VII. The Role of the International Community
The United States
With the growth of the Equatorial Guinea’s oil industry, the United States under the Bush administration sought to improve its relations with the Equatorial Guinean government. Prior to that the US had closed its embassy in Malabo in 1995 partly in protest against pervasive human rights abuses and endemic corruption. The US reopened a limited-function embassy in Malabo in 2003, although the US ambassador in Yaoundé remained concurrently accredited to Cameroon and Equatorial Guinea until September 2006. A resident US ambassador in Equatorial Guinea, Donald C. Johnson, arrived in Equatorial Guinea to take up post on November 14, 2006, ending a break of 12 years.
The reopening of the embassy followed intensive lobbying by the US oil industry, which had argued it was needed to counterbalance growing Chinese influence.[358] US companies have the largest and most visible presence in the country—with investments estimated at US$11 billion—and are the largest cumulative bilateral foreign investors. In 2005 the US was Equatorial Guinea’s main trading partner (24.6 percent), as oil exports to the US reached $3.1 billion. In 2006 and 2007 the US imported some $1.7 billion-worth of goods from Equatorial Guinea, mostly oil- and gas-related. This made the United States Equatorial Guinea’s second-largest export market (16.4 percent) and the single largest source of imports (6.4 percent) in 2007.
Symbolizing this relationship, John Isakson, a senator from Georgia and a member of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee, visited Equatorial Guinea in January 2008, the first visit of a US senator for many years. He visited the Equatoguinean Liquid Natural Gas Plant, as natural gas from this plant is shipped to the port of Savannah in his home state of Georgia. A further signal of closer ties came as US coast guard cutter Dallas concluded a three-day visit to the country on July 11, which included an at-sea exercise involving five Equatorial Guinean naval vessels.[359]
The reopening of a full-fledged US embassy in Malabo was rushed and reduced the US administration’s key leverage tools for encouraging better governance and human rights. The choice of the building to house the embassy (rented for $17,500 a month) was also a mistake. It is owned by the minister of national security, Manuel Nguema Mba, uncle to the president and a controversial figure who has allegedly been involved in torture of opposition supporters in the past.[360] Human Rights Watch believes that the US administration should have conducted better due diligence by finding a more suitable property before the embassy was opened. In effect, the United States is providing income to a senior government member accused of acts of torture.
President Obiang has been a regular visitor to Washington, DC, and he met President Bush in September 2002 at a United Nations meeting with Central African leaders in New York. In June 2004, when President Obiang met then-US Secretary of State Colin Powell in Washington, DC, the Riggs Bank issue was discussed, and President Obiang asked for US assistance in improving its transparency record, including help with the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (see Chapter IV). Obiang also requested US security training assistance from the US private military company Military Professional Resources, Inc.
MPRI assistance is something that Obiang has regularly sought. In 1998 MPRI first had been approached by Equatorial Guinea to put together a National Security Enhancement Plan. MPRI needed approval for such a project by the US Department of State, but the State Department’s Africa Bureau refused because of the country’s poor human rights record. MPRI appealed to the assistant secretary of state for African affairs, but the department’s Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights and Labor opposed that application. MPRI then lobbied the US Congress, and in 2000 and 2001 a contract to assess Equatorial Guinea’s defense needs was approved. MPRI made several trips to Malabo and then submitted a proposal to revamp the armed and police forces, but was granted a license by the State Department in May 2002 to train only the coast guard. US Senator Russel Feingold, a leading proponent of human rights in Africa, was in the forefront of opposition.[361]
This reservation by the Department of State was lifted in 2005, but approval of a training program was made conditional on credible human rights training and visible progress on the government’s commitment toward poverty reduction and fiscal transparency.[362] According to MPRI, their National Security Enhancement Plan for Equatorial Guinea has developed an integrated team of defense, security, and coast guard experts to provide “a detailed set of recommendations to the government of Equatorial Guinea concerning its defense, littoral, and related environmental management requirements, as well as [a] detailed implementation process.”[363]
The MPRI deal followed then-Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Jendayi Frazer’s visit to Equatorial Guinea, during which she met President Obiang on February 15, 2006, for talks on bilateral relations, governance, and oil. Frazer presented Obiang with a “road map” of democracy and transparency goals for his government to follow in its ties with Washington, DC. According to Cindy Courville, then National Security Council senior director for Africa, who accompanied Frazer, Obiang had accepted the US blueprint for stronger ties and more talks would be held “to agree what is do-able.”[364]
The blueprint had a number of specific benchmarks on democratization and human rights (such as focus on legal reforms prior to the 2008 elections, promote freedom of expression and development of a free press, and provide a list of political prisoners, allow US diplomats to visit them, and end the practice of unlimited detention) and economic development (such as developing and implementing a poverty reduction strategy and transparent management of oil wealth, including EITI). There were also benchmarks on humanitarian and social issues and security sector reform (linked to the MPRI program).[365]
As symbols, these benchmarks were important, but there are few signs that they have obtained significant concessions from the Equatorial Guinean government on issues of human rights in return for the two things President Obiang particularly sought and obtained in 2006: the return of a resident US ambassador to Malabo and MPRI training. Even before Jendayi Frazer and Cindy Courville met President Obiang in February 2006, the return of a resident US ambassador was planned for that fall, and MPRI expected to sign their contract with the Equatorial Guinean government that April.[366] There was little effort by the US Department of State or the Bush administration to measure progress on verbal undertakings by the Obiang government about governance and human rights.
President Obiang further endorsed the US Agency for International Development social program in Washington, DC, on April 11, 2006, and committed to make a $15 million contribution to the Equatorial Guinean Social Development Fund.[367] On April 12, 2006, President Obiang met then-Secretary of State Condolezza Rice at the US Department of State. During this meeting, Rice somewhat controversially told Obiang, “You are a good friend and we welcome you.”[368] This meeting attracted some criticism from members of the US Congress and in the Washington, DC press.[369]
This “business first” relationship was echoed when Donald C. Johnson testified before the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee in August 2006.[370] In his testimony he mostly emphasized that “[t]he stability and reliability of a source of raw materials equivalent to more than 350,000 barrels of oil per day from Equatorial Guinea is significantly relevant to our energy security and well-being.” He hardly mentioned human rights issues, but he did say he would “include candid discussions of issues that concern us, including such matters as democracy, human rights, and financial transparency.”[371]
Although Obiang wants to widen his international relationships with the oil industry, especially following the US Senate investigation into money laundering and corruption in July 2004, he still values a close relationship with the United States, and this provides an opening for dialogue on human rights and governance issues. The United States remains Equatorial Guinea’s main trading partner, and the US oil industry is alarmist, worried by increased competition rather than taking a long-term strategic approach toward governance and human rights and the stability that can bring.
The new Obama administration has an opportunity to show that energy security does not have to come at the expense of human rights and good governance. The new administration should show leadership on rights and governance issues. A first step would be to review the lease of the US embassy building to ensure that the United States is not paying rent to an alleged rights abuser. It should also immediately determine whether there are assets in the United States obtained through corruption by senior officials of the Equatoguinean government, and work to repatriate those assets to their rightful owners—the people of Equatorial Guinea. And finally, they should ensure through new or existing laws and regulations that US companies do not become complicit in the corruption and abuses that mar resource-rich countries like Equatorial Guinea.
China
China is currently equally favoured by Equatorial Guinea. Trade with China was 21.8 percent in 2005, and exports from Equatorial Guinea to China rose by 138 percent from $374 million in 2003 to $2.5 billion in 2006.[372] In 2007 China was Equatorial Guinea’s largest export market, accounting for 18.3 percent of the total (mostly oil). Equatorial Guinea established diplomatic relations with China in 1970; President Obiang has visited China six times in the past decade.[373] He announced on his return to Malabo from a tour of Asia including China in October 2005 that “[f]rom now on, China is the main partner with whom we are going to develop Equatorial Guinea.”[374] On February 17, 2006, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation, Ltd., announced it had been awarded a production sharing contract for Block S in one of Equatorial Guinea’s offshore fields.[375] A year later, on his return from Beijing’s Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in November 2006, Obiang stated, “China posed no prior conditions on democracy and human rights in its cooperation with African countries.”[376] During the summit several economic agreements were made between the two countries, the most important of which was the concession by the state-controlled Export-Import Bank (ExIm) of China of a $2 billion oil-backed loan to Equatorial Guinea. In January 2007 Obiang reemphasized that China was Equatorial Guinea’s “best friend” during a visit by Foreign Minister Li to Malabo.
Chinese construction firms are active in Equatorial Guinea as elsewhere in Africa; they work harder and for less, according to Equatoguinean officials. In March 2008 a labor-contractor dispute over salaries escalated into a strike and then open violence by Chinese laborers working for Jianyu Overseas Development Limited, a subsidiary of Weihai Construction Group. The dispute resulted in Equatoguinean police intervening, opening fire and killing two Chinese workers and injuring four others.[377] Despite this incident, China’s Vice-Minister for Foreign Trade Chao Wu-Chen visited Equatorial Guinea on December 8, 2008, and signed agreements with the Equatoguinean government for a series of new public works projects.
Other International Actors
President Obiang in his book My Life For My People noted that the discovery of oil has resulted in reduced pressure on him to reform, including from the international financial institutions and the European Union. He writes,
I have realized that the discovery of oil in Equatorial Guinea and especially the importance of these resources have completely changed the attitude of many of our partners, especially those who were more critical. Suddenly they have become more permissive. I know it is human nature, but not only men have changed in this fashion, institutions have done the same. And I specifically mean the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the European Union.[378]
[358] Ken Silverstein, “US Oil Politics in the ‘Kuwait of Africa,’” The Nation, April 4, 2002, http://www.thenation.com/doc/20020422/silverstein/4 (accessed December 15, 2008).
[359] “Coast Guard Cutter Dallas Conducts At-Sea Exercise with Equatorial Guinea Navy,” US Fed News, July 15, 2008.
[360] Ken Silverstein, “Mba’s House: Bush Administration Renting Embassy from Known Torturer,” Harper’s Magazine, October 25, 2006, http://harpers.org/archive/2006/10/sb-mbas-house-1161784135 (accessed January 28, 2009).
[361] Sunday Dare, “The Curious Bonds of Oil Diplomacy,” The Center for Public Integrity, November 6, 2002, [http://projects.publicintegrity.org/bow/report.aspx?aid=151 (accessed January 28, 2009), p. 5.
[362] Human Rights Watch interviews with State Department officials who did not wish to be identified, Washington, DC, November 2004, June 2005, and October 5, 2006. In his farewell speech on September 28, 2006, outgoing US ambassador Niels Marquardt noted that, “MPRI is partnering with the EG government to provide management, administrative and human rights training to police and military. Their team is living here and already working with the Ministry of National Security and Ministry of Defense. The International Committee of the Red Cross will be part of the training.” [362] R. Niels Marquardt, “Latest Embassy News, Ambassador R. Niels Marquardt Equatorial Guinea Farewell—Talking Points,” September 28, 2006, http://malabo.usembassy.gov/amb_marquardt_farewell_speech.html (accessed December 15, 2008). On January 25, 2007, senior members of MPRI, among them retired US General Willian Kernan, vice president and general manager, met President Obiang and briefed him on the first three months of a five-year program for training of military and presidential security units. “Private US firm trains Equatorial Guinea army units,” Agence France-Presse, January 30, 2007.
[363] MPRI, “MPRI International Africa,” http://mpri.com/site/int_africa.html (accessed April 25, 2007).
[364] “Interview-US Says Democracy Key to Guinea Gulf Oil Stability,” Reuters, February 17, 2006.
[365] Human Rights Watch has copies of these benchmark non-papers on file. These updated a set of nine benchmarks drawn up in 2005: on trafficking in persons; police training; recent mercenary incident; elections; social services; judiciary; conditions in detention facilities; human rights education, and other human rights issues such issuance of visas to international NGOs.
[366] This was still stated on MPRI’s website, http://mpri.com/site/int_africa.html, as of April 29, 2007, but was apparently removed by January 2009.
[367] “USAID and the Republic of Equatorial Guinea Agree to Unique Partnership for Development: Tobias Calls Memorandum of Understanding ‘Landmark Agreement,’” USAID press release, April 11, 2006, http://www.usaid.gov/press/releases/2006/pr060411_2.html (accessed December 15, 2008).
[368] US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman, “Secretary of State Condoleeza Rice and Equatorial Guinean President Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbassogo Before Their Meeting,” April 12, 2006.
[369] Senator Carl Levin, the ranking minority member on the Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, wrote about his concern to Condoleeza Rice on April 27, 2006, and then-Senator Joseph Biden, ranking minority member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, wrote to President Bush on May 17, 2006.
[370] He was confirmed by the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 15, 2006, sworn in as ambassador to Equatorial Guinea on October 16, and arrived in Equatorial Guinea to take up post on November 14, 2006.
[371] US Department of State, “Prospective Envoy Urges Closer US Ties with Equatorial Guinea. US Ambassador-designate Johnson testifies before a Senate Committee,” August 7, 2006, http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display,html (accessed December 15, 2008).
[372] Spain is the third largest trading partner in Equatorial Guinea (10.8 percent), and Equatorial Guinea is the second largest recipient of Spanish aid in sub-Saharan Africa ($9 Million in 2005). See Fundación par alas Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior, “La política exterior y de cooperación de España en Guinea Ecuatorial: Relevancia de los principios democráticos y el papel de la sociedad civil,” Madrid, Informe de Conferencia, December 15, 2006.
[373] According to President Obiang, “Another country that has been very consistent and efficient in its support has been the People’s Republic of China.” Obiang, My Life For My People, p. 147.
[374] EIU, “Country Report: Equatorial Guinea,” January 2006, p. 11.
[375]China Chemical Reporter, no.8 (506), vol .17, March 16, 2006.
[376] EIU, “Country Report: Equatorial Guinea,” January 2007.
[377] Chen Zhouxi, “A Chinese Laborer Recalls Horror in Equatorial Guinea,” The Economic Observer, May 5, 2008.
[378] Obiang, My Life For My People, p. 151.





