April 8, 2009

X. Responsibilities to Monitor and Oversee JATT

Role of the Executive  

The president of Uganda has a critical role to play in curtailing abuses and ensuring that the manner in which law enforcement and counterterrorism operations are conducted does not violate international and national law. Under the constitution, the president has a duty to safeguard the constitution and the laws of Uganda and to promote the welfare of the citizens.[226] The abuses documented in this report illustrate serious violations of the constitutional right to be free from torture as well violations of Ugandan criminal procedure.

As Commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the president has a direct role to play regarding abuses perpetrated by the army, such as military intelligence personnel operating under JATT. Under the UPDF Act, he holds the power to appoint the Chief of Defence Forces who is responsible for the command, control and administration of the armed forces.[227]President Museveni has taken swift action to suspend members of the armed forces suspected of embezzlement on two occasions.[228]

The president has the power to influence how the types of abuses documented in this report are addressed. The president should issue direct orders to JATT and CMI personnel to cease illegal detention and torture of suspects. He should order that Ugandan law be respected at each stage of any criminal investigation or counterterrorism operation. Human rights monitors and the Uganda Human Rights Commission should be granted access to detainees in any detention facility, including those in Kololo. Prosecutors should have the independence in which to investigate torture and illegal detention by JATT. Those found to be responsible for abuses should have their active service to the state terminated and should be held to account. The president should ensure that no one prevents or obstructs such investigations.

Role of National Security Council and Key Ministries

The National Security Council (NSC), chaired by the president, is also a vital government organ which should insist on an end to violations of human rights and Uganda law committed by ad hoc security groups like JATT, and on accountability for those abuses. [229] The NSC is comprised of all the key government actors in the security and law enforcement sector, including the Ministers of Internal Affairs, Foreign Affairs, Defence, Security, Finance and the Attorney General as well as the heads of the military, the police, External Security Organisation, Internal Security Organisation, Special Branch, Military Intelligence, the Criminal Investigation Department and the Prisons Commissioner. [230]

The Council has a mandate to advise the president on matters relating to national security and to coordinate and advise the president on policy matters related to intelligence and security. [231] In this capacity, all NSC members should ensure that intelligence is gathered while adhering to international and Ugandan law, and that human rights are respected in the course of any security or intelligence operations. When abuses by state actors are reported, NSC members should encourage accountability by fair and credible trials for those accused of any wrongdoing.

The Role of the Justice Law and Order Sector (JLOS)

In 2001, Uganda established a sector-wide approach to improve service delivery and coordination in the administration of justice and maintenance of law and order, known as JLOS. The sector comprises ten government institutions which "collectively implement reforms that have been drawn from a single policy and expenditure plan, under the leadership of the Government of Uganda." [232] JLOS is supported by a consortium of donor countries which act as development partners.

The sector's objectives include promoting of rule of law and due process and "fostering human rights culture across all sector institutions" as well as improving access to justice.[233]The sector has had some success, increasing institutional and personnel capacity in the justice sector, working to decongest prisons and trying to reduce the backlog of legal cases pending before the courts.

According to the June 2007 JLOS annual report, the sector "will have to focus on . . . increasing respect for the suspects' rights to freedom from torture and other forms of ill treatment." [234] This focus should include ungazetted places of detention, such as Kololo, and encouraging victims to report abuses by JATT. 

Though the armed forces are not part of JLOS, the sector provides an important forum in which the abuses documented in this report should be addressed. The police, the Directorate of Public Prosecutions and the judiciary may work from evidence collected by JATT personnel, and human rights abuses committed during JATT investigations directly impacts the ability of the sector to attain its objectives.

The Role of Parliament

The Uganda Parliament has a crucial role to play in overseeing the activities of intelligence and law enforcement operations. Because JATT is a joint operation between four agencies, two parliamentary committees have oversight powers: the Committee on Defence and Internal Affairs (PCDIA), which covers the Ministry of Defence (and the UPDF and CMI) and the police, and the Committee on Presidential Affairs, which covers both the Internal and External Security Organizations. According to the rules of procedure for Parliament, these committees are mandated to examine and comment on policy matters affecting the ministries covered by them, as well as to evaluate relevant programs, make appropriate recommendations, monitor the performance in their respective areas and to ensure government compliance with approved activities. [235] The committees are both "sessional," meaning that their membership, chairmanship, and agenda can change year to year. [236]

In the past, the PCDIA has responded to concerns about torture and illegal detention, albeit not apparently with the rigor or transparency that meaningful oversight involves. For example, in 2002 the PCDIA formed an ad hoc select committee to undertake a study of torture, and safehouses and other places of ungazetted detention. [237] Parliamentarians visited five locations run by security organizations, including the JATT offices in Kololo accompanied by then head of CMI, Col. Noble Mayombo. The committee concluded that it could find no traces of torture in any of the five locations. Some parliamentarians questioned the report's findings, saying in the press that it was an "open secret that state security agencies torture suspects in detention centres." [238] According to one member of that committee, that report was never made public and its recommendations, if there were any, were never implemented. [239]

Since then, Parliament and its committees with specified oversight functions have not addressed the specific human rights violations committed by JATT documented in this report. A former chairperson of the committee member interviewed by Human Rights Watch believed that the PCDIA had the power to summon CMI or officials from JATT and require them to provide information about their activities, but that they had not done this. [240]

According to some members of parliament (MPs), Parliament's oversight of the military and any of activities involving the army has been historically weak because the military are represented in Parliament, serve as members of various committees including the PCDIA, and have, at times, chaired the PCDIA . [241] This meant that the military could effectively carry out oversight of itself. Under the current Rules of Parliament, passed in 2006, active members of the military can not serve in committee leadership. The PCDIA has, therefore, had civilian parliamentarians as chairpersons, but other obstacles have prevented the committee from having serious impact on reining in the ad hoc security services such as JATT. Several MPs interviewed by Human Rights Watch noted that because the committee members change regularly, the lack of continuity makes it difficult to track abuses or see patterns of abuse by the security sector. [242] As one MP on the PCDIA stated, "When the year lapses, what wasn't completed tends to die a natural death." [243]

One current member of the committee voiced a desire to do sufficient research to have pertinent facts and make serious recommendations that could have long-term impact, but claimed that without more resources and staff with relevant technical expertise, the committees could not perform their mandated activities. [244] One parliamentarian, a member of the National Resistance Movement party, told Human Rights Watch: "We come from different backgrounds and with a huge variety of knowledge of defense issues. Without a better understanding of how to engage with the military, committee members often sit there like listening posts and take no action." [245]

MPs from both the opposition and ruling parties suggested other, fundamentally political, considerations that prevent parliamentary committees providing effective oversight of defense and intelligence work in Uganda. One stated that because the ruling NRM constitutes the majority on each committee, the committee members would find it very difficult to find fault with the actions of the security organizations, especially the military, no matter what resources are made available. [246] Another MP said that the intelligence agencies provide misleading information to parliament members and the public. [247] Another said that because of the history of military leadership in Uganda, Parliament has problems separating concerns for national security from how operations are conducted: "There are simply issues, especially related to how security operations are carried out, that we cannot discuss." [248]

Parliament and specifically the mandated committees have an important role to play in curtailing abuses by JATT and other ad hoc agencies. One parliamentarian noted that there should be a standing committee on human rights that could sustain pressure on intelligence, military and law enforcement to respond to allegations of abuse. [249] Without more efforts by parliament to oversee how JATT operates, who carries out arrests and how persons arrested are treated while in custody, JATT will continue to receive a classified budget without anyone from the elected government or the public questioning its conduct and abuses will likely continue.

The Role of the Uganda Human Rights Commission

The constitutionally enshrined Uganda Human Rights Commission (UHRC) was established to investigate human rights violations and to have access to and monitor detention conditions. [250] The commission, which is a standing body with judicial powers, is empowered to subpoena any witness or document, order the release of any detained person, and recommend payment or compensation, or any other legal remedy after it finds the existence of a human rights abuse. [251] The agency of government found responsible for torture or other illegal conduct by the commission may appeal the decision to the High Court. In some cases the commission has awarded damages for torture. Many such cases are pending before it.

Since 1997, the UHRC has investigated 3,155 torture complaints, and the UHRC tribunal has held hearings on some of those cases. In 2007, the Uganda Police Force, the Ugandan military and the Violent Crimes Crack Unit had the most complaints lodged against them, although there were also complaints against others, including military intelligence, JATT, and local government. [252] More than 60 percent of the 2007 complaints resolved involved allegations of torture.

Though the UHRC has the mandate to visit places of detention, investigators from the commission have rarely been granted access to the Kololo facility and have never been permitted to enter the safehouse-the garage where many victims report being held. In one instance in which UHRC staff was granted access, they found individuals who were dressed in army uniforms, allegedly members of the armed forces who had committed offenses such as being AWOL and some minor offenses. The military claimed that they had no civilians in custody. [253]

The government frequently fails to pay compensation for torture, as decided by the UHRC. [254] According to the Commission, "the implication [of monetary compensation] is that torture cases are costly, causing a taxpayer to lose money. . . . The trends in the violation of the right to freedom from torture have been consistent for the last consecutive three years and government has to find a solution to this problem." [255] The Commission has frequently complained that when awards are made, however, compensation is not paid out rapidly or with great frequency. [256] The UHRC has pointed out that "there is lack of political will to prevent torture that is further reflected in government's failure to honour compensations awarded by the UHRC." [257]

A disadvantage of the UHRC as an avenue for recourse in cases of torture is that its awards are not as generous as a victim might receive by retaining an attorney to take the case to the High Court. Another weakness is that decisions by the UHRC do not hold individual state officials or their superiors criminally responsible for their actions. While victims of abuse in custody are able to obtain some measure of compensation, those responsible for the abuse continue to benefit from the prevailing climate of impunity.

[226] Constitution of the Republic of Uganda, art. 99.

[227] UPDF Act, art. 8.

[228]Grace Matsiko and Risdel Kasasira, "Gen. Museveni fires Brigadier over 250m," The Daily Monitor, August 19, 2008.

[229]The National Security Council was established by the National Security Council Act 12 of 2000.

[230] National Security Council Act, 2002, art. 4 "Composition of the Council."

[231]Ibid., art. 3, "Functions of the Council."

[235]Rules of Procedure of the Parliament of Uganda, June 14, 2006, Rule no. 161.

[236]This is as opposed to standing committees which have a 2.5 year tenure. Rule no. 132.

[237] See Human Rights Watch, State of Pain, vol. 16, No. 4, March 2004, p. 70.

[238]Kennedy Lule, "MPs' Torture Report Clears State Agencies," The Daily Monitor, April 10, 2003.

[239]Human Rights Watch interview with MP, Kampala, January 29, 2009.

[240] Human Rights Watch interview with MP, Kampala, January 27, 2009.

[241]Ibid. Rule of Procedure (2006), 160 (6) states that "The Party or Organization in Government shall designate the Chairperson and Deputy Chairperson of each Sessional Committee provided that no active Member of the Uganda Peoples Defence Forces shall be designated Chairperson or Deputy Chairperson of the Committee on Defence and Internal Affairs."

[242]Human Rights Watch interview with MP, Kampala, January 22, 2009, MP, Kampala, January 27, 2009, MP, January 29, 2009.

[243]Human Rights Watch interview with MP, Kampala, January 29, 2009.

[244]Human Rights Watch interview with MP, Kampala, January 22, 2009.

[245]Human Rights Watch interview with MP, Kampala, January 27, 2009.

[246]Human Rights Watch interview with MP, January 29, 2009.

[247]Human Rights Watch interview with MP, Kampala, January 22, 2009.

[248]Human Rights Watch interview with MP, January 27, 2009.

[249]Human Rights Watch interview with MP, January 29, 2009.

[250] The UHRC was established under articles 51 to 59 of the 1995 constitution.

[251]Uganda Constitution, article 53 (1). The court powers include the issuance of summons and the power to compel testimony, on pain of contempt of court; however, the UHRC cannot investigate any matters pending before a court of law. The powers, functions, and structure of the UHRC are implemented in greater detail by the Uganda Human Rights Commission Act passed by parliament in 1997. Human Rights Watch, Protectors or Pretenders: Government Human Rights Commissions in Africa (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2001), http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/2001/africa/index.html.

[252]Uganda Human Rights Commission, Tenth Annual Report, 2007, p. 22.

[253] Human Rights Watch email communications with staff member of the Uganda Human Rights Commission, February 11, 2009.

[254]Uganda Human Rights Commission, Tenth Annual Report, 2007, p. 27.

[255]Ibid.

[256] Ibid., p. 104.

[257]"Govt fails to ratify law on torture," The Daily Monitor, August 31, 2008.