HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH

U.S. Proposal for a Darfur Tribunal: Not an Effective Option to Ensure Justice

A U.N. Commission of Inquiry that the United States helped create recently found that the International Criminal Court (ICC) is the “single best mechanism” and the “only credible way” of ensuring justice for Darfur’s victims. The U.N. Commission of Inquiry also detailed in depth in its report why other mechanisms would be inadvisable to bring justice for atrocities in Darfur. (See U.N. Commission of Inquiry on Why Alternatives to the ICC Are Inadvisable for Darfur for relevant excerpts from the report.) Because Sudan is not a party to the treaty establishing the ICC, a Security Council referral is needed for the court to prosecute crimes committed in Darfur.

Ignoring the commission’s strong recommendation that the Security Council immediately refer the situation in Darfur to the ICC, Washington has indicated that it opposes a Security Council referral because it does not “want to be party to legitimizing the ICC.” Instead it has proposed a new tribunal based in Tanzania administered by the United Nations and the African Union. The U.S. proposal may sound attractive on its face, with emphasis on encouraging “African ownership” and using an infrastructure “already in place” at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda to “begin operating quickly.” However, upon closer scrutiny, the U.S. proposal for a new tribunal for Darfur simply does not present a viable option to effectively handle the challenges of ensuring justice for crimes committed in Darfur.  
 
The U.S. Proposal Spells Delay, and Delay Means Death  
The U.S. proposal states that its tribunal for Darfur could “begin operations without delay” because it would share physical infrastructure with the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR). However, setting up the tribunal would likely take a long time and create unnecessary delay. This would undermine the deterrent effect of prosecutions and likely lead to more lives being lost.  
 
1. Setting up a new tribunal requires a lot more than physical infrastructure.  
 
2. In reality, the ICTR doesn’t have infrastructure to spare.  
 
3. By contrast, the ICC could open investigations relatively quickly and efficiently.  
 
The U.S. Proposal Would Lack the Necessary Permanence to Outlast Obstruction  
The U.S. proposal for a new tribunal for Darfur would lack the staying power to withstand predictable non-cooperation by the Sudanese government in the hopes of running out the tribunal’s clock.  
 
1. Ad hoc tribunals are, by their nature, temporary.  
 
2. Their time-limited nature creates an incentive for non-cooperation.  
 
3. Demonstrated staying power is essential for maximizing the deterrent effect of any justice institution assigned responsibility for Darfur.  
 
4. The ICC is here to stay.  
 
The U.S. Proposal Would Mean Needless Expense for a Weaker Result  
The U.S. proposal argues that it does not see a significant difference in cost between its proposal and referral, and that the proposed court may even be less costly. However, ICC prosecutions are unlikely to come anywhere near the estimated cost of the U.S. proposal.  
 
1. The U.S. proposal for a new tribunal for Darfur is likely to cost far more than the ICC.  
 
2. The U.S. wants countries that already pay for the ICC – a capable and far preferable option – to share the cost for the U.S. proposed tribunal.  
 
The U.S. Proposal is a Far Cry from being the “African Alternative”  
The U.S. proposal says that its tribunal would be “more appropriate” than referral to the ICC as it “takes full account of and reinforces” the African Union (AU) role in addressing the Darfur conflict. This is misleading and inaccurate.  
 
1. The ICC has widespread support in Africa.  
 
2. The AU is unlikely to support the U.S. proposal.  
 
3. There are real questions about the legitimacy of the U.S. proposed new tribunal for Darfur.  
 
The Proposed Temporal Jurisdiction for the U.S. Tribunal Offers No Significant Advantage  
The United States argues that its tribunal would be preferable because serious crimes were committed in Darfur prior to July 1, 2002 – when the ICC’s jurisdiction begins.  
 
1. However, the overwhelming majority of serious crimes committed in relation to the conflict were committed after July 1, 2002.  
2. The advantages of speed and staying power of the ICC outweigh any benefit of being able to potentially prosecute a small number of additional crimes.  



Related Material

U.N. Commission of Inquiry on Why Alternatives to the ICC Are Inadvisable for Darfur
Special Focus, February 15, 2005