing during his visit to Minsk that improving Belarus-Chinese relations was of strategic importance to Belarus, adding that he attached great importance to developing bilateral trade and that he welcomed Chinese entrepreneurs willing to invest in Belarus. The following month, the acting prime minister of Belarus attended a signing ceremony in Beijing for agreements on educational cooperation and on ensuring the quality of exported and imported goods.

A well-documented effort by the Chinese government to gain support in the commission from central European countries began before the 1994 vote. Poland, to the surprise of delegation members themselves, members of Parliament, and local human rights groups, abstained from voting on the no-action resolution instead of voting against it as it had the year before. Instructions from the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs had arrived just before the actual vote took place. China had reportedly agreed to support Poland's effort to gain a seat in the Security Council in exchange for the absention. A representative of the ministry later explained to the Polish parliament that the vote had come about as a result of a "mistake" by a junior official.

In 1995, Li Peng wrote to Polish Prime Minister Pawlak to thank him for his support in Geneva in 1994 and asked for "even more substantial support in 1995." The offer to promote a Security Council seat was reiterated. After the main Warsaw newspaper publicized the "vote trade" and media pressure mounted, Poland's vote against the no-action resolution helped to defeat it.

Two other Central European countries on the 1997 commission have received more attention from the U.S. and Europe than from China, and the commission votes may reflect this. With the exception of 1992 when itabstained, Bulgaria has voted against China on the no-action motion, and the Czech Republic, back on the commission after a hiatus of three years, would be unlikely to succumb to Chinese pressure.