January 2004
Afghanistan's human rights situation remains tenuous. Since a U.S.-led coalition ousted the Taliban in December 2001 and helped create a transitional government under President Hamid Karzai, there have been some successes in restoring essential governance, improving basic security, and building systems to ensure the rule of law. A new constitution adopted in January 2004 includes significant protections. But human rights practices have not improved markedly or indeed at all in large parts of the country.
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- The Rule of the Warlords
- The Taliban
- Women and Girls
- The Bonn Process: Off Track
- The Afghan Constitution
- Key International Actors
The Rule of the Warlords
Since the fall of the Taliban, Human Rights Watch has documented criminality and abuses by warlord forces all over the country: those under Atta Mohammad and Rashid Dostum in the north, Ismail Khan in the west, Hazrat Ali in the east, Gul Agha Shirzai in the south, Abdul Rasul Sayyaf near the center, and, Mohammad Qasim Fahim, the senior vice president and minister of defense, in Kabul itself and surrounding areas. Many other less powerful warlords are also implicated in ongoing abuses.
The list of documented violations is extensive. Local security and police forces, even in Kabul city, are involved in arbitrary arrests, kidnapping and extortion, and torture and extrajudicial killings of criminal suspects. Outside of Kabul, commanders and their troops are implicated in extortion, intimidation of political dissidents, rape of women and girls, rape of boys, murder, illegal detention and forced displacement, as well as specific abuses against women and children, including trafficking, sexual violence, and forced marriage. High-level commanders in Kabul, Kandahar, Herat, and other cities are also involved in property seizures and forced displacement.
The Taliban
Local factions are not the only problem. In the south and southeast of the country, Taliban remnants and other anti-government forces outside Afghanistan's political framework have further aggravated security conditions by attacking humanitarian workers and coalition and Afghan government forces. In 2003 and early 2004, numerous humanitarian workers in the south and southeast have been kidnapped, beaten up, shot at, and even killed. Over thirty-five schools in the south and southeast, mostly for girls, have been rocketed or burned since August 2002.
As a result of attacks, international agencies have suspended many of their operations in the affected areas. As a result, development and humanitarian work has suffered.
Women and Girls
Women and girls bear some of the worst effects of Afghanistan's insecurity. Conditions are generally are better than under the Taliban, but women and girls continue to face severe governmental and social discrimination. Those who organize protests or criticize local rulers face threats and violence. Soldiers and police routinely harass women and girls, even in Kabul city. Many women and girls are afraid to remove the burqa. Because soldiers are targeting women and girls, many are staying indoors, especially in rural areas, making it impossible for them to attend school, go to work, or actively participate in the country's reconstruction. The majority of school-age girls in Afghanistan are still not enrolled in school.
The Bonn Process: Off Track
Afghanistan's current political arrangements were set up under the December 2001 Bonn Agreement, a power-sharing agreement signed by representatives of various Afghan factions and a handful of other political figures invited by the United States and United Nations. The Bonn Agreement, among other things, set up a six-month interim authority for Afghanistan and mandated a conference (the June 2002 Emergency Loya Jirga) to choose a second "transitional administration" to serve though 2004, as well as a constitutional convention (the December 2003 Constitutional Loya Jirga) to choose a new charter for the country. Democratic elections for offices created under the constitution were to be held two years later, that is, in mid-2004.
The Bonn Agreement specified that separate military groups and factions were to come under the authority of the interim authority headed by President Karzai. The agreement also called on factions signing the Bonn Agreement to withdraw from Kabul city and other areas in which international forces might be deployed.
But the Bonn Process is not on track. On the surface, many of the Bonn Agreement's provisions have been honored, but in fact many of its aspirations have not been met. Overall, the political process for both the Emergency Loya Jirga and the Constitutional Loya Jirga did not increase legitimate political representation but instead entrenched existing factions.
Afghan factional forces have not unified; in some areas in the north there are regular clashes between rival groups sometimes resulting in civilian casualties. Military factions occupying Kabul have not withdrawn from the city, and efforts in January 2004 to have factions withdraw heavy weapons from the city have met with only partial success.
The Afghan Constitution
Despite the democratic shortcomings of the Constitutional Loya Jirga, the new Afghan constitution it approved in January 2004 included significant provisions, notably on women's rights. The constitution guarantees women a substantial number of seats in Afghanistan's bicameral National Assembly. Approximately 25 percent of seats in the Wolesi Jirga (House of the People) are reserved for women; the president is obligated to appoint additional women in the Meshrano Jirga (House of Elders). Another provision of the constitution specifically guarantees equality between men and women under law.
The document contains several provisions enunciating basic political, civil, economic, and social rights, but little strong language empowering institutions to uphold them. The Afghan Independent Human Rights Commission is given a mandate, but lacks many of the powers necessary for it to credibly protect basic rights.
The constitution fails to adequately address the role of Islamic law and its relationship to human rights protections. Human Rights Watch is concerned that extremist factions could use appointments to the new judiciary to implement laws that violate human rights standards.
The issue of accountability for past atrocities is also not addressed in the document. Despite Afghanistan's recent history, the charter does not directly address issues of past war crimes and serious human rights abuses. The AIHRC may be able to delve further into this area, but it lacks any specific constitutional mandate to do so.
Key International Actors
The government of Hamid Karzai has been unable to adequately address Afghanistan's security and human rights problems, and in many cases has preferred to negotiate and cooperate with leaders implicated in abuses, as have U.S. government officials in the country, who continue to be influential actors in Afghanistan's political processes.
The international community generally has not done enough to address Afghanistan's security situation. The U.N.-mandated International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), a small body of security troops predominately comprised of Canadian and German troops, is still mostly limited to Kabul city. NATO, which commands the force, has stated that it wants to expand its geographic scope, but contributing nations have not promised enough additional troops.
The United States has been expanding small Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) of 50-100 troops to several areas, but they have had only limited successes in improving human rights protections and security. The small size of the teams and their often close working relationship with local Afghan militias—the very forces who are creating abusive and insecure environments in the first place—have stymied further progress.
The United States, the most important and involved international actor in the country, has not taken the steps necessary to lead other nations in providing security, troops, funding, and political leadership to secure Afghanistan's future. But NATO member states and other potential troop contributors are also to blame for not providing more troops to ISAF and adequate overall funding for international efforts in Afghanistan.
The general failure of U.N. member states to provide an underlying security framework for reconstruction in Afghanistan has made it impossible for UNAMA to carry out many parts of its mandate.
But the leadership of UNAMA is also to blame for consciously limiting its criticisms of Afghan warlords and its efforts to monitor human rights and security. As a result of these decisions, no detailed and comprehensive human rights reporting is being conducted by the international community in Afghanistan, except by non-governmental groups like Human Rights Watch. To make matters worse, in its resolution on Afghanistan in 2003 the U.N. Commission on Human Rights failed to insist on improved rights monitoring and protection efforts.
