Background Briefing

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V.  Recommendations

To the Government of Afghanistan

  • President Karzai should take all possible steps to stop intimidation, threats, and harassment of political actors and voters by factions, including those who support him.  He should encourage voters and candidates—some of whom have little faith that their complaints will be heard—to report their abuses to local UNAMA, AIHRC, or JEMB offices.  President Karzai should order the dismissal of any government official found by either JEMB or the joint AIHRC-UNAMA political rights verification team to have committed threats or abuses.

  • To help alleviate the confusion and intimidation caused by parties and factions collecting or confiscating voter cards from registered voters, and to remove one motive for multiple registration by voters, President Karzai and his cabinet should repeal the sections of the Afghan electoral law specifying that candidates submit photocopies of Afghan voter cards to support their nominations for president, parliament, or local office.

  • The government should make a new request to NATO to supply additional troops for the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF).

  • The government should ask NATO and the U.N. Security Council to expand ISAF’s mandate to include a central role in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) efforts and request that countries operating Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) integrate PRT operations into ISAF command.

  • President Hamid Karzai, his cabinet, and Afghanistan’s main military factions must commit themselves to meaningful implementation of DDR programs. 

    To the United States

  • The United States should make human rights promotion and protection a primary goal of U.S. efforts in Afghanistan, which in turn will enable democratization and nation-building processes.  The United States should support Afghan government efforts to improve political freedoms, including by helping to weaken autonomous abusive commanders, redoubling efforts at militia disarmament, and increasing protection of independent political actors.

  • The United States should increase cooperation with the International Security Assistance Force and support the expansion of  troop levels so that ISAF can play a greater role in providing security for the 2005 elections and security generally to enhance political freedom. ISAF troop levels, currently set to go down after the elections, should instead be increased. The U.S. should work with other NATO member states to adopt a common mandate for ISAF and PRTs, focusing on assistance with disarmament efforts and protection of vulnerable political actors and groups.  Provincial Reconstruction Teams, where they are used in lieu of ISAF troops, should be given clearer mandates to assist with disarmament efforts and protection of vulnerable political actors and groups.

  • The United States should immediately end all direct cash payments and other assistance by agencies of the United States to Afghan military or faction leaders or sub-leaders and discourage payments to such leaders by other sources.  The Department of Defense and all intelligence-gathering agencies in Afghanistan should review their operations to ensure that U.S. cooperation with local militias, local commanders, intelligence sources, and other local entities is not being misused as a basis for extorting civilians or threatening political opponents.

  • The United States should increase funding and support for training of the Afghan national army, as well as police training, to professionalize these forces.  The United States should specifically increase the U.S. contribution to the Law and Order Trust Fund for Afghanistan (LOTFA).

    To NATO member states and other nations involved in Afghanistan

  • Increase ISAF troop levels, which are currently set to go down after the elections.

  • Adopt a common mandate for ISAF and PRTs, focusing on assistance with disarmament efforts and protection of vulnerable political actors and groups.  Provincial Reconstruction Teams, where they are used in lieu of ISAF troops, should be given clearer mandates to assist with disarmament efforts and protection of vulnerable political actors and groups.

    To Donors

  • Increase financial support for human rights and democratization projects, including funding for UNAMA and AIHRC human rights monitoring and reporting, and voter education projects.

  • Ensure that the JEMB and UNAMA have the necessary resources and funding to administer 2005 elections. 

  • Encourage UNAMA to facilitate a central independent monitoring body charged with observing the 2005 elections, and earmark funding for that body.

    To the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan (UNAMA)

  • Increase staffing levels for human rights and political affairs monitoring, and continue public reporting with the Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission on Afghanistan’s political rights situation.  To ensure that staffing increases are not delayed by bureaucratic hurdles, the hiring process should be centralized to Kabul.

  • Put special emphasis on facilitating a central independent monitoring body to observe the 2005 elections.

    To the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary-General

  • Continue pressuring the Afghan government and its international partners to revitalize disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration efforts.  The Special Representative should keep pressure on the United States and NATO members to increase troop contributions for ISAF and PRTs and refocus the mandates of those forces on assisting with disarmament efforts and protecting vulnerable political actors and groups.


    <<previous  |  index  |  next>>September 2004