8 avril 2009

VI. The Joint Anti-Terrorism Task Force (JATT)

Mandate and Relation to Other Security Bodies

JATT was created on May 13, 1999, specifically to "handle and quell" the outbreak of bombings in Kampala in 1998 that had allegedly been carried out by the rebel Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). The director of counter-terrorism, who is the head of JATT, is a senior officer of the UPDF and reports to the chief of military intelligence who is the "overall operations coordinator." [38] The serving chief of military intelligence is Brig. James Mugira, who replaced Col. Leopold Kyanda in August 2008.

According to Brig. Mugira, JATT is "an amalgamation of elements from various security organisations that have individual legal status under Ugandan law." [39] These include CMI-the intelligence arm of the Ugandan military-the police, the Internal Security Organisation (ISO) and the External Security Organisation (ESO). Because JATT was established without an act of parliament or official publicly available directive, it has no official legally specified powers or law enforcement mandate.

Historically, JATT has been the source of some friction between security organizations skirmishing over resources and power. A knowledgeable official from the Ministry of Internal Affairs told Human Rights Watch that it has an operating budget of 100 million shillings per month (50,227 USD).[40] The official told Human Rights Watch that CMI's control of JATT was not the foreseen hierarchy when JATT was first established in 1999, nor has JATT played its foreseen role in the intelligence community in Uganda, which was to gather and cross-check intelligence information, keep track of certain individuals or criminal suspects and recommend necessary next steps to combat terrorism, especially in the wake of the bombings at the US embassy in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998. According to this official, JATT was originally to have been under the command and control of the Inspector General of Police. However, over time, some took the view that the police were not adequately managing JATT, and a decision was made to put the task force under the control of CMI.[41] 

During a debate in parliament in 2002, this friction between security organizations related to JATT came to light, but was discounted publicly by then-head of CMI, the late Brig. Noble Mayombo. Opposition parliamentarian Reagan Okumu declared at the time that there was a "fight where CMI was involved, ISO was involved, and the Police were . . . involved. The fight amongst these people was, 'who controls the resources,' and at that time we were told that CMI took over control of these resources and, therefore, they took the lead.In other words, the police who were directly responsible were looked at as a department, which never heavily contributed and yet they did not have enough resources." [42]

Mayombo responded to this statement indicating that operating jointly saves resources, such as training and "the little fuel for the vehicles available." "This joint anti-terrorism task force," Mayombo said, "which is only led by Military Intelligence, did not take resources away from the Police.Whenever the Police have a project to run, they have access to those resources; whenever internal security has a project to run, they have access to those resources.We have a very harmonious joint anti-terrorism task force.It is doing a fantastic job in terms of bringing security in the country." [43]

According to the official from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the initial plan for JATT did not include any powers of arrest or detention, but that since the mandate was not specified in law, activities of JATT-and abuses committed by JATT-have varied as the leadership has changed over the years. The official also stated that JATT has become increasingly reliant on paid informers who may not be telling the truth or who may, at times, be settling private scores. In the official's opinion, "JATT has become powerful but ungovernable." [44]

Both the non-governmental Foundation for Human Rights Initiative (FHRI) and the state Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC) have reported publicly that there has been a disturbing trend of creating "special holding places" within different police stations which are outside the direct control of police. [45] In 2007, the UHRC reported that it was not given access to some detainees, even when they were held in police stations. The report notes, "The UHRC encountered resistance at the Central Police Station, Kampala, where we were denied access to certain detention cells suspected to have been holding suspects brought in by other security organizations, such as the Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence, the Internal Security Organization and the Joint Anti Terrorism Task Force (JATT). These 'special inmates' can stay in police detention as long as the detaining authority wishes." [46]

Individuals Targeted by JATT

Human Rights Watch found that of the 25 detainees interviewed about their detention in JATT's facility in Kololo, none were brought before a magistrate at any time while in JATT custody. They also reported that co-detainees were never removed from the facility to appear before a magistrate. Among the 25, some eventually were charged with terrorism or treason while others were released without charge. Human Rights Watch has previously documented the Ugandan government's tendency to use the charge of treason to silence political opponents and those critical of the government. [47] For this report, Human Rights Watch interviewed two people who had been held in Kololo and then were charged with treason. However, these cases do not appear to be the focus of JATT's work. Rather, it would appear that suspected terrorism cases predominate.

Of the 106 named individuals detained by JATT documented by Human Rights Watch, all but two were Muslim. One detainee told Human Rights Watch, "When I entered the garage [in the Kololo facility], I saw about 15 people. I think that three of them were not Muslims." [48]   Muslims make up about 12 percent of the population in Uganda; the rest are predominantly Christian. [49]

Allied Democratic Forces Suspects

As the chief of military intelligence wrote to Human Rights Watch in his November 3 letter, the rebel Allied Democratic Forces (ADF) are currently the focus of JATT's work. The ADF is a Ugandan rebel movement based in the Democratic Republic of Congo, in the Grand Nord area of North Kivu and Ituri. [50] According to research carried out by Human Rights Watch in 1998, the ADF is comprised of an alliance between the nationalist National Army for the Liberation of Uganda (NALU), and disgruntled elements within the Islamist Tabliq sect, who aim to establish an Islamic state in Uganda. [51]

The ADF were responsible for a series of killings and abductions of civilians, especially in schools, from the Ruwenzori mountain region in western Uganda. [52] The ADF were also reported to be responsible for several bomb explosions in Kampala from 1997 to 1999. I n 1999, UPDF forces conducted Operation Mountain Sweep and claimed to have killed between 1,500 and 2,000 rebels. [53] By 2001, it was believed that only a few hundred rebels remained, and that the movement had ceased to be a threat to the Ugandan government. The ADF was furthered weakened by a large joint Congolese army-MONUC operation in 2005 that destroyed most of the ADF/NALU camps. [54]

These actions failed to eliminate the rebel movement completely. According to Ugandan army reports, occasional skirmishes occurred between the ADF and the UPDF in 2007 in which scores of ADF rebels were killed. [55] The coordinator of intelligence services, Gen. David Tinyefuza, stated to the media that a spate of recent fires in schoolhouses was linked to ADF activity. [56]

Between 2000 and January 19, 2009, 1,904 supposed ADF combatants were granted amnesty under the terms of the 2000 Amnesty Act (see below). [57] In November 2008, the ADF reportedly agreed to formal peace negotiations with the Ugandan government. [58]

The Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting

From November 23 to 25, 2007, Uganda hosted the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM). Security around the capital was increased as police and military forces worked to ensure the safety of the many presidents, prime ministers and royalty who visited the country. On December 1, 2007, the independent newspaper The Daily Monitor newspaper reported that security agencies claimed to have "foiled plans by suspected terrorists with links to Al-Qaeda to lob bombs" into various venues used for the meeting. [59] A few weeks later, the same newspaper reported that the army had captured a speedboat "loaded with arms and homemade bombs that were reportedly to be used by the rebel ADF to disrupt" CHOGM. [60] Seven people were reported to be in custody of "intelligence agents" at that time. No names of suspects were released and they were being held in an "undisclosed location." [61]

In May 2008, the media reported that these suspects and others were in the custody of the Ugandan state, and still had not appeared in court, despite having been arrested five months before. UPDF spokesman Paddy Ankunda told The Daily Monitor, "We arrested a number of ADF rebel suspects some of whom have been released after they were found innocent. Some have been taken to police and others are still with us." According to the article, Ankunda declined to say how long the suspects would be kept in detention or which charges they would be likely to face should they be produced in court. [62]

When Human Rights Watch wrote on October 20, 2008 to CMI to ask about the whereabouts of certain individuals allegedly being held by JATT, Brigadier Mugira replied that two of them, Adinan Zubair and Abbas Karule, had been arrested in November 2007 for "conspiring to assassinate Kampala CHOGM VIPs." He said both had received amnesty in October 2008. He did not say where the men were physically located, nor where they had been detained between November 2007 and December 2008. Human Rights Watch research indicates that both men were held without charge in Kololo during that time period. Former detainees told Human Rights Watch that they had met Karule for the first time in Kololo in December 2007 and that he had been tortured. [63]

In December 2008, Karule was among a group of alleged ADF combatants who was granted amnesty by the Amnesty Commission and then paraded in front of journalists. According to the government-run New Vision newspaper, Karule admitted to the authorities to be acting "as an emissary, relaying information between the ADF rebels in the bush and those operating in Kampala." [64] There was no mention of his involvement in the alleged CHOGM bombing attempt, and no mention of where he had been held for over a year.

Arrests of alleged Al-Qaeda suspects 

JATT has been involved in the arrest and detention of individuals suspected of involvement with Al-Qaeda. [65] In late 2008, media reports indicated that the Ugandan police were warning of imminent attacks by groups connected to Al-Qaeda. [66] Ugandan authorities told the media that six terrorism suspects had been held by JATT for over a week. [67]

On August 18, 2008, two South Africans citizens, Mufti Hussain Bhayat and Haroon Saley, were arrested at Entebbe Airport and brought to the JATT facility in Kololo. [68] According to Bhayat's account of the events, three Ugandan men in civilian clothes questioned him at length about his affiliations with various groups, including some groups listed by the United States and the United Nations as terrorist entities. [69] Bhayat enquired as to who the men were, but they declined to identify themselves either by name or organization. [70] In one session, questions were read from a roll of fax paper from an unknown source. According to Bhayat, he and Saley were held separately from the male Ugandan detainees, but were once able to communicate with one female who they believed was Somali, and saw some male detainees lining up to receive food. [71]

Despite the considerable news coverage their detention received, both in Uganda and South Africa, Bhayat and Saley were held in Kololo for 11 days without charge. [72] They were deported from Uganda the day that their lawyer had secured a habeas corpus hearing, on August 29, 2008. [73]

No alleged Al-Qaeda suspect has ever been charged with terrorism in Uganda.

Detention of Foreigners

Former Kololo detainees interviewed by Human Rights Watch reported that they saw foreigners, such as Somalis, Rwandans, Eritreans and Congolese, in the JATT compound. The presence of foreigners was documented notably in July 2006 when, during a meeting of the Parliamentary Committee of Internal Affairs and Defence, parliamentarian and shadow Minister of Internal Affairs and Human Rights Kyanjo Hussein stated that JATT was holding 30 Rwandan and Congolese detainees. [74] The committee did not investigate Kyanjo's allegations of illegal detention by JATT. The whereabouts of the 30 men is unknown, though it is believed that they were eventually released. [75] Former Kololo detainees also told Human Rights Watch that they believed foreigners were held by JATT for failing to possess authentic travel documents.

Detention in the Kololo Compound 

The JATT compound in Kololo, an upmarket suburb of Kampala where many embassies and ambassadors' residences are located, is at the top of Kololo Hill Lane. The plot has been notorious for illegal detention and torture for well over a decade. Supreme Court Justice George Kanyeihamba told Human Rights Watch that in 1994, in his role as Senior Presidential Adviser on International and Human Rights Affairs, he directly informed President Museveni that he had reports of torture at the location, that people heard screams of agony from the facility, and that the government should conduct an inquiry. [76] Nonetheless, the government has not investigated allegations of torture and illegal detention at Kololo to date. In 2005, the government admitted that this location contained JATT offices to the UN Committee against Torture (while denying that the offices were used for detention.) [77]  

The use of the Kololo site as a safehouse came to light most vividly in March 2006 when the Daily Monitor newspaper reported the incident discussed previously in which Ronald Kasekende fled into the compound of the Danish Ambassador's residence. More recently, two diplomats who reside in the area told Human Rights Watch that they had been concerned about the use of the Kololo site for both torture and unlawful detention, because they had heard screams of pain from the location. In spite of this situation, they have not taken any action to urge the government to investigate abuses there. [78]  

JATT agents frequently attempt to conceal the location of the detention site to detainees. During transport to the site, some detainees reported to Human Rights Watch that they were told to keep their heads down or they would be hit with the butt of a gun. [79] Others were blindfolded while transported, and sometimes for long periods of time after arrival at the compound, to keep them disoriented. [80]

The property is close to the top of Kololo Hill, near the Summit View military area which was a notorious torture and detention center before 1986. It comprises a residential house with a reception room and offices on the top floors. According to former detainees, male detainees were held most frequently in the garage space under the house, referred to by former detainees as "the go-down," though some were held for short periods of time upstairs in various rooms of the house. [81] Some women were kept on the porch of the house, or in the rooms of the house. A water point for detainees to share exists, as well as a small separate building with toilet facilities. Former detainees reported to Human Rights Watch that detainees were occasionally held in the toilet area as well. [82]  

Detainees-especially those held for very long periods of time and for whom security became slightly more lax-also described to Human Rights Watch being able to see specific sites from beyond the compound wall. Some remarked seeing the television and radio antennae located on the summit of Kololo Hill, towering over the suburb. Some also described being able to see the flags of the embassies in the area. [83]

Most detainees told Human Rights Watch that they eventually came to understand that they were in Kololo in the custody of JATT, either via other detainees or by overhearing the place referred to by their captors. Some saw written evidence of who was detaining them. One woman, who was arrested in 2008 because her husband was suspected of rebel involvement, told Human Rights Watch:

Men grabbed me and pushed me into the car after they blindfolded me. . . I couldn't see very much but I could hear. We went somewhere and then they took me out of the car. The man who took me out went up some steps into a house and I was left outside all night. It wasn't until 4 p.m. the next day that they took off the blindfold. They were kicking me and slapping me and tightening the blindfold. I could hear other people around. When they brought me inside the next day I was put in a room where it said, 'No one is allowed to use this office but JATT' on a piece of paper on the wall. [84]

In some instances, the military has indicated publicly that individuals were being held in the JATT facility in Kololo for long periods of time without charge, despite its illegality as a place of detention and the constitutional requirement to be brought before a judge after 48 hours. For example, on October 27, 2007, UPDF spokesman Maj. Felix Kulayigye told the media that Hanifa Nalukwago had been arrested and was being held by JATT, pending further investigations, for alleged involvement with the ADF. [85] On December 20, 2007, Kulayigye stated that Nalukwago had not been charged in court and that she was still in detention at JATT headquarters in Kololo at that time. [86] She was eventually released on February 24, 2008, without charge. [87]

Arrests by JATT

Arrests by JATT documented by Human Rights Watch violate Ugandan criminal procedure at several stages. It is unclear if those carrying out these arrests are members of the police, military, or intelligence agencies or are paid informants. Under all circumstances, Ugandan law requires that certain procedural safeguards be respected, including when someone is arrested pursuant to a lawful warrantless arrest. For example, a police officer may carry out an arrest without a warrant if in his or her view the person is reasonably suspected of having committed certain cognizable offenses. [88] Police must then bring a person arrested without a warrant in front of a magistrate "as soon as is practicable." [89]

Among the 25 former detainees interviewed by Human Rights Watch, none were shown arrest or search warrants, and none were handed over to police or brought in front of a magistrate until months after their arrest.

Ugandan criminal procedure law allows for some blurring in the boundaries between the military and police functions. Although the Ugandan armed forces and the Uganda Police Force are independent bodies under the Ugandan constitution and governed by different acts of parliament, [90] UPDF "officers and militants" enjoy the "powers and duties" of police officers in assisting civil authorities where a "riot or other disturbance of the peace is likely to be beyond the powers of the civil authorities to suppress or prevent." [91] Given that the vast majority of arrests documented in this report took place not in civil disturbances or combat situations, but instead when individuals were at their homes or places of work, members of armed forces acting for JATT could not be said to be acting under this legal provision. However, even assuming that the armed forces could be understood to be assisting the civil authorities during JATT operations, its personnel would be bound by the same procedural safeguards attached to searches, arrests, and detentions by police officers. Human Rights Watch has previously documented abuses by members of the Ugandan military carrying out law enforcement operations. [92]

The terms of the UPDF Act appear ordinarily to limit the armed forces' power of arrest to service members. [93] As far as Human Rights Watch is aware, Ugandan law does not set out specific procedural safeguards that must be followed in the authorization of searches, arrests, and detentions by armed forces or CMI personnel and it is unclear under the UPDF Act to what extent the military may undertake searches, arrests, and detentions of civilians or civilian property. [94]

In the incidents researched by Human Rights Watch, those carrying out searches, arrests, detention and interrogation in Kololo and at CMI did not identify themselves, either by name or by official affiliation, according to multiple sources. [95] Arresting agents did not display an identity card, as is usual practice according to CMI statements to the media. [96] One former detainee told Human Rights Watch that when he asked the individuals who were arresting him who they were, they said they were "not the police and not the military, but in between." [97]

Cars and pickup trucks used during arrests are also typically unmarked.

One former detainee described her arrest to Human Rights Watch:

Suddenly six men came in where I was renting a room. They entered the house and said they were looking for me . . . They came in plain clothes and they didn't say where they were from. I had no option but to agree to what they said. They searched my house and they turned everything upside down. My two young children were there. There was a vehicle waiting outside. . . . They put me in the car, near a man with a gun, an AK-47 [assault rifle]. There was also a driver and a man with another gun. I was put in the back. The one in the front had a pistol. The one in the back, sitting next to me, said that I would eventually tell them everything. We drove up Entebbe road, past Africana hotel, and then we branched off to Kololo. I saw a sign for Kololo and then we reached a house; they hooted the car horn and the gate opened. A man in a UPDF uniform opened. . . . I wasn't blindfolded while we drove there. They tried to force my head behind the seat but I could still see a bit. [98]

Detainees reported that they frequently did not understand what exactly was happening to them and spoke of feeling traumatized by what had occurred during the arrest. One former detainee, who broke into tears when recounting his arrest to Human Rights Watch, said that he was on the road toward eastern Uganda when several men grabbed him off the street and threw him into a waiting minibus. The men sat on him and beat him repeatedly. He could not see where he was being taken. He eventually spent four months in Kololo and another safehouse, where he alleged that he was beaten and tortured and eventually charged with terrorism. [99]

Distinctions between JATT and CMI agents were not apparent to detainees and they often used "JATT" and "Kololo" interchangeably to refer to where they were held. Local sources with knowledge of the situation also indicated that other informal government security groups may occasionally detain individuals at the Kololo facility, particularly the Rapid Response Unit (RRU), which is run by the police and has a detention facility in Kireka, Kampala. [100]

Human Rights Watch research found that the Ugandan armed forces play a central role in the daily work of JATT. Former detainees interviewed by Human Rights Watch stated that there was a constant presence of men in military uniform inside the Kololo plot, guarding the gate, guarding detainees and carrying out some interrogations. Detainees also stated that they were often shuttled between the JATT compound in Kololo and the CMI offices in Kitante, Kampala, and that interrogation and severe beatings took place in both locations, frequently by the same men.

Despite officially being part of JATT, police were generally absent from detainees' descriptions of their detention. No detainee interviewed by Human Rights Watch could recall ever having seen an individual in police uniform or having met someone who identified themselves as a member of the police on any occasion during their detention in Kololo. [101]

Detainees reported learning the names of their interrogators and torturers when mentioned by others during informal communications. Occasionally, a detainee recognized a JATT agent as someone he or she knew from their local community.

Some detainees saw JATT agents in uniforms. One man told Human Rights Watch that he saw men wearing all black clothes inside the CMI compound when he was taken there for questioning. All-black uniforms are the trademark of the Black Mamba Hit Squad, a unit thought to be part of the military intelligence that gained notoriety during the storming of the high court at the case of Dr. Kizza Besigye in 2007. [102]  

According to the head of CMI, the police, military, and intelligence personnel working for JATT are acting under the laws of their respective security forces. Police participating in JATT actions are therefore acting under the Police Act; members of CMI, as members of the army, are acting under the UPDF Act, and members of the intelligence organizations act under those respective laws. [103] Brig. Mugira told Human Rights Watch, "JATT/CMI personnel suspected of committing violations of the law are tried by both civil and military courts depending on the type of offence and the nature of the suspects." [104] He did not respond to Human Rights Watch's queries about any pending cases in which JATT personnel or affiliates had been prosecuted for human rights violations, but agreed that individual criminal liability for abuses such as those documented in this report is important.

Identifying Perpetrators Affiliated with JATT and CMI

Human Rights Watch passed on to the CMI chief the names and aliases of nine people whom its research indicated had carried out arrests that led to detention in Kololo, as well as some incidents of alleged torture. Of the nine people, Brig. Mugira confirmed that six of them are JATT operatives or agents. [105] In a further meeting, he confirmed that another of those nine worked for CMI. [106]

The names of those carrying out arrests and torture in Kololo and CMI emerged repeatedly during interviews with former detainees. Several cited Pvt. Mushabe, Lt. John Mwesigwa, Lt. Asiimwe, also known as "Semakula", Abdul Aziz Mucunguzi, and a man referred to as "Opio" with a large stature as having tortured them, and having tortured others in front of them.[107]Mwesigwa, Asiimwe and Mucunguzi were allegedly involved in one particularly long and brutal episode reported to Human Rights Watch, in which four detainees were taken to CMI, were beaten, and had chili pepper paste rubbed into their eyes, nose and mouth. Two detainees also cited Mwesigwa as having used electricity to torture them during interrogations.

[38]Letter from Brig. James Mugira, CMI, to Human Rights Watch, November 3, 2008, para. 5.


[40] Human Rights Watch interview, Ugandan government official, Kampala, August 10, 2008. This figure was also later cited in the media. See Obed K. Katureebe, "Security bosses swindle America terror money," The Independent, December 19, 2008, http://www.independent.co.ug/index.php/cover-story/cover-story/82-cover-story/413-security-bosses-swindle-america-terror-money?tmpl=component&print=1&page=.

[41]Human Rights Watch interview with Ugandan government official, Kampala, August 10, 2008.

[42]The Daily Hansard of the Parliament of Uganda, March 19, 2002. http://www.parliament.go.ug/hansard/hans_view_date.jsp?dateYYYY=2002&dateMM=03&dateDD=19. At that time, Mayombo was one of the UPDF representatives in Parliament as well as head of CMI.


[44]Interview with Ugandan government official, August 10, 2008.

[45]FHRI, Deprivation of the Right to Life, Liberty and Security of Person in Uganda, Report for the Period January to June 2006, p. 6.

[46]Uganda Human Rights Commission Annual Report 2007, p. 31.

[47]See Human Rights Watch, Hostile to Democracy, (New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999)p. 131-133. "While the charge [of treason] is brought in cases of suspected involvement in one of Uganda's several armed rebel groups, treason charges have also provided the basis for the detention of non-violent political dissidents." and Human Rights Watch, "Uganda: Respect Opposition Right to Campaign," December 18, 2005. www.hrw.org/english/docs/2005/12/19/uganda12321.htm.

[48]Human Rights Watch interview with former detainee C.N., Kampala, August 10, 2008.

[49] U.S. State Department report, Bureau of African Affairs, Uganda country profile, February 2009.

[50]Hans Romkema, "Opportunities and Constraints for the Disarmament & Repatriation Of Foreign Armed Groups in the Democratic Republic of Congo – The Case of the: FDLR, FNL and ADF/NALU," June 2007. http://www.mdrp.org/PDFs/MDRP_DRC_COFS_Study.pdf. p.83.

[51]Human Rights Watch, "HRW Condemns Deadly Attack By Ugandan Rebels On School Children," June 9, 1998. http://www.hrw.org/en/news/1998/06/09/hrw-condemns-deadly-attack-ugandan-rebels-school-children.

[52] Ibid.

[53]Romkema, June 2007, p. 83.

[54]Ibid., p. 82.

[55]"ADF death toll up, M7 thanks Army," The Daily Monitor, April 8, 2007.

[56]"ADF rebels behind fires – Tinyefuza," The Daily Monitor, July 1, 2008.

[57]Statistics provided by the Amnesty Commission, Kampala, January 19, 2009.

[58]"ADF agrees to talks with government," The Daily Monitor, November 17, 2008.

[59]"Chogm - How Security Averted Terror Strike," The Daily Monitor, December 1, 2007.

[60]"UPDF Intercept ADF Arms On Lake Victoria," The Daily Monitor, December 27, 2007.


[62]"Terror Suspects Still in Detention," The Daily Monitor, May 3, 2008.

[63] Human Rights Watch interviews with former detainees, August 2008. Human Rights Watch did not speak with Zubair or Karule.

[64]Charles Ariko, "Former ADF chief seeks amnesty," The New Vision, December 17, 2008.

[65]Eleven days after September 11, 2001, the New Vision newspaper reported that JATT arrested six Pakistanis and a Zambian because of their suspected links to Osama Bin-Ladin. See "Seven Bin-Ladin suspects arrested at airport," The New Vision October 2, 2001. They were freed on October 26, 2001 when the judge hearing a petition for habeas corpus ruled that the state "admitted that it has no lawful grounds to keep them in custody.""Uganda frees six Pakistanis," AFP, October 26, 2001.

[66]E. Ssejjoba and S. Candia, "Police issues countrywide terror alert," The New Vision, October 3, 2008. Available at http://www.newvision.co.ug/D/8/12/652888. Andrew Bagala, "Uganda on terrorism alert," The Daily Monitor, October 4, 2008. Available at http://www.monitor.co.ug/artman/publish/news/Uganda_on_terrorism_alert_72576.shtml.

[67]Grace Matsiko, "Six held over terrorism," The Daily Monitor, November 27, 2008.

[68]Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Mufti Bhayat, November 26, 2008.

[69]Diary of Events, Mufti Bhayat, September 3, 2008. On file with HRW.

[70] Ibid.

[71]Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Mufti Bhayat, November 26, 2008, and Grace Matsiko and Lominda Afedraru, "Uganda deports suspected South African terrorist," The Daily Monitor,  August 20, 2008.

[72]Grace Matsiko & Lominda Afedraru, "Uganda deports suspected South African terrorists," The Daily Monitor, August 30, 2008. http://www.monitor.co.ug/artman/publish/news/Uganda_deports_suspected_ South_African_terrorists_70718.shtml. Juggie Naran, "Muslim aid workers tell of detention" September 14, 2008, The Sunday Tribune. Uganda confirms arrest of South Africans, August 24, 2008, The Mail and Guardian, http://www.mg.co.za/article/2008-08-24-uganda-confirms-arrest-of-south-africans.

[73]Human Rights Watch telephone interview with Yousha Tayob, lawyer for Haroon Saley and Mufti Bhayat, November 26, 2008.

[74]Charles Kazooba and Jumah Senyonga "Ugandan MP exposes Rwandan illegal arrests in Kampala" published in English by Rwandan newspaper The New Times website on July, 19, 2006.

[75] Human Rights Watch interview, name withheld, August 11, 2008.

[76] Human Rights Watch interview with Justice George Kanyeihamba, Kampala, January 26, 2009.

[77]"Allegations of the existence of a JATF (sic) detention centre in Kololo were unfounded. . . The building in question contained JATF (sic) offices." The Committee against Torture, Summary record, May 23, 2005 http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/898586b1dc7b4043c1256a450044f331/832ff33b3880c194c125700c0029d42e/$FILE/G0541841.DOC.

[78]Human Rights Watch interview with diplomats in Kampala, August 2008 and January 2009.

[79]Human Rights Watch interview with former detainee C.N., August 10, 2008. Human Rights Watch interview with former detainee P.N., August 19, 2008. Human Rights Watch interview with former detainee C.B., September 21, 2008.

[80] Human Rights Watch interview with former detainees, O.V., August 28, 2008 and A.C., August 7, 2008 and Human Rights Watch interview with former detainee O.G, August 10, 2008.

[81] Human Rights Watch interview with former detainee C.N., August 10, 2008. Human Rights Watch interview with former detainee P.N, August 19, 2008. Human Rights Watch interview with former detainee C.B., September 21, 2008.

[82] Human Rights Watch interview with former detainee C.B., September 21, 2008.

[83] Human Rights Watch interview with former detainee C.N., August 10, 2008. Human Rights Watch interview with former detainee T.U., August 20, 2008.

[84]Human Rights Watch interview with former detainee O.G., August 10, 2008.

[85]Tom Malaba, "Kampala Woman Held Over ADF Boat," Uganda Radio Network, October 27, 2007.

[86]Tom Malaba, "Army Denies Arrest of 60-Year-Old Terrorism Suspect," Uganda Radio Network, December 20, 2007.

[87]Human Rights Watch interview with former detainee, January 19, 2009.

[88]Criminal Procedure Code Act of Uganda, Art. 10. Arrest without a warrant can also occur for offense such as breaching the peace, obstructing a police officer from performing his or her duty, escaping lawful custody deserting the armed forces, or offenses defined in Chapter XVI of the Penal Code which defines Nuisances and Offences against Health and Convenience.

[89] Ibid., Arts. 14 and 17.

[90]See Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, 1995, arts. 208-210 (providing for UPDF) and 211-214 (providing for Uganda Police Force); The Uganda Peoples' Defence Forces (UPDF) Act, 2005; and The Police Act, 1994, as amended by the Police (Amendment) Act, 2006.

[91]UPDF Act, sections 42, 43.

[92]See Human Rights Watch, Get the Gun! , Vol. 19, No. 13, September 2007.

[93]UPDF Act, section 185 (authorizing the arrest of "a person" suspected of committing an offense under the UPDF Act, but referring to the arrest of such a persons by his commanding officer). However, the UPDF Act does provide for the appointment of special personnel to "detain or arrest without warrant any person subject to military law [who] is suspected of having committed a service offence" and to "exercise such other powers as may be prescribed for the enforcement of military law. UPDF Act, section 187.

[94]The military has long argued that the General Courts Marital has the power to prosecute civilians for unlawful possession of firearms, terrorism and other "service offences" under the UPDF Act, "since the equipments and means of terrorist activities are carried out using unlawful weapons which are the monopoly of the UPDF." The Supreme Court in January 2009 ruled against this argument, stating "[f]or an offence under an act other than the UPDF Act to be within the jurisdiction of the General Courts Martial, it must have been committed by a person subject to military law." Supreme Court of Uganda, Attorney General vs. Uganda Law Society, Constitutional Appeal 1 of 2006, Decision January 20, 2009. pp. 7-10.

[95]Human Rights Watch interviews with former detainees, August 2008 and January 2009.

[96]This practice of CMI identity cards for employees came to light recently when a man claiming to work for CMI was arrested for involvement in a murder. In response to a reporter's queries about the man's affiliation, Lt. Col. Dominic Twesigome said, "He is not our staff. We don't know him. He is not on our roll. . . . We are not concerned. If he claims to be our staff, let him produce our identity card." See Zurah Nakabugo & A. Wesaka, "Medic held over murder of patient," The Daily Monitor, December 17, 2008.

[97] Human Rights Watch interview with N.U., January 12, 2009.

[98]Human Rights Watch interview with former detainee U.B., August 7, 2008.

[99]Human Rights Watch interview with former detainee O.V., August 28, 2008.

[100]Human Rights Watch phone interview with Uganda Human Rights Commission employee, December 3, 2008.

[101]Some detainees were eventually taken to Criminal Investigations Department for processing. They were charged and brought to Luzira prison.

[102]There are various reports of security personnel donning black uniforms. See Human Rights Watch, "Uganda: Government Gunmen Storm High Court Again, Security Forces Used to Intimidate Judiciary in Case of 'PRA Suspects,'" March 4, 2007. http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2007/03/04/uganda-government-gunmen-storm-high-court-again. See also Sabiiti Mutengesa and Dylan Hendrickson, State Responsiveness to Public Security Needs: The Politics of Security Decision-Making, Uganda Country Study, No. 16, June 2008. http://www.ssrnetwork.net/documents/Publications/psdm/Uganda.pdf, p. 56

[103]Letter from Brig. James Mugira, CMI, to Human Rights Watch, November 3, 2008., para. 4

[104]Ibid., para 6.

[105]Ibid, para. 8.

[106] Human Rights Watch interview with Brig. James Mugira, January 24, 2009.

[107]Human Rights Watch interview with former detainee P.N, August 19, 2008; Human Rights Watch interview with former detainee L.I., August 20, 2008; Human Rights Watch interview with former detainee O.V. August 28, 2008; Human Rights Watch interview with former detainee C.B. September 21, 2008.