IV. Arms and Abuses in Kashmir

Since the late 1980s, Kashmiri militants have engaged in widespread violations of international human rights and humanitarian norms. The link between more sophisticated arms--including those procured from Pakistan--and the commission of abuses by Kashmiri militants against civilians is not as pronounced as in the case of Punjab. In Punjab, militants regularly used such weapons to attack civilians. In Kashmir, militants have used such weapons more frequently against military targets.⁽¹⁴⁶⁾ Although Kashmir militants have not characteristically carried out the kinds of drive-by shootings and other large scale attacks typical of Sikh militant operations against civilians, they have killed hundreds of civilians in targeted attacks, and have used more sophisticated weapons in some instances. It is also likely that the acquisition of large numbers of more advanced weapons contributes to the militants' efforts to instill fear in the civilian Hindu population and among Muslim civilians who do not support the militants' aims; militant threats and attacks on Hindus living in the Kashmir valley caused some 100,000 to flee to refugee camps in 1990.⁽¹⁴⁷⁾

Human Rights Watch/Asia and Physicians for Human Rights reported in The Human Rights Crisis in Kashmir: A Pattern of Impunity:

Militant organizations operating in Kashmir have committed grave violations of international human rights and humanitarian law. Many of the violent attacks committed by these groups have deliberately targeted civilians. Among the worst abuses have been the assassinations of hundreds of civilians, including members of the Hindu community, civil servants and political figures, particularly Muslim political leaders associated with the National Conference party and other political groups opposed by the militants.⁽¹⁴⁸⁾

The Arms Project contends that arms and military assistance should not be provided to governments or opposition groups that violate principles of human rights and humanitarian law. Accordingly, arms supplies and other forms of military assistance to Kashmiri militants should be conditioned on the cessation of such abuses, even if the abuses do not always directly involve sophisticated weapons.⁽¹⁴⁹⁾

This chapter outlines the history of the conflict in Kashmir and the pattern and practice of serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law carried out by Indian government forces in Kashmir and by Kashmiri militants. In the course of committing some of these violations militants have used weapons such as automatic rifles, grenades, rockets, and explosives. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the impact on the human rights situation in Kashmir of increased access by militant organizations to more advanced weaponry.

Jammu and Kashmir ("Kashmir"), India's northernmost state, lies south of one of the highest ranges of the Himalayan mountains, and borders Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tibet, and China. The state comprises the areas of Jammu, on the plains below the Pir Panjal mountain range, and the Kashmir valley, located between the Pir Panjal and Pangi ranges south of the highest peaks of the Karakoram mountains. It also includes Ladakh, which borders Tibet.

Jammu and Kashmir is the only Indian state in which Muslims constitute a majority. Muslims make up about 12 percent of India's total population, while in Jammu and Kashmir, they represent roughly two-thirds of the population, and predominate in the Kashmir valley.

The state's political status as part of India is a matter of long-standing controversy. Kashmir has been the site of three border wars since the partition of British India into India and Pakistan in 1947, and, since 1989, of an insurgency by militant Muslim groups seeking independence from India.

At the time of partition, hundreds of nominally independent "princely" states were absorbed into the two new nations. However, Kashmir's ruler, Maharaji Hari Singh, refused to accede to either nation, apparently in the hope that the state might be permitted to remain independent. An invasion by Pakistani tribesmen⁽¹⁵¹⁾ in August and September 1947 and an uprising among Kashmiri Muslims in the state's western regions ultimately compelled the maharaja to seek the assistance of Prime Minister Nehru of India, who agreed to send troops only if Kashmir formally acceded to India. On October 27, 1947, the maharaja agreed, on the condition that Kashmir be permitted to retain its own constitution. Indian troops drove Pakistani forces back to the western third of the state, which then acceded to Pakistan as "Azad" (free) Kashmir. United Nations intervention achieved a cease-fire on January 1, 1949.

The validity of the rest of Kashmir's union with India is disputed by Pakistan and by militant and political groups in Kashmir. Because of Kashmir's key strategic, economic, and symbolic importance, however, the Indian government has resisted negotiations since 1948.

The U.N. agreement under which Kashmir became part of India promised Kashmir autonomy in local affairs, with only foreign relations, defense, and communications left to the central government. Kashmir also was to be allowed to adopt its own constitution.

Despite the agreement and subsequent U.N. resolutions endorsing a plebiscite on Kashmir's future, neither the plebiscite nor the promised autonomy materialized. India claimed first that Pakistan must vacate the parts of Kashmir it held. Pakistan refused to do so unless India also withdrew its troops. Subsequently, India argued that Kashmiris had effectively ratified accession by voting in Indian elections. The Indian government ignored constitutional provisions protecting Kashmir's separate status and enacted legislation bringing the state increasingly under the authority of the center. Kashmiris who insisted on real autonomy and protested New Delhi's interference in local issues were jailed on charges of sedition. Frustrated over the inability to achieve gains politically, the first militant organization, the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front (jklf), was founded in 1964, and began a campaign for Kashmiri independence.

The turning point came with the 1987 state elections, widely believed to have been rigged by the ruling Congress I party to prevent a victory by a popular opposition party, the Muslim United Front (muf). Widespread irregularities in the vote count and mass arrests of muf candidates fueled popular disillusionment with the ruling party. Amid protests, the National Conference party, in coalition with the Congress Party, again took power.

Popular resentment against the state government continued. Support for the militants, who had not been seen as posing much of a threat before 1987, also grew. Beginning in the latter half of 1988 and continuing through 1989, jklf militants claimed responsibility for a series of explosions in Kashmir which damaged government buildings, buses, and the houses of state government officials. In response, New Delhi sent in paramilitary reinforcements.

A campaign of intimidation by militant groups led to a state-wide boycott of the November 1989 national parliamentary elections. In December 1989, jklf militants kidnapped the daughter of Home Minister Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, then freed her when the government acquiesced to demands for the release of five detained jklf members. This result, seen as a major political victory for the militants, encouraged other, newly emergent armed organizations--many of which openly supported union with Pakistan--to step up their attacks on government troops.

Increased militant activity, together with a surge in popular protest against the central government, led to the imposition of direct rule in January 1990, and triggered a massive crackdown by government authorities. In subsequent months, government forces arrested hundreds of young men and opened fire on unarmed demonstrators, killing scores of civilians. This repression only furthered popular protest; in one demonstration in late February 1990, nearly 400,000 Kashmiris marched through Srinagar to the office of the United Nations Military Observer Group to hand over petitions demanding independence. Growing opposition to the central government provoked greater repression by the security forces. Round-the-clock curfews were imposed for days a time, paramilitary troops conducted large-scale searches and arrests, peaceful protests often were met with gunfire, and summary executions of detainees became increasingly common. In an ever-escalating spiral of violence, Kashmiri militants stepped up armed attacks against civilians, as well as military and paramilitary targets.

The estimated numbers of casualties since the end of 1989, while varying depending on the source, reflect the increased level of violence. In their July 1993 report on Kashmir, Asia Watch and Physicians for Human Rights estimated that at least 6,000, and possibly twice that number, had been killed by all parties.⁽¹⁵²⁾ Recent press reports, citing hospital and police sources, have claimed that the death toll now numbers some 16-17,000 people.⁽¹⁵³⁾

While it was not a causal factor in Kashmir's armed insurgency, the massive influx of more sophisticated weaponry into the region during the 1980s was a contributing factor to the rising levels of violence and increased violations of humanitarian law.

Throughout the conflict, Indian security forces--particularly the Army, the Central Reserve Police Force (crpf) and the Border Security Force (bsf)--have committed regular and deliberate violations of human rights and humanitarian laws in Kashmir. It is clear that in recent months, the level of abuses by Indian government forces has risen significantly, with large numbers of summary executions of suspected militants and increased killings of civilians in reprisal attacks.

In addition to summary executions and reprisal killings of civilians, abuses by Indian forces include disappearances, unprovoked shootings of unarmed noncombatants, rape, and other attacks on civilians and captured combatants. Legislation authorizing the security forces to shoot to kill and protecting them from prosecution has facilitated such abuses. The security forces have also engaged in wanton destruction and looting of civilian property, and have burned down residential neighborhoods in retaliation for militant attacks.

Government forces have also systematically violated international law by using lethal force against peaceful demonstrators, and engaging in widespread and arbitrary arrests of persons suspected of sympathizing with the militants, and detaining them for extended periods without charge or trial. Torture of detainees is widespread, and includes methods such as prolonged beatings, electric shock, and sexual abuse.

The incidence of rape is also high. Women are often raped in the course of house searches by the security forces, and in retaliation for militant attacks on government patrols.

In complete violation of international law, Indian forces often go on rampages in civilian areas after militant attacks. These rampages commonly include arbitrary beatings and shootings of civilians, sacking of their houses, rape, and arson. In a January 1993 incident, Indian police admitted that paramilitary security forces killed at least forty-three civilians, wounded more than a dozen others, and torched scores of buildings in Sopore in revenge for an attack by armed members of Hezb-ul Mujahidin.⁽¹⁵⁵⁾ The severity of these attacks and their regularity have not only traumatized the local population, but have also alienated the local police forces. The torture and death in custody of a constable sparked a local police revolt in May 1993.

The government's efforts to justify these abuses as legitimate responses to militant action completely fly in the face of international law.

Members of militant organizations have committed grave violations of humanitarian laws. Several major militant groups operate in Kashmir, and perhaps dozens of smaller ones, some supporting independence and others accession to Pakistan.⁽¹⁵⁶⁾ The most prominent are the jklf, a pro-independence group which is the oldest and reportedly one of the most popular organizations, and the Hezb-ul Mujahidin, which supports confederation with Pakistan, and is reportedly the best armed. Another insurgent group which supports independence is the Jammu and Kashmir Student Liberation Front. Numerous new militant organizations have emerged in recent years, many of which support accession to Pakistan. In addition to Hezb-ul-Mujahadin, pro-Pakistani groups include the Islami-Jamiat-Tulba and the Muslim Students Federation, all of which are affiliated with the Jamaat-e-Islami political party. Other pro-Pakistan militant organizations include the Hezb-e Ullah, the Hezb-e-Islami, the Muslim Janabaz Force, the Al Umar Mujahidin, Operation Balakote, the Tehreik-e-Jehadi-Islami, the Islamic Tehrik-e-Tulba, the Allah Tigers, the Zia Tiger Force, the Islamic Students' League, and the Jammu and Kashmir People's League, Al-Jehad, Al-Barq, Hizbollah, Ikhwan-ul-Muslimin, Jamait-ul Mujahidin, Al-Umar Mujahidin, Tekriqu-ul Mujahidin, Allah Tigers, Ul-Umar Commandos, and the Harakatul Ansar.

Although all the militant groups are violent in their drive for independence from India, and some periodically work in coalition,⁽¹⁵⁷⁾ most of the groups do not necessarily coordinate actions or support one another's tactics. None of the groups, individually or collectively, control territory in Kashmir, although certain areas in the Kashmir valley are reputed to be strongholds of particular groups, especially certain towns along the border with Pakistan, some of which are along supply routes for weapons brought in from Pakistan.

Militant military operations are generally characterized by ambushes of government forces and hit-and-run attacks for which they rely on weapons such as AK47s, grenades, landmines, rockets, and other light weapons and small arms. Acquisition of unprecedented levels of firepower has not only helped militants achieve greater military successes, but has also contributed to the proliferation of lethal attacks by militants on civilians since 1989.

Violations of humanitarian law committed by militants include: execution-style killings of civil servants, notably Muslim political leaders associated with the National Conference party, which is allied with New Delhi, prominent Hindus, and civilians suspected of being government informers; attacks in which militants fail to distinguish between military targets and civilians; rape; threatening and attacking members of the minority Hindu community; violations of medical neutrality; and the use of religious sites for military purposes.

Targeted Killings of Civilians

Militant organizations operating in Kashmir have repeatedly violated international prohibitions against the murder of individuals taking no part in armed hostilities.⁽¹⁵⁸⁾ They have killed prominent members of the National Conference party, leading members of the Hindu community and persons suspected of collaborating with the Indian government.

The following accounts typify the kinds of targeted murders of civilians carried out by militants in Kashmir.

• On March 2, 1993, Ghulam Nabi Baba, a retired assistant commissioner, was shot dead after being abducted by militants on February 28. Ghulam Nabi Baba was a relative of the state Congress-I party leader, Ghulam Rasul Kar. On March 1, Ghulam Rasul Kar's brother-in-law, Habibullah Mirshah, was also killed by militants.⁽¹⁵⁹⁾

• On November 7, 1992, militants hurled a grenade into Shaheedi Chowk, Srinagar, killing a shopkeeper, Rajesh Jain, and causing minor injuries to Hamidullah Khan, an advisor to the state governor. Khan was believed to have been the target of the attack.⁽¹⁶⁰⁾

• On December 13, 1990, Hezb-e Ullah militants gunned down Maulana Mohammad Sayeed Masoodi, the former general secretary of the National Conference party and a leading moderate politician in Kashmir. According to a public statement issued by Hezb-e Ullah, Masoodi was killed for his involvement with the National Conference and for supporting Kashmir's union with India.⁽¹⁶¹⁾

• After being threatened with death on several occasions if he did not leave the Kashmir valley, Gopi Nath Raina, the co-director of the textiles department of the Jammu and Kashmir government, was shot dead by members of the jkslf using automatic rifles on June 26, 1990.⁽¹⁶²⁾

• In April 1990, jkslf militants murdered Mushir-ul Haq, the vice chancellor of Kashmir University in Srinagar, and his personal secretary Abdul Ghani. Haq was apparently well-known as a proponent of progressive Muslim views. The two were kidnapped by armed agents of the jklf and Hezb-ul Mujahidin immediately prior to a scheduled meeting between Haq and the state Governor Jagmohan, who had been appointed by the central Indian government. Militants demanded a three-hour relaxation of the curfew which had been in force around-the-clock, and the release of three detainees in government custody. Haq and Ghani were found shot to death several days later.⁽¹⁶³⁾

• Lassa Koul, the director of the state-run television station for Jammu and Kashmir, was shot dead by jklf gunmen on February 13, 1990, apparently as part of an attempt to obtain programming more favorable to the militants. Koul received numerous threats prior to his death from both the jklf and Hezb-ul Mujahidin, as well as from other militant groups. His murder prompted other newscasters to begin accommodating their programs to the militants' demands out of fear of similar attacks.⁽¹⁶⁴⁾

Extrajudicial Punishment

Militant organizations have ordered summary punishment, including execution, of individuals believed to be government operatives and informers. The following two accounts are typical:

• In March 1990, the Hezb-ul Mujahidin militant group shot to death two Muslim religious leaders near Shopian, south of Srinagar, reportedly claiming that they had been tried and executed under Islamic law for spying for an intelligence agency.⁽¹⁶⁵⁾

• A group of armed militants belonging to the Hezb-ul Mujahidin kidnapped Mir Ghulam Mustafa, a former member of the dissolved Kashmir state legislative assembly, who had helped arrange the release of the kidnapped daughter of Home Minister Mufti Mohammed Sayeed in December 1989. He was hung after Hezb-ul Mujahidin pronounced him guilty of "indulging in anti-Islamic activities and spying for Indian government intelligence."⁽¹⁶⁶⁾ Militants have also executed captured government security force personnel. In 1993, a spokesman for the groups claimed that this policy was adopted because the Indian government summarily executed captured militants.⁽¹⁶⁷⁾

Attacks on Civilian Government Targets

While militants in Kashmir tend to avoid the kind of random shootings at crowds of civilians or passenger vehicles that have characterized Sikh militant tactics, they have engaged in attacks on government targets that are not military in nature. In particular, militants have launched bomb and grenade attacks on government buildings and transport vehicles. Such attacks violate humanitarian law if the buildings and vehicles are not being used in ways that contribute significantly to the war effort.⁽¹⁶⁸⁾ The following accounts are representative:

• Hezb-ul Mujahadin claimed responsibility for a May 11, 1993 attack on the government secretariat, which houses the offices of the civil administration in Srinagar. Rocket-propelled grenade launchers were used. One employee reportedly was killed and three injured during the attack.⁽¹⁶⁹⁾

• On October 17, 1992, a car bomb planted by militants of the Hezb-ul Mujahidin exploded outside the State Bank of India on Residency Road in Srinagar, a popular shopping and business district. Asia Watch interviewed witnesses who reported that at least two civilians were killed and others injured; several members of the Indo-Tibetan Police, on guard outside the bank, were also injured.⁽¹⁷⁰⁾

• Al Jihad Mujahidin took responsibility for the December 8, 1990 explosions in the office of the chief of agricultural reforms of the state government, which caused extensive damage. Offices of the state civil administration have been a frequent target of attack.⁽¹⁷¹⁾

• On November 16, 1989, at least twenty-four persons were injured when a bomb planted inside a government passenger bus exploded south of Srinagar. The jklf claimed responsibility for the incident. The same afternoon, the jklf set off a bomb which caused extensive damage to a building in Srinagar which housed the office of a division of the public works department. The local press reported that a caller explained that the explosions were designed to reinforce the militants' call to boycott the fall 1989 elections to the lower house of the Indian Parliament.⁽¹⁷²⁾

Rape⁽¹⁷³⁾

Rape by members of militant organizations was rare in the conflict's early years, although threats and attacks against women by groups seeking to enforce their interpretation of Islamic culture were not uncommon. Since 1991, however, rape has been committed with increasing frequency by members of certain militant organizations.

In some cases, women have been raped and then killed after being kidnapped by rival militant groups and held as hostages. In other cases, members of armed militant groups have abducted women after threatening to shoot the rest of the family unless the woman was handed over to a particular militant leader. Some incidents of rape by militants appear to have been intended as punishment because the victims or their families were believed to be government informers, opposed to the militants, or supporters of rival groups.

Asia Watch and Physicians for Human Rights reported that one of the earliest rape cases involved a staff nurse kidnapped from the Saura Medical Institute on April 14, 1990. Her body was found with a note nearby stating that the jklf took responsibility for the killing and accused the victim of informing the security forces about the presence of a number of wounded militants in the hospital. A post-mortem report concluded that she had been raped before being shot dead.⁽¹⁷⁴⁾

Kidnapping

The December 1989 kidnapping by the jklf of Dr. Rubia Mufti, the daughter of the Union home minister Mufti Mohammed Sayeed, is often seen as marking the beginning of increased militant activity in Kashmir. In exchange for her freedom, the jklf demanded the release of five of their colleagues from detention. She was freed several days after the abduction, following the government's compliance with the jklf demand. Since then, members of various militant organizations have engaged in kidnapping as a way to pressure the government to release militant detainees or make other changes. The following are examples of kidnappings:

• On March 31, 1991, the Moslem Janbaz Force abducted two Swedish engineers employed at a hydroelectric project in Kashmir, and threatened to kill them if the government did not permit Amnesty International and the United Nations to investigate human rights abuses in Kashmir. They managed to escape after several months.⁽¹⁷⁵⁾

• On June 8, 1993, militants kidnapped Sharifuddin Shariq, a well-known National Conference leader and former member of the state assembly. Shariq reportedly was considered to have close ties with former Chief Minister Farooq Abdullah.⁽¹⁷⁶⁾

• On June 6, 1994, the Harakatul Ansar militant group kidnapped two British tourists, aged 16 and 36, who were on holiday near Pahalgam. Motive for the kidnapping was unclear. An initial Ansar statement indicated the hostages would be released in exchange for three jailed militants, a subsequent statement said they were being held only to highlight human rights abuse in Kashmir by Indian troops, while a third said they strayed too near a militant camp. The two were released unharmed on June 23, 1994.⁽¹⁷⁷⁾

Inducing Terror in the Civilian Population

International law prohibits not only acts, but also "threats of violence, the primary purpose of which is to spread terror among the civilian population."⁽¹⁷⁸⁾ In contravention of this rule, some militant groups have employed threats to compel suspected opponents, government informers, and others to leave the Kashmir valley, or to conform their behavior to desired Islamic standards. A jklf statement in June 1990, for example, claimed responsibility for bombings in the town of Pulwama, and warned that "all Indian agents and spies" should recant or risk being killed. In November 1989, a number of militant groups issued threats against liquor store owners that those who did not shut down their businesses would have to "face the consequences."⁽¹⁷⁹⁾ A March 26, 1991 statement issued by Hezb-ul Mujahidin warned that action would be taken against women who failed to cover their faces and bodies.⁽¹⁸⁰⁾

Many Hindus have also been made the targets of militant threats, especially in 1989-1990, and these threats combined with acts of violence and harassment by militants against the Hindu population, caused many to flee.⁽¹⁸¹⁾ For example, in March 1990, the jkslf issued a statement warning all non-Kashmiri traders and officials living in the valley "after acquiring citizenship rights through false declaration" to leave by the end of the month. The statement also announced that those who did not leave would be targeted for attack. Hezb-ul Mujahidin issued a directive the same month in Srinagar, ordering non-Kashmiris working as civil servants for various branches of the Indian government to leave by month's end, or face death.⁽¹⁸²⁾ A 1992 press report noted that, when one militant group, the Ikhwan-ul Muslimin, broadcast an appeal urging Hindus to return, Al-Umar and Al-Jehad issued press releases warning them not to come back.⁽¹⁸³⁾

Militant groups have also issued threats to journalists whom they believe publish reports biased against the militant cause. They have imposed bans on particular newspapers and enforce those bans through the abduction of distributors and other attacks.⁽¹⁸⁴⁾

Violations of Medical Neutrality

Doctors in Kashmir claim that militants abduct medical workers to force them to provide treatment to injured militants. Militants have also reportedly abducted patients from hospitals. Asia Watch and Physicians for Human Rights interviewed a doctor in October 1992 who described the sense of fear pervading the hospital where he worked: "I can't even ask the floor sweeper to do his job because you never know who's carrying a gun or who someone may be."⁽¹⁸⁵⁾

Use of Religious Sites as Military Strongholds

Press accounts described the October 1993 occupation of the Hazratbal Mosque on the shore of Dal Lake in Srinagar. The mosque is held sacred by Kashmir's Muslim population because it enshrines a hair of the Prophet Mohammed. According to a number of reports, the mosque was taken over by militants armed with sophisticated weapons. Religious pilgrims were said to be inside at the time of the take-over, but none were killed.⁽¹⁸⁶⁾ These reports suggest that militants violated the international proscription against the use of religious sites as military strongholds. ⁽¹⁸⁷⁾

Militant forces in Kashmir have engaged in the commission of serious abuses of humanitarian law since at least 1989. Easy access by militants to large caches of more advanced weapons--made possible by the proliferation of small arms and light weapons throughout the region during the 1980s--has contributed to the deterioration of the human rights situation in Kashmir.

More sophisticated weapons such as automatic rifles, rockets, and grenades have been used in direct attacks on civilians and civilian property, although they have not been used by Kashmiri militants to commit human rights abuses with the same frequency that they were used by Sikh militants in Punjab. These weapons have also enhanced the ability of the militants to induce fear in the civilian population; threats of force backed up by a vast arsenal of weapons have contributed to the flight of many civilians from Kashmir.

In light of this record of abuse, the Arms Project believes that any future supplies of weapons to Kashmiri militants should be tied to respect for humanitarian law and human rights.⁽¹⁸⁸⁾

146. Human Rights Watch takes no position on attacks against legitimate military targets provided that international norms of human rights and humanitarian law are observed.

147. The government role in encouraging the exodus is a matter of considerable controversy in Kashmir and among the displaced Hindus in Jammu and New Delhi. Some reports suggest that while many Hindus left the valley out of fear of militant violence, some may have been encouraged to leave by authorities who hoped to undermine support for the militant movement.

148. Asia Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, A Pattern of Impunity, p. 147.

149. In Chapter 5, the Arms Project also argues that arms supplies and other forms of military assistance to the Indian government must be linked to the cessation of abuses by the security and military forces.

150. This section is drawn from the historical discussion contained in Asia Watch, Kashmir Under Siege: Human Rights in India, New York: Human Rights Watch, May 1991. Readers are referred to Chapter 2 of that report for a more detailed analysis.

151. Many observers believe that the tribesmen included Pakistani army soldiers and irregulars in civilian dress.

152. Asia Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, Pattern of Impunity, pp. 1-2. See also "Figures for Kashmir fighting toll," British Broadcasting Corp., November 25, 1993; "Hazratbal siege enters second month, Agence France Presse, November 15, 1993; "Indians Reported stepping up firing in Kashmir," September 27, 1993. "At least 26 killed in strife-torn Kashmir," Reuters, Ltd., September 20, 1993; Molly Moore and John Ward Anderson, "Kashmir's Brutal and Unpublicized War," Washington Post, June 7, 1993.

153. See, for example, "Kashmiris Stop Work, Mourn Murdered Cleric's Death," Reuters, June 21, 1994; "Moslem Politician Shot Dead in Kashmir," Reuters, June 20, 1994.

154. This section is drawn largely from Asia Watch, Kashmir Under Siege and Asia Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, Pattern of Impunity. Since this report focuses on the impact on human rights of the flow of weapons to militants, it includes only a very abbreviated account of government abuses. However, most observers agree that violations by government forces are far more widespread than those committed by the militants.

155. "Forces Went Amok in Kashmir," Los Angeles Times, January 8, 1993; "Indian forces killed 53", Newsday, January 8, 1993; Asia Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, Pattern of Impunity, pp. 70-72.

156. The information on the composition of the various militant organizations is drawn largely from Asia Watch, Kashmir under Siege and Asia Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, Pattern of Impunity.

157. Asia Watch noted in 1991 that many of the pro-Pakistan groups were part of a loose coordinating body known as the United Jehad Council. In its 1993 report with Physicians for Human Rights, it further explained that as of mid-1993, a coordination committee comprising representatives of the leaders from the jklf, Hezb-ul Mujahidin, Iqwan Muslim, Harkat-ul-Majaheedin, Jamait-ul-Mujaheedin, Tahreek-ul-Mujaheedin, Hizbollah, and Muslim Mujahidin had formed to provide oversight for the various groups.

158. See Appendix I.

159. Asia Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, Pattern of Impunity, p. 154; "Kashmir Militants Kill Abducted Ex-Official," All-India Radio, March 2, 1993, cited in FBIS, (NES-93-040), March 3, 1993, p. 32.

160. "Grenade attack on Saxena's Aide," Times of India, November 8, 1992.

161. "32 Die in Clashes After Secessionist Arrested," Agence France Presse, December 13, 1990.

162. Asia Watch, Kashmir Under Siege, p. 136.

163. The jklf issued a statement in which it assumed joint responsibility with Hezb-ul Mujahidin for the kidnapping, but stated that it had agreed to the plan only after Hezb-ul Mujahidin leaders and an official of the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence Agency threatened a cut-off of isi aid, unless they did so. The jklf further claimed that they gave their support on the condition that no harm would come to the hostages, and condemned Hezb-ul Mujahidin for killing Haq and Ghani. Asia Watch, Kashmir Under Siege, pp. 131-135. See also, "Violence in Kashmir Intensifying," New York Times, April 12, 1990, and "Militants Show Their Hands," Independent, June 8, 1990.

164. Ibid.

165. Asia Watch, Kashmir Under Siege, p. 141, citing Yusuf Jameel, "Priests Killed in Jammu and Kashmir," Telegraph, March 13, 1990.

166. Asia Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, Pattern of Impunity, p. 157; "Kidnapped Kashmir Politician Found Dead," Reuters, March 25, 1990.

167. Asia Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, Pattern of Impunity, p. 159; "jklf Executes Two Army men taken Hostage," Times of India, September 18, 1992.

168. See, e.g., Additional Protocol I, Article 52. Civilian government buildings are legitimate military targets if and when they are used in ways that contribute significantly to the war effort. Human Rights Watch believes that there should be a presumption of illegitimacy of attack, but if facts show that a particular government building does in fact participate significantly in the military effort, the presumption is overridden.

169. "Attack Sparks Four Day Boycott," Agence France Presse, May 11, 1993.

170. Asia Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, Pattern of Impunity, p. 109.

171. Asia Watch, Kashmir Under Siege, p. 144, citing Srinagar Times, December 9, 1990.

172. Asia Watch, Kashmir Under Siege, p. 144, citing "Militants Gun Down One in Srinagar," Kashmir Times, November 17, 1989.

173. See Asia Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, Pattern of Impunity, pp. 160-162; and Asia Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, Rape in Kashmir: A Crime of War (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1993), p. 16.

174. Asia Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, Rape in Kashmir, p. 16.

175. Barbara Crossette, "Kashmiri Militants Say They May Kill 2 Swedes," New York Times, April 13, 1991; "Kashmir Governor Refuses Amnesty Visit," Associated Press, April 13, 1991.

176. "Militants Abduct Farooq Aide," Times of India, June 9, 1993; A Pattern of Impunity, p. 163.

177. "Britons To Be Freed Within a Day, Militants Say," Reuters, June 22, 1994; "Britons Held By Kashmir Militants Set Free," Financial Times, June 24, 1994.

178. Additional Protocol II, Art. 13; Additional Protocol I, Art. 51(2). See discussion in Legal Appendix.

179. Asia Watch, Kashmir Under Siege, pp. 151-152.

180. "Kashmiri Militants Warn Women on Muslim Dress" Agence France Presse, March 26, 1991; Asia Watch, Kashmir Under Siege, p. 153.

181. See, e.g., Asia Watch, Kashmir Under Siege, pp. 147-153, and Asia Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, Pattern of Impunity, pp. 168-171; Gill Tudor, "Kashmir Hindus Want Haven from Ethnic Cleansing," Reuters, July 10, 1993. According to Kashmir Under Siege, as many as 90,000 Hindus left the valley in 1989-90. There is, however, evidence that some Hindus decided to leave not directly or solely as a result of threats by militants, but were encouraged to do so by government officials. Ibid, pp. 147-148.

182. Asia Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, Pattern of Impunity, pp. 170-171; "Quit Notice to IAS", Telegraph, March 21, 1990.

183. Marinder Baweja, "Living on the Edge," India Today, July 15, 1992.

184. Asia Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, Pattern of Impunity, p. 167.

185. Ibid., pp. 172-173.

186. Civilians were killed at another location by Indian security forces who opened fire on Muslim demonstrators protesting government action against militants inside the mosque. "Kashmir's Conflict Explodes Again; At least 29 Killed as Indian Troops battle Muslim Separatists," Washington Post, October 23, 1993; "Militant Palestinians Denounce Indian Attacks in Kashmir", Agence France Presse, October 25, 1993; "Jammu and Kashmir Government Orders inquiry Into Bijbiara Shootings;" British Broadcasting Corporation; October 25, 1993; "India: Stalemate in Kashmir, Militants Threaten Mosque", Inter Press Service, October 18, 1993.

187. See Legal Appendix.

188. The Arms Project also argues, in Chapter 5, that arms supplies to the Indian government must be conditioned on an improvement in the human rights record of its security and militant forces.