16. DoD spent $1.68 billion on scatterable landmine systems in 1983-92 (U.S. Army, Information Paper, "Anti-Personnel Land Mine Procurement and Production," 1992). This figure also includes the antitank mine components of combined antitank/antipersonnel mine systems. It is believed that significant research and development contracts were awarded in the 1970s.
17. Honeywell brochure of FASCAM products, October 1983.
18. Arguments in favor of the military utility of "scatterable" mines have been challenged by retired military commanders like former Marine Corps Commandant General Alfred Gray, Jr., who said: "We kill more Americans with our mines than we do anybody else. We never killed many enemy with mines.... What the hell is the use of sowing all this (airborne scatterable mines) if you're going to move through it next week or next month?.... I know of no situation in the Korean War, nor in the five years I served in Southeast Asia, nor in Panama, nor in Desert Shield-Desert Storm where our use of mine warfare truly channelized the enemy and brought them into a destructive pattern.... We have many examples of our own young warriors trapped by their own minefields or by the (old ) French minefields (in Southeast Asia)—we had examples even in Desert Storm." Speech to the American Defense Preparedness Association's Mines, Countermine and Demolitions Symposium, Asheville, NC, September 7-9, 1993.
19. Charles Digney, Deputy Program Manager, U.S. Army Mines, Countermine and Demolitions, "Program Opportunities," presentation to the ADPA Symposium, Asheville, NC, September 7-9, 1993.
20. William M. Arkin, "Military Technology and the Banning of Land Mines," presentation to the 1st International Campaign to Ban Landmines NGO Conference on Antipersonnel Landmines, London, May 24, 1993, p. 6.
21. According to a Pentagon document, there is no planned production of antipersonnel mines in the U.S. at least through fiscal year 2004. Letter from George R. Schneiter, Acting Director, Tactical Warfare Programs, Acquisition and Technology, Office of the Undersecretary of Defense, to Rep. Lane Evans, October 27, 1994.
22. Letter from Alliant Techsystems, Inc., President and CEO Richard Schwartz to Human Rights Watch, August 22, 1996.
23. Letter from Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict H. Allen Holmes to Senator Patrick Leahy and Representative Lane Evans, January 9, 1997. The letter also states: "In implementing the President's decision, the Department has provided additional funds for the FY 1998-2003 time period to undertake an aggressive effort that expands our research and development program for humanitarian demining and establishes a new program for alternatives to antipersonnel landmines."
Following the disastrous U.S experience with antipersonnel mines in Vietnam, the Pentagon decided to develop and procure so-called "smart" mines, the most notable feature of which is a self-destruct mechanism that will cause the mine to automatically blow up after a pre-set period of time (usually four to forty-eight hours). Most of these mines were also designed to be "scattered" (dropped from helicopters or planes, or fired from artillery or other systems) rather than hand-emplaced. Production of dumb mines went into decline and billions of dollars were poured into corporate research and development laboratories in the 1970s and early 1980s to develop smart landmine systems.16 In a 1983 advertising brochure one company described the new FASCAM ("Family of Scatterable Mines") as "a family of target-activated munitions which will revolutionize the modern battlefield. Yes, these mine systems...have the potential to change battlefield methods more than any innovation since guided missiles." 17 A variety of smart landmines were used during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. 18
There is an estimated five billion dollars worth of scatterable smart landmine equipment now in U.S. stockpiles.19 According to one source, one company—Alliant Techsystems—produced eight million of one type of smart antipersonnel mine—the ADAM—in a fifteen year period.20 New orders were placed by the Pentagon to replace antipersonnel mines used in the 1991 Persian Gulf War, and those contracts were completed by the end of 1996. Human Rights Watch believes that there has been no production of antipersonnel mines in the U.S. since November 1996.21
In the U.S., no single company is responsible for the production of an antipersonnel landmine from beginning to end. The Pentagon will usually award a contract to one large manufacturer, like Alliant Techsystems, which in turn will buy component parts from many other companies. Final assembly of mines is often done in government-owned, contractor-operated factories.
Alliant Techsystems was the primary contractor on the two most recent antipersonnel mine contracts, for Gator and Volcano mine systems. In August 1996 Alliant CEO Richard Schwartz informed Human Rights Watch: "Since Desert Storm, production of self-destruct, self-deactivating mines has been limited to replenishing inventories used during that conflict, and we anticipate no future production of self-destruct, self-deactivating mines." He said the Pentagon has requested Alliant to reconfigure the Volcano landmine system solely to an antitank capacity, instead of its current mix of antitank and antipersonnel mines. Production of the Gator system was completed in late 1996.22
On January 9, 1997, Assistant Secretary of Defense H. Allen Holmes stated: "At this time, the Department is not conducting any research and development efforts for antipersonnel landmines. In light of the President's direction on antipersonnel landmines, the Department does not envision a need to conduct research and development for antipersonnel landmines in the future."23 It should be noted that DoD has earmarked continued funding for self-destruct antitank mines.
