II. Background

The Macías Dictatorship, 1968-79

Equatorial Guinea was one of two Spanish colonies in Africa (the other being the former Spanish Sahara, which is now under Morocco’s de facto and disputed control). Upon independence in 1968 Francisco Macías Nguema was elected the country’s first president. Macías quickly abandoned democracy and went on to make Equatorial Guinea one of Africa’s most repressive and dictatorial states; during his rule, an estimated 100,000 people—at the time, approximately one-third of the population—were killed or fled into exile.[1] Widespread persecution of the political opposition and elites began in 1969. A year later all opposition parties were outlawed, and the Partido Unico Nacional (PUN) was created.[2] In 1972 Macías declared himself president-for-life. Once the political opposition was eliminated, the government began to harass and intimidate the Roman Catholic Church, which was seen as another possible institution of opposition.[3] The government claimed, “There is no other God than Macías,” and the phrase “God created Equatorial Guinea thanks to Macías—Without Macías Equatorial Guinea would not exist” became a mandatory part of all church services. In 1975 a decree banning all private education led to the closure of all Catholic schools, and the population was warned that contact with the church would lead to severe punishment. The same year Macías proclaimed himself the “Unique Miracle.”[4] 

The regime was virulently anti-intellectual. Between 1969 and 1976 some 75 teachers or education officials were executed, including three ministers. Hundreds of teachers were fired, causing hundreds of schools to close.[5]

The regime’s hostile stance toward intellectualism was not limited to the education system. Any educated Equatoguineans were seen as a threat, and professionals, such as statisticians, could be killed. As a result little economic data was generated on Equatorial Guinea throughout the 1970s. In fact, the use of the term “intellectual” was prohibited by Macias in 1973.[6]

Economic mismanagement and corruption were rife, and relationships with trading partners such as Spain were strained. Due to pilferage, ignorance, and neglect, the country’s infrastructure fell into ruin under Macías. The private and public sectors of the economy were devastated and the agricultural sector, historically known for cocoa of the highest quality, has never fully recovered from the crippling effects of this 11-year dictatorship. The country was the poorest in central Africa and one of the most heavily indebted by the time Macías was deposed in 1979.[7]

Obiang—Democracy Pledged but Authoritarianism Preserved

Macías was deposed on August 3, 1979, in a military coup by his nephew and then-minister of defense, Lt. Col. Teodoro Obiang Nguema Mbasogo.[8] As president, Obiang—not to be outdone by his predecessor and uncle—continued in the tradition of consolidating absolute and self-aggrandizing power. State-run radio announced in July 2003 that Obiang was “like God in heaven.... He has power over men and things.... He can decide to kill without anyone calling him to account and without going to hell because it is God himself with whom he is in permanent contact, who gives him strength.”[9]

Under Obiang, schools have reopened, primary education has expanded, and public utilities and roads have been restored; to that extent his rule compares favourably with Macías’s tyranny and terror. But the US Department of State and other institutions have criticized the Obiang government for not investing in genuine reform and the development of public institutions.[10] Widespread corruption and a dysfunctional judicial system undermine development of society and the economy.

Obiang pledged to restore democracy, but there has been little real progress in that direction. Initially, Obiang ruled the country with the assistance of a Supreme Military Council. The United Nations Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR) helped draft a new constitution in 1982, and this came into effect after a popular vote on August 15 that year. Obiang remained in power for a further seven-year term before being elected for the first time in 1989. In February 1996 he was re-elected with 98 percent of the vote after several opponents withdrew from the race and international observers criticized the election.[11] Despite the pledge to restore democratic rule, the country remained a one-party state until 1991, when multiparty politics were introduced under another new constitution that permitted opposition parties. In reality, what organized political opposition has emerged is under constant threat, while Obiang, along with a circle of advisors drawn largely from his own family and ethnic group, and his party, the Democratic Party of Equatorial Guinea (Partido Democrático de Guinea Ecuatorial, PDGE, founded in 1987 and replacing PUNT), control all aspects of the government. As described by the US Department of State in 2008, “The president names and dismisses cabinet members and judges, ratifies treaties, leads the armed forces and has considerable authority in other areas as well.”[12]

Political arrangements and regional balance of power

The geography and ethnic makeup of Equatorial Guinea have important repercussions for the balance of political power within the country. Equatorial Guinea consists of a mainland portion, situated on the west central African coast between Gabon to the south and Cameroon to the north, and five islands. The smaller islands of Corisco, Elobey Grande, Elobey Chico, and adjacent islets, along with the nearby mainland, together make up the continental region known as Rio Muni. Bioko Island, where Equatorial Guinea’s capital, Malabo, is located, lies roughly 40 kilometers (25 miles) off the coast of Cameroon to the north (see Map of Equatorial Guinea).

While the majority of the Equatoguinean people are of Bantu origin, historical divisions between the many Bantu-speaking peoples of the region still exist today. The largest Bantu tribe, the Fang, constitutes roughly 80 percent of the population of Equatorial Guinea. The Fang are indigenous to the mainland, but substantial migration to Bioko has resulted in their dominance over the tribe of Bantu inhabitants native to the island, the Bubi.

Traditionally, Equatorial Guinea’s prime minister has been from the Bubi minority, which constitutes just six percent of the country’s population. The last Bubi prime minister, however, was Miguel Abia Biteo Boricó: following the forced resignation of Boricó’s cabinet in August 2006 on charges of corruption and incompetence (a charge the president has levelled against members of his government on various occasions), Obiang broke with tradition and appointed as prime minister Ricardo Mangue Obama Nfubea, a Fang.[13] Nfubea’s government had the same fate as its predecessor less than two years later, in July 2008, with Obiang adding accusations of destabilizing the country to charges of corruption and mismanagement[14] (the corruption allegations against successive recent governments are elaborated in the next chapter). Notwithstanding Obiang’s declaring that “[w]e must change the entire government,”[15] later that month half of the old cabinet was reinstated in a new administration headed by Prime Minister Ignacio Milam Tang, also of Fang decent.

Discrimination against ethnic Bubi who are not part of the dominant political party is widespread.[16]

Political parties and the political opposition

As control of the government—and corresponding access to rising oil revenues—becomes increasingly lucrative, the democratic process in Equatorial Guinea has not improved, and the government has consistently been able to avoid accountability in elections. Equatorial Guinea is nominally a multiparty democracy, but through the use of criminal prosecutions, intimidation, and coercion, the PDGE-led government has managed to maintain an effective monopoly over political life. The extremely high stakes represented by the oil boom have led to ever-increasing political control over an already weak opposition, whose members the government has regularly intimidated, exiled, or imprisoned.

After the 1991 constitution legalized political parties, a January 1992 law on party formation initiated the process of party organization. The 1992 law, though, restricted party membership and activity to those who had lived continuously in Equatorial Guinea for 10 years. Since some opposition politicians had been in exile since independence, the effect was to prohibit serious opposition. Obiang established the ruling PDGE as the country's sole legal political organization in 1987. The Convention Liberal Democratica, the Unión Popular (UP), and the Alianza Democratica Progresista all were recognized in 1992. The Partido del Progreso de Guinea Ecuatorial (PPGE) was legalized after a long delay and, in 1993, the Partido Socialista de Guinea Ecuatorial (PSGE) was approved. The Convergencia para la Democracia Social (CPDS), a key opposition party and the only one that engages in any type of human rights monitoring, was granted recognition in 1993.[17] By mid-1993, 13 legal opposition parties stood prepared to contest elections. Political parties, however, continued to face harassment, and in June 1997 the PPGE was banned by presidential decree. The government accused the PPGE leader, journalist Severo Moto, of plotting a coup against Obiang, linking him to arms intercepted by Angolan authorities on a Russian boat destined for Equatorial Guinea. Moto went into exile in Spain, but the government continued to seek his extradition to face trial. In March 2004 he became associated with another coup attempt (see Chapter VI), and was accused of a further coup plot in 2008 (see Chapter V).

As of 2009 there may be as many as 33 political parties in Equatorial Guinea. However, some may not be legally registered. Of the legally recognized parties, 11 formally oppose the ruling PDGE but are nevertheless pro-presidential, to the extent that they accepted inclusion into a government of national unity proposed by President Obiang in 2003. Only the CPDS is actively opposed both to the PDGE and to Obiang. In 2007 the US Department of State noted the dominance of the PDGE and the cost of being in opposition:

The government pressured public employees to join the ruling ... party. Reportedly they are forced to allow automatic deductions from their paychecks with proceeds going to the party whether or not they were members. Opposition party members are regularly discriminated against in hiring, job retention, scholarships, and obtaining business licenses. A business found to have hired someone on a political blacklist had to dismiss the person or face the threat of closure.[18]

Elections

There have been no free and fair elections since independence in 1968. The calling of elections has often been accompanied by intimidation and imprisonment of the opposition; the government has typically used the pretext of thwarting a coup attempt as justification for its actions (see Chapter V).

In elections for the Chamber of People’s Representatives (parliament) held in November 1993 Obiang’s PDGE won more than three-quarters of the seats amid a partial boycott led by the anti-government Combined Opposition Platform. A similar situation prevailed for the February 1996 presidential election, from which the three main opposition parties withdrew, and Obiang was elected unopposed. The September 1995 municipal elections were the freest held in Equatorial Guinea to date. Although there had been some harassment prior to the elections, the campaign was fairly quiet, and voting on the day was free. The government, however, refused to accept the results and placed its own people in the councils.[19] The bulk of the opposition once more boycotted the legislative elections in March 1999, and the PDGE inevitably won a massive majority—75 out of 80 seats.

In the run-up to the December 2002 presidential election there was again a crackdown on the political opposition. The elections were announced at short notice, and the four main opposition candidates withdrew on polling day, claiming the process was flawed. Independent observers who visited Equatorial Guinea during the election period described many irregularities,[20] and the European Union and United States criticised the conduct of the election.[21] As a result of the opposition candidates’ withdrawal Obiang was re-elected with over 97.1 percent of the vote. The ruling party’s victory in the concurrent local government elections was more emphatic still, with a clean sweep of all 30 municipalities.

April 2004 elections

On February 20, 2004, the president dissolved the Chamber of People’s Representatives, and legislative and municipal elections were held on April 25, 2004. The results gave the PDGE 98 of 100 seats in the new single-chamber parliament and 237 out of 244 city councillorships.

According to the US Department of State’s assessment of human rights practices in 2004, the Equatoguinean government harassed opposition party members prior to the elections and subjected them to arbitrary arrest. PDGE members, according to the report, also went door-to-door seeking out and threatening opposition supporters.[22] On election day the CPDS complained of multiple procedural violations and fraud. The State Department noted “widespread reports of irregularities, including intimidation at the polls. Voters were discouraged from voting in secret, ballots were opened, and ruling party representatives cast votes in their own right as well as on behalf of children and the deceased. There also were reports that security forces intimidated voters by their presence in polling booths. There was a lack of observers in rural areas.”[23] The Spanish government questioned the validity of the election results when its observer mission “detected important irregularities that distorted the electoral process.”[24] Nonetheless, local election officials said that the vote had been free and fair with 95 percent turnout, and they stressed the use of transparent ballot boxes which they said had prevented ballot stuffing.[25]

May 2008 elections

The most recent legislative elections, for 100 parliamentary seats and 230 municipal councillor posts, were held in May 2008.

In early April the PDGE forged an alliance with nine small parties that also supported Obiang.[26] Only three parties participated in the election outside the alliance: the opposition CPDS, and two other parties that were pro-presidential but had opted not to ally with the PDGE, UP and Accion Popular de Guinea Ecuatorial (APGE).

As in previous years, in the run-up to the elections there were allegations of coup attempts,[27] and consequently an increased military and security presence on the streets of all major towns. The Ministry of Defense also closed land and sea borders from April 22 until the elections took place, claiming it was necessary to improve national security and avoid external interference in the polls. On election day there were also allegations from the opposition of harassment and many irregularities at polling stations.[28]

The European Union did not send observers because the government’s invitation came too late to organize a mission. The authorities refused visas to major Spanish media outlets even though they had submitted visa applications on time—weeks before in some cases.[29] Three Spanish parliamentary deputies who visited the country during the elections, while welcoming the fact that a vote had been held, voiced their concerns about the process.[30]

The US Department of State reported,

A small, mixed contingent of international observers characterized the elections as an improvement over the last legislative and presidential elections, which were severely marred by irregularities and were not free and fair.... Despite these improvements over past elections, there were reports of notable electoral irregularities, including harassment of opposition supporters and voters at polling stations and during the campaign, some of which was captured on video by the opposition CPDS, and several reports by the international media of the failure by local election authorities to ensure voting by secret ballot. A respected humanitarian organization with personnel working in different parts of the country characterized the election as “not very transparent.”[31]

On May 9, 2008, the National Electoral Commission announced that the PDGE and its allies had obtained 99 of 100 seats in the parliamentary elections, the remaining seat going to the CPDS. The PDGE also swept the board in the concurrent local elections.[32]

Upcoming presidential elections

Political instability and uncertainty, resulting from a lack of democratic and transparent practices and reflecting the weaknesses of a political system built around the personality of the president and a small circle of his relatives, have made succession to Mr. Obiang a divisive issue. As another presidential election draws near—Obiang has said it will take place in December 2009—this uncertainty has proved increasingly corrosive to the political status quo. Tensions among sub-clans of the Fang ethnic group, especially resentment of the political dominance of the Mongomo sub-clan, are a constant source of unrest. The growing prosperity of the Mongomo through their control of economic activities, including construction and services to the oil industry, has exacerbated the situation. Mr. Obiang’s announcement in August 2006 that he would run for re-election in 2009 was in part an effort to reduce speculation about who would succeed him.

Human Rights Record of Recent Governments

The devastating human rights violations in Equatorial Guinea under Macías resulted in the United Nations (UN) focusing, belatedly, on the country’s situation. After the 1979 coup, and following a request by the new government for technical assistance on how to improve human rights, the UNCHR in 1982 appointed an independent expert on Equatorial Guinea to monitor the situation. The expert retired in 1992, and in 1993 the UN appointed a special rapporteur for Equatorial Guinea, a title that comes with a much wider mandate. By 1999 the human rights situation in the country was perceived as “improved,” and the UNCHR appointed a special representative instead. The special representative’s mandate was narrower than that of the special rapporteur—although it also included a call for implementation of technical assistance programs—and it was only renewed for two years, until 2002, when governments sympathetic to Obiang successfully lobbied against its continuation.[33] In his final report the last special representative, Gustavo Gallón, stated,

The problem can be summarized as the absence of any genuine rule of law under what is actually a single-party regime (although in formal terms multiparty politics is permitted) functioning with the support of a military whose powers are no different from those of the police and which even exercises jurisdiction over civilians. Following the overthrow of Francisco Macías’ dictatorship in 1979 by his nephew ... the Government proclaimed itself democratically based and accordingly established a number of democratic institutions; however, the population lacks any legal safeguards and any person can be deprived of his liberty at any moment and has no effective remedy to impede, rectify, or repair that situation.[34]

Gustavo Gallón was referring to the lack of due process, the lack of freedom of expression and association, and the arbitrary manner by which the government acted, which continues to be a hallmark of Equatorial Guinea in 2009.

There are no independent human rights organizations in the country.[35] In fact, there is very little civil society in Equatorial Guinea at all. There are signs that the country is opening up somewhat under pressure to meet Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative criteria from the World Bank, the US and EU governments, and companies. However, these are very nascent efforts, and it is far from clear that the government will allow independent civil society to function in regard to EITI or in general. A United States Agency for International Development (USAID)-led initiative, the Technical Support Project for Social Investment and Capacity Building in Equatorial Guinea (TSPSICB), is tasked to engage in nongovernmental organization capacity building. In its design and implementation plan TSPSICB highlighted that “existing capacity of civil society is extremely underdeveloped and requires a significant amount of investment and support to enable them to reach a level to be effective actors for Equatorial Guinea.”[36]

The following chapters detail endemic governmental corruption and financial mismanagement, and how these have contributed to widespread poverty and deprivation, in some cases violating human rights under the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). The government’s dereliction in allocating funds for crucial social services such as primary health care and primary education, in large part because of corruption and maladministration, is in breach of its obligations under articles 12 and 13 of the ICESCR.[37]  The government of Equatorial Guinea has also violated its treaty obligations to report on its compliance with the ICESCR: compliance reports under the ICESCR were due in 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005; to date, Equatorial Guinea has yet to submit even one.[38]

The lack of transparency and accountability in oil revenue management impedes Equatoguineans’ right to access information, in violation of article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR).[39]  The government of Equatorial Guinea has also failed to meet its treaty obligations to report on its compliance with the ICCPR. An initial compliance report was due in 1988; absent this report, the Human Rights Committee issued provisional concluding observations on the situation of civil and political rights in Equatorial Guinea in November 2003, calling on the government of Equatorial Guinea to submit its initial report by August 1, 2004.[40]  To date, this report has not been submitted.

The Onset of Oil

Equatorial Guinea is emerging as one of the fastest growing economies in Africa. After the discovery of massive oil reserves in the 1990s, it has become the fourth-largest producer of oil in sub-Saharan Africa, after Angola, Nigeria, and Sudan.[41] Oil revenue climbed in value from US$3 million in 1993 to $190 million in 2000 to $4.8 billion in 2007. Recent discoveries of oil were expected to increase production of hydrocarbons to about 465,000 barrels per day (b/d) in 2008.[42] However, unless there are further significant discoveries oil production will start to decline in 2009.

From 2003 to 2008 Equatorial Guinea’s real annual gross domestic product grew on average by 14.9 percent per year. The International Monetary Fund estimated that the oil sector accounted for nearly 74 percent of the country’s GDP and that oil revenues comprised approximately 82 percent of government revenue in 2007.[43] By 2008, the country’s GDP was estimated at $18.5 billion—an increase of 5,272 percent between 1992 and 2008—almost completely from oil revenue.[44]

US oil companies, such as ExxonMobil, Hess, Marathon, Chevron Corporation and Vanco Energy Corporation, are the principal investors in the country. The country has become one of the main destinations of US investment on the continent (over $12 billion to date), the fourth-highest in sub-Saharan Africa (after South Africa, Angola, and Nigeria).[45] 

Companies in the oil business have been anxious to improve the image of the country and so underplay how politically unstable the country has become. They avoid political discussion or meeting the opposition directly.[46] According to opposition leader Plácido Micó, oil has had a “negative impact” on the democratic process and has managed “to strengthen the dictatorship” in the country. He argued that oil wealth has also made Equatorial Guinea more resilient to international pressure to improve its human rights record.[47]