I. Arms and Abuses in Punjab

Although violent Sikh activity virtually ended in 1993 in the wake of a ruthless campaign by the government to crush separatist efforts, during the last decade Sikh militants regularly engaged in widespread armed violence, including attacks on civilians. This chapter, after summarizing the history of the conflict in Punjab and the egregious abuses of human rights and humanitarian law carried out by the Indian government, focuses on violations committed by Punjab-based Sikh militants: cases in which militants, in contravention of international norms, opened fire in crowded public areas, attacked passengers on public buses and trains, murdered Hindu laborers, assassinated political and religious figures and government employees, committed election-related violence, engaged in extortion, killed the families of policemen, and used religious sites for military purposes. The chapter concludes with an examination of the role of weapons in the commission of these abuses. Militant forces used such weapons as automatic rifles, grenades, rockets, and bombs in committing many of these acts. Increased access to more sophisticated weaponry, particularly automatic rifles, contributed to and facilitated increased violations of international humanitarian law by the militants.

The state of Punjab is located in India's fertile northwest "breadbasket", bordering Pakistan on the west, and the Indian states of Haryana and Rajasthan in the south, Uttar Pradesh in the east, and Jammu and Kashmir in the north. Followers of a religion begun almost 500 years ago, Sikhs make up about 2 percent of India's total population, whereas in Punjab, they constitute approximately 60 percent of the population.

For more than a decade, Punjab has been the site of one of the bloodiest conflicts in India's post-independence history. The conflict had its origins in a power struggle between Sikh political leaders and the Indian government, both of which were eager to maintain control over the resources of one of the country's most prosperous states.

While the causes of the conflict are complex, a key factor was the desire on the part of many Punjab Sikhs for greater autonomy and the Indian government's refusal to relinquish control. In the early 1980s, after years of protracted negotiation between Sikh political leaders and the central government, a number of Sikhs--mainly followers of Sant Bhindranwale, a fundamentalist Sikh preacher--began to adopt more violent tactics.⁽⁸⁰⁾ A crucial precipitating factor was Indira Gandhi's dismissal in 1980 of Punjab's elected state legislature, which for the first time had been under control of a leading Sikh political party, Akali Dal. When state elections were held in May of that year, Gandhi's Congress Party gained power by a small majority.

Extremist Sikhs subsequently grew bolder in confronting the government. In September 1981, a leading Hindu journalist and publisher was assassinated in Punjab, and the followers of Bhindranwale were suspected. Bhindranwale surrendered to police, but he was released less than a month later.

These events were followed by a marked increase in random attacks by Sikhs on civilians in markets and other public places. Following Bhindranwale's arrest in 1981 and until June 1984 when the Indian army launched its assault on the sacred Sikh Golden Temple in Amritsar, the Indira Gandhi government and the Sikh Akali Dal leadership continued to negotiate over the political future of Punjab. Akali Dal sought more state autonomy, a long-promised transfer to Punjab of the city of Chandigarh and other Punjabi-speaking areas, and changes in Indian law that would give greater legal recognition to Sikhism as a distinct religious affiliation. The demands also included a more equitable share of the water from local rivers--a demand vehemently opposed by the neighboring state of Haryana, which has a majority Hindu population.

Negotiations ended in stalemate, and in May 1982 the government broke off talks with Akali Dal and banned several militant Sikh organizations. Members of these organizations retreated to the Golden Temple complex in Amritsar--a small walled city and Sikhdom's holiest shrine. This became Bhindranwale's headquarters, housing thousands of his armed followers and an arsenal of weapons. The rest of the year saw resumed negotiations, another stalemate, and the failure of ongoing Sikh civil disobedience campaigns to achieve a political breakthrough. This prompted some previously moderate Sikh politicians to align themselves with the militants, and to support the resort to violence.

By 1984, increasing militant violence had prompted the central government to impose President's rule (direct rule) on Punjab.⁽⁸¹⁾ The imposition of direct rule brought with it a dramatic increase in human rights abuses against the Sikh population by Indian authorities, including arbitrary arrests, extrajudicial executions, and torture.

On June 3, 1984, Sikh leaders called for a new campaign of civil disobedience. In response, Prime Minister Gandhi ordered the Indian army to Punjab, imposed a state-wide curfew, suspended train service, deported foreign journalists, and prohibited domestic press from reporting on army action.

The army and the Central Reserve Police Force (crpf), then surrounded the Golden Temple complex. A full assault on the complex, code-named Operation Bluestar, took place between June 4 and 6, 1984. Because June 3 was a Sikh holy day, thousands of pilgrims were housed along with temple employees within the complex. The army did not offer those inside the opportunity to surrender. Hundreds of civilians were killed in the assault, including Bhindranwale, and a number of men captured by the army were summarily executed. Over 6,000 persons were detained following the assault, and during the next two months, the army conducted large-scale operations throughout Punjab, resulting in thousands more arrests. The overall effect of Operation Bluestar was to harden the resolve of the Sikh militants.

The level of violence and repression in Punjab rose dramatically after the assault on the Golden Temple. Outraged by the attack and continuing violations by Indian authorities, some separatist Sikhs began to demand an independent state of Khalistan. On October 31 of the same year, Sikh bodyguards assassinated Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. In response, Hindu mobs slaughtered thousands of Sikhs in New Delhi and other cities throughout northern India. The complicity of local officials in the massacres and the failure of the authorities to prosecute the killers alienated many ordinary Sikhs who had not previously supported the militant cause.⁽⁸²⁾

The Sikh conflict was sparked by the government's political intransigence and escalated following the assault on the Golden Temple and subsequent police repression. However, the frequency and severity of militant Sikh attacks, and the ability of militants to induce widespread fear in the civilian population were clearly enhanced by the increasing availability of sophisticated weaponry in the region during the same time period.

Sikh militarism began to decline significantly in 1992, mainly due to a ruthless campaign by the Indian security forces, orchestrated by the current Director General of Police in Punjab, K.P.S. Gill. Gill's efforts, which have resulted in sustained and extreme violations of human rights and humanitarian law, led to the capture or killing of militant leaders, and a fragmenting of rebel organizations. Although the militant movement is now quiet, it is not yet clear whether this fragile peace--imposed at tremendous cost to the civilian population--will last. If the militant forces should re-emerge, the ease with which sophisticated weapons are now obtained throughout South Asia should make it relatively easy for groups to re-arm.

Indian authorities engaged in a pattern and practice of gross violations of human rights and humanitarian laws in Punjab. These abuses included arbitrary arrests, torture, prolonged detention without trial, disappearances, and summary killings of Sikh civilians and suspected militants. Attacks by government forces against civilians often were carried out in revenge for the activities of armed opposition groups. Numerous incidents involving the shooting of civilians in reprisal for acts by militants have been documented by Human Rights Watch/Asia and reported in the press.

Summary executions and deaths in custody were regularly covered up by the practice of filing reports claiming that individuals were killed in "encounters" with the security forces. In addition, the security forces were issued shoot-to-kill orders, and were permitted by several changes in law to conduct mass round-ups and warrantless house-to-house searches in Sikh areas, as well as to detain people without approval of the courts. Government personnel were virtually immune from prosecution for human rights violations.

The use of various forms of torture was widespread.⁽⁸⁴⁾ Torture was practiced against alleged militants, and also against relatives and those believed to be close associates of suspected militants. Human Rights Watch/Asia has contended that "virtually everyone detained in Punjab is tortured."⁽⁸⁵⁾ Torture also was used as a form of reprisal. For example, in August 1990, some 200 residents of five villages near Kathunangal were reportedly rounded up and beaten by members of the crpf. Some were taken to a police station and tortured. These incidents occurred the day after an explosion damaged a patrol jeep nearby, and were reportedly carried out in retaliation.⁽⁸⁶⁾ Despite the considerable amount of available information and testimony concerning the violation of human rights by the security forces, the only consequence was that a few security personnel involved in the incident were suspended.⁽⁸⁷⁾

Forced disappearances of suspected militants were also common; it is estimated that the number of disappearances in Punjab may be as high as several thousand. Police typically either deny that the detainee was in custody or claim that the victim escaped. Thus, the families and friends of the disappeared never learn with certainty the real fate of the victim. Most of the disappeared are believed to have been killed and their bodies disposed of in secret.⁽⁸⁸⁾

In their zeal to suppress the militant Sikh movement, Indian government forces, under the leadership of Punjab Director General of Police K.P.S. Gill, have continued to commit serious violations of human rights and humanitarian law. Gill's stated goal is to eliminate entirely the militant Sikh leadership. Accordingly, as documented in Dead Silence: The Legacy of Abuses in Punjab, "the deliberate use of torture and execution as counterinsurgency tactics is not merely tolerated but actively encouraged by Indian government officials,"⁽⁸⁹⁾ and supported by laws which provide protection from prosecution for abuses committed in the line of duty.⁽⁹⁰⁾ Gill, in fact, has expanded a bounty system of rewards for police who kill known militants, a practice which, not surprisingly, has encouraged extrajudicial executions and disappearances.⁽⁹¹⁾

Between 1981 and 1992, at least seven major Sikh militant organizations and approximately a dozen smaller groups, often acting independently of one another and sometimes at cross-purposes, waged frequent bloody attacks against unarmed civilians, engaging in both random acts of violence, as well as violence targeting particular individuals or groups. Some of the groups were organized into forces with identifiable command structures, although with constantly shifting political alliances, the structures tended not always to be obvious. Others operated more as criminal gangs who found in the political crisis a lucrative business in extortion and arms smuggling. By 1990, the seven major groups were all, at least nominally, under the authority of one of several Panthic Committees, which functioned as decision-making and command bodies.⁽⁹³⁾ Although members of Sikh militant organizations were relatively few in number compared to the total Sikh population, and in recent years had increasingly equivocal support from the local Sikh population, the militants reportedly had little difficulty raising money from Sikhs living abroad to finance their activities.⁽⁹⁴⁾

Beginning in 1981, however, Sikh militants regularly engaged in a pattern of serious violations of humanitarian law.⁽⁹⁵⁾ Most of these violations involved deliberate attacks on unarmed civilians. These took a variety of forms: random assaults on civilians; targeted killings of Hindu civilians and Sikh civilians suspected of collaboration with the Indian government; and assassinations of political figures and Hindu religious leaders. Although most militant Sikh attacks on civilians took place in Punjab, they were also undertaken in other regions of India, particularly in the neighboring state of Haryana, and in Delhi and Bombay.

Militants frequently opened fire in public areas such as marketplaces, crowded streets, and residential neighborhoods; targeted Hindu laborers for murder; attacked public buses and trains; assassinated political and religious figures and government employees; engaged in election-related violence; threatened the lives of journalists; extorted money from local businessmen through threats and kidnapping; killed the families of policemen; and used religious sites frequented by civilians for military purposes. In almost all instances, they used light weapons such as automatic rifles, grenades, rockets, and bombs.

Random Attacks on Civilians in Public Places

Militant groups deliberately directed attacks against civilians in public areas, shooting randomly, for example, through crowded marketplaces, in residential districts, and on congested streets. These attacks apparently were designed to cause extensive civilian casualties, and induce general terror among the civilian population, in clear violation of all international norms.

Automatic weapons made it easier for militants to carry out these kinds of attacks. Assault rifles, for example, permitted militants to shoot large numbers of people while riding by in a car or on a motorscooter. Such weapons also increased the number of casualties and helped the attackers to avoid capture by permitting them to flee under cover of rapid fire. The accounts below are typical of attacks that appeared to be deliberately carried out by Sikh militants against randomly chosen, unarmed civilians in public places using deadly automatic weaponry.

• In October 1992, suspected Sikh militants gunned down five civilians and a law enforcement officer in a heavily wooded area in Uttar Pradesh that has become a refuge for Sikh separatists fleeing a crackdown by Indian authorities in Punjab. The attack followed a massacre two months earlier of twenty-nine villagers in the same area. In that incident, villagers collecting wood in the forest were captured by suspected militants, bound, and killed by automatic gunfire.⁽⁹⁶⁾

• In March 1992, four Sikh separatists armed with AK47 assault rifles went on a shooting spree in the industrial city of Ludhiana killing twenty civilians and injuring others. The armed gunmen drove a car first through the city's Vishwakarma residential district, mowing down ten people at a neighborhood market. The gunmen then drove on, shooting people at random along a two-mile route, killing eight more. They ended the rampage at a public square by shooting to death two more civilians, and then escaped.⁽⁹⁷⁾

• In May 1988, a total of sixty-five people were reported killed by Sikh extremists in hit-and-run attacks in a thirty-six-hour period.⁽⁹⁸⁾

• In Kuban village in October 1986, five gunmen sprayed a crowded marketplace with bullets on a Saturday killing eight people and injuring four. Police sources said the attack appeared to be in revenge for the police killing of militants in the area earlier the same month. It was the worst single attack since fourteen bus passengers were shot near Mukhtsar town three months earlier.⁽⁹⁹⁾

• On May 21, 1986, Sikh gunmen killed nine Hindus and two Sikhs in a shooting spree in an Amritsar market. The attacks came during a twelve-week period of separatist violence during which more than 230 people were killed, many of them Hindu civilians.⁽¹⁰⁰⁾

Targeting the Hindu population

It is sometimes difficult to tell whether particular attacks on civilians in public areas are completely random--to induce terror generally--or are directed specifically against Hindu civilians to force them to leave. Other instances are more clear. Quite apart from selective attacks on Hindu political and religious leaders, militants carried out a campaign of terror against Hindu civilians simply because of their religious and cultural affiliation. This was in keeping with the stated aim of the Sikh separatist movement to create an independent state, a task considered easier if the Hindu population fled. Militants also attacked Hindu civilians in retaliation for crackdowns by the Indian government.

Attacks often occurred in neighborhoods known to be home to large Hindu populations. On November 20, 1990, for example, Sikh militants rampaged through Islamabad, a predominantly Hindu neighborhood in Amritsar, shooting into shops along the street. Twelve civilians were killed.⁽¹⁰¹⁾ Asia Watch representatives spoke to a number of witnesses who described the attack. They explained that at about 7:30 P.M., four men wearing shawls over the faces, armed with AK47 rifles, began to shoot on the main street of Islamabad's busy commercial center. They moved down the street, firing into shops, killing merchants, customers, and passersby. When Asia Watch visited Islamabad in early December 1990, bullet holes were visible in the walls and floor boards inside the shops and in the outside walls. According to a local journalist, the Khalistan Commando Force claimed responsibility for the killings.⁽¹⁰²⁾

Militants sometimes claim that particular attacks against the Hindu population are carried out in revenge for security force crackdowns on militant activity. In the villages of Bhikhiwind and Patti in Amritsar district, for example, militants undertook a series of kidnappings and murders in late 1990, apparently in retaliation for the killing of a large number of militants by the security forces in the area over the previous month, as well as to terrorize local Hindus into leaving and to extort ransom payments from wealthy families. Shortly before the attacks, the Khalistan Commando Force had issued an order to all Hindus to leave the area within three days. The attacks, which also occurred in several neighboring villages, caused many Hindus to flee to Amritsar and New Delhi.⁽¹⁰³⁾ At least some of the attacks were carried out with automatic rifles, including AK47s.

More recently, on March 25, 1993, Sikh separatists armed with automatic weapons opened fire on Hindus in a market in Jagraon, killing seven Hindu civilians and seriously wounding two more. Indian officials claimed that the attack was part of a continued campaign by militants to force Hindus out of Punjab.⁽¹⁰⁴⁾

Reports of attacks near Hindu temples, in conjunction with Hindu festivals, and even on Hindus praying at religious sites were also common; such attacks often involved use of deadly automatic weapons.

• On July 14, 1992, four militants riding motorscooters opened fire at a busy shopping district in Bhatinda town in Punjab, killing seven civilians and injuring five more seriously. The incident took place outside a Hindu temple, and may have been in retaliation for a security operation aimed at flushing out militants in the area.⁽¹⁰⁵⁾

• In April 1990, thirty-five people were killed when a bomb exploded during a Hindu religious procession; Sikh separatists were suspected. The bombing set off dozens of Hindu-Sikh clashes throughout the state, resulting in another sixteen deaths.⁽¹⁰⁶⁾

• In October 1987, gunmen on a motorscooter killed at least eight people in the Indian capital, spraying submachine gun bullets in a residential neighborhood and at fairs heralding the Hindu New Year. The gunmen then abandoned their scooter and boarded a public bus which was halted at a police roadblock about six miles from the shootings. The gunmen opened fire, wounding a sub-inspector and a passenger.⁽¹⁰⁷⁾

• In May 1986, Sikh extremists reportedly opened fire with automatic weapons on Hindus praying outside a small-town shrine in Punjab state, killing two and wounding seven. The shooting occurred as the Hindus were reading from the Hindu epic Ramayana in what was to have been a night-long prayer vigil. It was the second major attack in a month in Jandiala Gur, a town fifteen miles east of Amritsar.⁽¹⁰⁸⁾

Hindu farm laborers were frequent targets.⁽¹⁰⁹⁾ Some observers have speculated that militants were seeking to destroy the state's economy by driving away farm labor. Others believed that the militants wanted only Sikhs to work in the state. The following incidents were typical:

• In May 1988, six Sikhs armed with automatic rifles opened fire on sleeping workers in the village of Gujarpura, about eighteen miles northwest of Amritsar. Nine workers were killed, and three wounded. Two days earlier, at a labor camp in Amritsar, Sikh militants ordered Hindu migrants to line up against a wall and then shot five to death. Two days before that, thirty workers were slain as they slept at a Hindu migrant workers camp near Chandigarh. The attacks prompted an exodus of hundreds of Hindu laborers who traditionally migrate from the northern states of Bihar and Orissa to work on farms in Punjab.⁽¹¹⁰⁾

  Some attacks on Hindu civilians were thought to be aimed at instigating violence between Hindus and Sikhs to help revive waning support among Sikh moderates for the militant cause. In June 1988, for example, more than sixty people, mainly Hindu civilians, were killed and at least one hundred injured in bombings that took place over three days. The attacks were carried out in shopping centers, cinemas, markets, and temples. The bombings came in the wake of the Sikh surrender to Indian security forces during the May 1988 siege of the Golden Temple shrine. Many Sikhs were angered, claiming that the militants should have fought to the death or not have begun the fight at all. In addition, a number of Sikhs had recently turned against militants who had waged a campaign of extortion and blackmail of rich Sikh farmers, reportedly conducted by leaders inside the temple. Commentators speculated that the attacks on Hindu civilians were probably part of an attempt to provoke a Hindu backlash against Sikhs, which in turn could help recoup support for the separatist platform.⁽¹¹¹⁾ One of the results of sustained violence and threats of violence by militants against the Hindu population--and arguably an intentional result--was the creation of a large internally displaced Hindu population.⁽¹¹²⁾

  Bus and Train Attacks

  Sikh militants frequently attacked civilian passengers on public buses and trains in Punjab and neighboring states. While the majority of these attacks did not seem to target particular individuals, many of them were apparently directed against Hindus; frequently, Hindu passengers were singled out for execution, and in some cases, militants stopped vehicles likely to being carrying Hindus--buses traveling to Hindu religious sites, for example.

  The basic pattern of assaults on buses and trains was that militants forced a vehicle to a halt, removed Hindu passengers, and shot them to death, usually with automatic rifles. On occasion, the militants firebombed the vehicle, apparently intending to kill all on board.

  The Arms Project identified dozens of reports of attacks on buses and trains carried out by militants. The following accounts are representative examples:

• In December 1992, a state-run bus traveling to Chandigarh was ambushed by six militants, believed to be members of the Khalistan Liberation Front, who ordered Hindu passengers to stand apart from the Sikhs. The gunmen reportedly then raked the Hindus with hundreds of rounds of AK47 rifle fire, killing sixteen and wounding nine. Five weeks earlier, twenty-five Hindu migrant laborers were killed in a similar bus attack.⁽¹¹³⁾

• On November 4, 1992, militants placed road blocks and stopped vehicles on the Gurdaspur-Tibri road near Amritsar. Seventeen persons identified as Hindu were shot. According to a report published in the Punjab English daily, Tribune, the police claimed to have recovered a note on Bhindranwale Tiger Force (btf) letterhead stating that the killings were in retaliation for the killing of a btf leader.⁽¹¹⁴⁾

• In an October 1992 attack marking the fourth anniversary of the assassination of former Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, Sikh gunmen bombed an intercity bus near the border between Punjab and Kashmir, killing eighteen civilians and seriously injuring twenty-eight. The attack, along with two separate attacks against Hindu laborers, triggered anti-Sikh rioting.⁽¹¹⁵⁾

• At about 9:30 P.M. on June 15, 1991, gunmen opened fire inside two passenger trains stopped outside Ludhiana, killing at least 75 passengers. The attacks reportedly were coordinated, as both trains were stopped about a mile from the station by having their emergency cords pulled. Survivors stated that on one of the trains, Hindu passengers were identified before being shot. On the second train, the firing was indiscriminate, and many Sikhs as well as Hindus were killed. Although no group claimed responsibility for the attacks, they were believed to have been carried out by groups opposed to the elections scheduled for June 22.⁽¹¹⁶⁾

• On July 7, 1987, Sikh separatists attacked two buses in northern Haryana state, killing thirty-four. Most of the victims were Hindu. The militants used a car and a jeep to create a roadblock. On one bus, they singled out particular passengers, dragged them off, and shot them to death. Militants then boarded the second bus and opened fire, killing all the passengers. Chinese-made AK47s were used in both attacks. The incidents occurred the day after militants opened fire on a bus in Punjab, killing forty passengers, and wounding twenty-seven. The victims were all Hindus bound for a pilgrimage center in Uttar Pradesh.⁽¹¹⁷⁾

• In June 1987, militants hauled seventy-two Hindus off two rural buses and shot them dead.⁽¹¹⁸⁾

Election-Related Violence

Militants reportedly used violence and threats of violence to undermine elections in Punjab in 1991 and 1992. In 1991, the Indian government called for state legislative elections which would effectively end five years of direct rule by New Delhi. Militants ordered an election boycott, claiming that a vote would validate Indian rule and undercut Sikh efforts to achieve a separate nation. A widespread campaign of violence, in which twenty-four candidates were assassinated, apparently prompted the Indian government to cancel the 1991 elections.⁽¹¹⁹⁾

New elections were scheduled the following year on February 19, 1992. Sikh militants called for another boycott, which they again promised to enforce with violence. Some political parties also boycotted the polls. About a quarter of the normal number of candidates ran, and those that did feared for their lives. As one journalist noted: "More bodyguards than supporters surround candidate Kanwaljit Singh as he sets out on the campaign trail every morning in the violence-wracked northern state of Punjab."⁽¹²⁰⁾

Campaign rallies were poorly attended, as residents feared attack by the militants and by members of rival political parties. Shop owners in towns where candidates made appearances often left stores unattended rather than risk having a candidate enter and strike up a conversation.⁽¹²¹⁾ At one campaign gathering in southern Punjab gunmen opened fire killing five people in what appeared to be a grim warning to prospective voters.⁽¹²²⁾ Militants also vowed to kill the first five voters at each of the state's 14,659 polling stations.⁽¹²³⁾ A press account described the following:

Devinder Singh, 22, and unemployed, sentenced himself to death Wednesday. He voted. Himself a Sikh, when asked if he was afraid, he responded, "People get killed here traveling in buses. People get killed in marketplaces everyday. People get killed just walking outside. So I'll get killed voting."⁽¹²⁴⁾

According to one press account, in villages where the militants were strongest, not a single person voted. Only a handful of civilians were actually killed on election day, and a few dozen wounded, in bombings and shootings at polling places. However, revenge killings came later. Police reports showed that in a period of less than two weeks after the elections, there were almost one hundred murders in Punjab. Some of those killed were villagers who defied the boycott and voted.⁽¹²⁵⁾ In one incident a week after the election, militants shot five Harijans⁽¹²⁶⁾ in Sangrur, and five more in Ludhiana district; large numbers of Harijans voted for a candidate strongly opposed by the militants.⁽¹²⁷⁾

Attacks on Public Figures, Government Officials, and Religious Leaders

Political and religious leaders, including heads of villages and members of rival Sikh organizations, were frequently attacked, typically shot dead by militants using automatic weapons. Government officials such as judges and state ministers were also common targets. Asia Watch detailed numerous killings of this type in its 1991 report on Punjab. The report highlighted, for example, the 1990 assassination of a former finance minister, Balwant Singh, who had helped broker an accord between Sikh groups and the Gandhi government. Singh and two bodyguards were killed by gunmen who opened fire on his car with automatic rifles. Militant groups aligned with the Sohan Singh Panthic Committee claimed responsibility for the murders.⁽¹²⁸⁾

The following accounts, excerpted from press reports, also illustrate the pattern of such attacks:

• In September 1993, a car bomb attack using RDX explosives against Sikh moderate politician Maninder Singh Bitta killed eight people. Bitta himself escaped with minor injuries. Three Sikh separatist organizations claimed joint responsibility.⁽¹²⁹⁾

• In May 1992, Sikh separatists riding scooters shot at the car of Excise and Tax Commissioner A.K. Mishra at Bradara Gardens in Patialia City. Mishra and his guards were killed, and the driver of the car was injured.⁽¹³⁰⁾

• In November 1988, Jagdev Singh Talwandi, a Sikh leader who had initiated moves to unite the main Sikh political party, was shot and critically injured. Two of his bodyguards were killed. Militant Sikhs opposing the unification were believed responsible for the attack.⁽¹³¹⁾

• In January 1987, Sikh extremists armed with automatic rifles assassinated Joginder Pal Pandey, a leading Hindu politician and his bodyguard. Six other people were also killed by militants in a surge of attacks in Punjab.⁽¹³²⁾

• In September 1986, officials in Chandigarh said Additional District and Sessions Judge R.P. Gaind was shot four times by two Sikh gunmen in a store in Jullundur as his wife and daughter stood outside. The two assassins, armed with 9mm semi-automatic pistols, escaped on a motorscooter. Gaind had received death threats from Sikh militants after presiding three years ago over a dispute between Sikhs and Hindus involving a Hindu temple in Jullundur. He also tried cases involving Sikh separatists in the city of Hoshiarpur.⁽¹³³⁾

Attacks on Journalists

Journalists were particularly targeted by Sikh militants. In particular, Human Rights Watch/Asia noted that the Hind Samochar group of newspapers was a favorite target; between 1981 and February 1991, militants assassinated sixty people associated with the chain.⁽¹³⁴⁾

On November 22, 1990, the Sikh Panthic Committee issued a "code of conduct" for the press which required all journalists to refer to Sikh separatists as "militants," "freedom fighters," or "mujahidin," rather than "terrorists" or "extremists," and to refer to Punjab as Khalistan. They threatened that non-compliance would result in "memorable punishment."⁽¹³⁵⁾ In February 1991, the Zaffarwal Panthic Committee issued an additional code of conduct ordering all journalists to boycott government-sponsored events, and to refuse to publish government material or any "objectionable, derogatory and misleading" news about the militants. The statement warned that the committee "may award the death penalty" to those who did not obey the code.⁽¹³⁶⁾ The Sohan Singh Panthic Committee published a similar directive, which threatened "strict punishment" to journalists as well as government employees and university faculty members who used English typewriters and engaged in undefined activities of which the group did not approve. ⁽¹³⁷⁾

Attacks on Families of Police

While a variety of police, paramilitary and military units operated in Punjab, the Punjab police were the principal government force combatting Sikh militants throughout the conflict.⁽¹³⁸⁾ Police performing military functions are not "protected" from attack under international humanitarian law as they are considered to be taking an active part in hostilities.

However, the families of police also became militant targets, particularly in 1992. For example, in August 1992, following the death of a founder of the Sikh militant groups, militants launched a vengeance campaign against families of police, killing scores of people, including children. The vendetta additionally was intended to demoralize the predominantly Sikh police force and deflate a sense of victory over the recent crackdown on militants.⁽¹³⁹⁾ Attacking the civilian family members of police--whether the police are engaged in combat duty or not--is a gross violation of international law.

Use of Religious Sites As Military Strongholds

On several occasions, Sikh militants used Amritsar's Golden Temple complex as a military stronghold. This contravened humanitarian law forbidding the use of places of worship in support of military efforts, as well as laws which require combatants to take measures to protect civilians from attack and to avoid locating military objectives in densely populated areas.⁽¹⁴⁰⁾

The Golden Temple is the holiest shrine of Sikhism, frequented by numerous worshippers. After negotiations broke down in 1982 between the central government and the Sikh's main political party in Punjab, the Akali Dal, Sikh leader Bhindrawale and his followers retreated to the Golden Temple complex. There they built up a sizeable cache of weapons. On June 4, the Indian army attacked the Golden Temple, killing hundreds of civilians, including worshippers. Indian government forces were guilty of outrageous violations of fundamental human rights--deliberately attacking the temple at a time they knew thousands of religious pilgrims were inside, not offering an opportunity for surrender, and summarily executing those it captured. Bhindrawale and his supporters also violated humanitarian law by using the Golden Temple as a military stronghold.

In May 1988, heavily-armed militants again holed up in the Golden Temple, and engaged in gun battles with Indian troops over the course of a week. According to police, militants opened fire from at least sixteen different sites in the complex, mainly with Chinese-made AK47 rifles. They also claimed that militants had large ammunition supplies in the basement of the main temple building. Several civilians were killed before militants surrendered. Numerous civilians were in the complex hile militants and troops exchanged gunfire, including approximately 800 pilgrims who eventually were evacuated.⁽¹⁴¹⁾

The evidence shows that from the early 1980s until the ruthless crackdown by Indian government forces in 1992-93, Sikh militants engaged in a sustained pattern and practice of violations of humanitarian law. Militants frequently used such weapons as automatic rifles, grenades, and rockets in deliberate attacks on unarmed civilians.

Prior to the 1980s, militant groups mainly had access to relatively unsophisticated weaponry. The militants possessed little more than country-made weapons, 12-gauge shotguns, Enfield .303 rifles and, at best, a small number of Sten guns.⁽¹⁴²⁾ As detailed in Chapter 2, the large-scale introduction of more sophisticated weapons into South Asia began in 1979 with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the establishment by the U.S. of covert arms pipeline in which massive amounts of weaponry were funneled through the Pakistani isi to mujahidin leaders and fighters in the field. Large quantities of this U.S.-supplied, isi-controlled weaponry were illicitly siphoned off and diffused throughout the region, with some of it acquired by militant Sikhs.

While many factors contributed to the growing strength and resolve of Sikh fighters during the mid-1980s through the early 1990s, increased access to vast quantities of more advanced weapons allowed them to consolidate power through force. At the same time, the acquisition of large numbers of these weapons contributed to a dramatic increase in both the frequency and severity of abuses inflicted on the unarmed civilian population.

The human rights record of the Sikh militants might have deteriorated anyway, but the influx of automatic weapons, in particular, facilitated the commission of greater numbers of serious violations. Automatic weapons allowed the killing of more people. They permit extremely rapid fire, which is more likely to cause both death and collateral damage.⁽¹⁴³⁾ If militant Sikhs had continued to have access only to handguns or knives, it would have been difficult in practical terms to carry out the kinds of large-scale civilian killings described in this chapter. Typical means of militant attack--drive-by shootings, shooting sprees in public places, and opening fire on passengers on buses and trains--would not likely have resulted in such high numbers of casualties had automatic rifles not been used.

Access to large numbers of automatic weapons also allowed militants deliberately to instill terror in the civilian population at a level probably higher than would have been otherwise possible. This contributed both to the flight of many Hindus and Sikhs from Punjab, and to the reluctance on the part of many residents to oppose the militants politically. This latter point was strikingly evident in the militants' ability to enforce election boycotts in 1991 and 1992 through threats of violence and selective shootings at campaign gatherings.

It is apparent from Arms Project interviews and a careful review of hundreds of press accounts of violations reportedly committed by Sikh militants since 1981, that there is a strong correlation between the number of civilians killed and the use of automatic rifles; as the use of Kalashnikovs increased, so did the number of civilian killings.

Information compiled by the Punjab Police on weapons seizures, weapons use, militant attacks and civilian casualties also reflects this correlation. Increased availability and use of Kalashnikovs corresponded to increased attacks and civilian killings. For example, from 1989 to 1990, Indian authorities claim that both the number of militant attacks, and the number of civilian killings by militants, more than doubled. Meanwhile, Indian authorities also claim that the number of incidents in which Kalashnikovs were used, and the number of Kalashnikovs allegedly seized, both nearly doubled.⁽¹⁴⁴⁾

In sum, greater access by Sikh militants to more advanced weaponry during the last decade directly exacerbated the human rights situation in Punjab. It allowed militants to increase the frequency and severity of their attacks on the unarmed population, resulting in a greater number of civilian casualties, and permitted them to sustain a higher level of terror and control over the general population. The governments of Pakistan and the United States bear considerable responsibility for the arming of Sikh militants and the atrocities they have committed.

Although the Indian government's crackdown in Punjab has largely crushed militant activity for the time being, arms are still widely dispersed among the populace. This weaponry could facilitate and fuel future conflict and abuses of human rights.⁽¹⁴⁵⁾

79. This material is drawn from a lengthier analysis by Asia Watch in Punjab in Crisis. Readers are referred to Chapter 2 of that report for a more detailed historical account.

80. Most of the militant groups in Punjab trace their origins to Bhindranwale, who rose to prominence in the mid-1970s as a fiery orator and rigid fundamentalist. By 1978, he had gained the backing of Congress (I) political leaders who saw in him an opportunity to discredit the Akali Dal-Janata Dal coalition government then in power in Punjab. As he became more powerful, the Akali Dal also courted him, causing rival Akali factions to support other militant groups. Bhindranwale was killed when the Indian army stormed the Golden Temple in 1984. After his death, the number of militant groups proliferated, as did the divisions among them.

81. Punjab was under direct rule from Delhi between 1984 and 1986, and again between 1988 and 1992.

82. According to one militant leader: 'It was the Delhi riots, even more than Operation Bluestar, which made me an active Khalistani. After the riots, I felt not only could we no longer trust the Government, we also couldn't trust the Hindus as a community', quoted in Mira, C., 'Confessions of an ex-terrorist', Hindustan Times, August 22, 1992.

83. What follows is a brief summary of abuses by Indian security forces, drawn mainly from more detailed descriptions in Punjab in Crisis (Asia Watch, 1991), and Dead Silence: The Legacy of Abuses in Punjab (Human Rights Watch/Asia and Physicians for Human Rights, 1994).

84. In Punjab in Crisis, a 1991 report, Asia Watch devotes thirty-eight pages to torture by government forces, much of it consisting of accounts by torture victims themselves. Similarly, in the recently published Dead Silence: The Legacy of Abuses in Punjab, thirty pages are devoted to torture at the hands of Indian authorities.

85. Asia Watch, Punjab in Crisis, p. 110.

86. India: Torture, Rape & Deaths in Custody, (Amnesty International, London, March 1992), p.30.

87. Ibid.

88. Human Rights Watch/Asia and Physicians for Human Rights, Dead Silence, p. 38.

89. Ibid., p. 1.

90. Ibid., p. 13.

91. Ibid., p. 2.

92. The Arms Project did not conduct fieldwork directly documenting individual human rights violations by militants. The examples given in this section are drawn from studies done by Asia Watch in the 1991 report Punjab in Crisis, and by Human Rights Watch/Asia and Physicians for Human Rights in the 1994 report Dead Silence, and from an Arms Project review of hundreds of press accounts of human rights violations reportedly committed by Sikh militants since 1980. With regard to the use of press reports, every effort was made to include only those types of abuses that are consistent with other reliable accounts or are reported with frequency and specificity. The Arms Project recognizes the obvious point, however, that press reports may be biased or based on biased sources.

93. Human Rights Watch/Asia and Physicians for Human Rights, Dead Silence, p. 13. The Khalistan Commando Force (Panjwar), Babbar Khalsa, Khalistan Liberation Force (Budhisingwala) and the Bhindranwale Tiger Force of Khalistan (Sangha) were affiliated with the historically most powerful Panthic Committee headed by Dr. Sohan Singh, who was captured in November 1993. The Bhindranwale Tiger Force (Manochahal) and the Khalistan Commando Force (Rajasthani Group) supported the Panthic Committee led by Gurbachan Singh Manochahal. The Zaffarwal Panthic Committee was supported by the Khalistan Commando Force (Zaffarwal).

94. Arms Project interviews.

95. See Appendix I for an analysis of the applicable legal standards. The Arms Project believes that when a group is engaged in organized armed conflict, it should be held to internationally recognized principles of human rights and standards of humanitarian law required of governments.

96. "Suspected Sikh gunmen kill 6 in Wooded area," United Press International, October 21, 1992.

97. "Punjab on Red Alert After Another Massacre," Agence France Presse, March 15, 1992. The article also noted that most of the victims of this attack were Hindu, and that earlier in the week Sikh separatists had killed 15 engineers and executives at a textile factory in Sangrur district.

98. "India: Security Forces Step up Attacks on Temple Fortifications", Inter Press Service, May 17, 1988.

99. "Sikhs and Hindus Clash during Punjab Strike Against Killings," Reuters, October 27, 1986.

100. "Crowds Go on Rampage during Punjab Protest Strike," Reuters, May 23, 1986.

101. Asia Watch, Punjab in Crisis, p. 178. Asia Watch was informed that although both Sikhs and Hindus live in Islamabad, much of the Hindu population in Amritsar resides in that neighborhood. According to local residents, Hindus make up more than 90 percent of Islamabad's population. Although Asia Watch was not able to confirm this figure, it is clear that an attack such as the one described would likely kill a greater number of Hindus.

102. Ibid., pp. 178-179. See also "Attack by Punjab Gunmen Kills 13 and Wounds 15 at a Market," New York Times, November 21, 1990.

103. Asia Watch, Punjab in Crisis, pp. 179-181.

104. "Sikh extremists massacre 7 Hindu civilians," United Press International, March 25, 1993.

105. "Seven people die in Sikh militant raid, five wounded," Agence France Presse, July 14, 1992.

106. "Sikh Separatist Violence in Punjab," Facts on File World News Digest, April 20, 1990.

107. "Gunmen Attack Hindu New Year Fairs, Nine Dead in Delhi", Reuter Library Report, October 21, 1987; "250 Arrested Near Sikh Shrine", Chicago Tribune, October 22, 1987.

108. "Sikh Spray Kill Two at Prayer Meeting," Associated Press, May 30, 1986.

109. See, e.g., "Sikhs Slaughter Nine Sleeping Farm Laborers in Latest Attacks," Associated Press, May 21, 1988; Susanne Rudolph, "Why India's Militant Sikhs Keep Fighting," Christian Science Monitor, March 8, 1989; "Militants Kill 45 Civilians on Anniversary of Indira's Death," United Press International, October 31, 1992; Human Rights Watch/Asia and Physicians for Human Rights, Dead Silence, p. 91.

110. "Sikhs Slaughter Nine...," Associated Press.

111. "India's Sikh Extremists Scramble to Recoup Mainstream Support," Christian Science Monitor, June 23, 1988.

112. See Asia Watch, Punjab in Crisis, pp. 179-189 for a detailed description of this situation and excerpts of interviews with Hindu refugees.

113. "Sikhs kill 16 Hindus in Bus Ambush", Guardian, December 2, 1992; "Sikh gunmen kill 16 Hindus as police order final assault," Agence France Presse, December 1, 1992.

114. Asia Watch, Punjab in Crisis, pp. 194-195; "Massacre Leaves Trail of Misery," Tribune (India), November 6, 1990.

115. "Militants Kill 45 Civilians...," United Press International, October 31, 1992.

116. Asia Watch, Punjab in Crisis, p. 194; "Police in India Put Toll in Train Attacks Between 76 and 126," New York Times, June 17, 1991; "Sikh Gunmen Kill 110 Aboard 2 Punjab Trains," Washington Post, June 16, 1991.

117. Surinder Khullar, "Two more bus attacks bring death toll to 67 in 24 hours," United Press International, July 7, 1987.

118. "`Holy Wars': The Ominous Side of Religion in Politics," Christian Science Monitor, November 12, 1987.

119. See Asia Watch, Punjab in Crisis, pp. 199-202; Mark Fineman, "Few Defy Sikhs to Vote in Punjab; India: the 25% Turnout Clouds New Delhi's Hopes of Ending the Anarchy and Restoring the Elected Government," Los Angeles Times, February 20, 1992; Krishnan Guruswamy, "Fear in Punjab, 5 Killed on Election Eve," Associated Press, February 18, 1992; Monimoy Dasgupta, "Candidate Elimination Plan in Punjab," Telegraph, May 15, 1991; Steve Coll, "New Delhi Postpones Vote in Punjab State; Violence by Sikh militants Cited as Reason," Washington Post, June 22, 1991; Mahesh Uniyal, "India: Elections in Punjab Under the Shadow of the Gun," Inter Press Service, January 25, 1992.

120. Harbaksh Singh Nanda, "Fear Stalks Voters, Candidates in Punjab," Associated Press, February 14, 1992; Mark Fineman, "Few Defy Sikhs to Vote in Punjab; India: the 25% Turnout Clouds New Delhi's Hopes of Ending the Anarchy and Restoring the Elected Government," Los Angeles Times, February 20, 1992; Krishnan Guruswamy, "Fear in Punjab, 5 Killed on Election Eve," Associated Press, February 18, 1992; Mahesh Uniyal, "India: Elections in Punjab Under the Shadow of the Gun," Inter Press Service, January 25, 1992.

121. Ibid.

122. Guruswamy, Associated Press, February 18, 1992.

123. Fineman, "Few Defy Sikhs To Vote...," Los Angeles Times.

124. Ibid.

125. "Killing Rages Unabated in Punjab after Polls," Reuter Library Report, March 1, 1992.

126. These are persons from the lowest "outcaste" level of Hindu society. Formerly called "untouchables," they were renamed Harijans (Children of God) by Mohandas Gandhi. Many now prefer the term Dalit (oppressed).

127. "Indian Troopers Claim Killing of Top Sikh Assassin," Agence France Presse, February 26, 1992.

128. Asia Watch, Punjab in Crisis, p. 197. See also "Sikh Who Promoted Truce is Shot Dead," New York Times, July 11, 1990.

129. "New Delhi car bomb blast sparks concerns over Sikh militancy," Agence France Presse, September 13, 1992.

130. "Sikh militants kill civil servant", Agence France Presse, May 6, 1992.

131. "Sikh leader critically injured after trying to unite political party", Associated Press, November 30, 1988.

132. "Sikhs Kill Hindu Official, 7 Others in Punjab", Chicago Tribune, Jan. 20, 1987; "Sikh Extremists Kill Eight in New Attacks, Police Say", Associated Press, Jan. 19, 1987.

133. "Sikhs assassinate judge in Punjab", United Press International, September 1, 1986.

134. Asia Watch, Punjab in Crisis, pp. 192-193; Deepak Sharma, Associated Press, February 8, 1991.

135. "Panthic Panel's Code for Scribes," Indian Express, November 23, 1990 cited in Asia Watch, Punjab in Crisis, pp. 189-190.

136. Asia Watch, Punjab in Crisis, p. 191.

137. Ibid., p. 192.

138. Forces deployed in the Punjab included the Punjab Police, the Punjab Armed Police, members of India's principal paramilitary forces--the Central Reserve Police Force (crpf) and the Border Security Force (bsf)--other security detachments such as the Railway Police Force, and regular Indian army units.

139. See Human Rights Watch/Asia and Physicians for Human Rights, Dead Silence, p. 87; "Sikh militants step up vendetta against policemen's families", Agence France Presse, Aug. 27, 1992; "Sikh Militants Kill 16 Relatives of Cops in Punjab", Associated Press, Aug. 11, 1992.

140. The 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Convention of 1949 are most relevant. See Legal Appendix for a more detailed analysis.

141. "Fatal shootout at Golden Temple", Associated Press, May 9, 1988; "Police Sharpshooters Kill 5 Sikh Militants in Golden Temple", Los Angeles Times, May 14, 1988; "Indian Sikhs refuse to undertake to keep Golden Temple free of Arms", Xinhua General News Service, May 20, 1988; "India: Security Forces step up attacks on Temple Fortifications", Inter Press Service, May 17, 1988.

142. Arms Project interviews, March 1993.

143. According to one account, the first time an AK47 was used by a Sikh militant in Delhi, thirteen people were killed in the space of one hour. "The Hit Men," Sunday Times of India, November 1, 1992.

144. ¹⁴⁴ The following information was provided to the Arms Project by the Director General of Police in Punjab in March 1993. The Arms Project was not able to undertake independent verification of these statistics. Some observers believe that they may be inflated.

Year AK47/56/74 Civilian Militant Kalashnikovs

Seizures Killings Attacks Used

1986 - 526 - -

1987 - 910 - -

1988 328 1,949 - -

1989 314 1,168 846 660

1990 553 2,474 2,116 1,302

1991 525 2,591 2,107 1,228

1992 565 1,518 979 973

1993* 99+ - - -

*through March 1993

145. Arms Project interviews. See also, A. Bharadwaj, "Hidden Arms Pose Problem in Punjab," Times of India, March 21, 1993.