IV. Punitive House-Burning

House-Burning as a Means of Persecution

In all the cases documented in this report, the families whose houses were burned have alleged insurgents among their close relatives, usually sons or nephews. There can be no doubt that the families' houses were burned in retribution for this. In most cases, prior to the house-burning, law enforcement and local administration officials strongly pressured the families to bring their relatives home "from the woods" and threatened them with severe repercussions for failure to do so. Some burnings occurred very soon after a rebel attack in the vicinity and therefore appeared to have been motivated by retribution.[37] Also, as noted below, two government officials have acknowledged that families were targeted for house-burning because of their relatives who were alleged insurgents,[38] although they denied this was a government policy.

The house-burning documented in this report is not the only means the Chechen authorities use to threaten and punish families of suspected insurgents, and to force insurgents to surrender. At least one homeowner was also tortured and arbitrarily detained, and another described how his nephews were nearly abducted.[39] Two other interviewees said they so greatly feared that their remaining sons would be abducted, tortured, or killed in retribution that they sent the young men to either other parts of Russia or even abroad to ensure their safety.

Nor are these practices new-they began at least as early as 2001.[40] During the next few years a leading Russian human rights nongovernmental organization (NGO), Memorial Human Rights Center (Memorial) documented several cases in which federal forces killed or took hostage relatives of alleged insurgents and demolished their houses. Starting in 2004, as Chechen law enforcement and security agencies began to play a much greater role in the  reprisals against relatives of insurgents became much more frequent. In a high-profile case, in March 2004 Magamed Khambiev, the then-minister of defense for Chechen separatists, surrendered to Ramzan Kadyrov when at least 40 of his relatives, including women, were taken hostage (some of them held in empty gasoline tanks dug into the ground).[41]

The first public threat to family members of insurgents was made by Akhmad Kadyrov on May 1, 2004, when, just a few days before his assassination, he called for the punishment of families and even neighbors of rebel fighters. The very next day, in the village of Alleroi (Kurchaloi district), "Kadyrovtsy" burned the houses of two families whose sons had been involved in the insurgency.[42]

After the killing of his father, Ramzan Kadyrov reiterated Akhmad Kadyrov's threats and the "Kadyrovtsy" launched a campaign of threats, killings, abductions, and enforced disappearances against insurgents' families. In a highly publicized case, seven relatives of Aslan Maskhadov, the separatist leader, were kidnapped by members of Kadyrov's forces in December 2004 and held in an illegal prison until May 31, 2005.[43] House-burning continued to be among the tactics against families of alleged insurgents. For example, according to

Memorial, in December 2004 alone Kadyrov's forces burned the homes of three alleged insurgents.[44]

2008: Surge in House-Burning

Between mid-summer 2008 and early spring 2009, Memorial identified 25 cases of punitive house-burning in seven districts of Chechnya. This represented a dramatic surge in the practice compared to prior years. The burnings took place in the following districts: Kurchaloi (10 cases), Shali (six), Vedeno (four) Naur (two), and one each in Shatoi, Achkhoi-Martan, and Grozny districts.[45] Human Rights Watch confirmed that all of these homes were in fact burned, and documented in detail 13 cases.[46] The present report includes only those cases for which we were able to interview victims and witnesses to the burnings and visit the sites.[47]

The house-burnings documented in this report generally were perpetrated at night.[48] The perpetrators would arrive at the victim's home in several cars, break into the yard, and force the residents out of their house. If there was another house on the family compound, which is quite common in Chechnya, people were led there and locked inside to prevent them from interfering.[49] Otherwise they were simply forced onto the street and prevented from approaching their home. The assailants treated residents roughly, and ignored their questions, pleas, and screams. They offered no explanation as to their own intentions or actions. If any neighbors dared try to interfere on behalf of the residents, they were chased away.

Usually, the perpetrators went about the torching in a businesslike manner. They piled the furniture together-to create a pyre of sorts-putting easily flammable objects such as curtains and bed linens on top. They brought containers of gasoline from the trunks of their cars, doused the house with it thoroughly, and set it alight. In one case Human Rights Watch documented, witnesses reported that the assailants looted valuables before lighting the fire. They would stay for up to an hour watching the fire spread to make sure the residents or their neighbors did not attempt to put it out before the house was fully ablaze.

The assailants warned victims clearly that trying to complain about the house-burning or draw any attention to their situation would be counterproductive and lead to negative repercussions. In only six cases known to Human Rights Watch did victims file complaints with the prosecutor's office either on their own or via Memorial, which, as explained below, did not result in investigations. On its own initiative, Memorial also informed the Chechnya prosecutor's office of most of the other cases.[50] The Chechnya prosecutor's office forwarded the information to the relevant district prosecutor's offices. The district prosecutor's offices in turn forwarded the information to the investigative committees of relevant district police authorities, which have jurisdiction to investigate crimes of arson (article 167 of the Russian Criminal Code).[51] The last in this chain of referrals creates a vicious circle due to the fact that the crimes themselves, as will be discussed below, were allegedly perpetrated by personnel of the Chechnya Ministry of Internal Affairs. For example, a family in the village of Mesker-Yurt who reported the burning of their house to the authorities was threatened by the district law enforcement authorities and forced to provide a written statement that the fire had been caused by their own carelessness. At this writing, not a single criminal case into allegations of punitive house-burning has been opened.

Government Responsibility for Punitive House-Burning

Chechen authorities do not acknowledge responsibility for punitive house-burning. But in 2007 and 2008 high-level Chechen officials, including President Ramzan Kadyrov, made numerous public statements stressing that insurgents' families should expect to be punished unless they convinced fighters related to them to surrender.

In May 2007 Chechnya's then-Deputy Prime Minister Adam Delimkhanov and Minister of Internal Affairs Ruslan Alkhanov held a meeting with family members of alleged insurgents. According to Memorial, the gathering, which involved approximately 100 law enforcement and security servicemen and as many civilians, was called to address the gradual increase in the number of young men leaving their homes to join the insurgents. Delimkhanov stressed that if the young men were caught by police "they'll have their heads cut off" and indicated that their relatives should not expect any mercy. Alkhanov, in turn, said that families of insurgents were helping their relatives in the woods by providing them with food supplies and that they would punished. He added that the neighbors of such families also had to be punished as they could not but know about the intentions of insurgents but failed to report them.[52]

When speaking at a televised meeting of his cabinet on August 9, 2008, President Kadyrov stressed,

[W]e must resort to Chechen customs-in the past, such people were cursed and ousted [from society]. It's normal. They [relatives] pass on information to their family members in the woods ... They warn them ... They bring them food, help them, and the rebels kill our policemen and burn our houses. There is not a single family that does not maintain connections with their relatives in the woods ... So, those families that have relatives in the woods are all collaborators in the crime; they are terrorists, extremists, Wahhabis, and devils. Some of them publicly renounce their relatives [insurgents] in hope to be left alone [by us] but they continue helping them in secret.

Following upon the remark urging "Chechen customs" of retribution,[53] Kadyrov ordered district police and especially district administration heads to boost "work in that direction" with family members of insurgents.[54]

Such statements by the president can be clearly interpreted as a direct threat to the families and a call for punitive measures addressed to law enforcement agencies. At the very least, they suggest that punitive measures would be tolerated and condoned.

One week later the mayor of Grozny, Muslim Khuchiev, reinforced this message at a televised meeting with relatives of insurgents. Ali Tagirov, deputy minister of internal affairs of Chechnya, and Nikolai Simakov, head of the ministry's Criminal Police Service, were also present at the meeting. Khuchiev addressed family members of alleged rebel fighters with explicit threats of revenge:

Today, we are not having a dialogue with you based on the laws of this state; we'll be acting in accordance with Chechen customs ... [Y]ou know very well what your relatives are doing. They're killing sons of other people whom those people love no less than you love your sons, and we cannot leave those killings without response. This cannot continue, and in the future you will have to find your relatives and bring them back home. In the future, if your relatives commit an act of evil, this evil will be brought upon you, your other family members and even your descendents ... The evil perpetrated by your relatives from the woods will come back to your own houses and in the very near future every one [of you] will feel it on your own back. Everyone who has relatives in the woods will feel the accountability, each and every one! Because what your children are doing will touch upon you ... If you really want to help us, here is a camera, address your children and tell them to come back to normal life ... You have a chance to save your children and protect yourselves from revenge.[55]

The mayor's speech was supported by Deputy Minister Tagirov and followed by televised images of the distressed relatives of insurgents crying on camera and begging their sons to return home.

Some district administration heads had already "boosted up work" with families of insurgents before Kadyrov's order. For example, according to Memorial, on August 1 (eight days before the president's televised speech) the head of Argun administration, Ibragim Temirbaev, summoned 17 families residing in Argun and told them they had to leave town unless they brought their insurgent relatives back from the woods. At least two families left right away.[56] In Argun rumors were circulating that houses of those refusing to cooperate would be burned. Though at the August 1 meeting, Temirbaev said no such punitive actions were being planned,[57] only three days later, on August 4, the house belonging to the G. family was torched by unknown servicemen in camouflage uniforms (see Chapter V, section on Shali district). Also on August 4, several other families were visited by members of the law enforcement who allegedly had orders to ensure that those families leave their homes.[58]

In most cases documented in this report, house-burning took place after the occupants had been summoned to police numerous times and explicitly warned about unspecified consequences should they fail to convince their family members to quit the insurgency.

Official Responses to Allegations of House-Burning

When discussing the problem of house-burning with Human Rights Watch, the ombudsman of Chechnya, Nurdi Nukhazhiev, told us that servicemen were involved, but in their private capacity, and he acknowledged and the law enforcement servicemen involved in such activities were committing a crime. He stressed that they were acting "impulsively and solely of their own initiative" and suggested they were motivated by a desire to avenge their colleagues and relatives:

For example, insurgents torch a policeman's house or ambush a group of servicemen, so their mates jump up, put on the masks, and attack a house of a known rebel's family ... I, by no means, condone their actions-private property is protected by law-but I kind of understand on a personal level what's driving them to it.

Nukhazhiev emphasized that such actions were unlawful and unacceptable as "we cannot fight bandits resorting to their own methods." He expressed hope that, with the end of the counterterrorism operation in Chechnya in April 2009,[59] the law enforcement and security agencies would be strictly bound by the rule of law and such incidents would end. While he lamented that the perpetrators were able to act with impunity he provided the following explanation:

Those servicemen are acutely aware of the fact that thousands of innocent people were murdered and disappeared by Russian military and security forces and, no one was held accountable for those heinous crimes. And they are thinking, federal servicemen and their generals killed with impunity for years, so will someone actually punish me for taking revenge for my family members and mates killed by the Wahhabis?[60]

The ombudsman agreed that televised statements by President Kadyrov and Mayor Khuchiev could have been interpreted by some individual members of the law enforcement as giving them "a green light" for violence. However, he stressed that such interpretation was wrong and never intended:

When the president spoke about the families' responsibility he was referring to our traditions ... he means it as a warning to those who have an itch to leave [for the woods], to kill. Some people misunderstand his message due to poor education and low level of professionalism, and we must work with them, we must explain it to them.[61]

Nukhazhiev said that he brought the issue of house-burnings to the attention of Ramzan Kadyrov in early autumn 2008 after he received a statement on this issue from human rights groups.[62] Nukhazhiev said Kadyrov responded, "No one should be using my name for cover and each and every one must act within the framework of the law. No one has a right to kick people out into the street and burn their houses."[63]

Human Rights Watch is not aware of evidence that Kadyrov ever made any attempts to bring the perpetrators to justice. Burning of houses belonging to families of insurgents continued throughout autumn to winter 2008 and at least two punitive house-burnings were perpetrated in spring and early summer 2009.    

In an interesting contrast to the Chechen ombudsman, a chief expert of the Department for Liaison with NGOs and Religious Organizations within the Administration of the President of the Chechen Republic, Movsar Orzaliev, assured Human Rights Watch that the president was not aware of the practice of punitive house-burning. Orzaliev lamented that the problem was probably being kept from Ramzan Kadyrov on purpose:

The president does not put a stop to this because he simply does not know. He is a very busy man. And he listens to what others are telling him and only few people have access. So, the information does not reach him and he's not aware of the problem. If he had only known he would've stopped them. He is such a kind man ... He never told anyone to burn those houses. He was just very frustrated with young men joining rebels and made some comments about family responsibility and how parents should prevent their children from setting on a wrong path and bring them back home if they've already left. Then, some people in the law enforcement agencies misinterpreted and misused his words to promote their own objectives. But this is something of which he is not aware. And it's also difficult to prove anything.[64]

Another Chechen official, Timur Aliev, advisor to Kadyrov, said he only learned of the problem of house-burning from Human Rights Watch and doubted the president could be aware of it.[65]

House-Burning, Collective Punishment, and Russia's Legal Obligations

The arbitrary destruction of individual's homes and property cannot be justified under any circumstances, and constitutes grave violation of many basic rights protected under Russian's human rights obligations. In particular, such actions by agents of the state constitute violations of the victims' rights to family and home life, to property, and to shelter. However, in light of the hardship the destruction imposes on victims, and given that the purpose of the destruction is a form of collective punishment, such actions also constitute at least inhuman and degrading treatment and punishment. Russia is a party to several human rights treaties including the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),[66] the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),[67] and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR)[68], which impose binding obligations on Russia with respect to all of the rights violated by the policy of house-burning.

A strategy of house-burning was also extensively pursued by the Turkish military in their conflict with Kurdish insurgents. In several cases brought by victims whose homes had been burned down by the security forces the European Court of Human Rights consistently held that there could be no doubt that the deliberate burning of victims' homes by the security forces constituted grave and unjustified interference with the right to respect for their private and family life, and home and property, in violation of article 8 and article 1 of Protocol 1 to the ECHR respectively.[69]

In the 1998 case Selcuk and Asker v. Turkey, the Court went further, not only finding the government in violation of the rights to home, family life, and property, but also ruling that by burning the applicants' homes the security forces subjected them to cruel and degrading treatment in breach of article 3 of the Convention (prohibition of torture and cruel and degrading treatment). The Court stressed, "Their homes and most of their property were destroyed by the security forces, depriving the applicants of their livelihoods and forcing them to leave their village. It would appear that the exercise was premeditated and carried out contemptuously and without respect for the feelings of the applicants."[70] It concluded that the applicants "must have been caused suffering of sufficient severity for the acts of the security forces to be categorized as inhuman treatment within the meaning of Article3."[71] Notably, in its ruling the Court specifically emphasized that "Article3, as the Court has observed on many occasions, enshrines one of the fundamental values of democratic society. Even in the most difficult of circumstances, such as the fight against organized terrorism and crime, the Convention prohibits in absolute terms torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment... and no derogation from it is permissible under Article15 even in the event of a public emergency threatening the life of the nation."[72]

Likewise, the Court found Turkey in violation of article 3 of the Convention in the case of Dulas and others v. Turkey in 2001 and in Ahmet Özkan and others v. Turkey in 2004.[73] In Özkan the Court noted that "the destruction of the applicants' homes and possessions, as well as the anguish and distress suffered by members of their family, must have caused them suffering of sufficient severity for the acts of the security forces to be categorized as inhuman treatment within the meaning of Article 3 ... Even assuming that the motive behind the actions of the security forces was to punish the applicants and their relatives for their alleged involvement in, or support of, the PKK [Kurdish insurgency], that would not, in the opinion of the Court, provide a justification for such ill-treatment."[74]

As a mode of forced eviction, house-burnings also constitute a violation of article 11 of the ICESCR, which establishes the obligation to protect the right to adequate housing including protection against forced eviction.[75] Involving the arbitrary destruction by the state or its agents of resources that individuals and families have invested in building their homes, forced evictions have long been termed a gross violation of human rights.[76]