General Background on the Military-Political Crisis in Côte d'Ivoire
For 30 years following independence in 1960, Côte d'Ivoire enjoyed relative stability and economic prosperity under the leadership of President Felix Houphouët-Boigny, an ethnic Baoulé and Roman Catholic from the geographic center of the country. The pillars of Houphouët-Boigny's post-independence political and economic policy included a focus on export-driven agriculture as a development strategy, an open-door immigration policy, and extremely close ties with the former colonial ruler, France, which assured the government's security. During these years, Côte d'Ivoire become a key economic power in West Africa, a global leader in cocoa and coffee production, and a magnet for migrant workers who would eventually come to make up an estimated 26 percent of its population.[2]
While Côte d'Ivoire may have been the economic motor of the sub-region, it was not a model for governance and accountability. Houphouët-Boigny's Democratic Party of Côte d'Ivoire (Parti Démocratique de la Côte d'Ivoire, PDCI) monopolized political activity in an autocratic, single-party state. While his PDCI governments nominally reflected the ethnic and religious make-up of the country, maintenance of power was based on an "ethnic coalition" strategy involving groups from Côte d'Ivoire's north and center.[3]Many southern and western groups felt excluded and politically frustrated under Houphouët-Boigny's reign.[4]
In the late 1980s, the "Ivorian miracle" began to flounder on the rocks of plummeting cocoa prices and rising foreign debt, leading to a serious economic recession. The foundations of Houphouetism began to crumble. Combined with the impact of structural adjustment measures imposed by international financial institutions and donors, the recession affected not only the cocoa and coffee sector, but also general employment opportunities. As a result, an increasing number of educated urban youth could not find work.[5] As joblessness and frustration rose, so too did pressure from opposition parties and civil society (including trade unions and student groups) to reform and democratize Côte d'Ivoire's one-party state.
Battle for Succession
The death of Houphouët-Boigny in 1993 marked the formal beginning of an overt battle for political succession that would bring Côte d'Ivoire to the brink of disaster. As candidates representing the principal ethnic and geographic blocs began vying for the presidency in the run-up to the 1995 elections, questions of ethnicity and nationality came to the fore.[6] In order to exclude rivals, politicians began to employ the rhetoric of "Ivoirité" (or "Ivorianness")-an ultranationalist and exclusionary political discourse focusing on Ivorian identity and the role of immigrants in Ivorian society that marginalized perceived outsiders.[7]
The opposition party, Rally of Republicans (Rassemblement des Républicains, RDR), which since its formation has been dominated by Ivorians from the largely Muslim north, boycotted the 1995 election after the candidacy of former prime minister Alassane Dramane Ouattara was effectively barred.[8] Voicing concerns about transparency, the Popular Ivorian Front opposition party (Front Populaire Ivoirien, FPI) led by current president Laurent Gbagbo also boycotted the election, and Henri Konan Bédié of the PDCI won with 96 percent of the vote.
During Bédié's six-year rule, allegations of corruption and mismanagement multiplied, and he increasingly relied on ethnic favoritism to garner support in an unfavorable economic climate. Political opposition groups, including the RDR and FPI, formed an alliance to combat this "misrule" called the Republican Front. This coalition later disintegrated due to internal friction.
The 1999 Coup and 2000 Elections
In December 1999, General Robert Gueï, a Yacouba from the west and former army chief of staff, took power in a coup following a mutiny by non-commissioned officers.[9] Nicknamed "Santa Claus in camouflage," Gueï was initially applauded by most opposition groups as a welcome change from the longstanding PDCI rule and Bédié's corrupt regime. However, Gueï's pledges to eliminate corruption and introduce an inclusive Ivorian government were soon overshadowed by his personal political ambitions, the repressive measures he used against both real and suspected opposition, and near-total impunity for human rights abuses by military personnel.[10]
Throughout 2000, Ivorian politics became increasingly divided along ethnic and religious lines. Elections in this inauspicious climate would prove to be, in the words of President Gbagbo, the winner of those elections, "calamitous."[11]
Several weeks before the October presidential election, the government deemed the majority of candidates ineligible, including both Alassane Ouattara of the RDR and former president Bédié of the PDCI, resulting in an electoral contest between Laurent Gbagbo's FPI party and General Gueï.When it became clear that Gbagbo had the upper hand on election day, Gueï attempted to disregard entirely the election results and seize power, leading to massive popular protests and the loss of military support. General Gueï fled the country on October 25, 2000 and Laurent Gbagbo was installed as president a day later.
Soon after Gueï's flight, RDR supporters-calling for new elections "with no exclusion"-clashed with FPI supporters and were targeted by government security forces, resulting in many deaths. The killings, the most violent episode of political violence in Côte d'Ivoire's post-independence history, shocked Ivorians and members of the international community alike, grimly highlighting the danger of manipulating ethnic loyalties and latent prejudice for political gain.[12]
Efforts by President Gbagbo to include members of opposition parties in his government were seen as largely symbolic, and throughout 2001-2002 political tensions remained high.
The 2002 War
On September 19, 2002, rebels from the Patriotic Movement of Côte d'Ivoire (Mouvement Patriotique de Côte d'Ivoire, MPCI), whose members are drawn largely from the predominantly Muslim north of the country, attacked Abidjan, the commercial and de facto capital of Côte d'Ivoire, and the northern towns of Bouaké and Korhogo.[13] The rebels' stated aims were the redress of recent military reforms, new elections, an end to political exclusion and discrimination against northern Ivorians, and the removal of President Gbagbo, whose presidency they perceived as illegitimate due to flaws in the 2000 elections. Although they did not succeed in taking Abidjan, the rebels encountered minimal resistance and quickly managed to occupy and control half of the country. Rapidly joined by two other western rebel factions, they formed a political-military alliance called the New Forces (Forces Nouvelles, FN).[14]
The armed conflict between the government and the New Forces ended in May 2003 with the signature of a total ceasefire agreement.[15] Since 2003, the country has effectively been split in two with the New Forces based in Bouaké, controlling the land-locked north, and the government holding the south, where the majority of the country's estimated 20 million inhabitants live.
Peace Agreements
Since the end of hostilities in 2003, France, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union, and the United Nations have all spearheaded initiatives to end the political-military stalemate in Côte d'Ivoire. These efforts resulted in a string of unfulfilled peace agreements, a peak of over 11,000 foreign peacekeeping troops on the ground to prevent all-out war and to protect civilians, and the imposition of a UN arms embargo in addition to travel and economic sanctions.[16]
In March 2007 President Gbagbo and rebel leader Guillaume Soro signed a peace accord negotiated with the help of Burkina Faso President Blaise Compaoré ("The Ouagadougou Agreement"), and later endorsed by the African Union and the United Nations Security Council.[17] The Ouagadougou Agreement is the first to have been directly negotiated by the country's main belligerents on their own initiative and resulted in the appointment of Guillaume Soro as prime minister in a unity government. Implementation efforts following signature have resulted in important milestones in the peace process, even if accomplishment of major prerequisites to elections, including voter registration and disarmament, has thus far been lacking.[18] Presidential elections are currently scheduled in late November, some three years beyond the expiry of President Gbagbo's constitutional mandate.[19]
The Human Rights Fallout from the Crisis
The human rights fallout from the crisis for civilians living on both sides of the political-military divide has been and continues to be devastating.[20] Political unrest and the impasse following the 2002-2003 armed conflict between the government and northern-based rebels have been punctuated by atrocities and serious human rights abuses attributable to both sides including extrajudicial killings, massacres, sexual violence, enforced disappearances, and numerous incidents of torture. These abuses have been continued in large measure due to a prevailing culture of impunity.
Rebels in Côte d'Ivoire carried out widespread abuses against civilians in some areas under their control. These included extrajudicial executions, massacres, torture, cannibalism, mutilation, the recruitment and use of child soldiers and sexual violence including rape, gang rape, egregious sexual assault, forced incest, and sexual slavery. Liberian combatants fighting alongside Ivorian rebel groups were responsible for some of the worst crimes. However, even after their departure, various forms of violence have continued.
In response to the rebellion, government forces and government-recruited Liberian mercenaries frequently attacked, detained, and executed perceived supporters of the rebel forces based on ethnic, national, religious, and political affiliation. Even after the end of active hostilities, state security forces assisted by pro-government groups such as the Jeunes Patriotes ("Young Patriots" or JP) regularly harassed and intimidated the populace, particularly those believed to be sympathetic to the New Forces rebels or the political opposition. Security forces in government-controlled areas regularly extorted and physically abused Muslims, northerners, and West African immigrants, often under the guise of routine security checks at roadblocks.
On both sides of the political and military divide, the most horrific human rights abuses peaked from roughly 2002 to 2004, and have declined in recent years. However, more chronic human rights abuses persist and go unaddressed; most notably, government security forces and New Forces rebels who continue to engage in widespread extortion at checkpoints and, on a more limited scale, sexual violence against girls and women.
A nation divided, Côte d'Ivoire is only beginning to emerge from the most serious political and military crisis in its post-independence history. Widespread criminality in the university context involving student groups has taken place and continues to occur against this backdrop of instability, violence, and impunity.
[2]The largest immigrant communities are from bordering countries such as Guinea, Mali, and Burkina Faso. At least 52 percent are of Burkinabe origin. Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, "The Roots of the Military-Political Crises in Côte d'Ivoire," Report No. 128, 2004.
[3]Côte d'Ivoire is an ethnic mosaic of over 60 groups who have migrated from neighboring countries over the centuries. The country remains roughly divided into regional blocs. The center and east are mainly occupied by the Baoulé and Agni, both part of the Akan migration from Ghana. The north is largely home to two main ethnic groups: the Malinké (part of the northern Mande group) who migrated from Guinea and Mali, and the Senaphou and Lobi people (part of the Gur group) who migrated from Burkina Faso and Mali. The west is populated by the southern Mande group-largely the Dan or Yacouba and Gouro ethnic groups, who migrated from areas west of modern-day Côte d'Ivoire. Finally, the southwest is home to the Krou peoples, including the Bété, who are believed to be among the earliest migrants from the southwestern coast. Despite these rough divisions, there is substantial mixing of these populations in urban areas such as Abidjan, and the cocoa growing areas of the west and southwest.
[4]There were several episodes of repression of "southern" Ivorians during Houphouët-Boigny's rule, notably in 1970 against the Bété. See Tiemoko Coulibaly, "Lente décomposition en Côte d'Ivoire," Le Monde Diplomatique, November 2002; Jean-Pierre Dozon, "La Côte d'Ivoire entre Démocratie, Nationalisme et Ethnonationalisme," Politique Africaine, No. 78 (June 2000), pp. 45-62.
[5]See Richard Banégas, "Côte d'Ivoire: Patriotism, Ethnonationalism and Other African Modes of Self-writing," Affrican Affairs, 105/421 (2006), p. 539; Jean Pierre Chaveau, "Question Foncière et Construction Nationale en Côte d'Ivoire," Politique Africaine, No. 78 (June 2000), p. 112.
[6]The main candidates were Houphouët-Boigny's Baoulé successor, Henri Konan Bédié, from Côte d'Ivoire's geographic center, Laurent Gbagbo, the Bété leader of the Ivorian Popular Front (Front Populaire Ivoirien, FPI) from the South, and Alassane Dramane Ouattara of the Rally of Republicans (Rassemblement des Républicains, RDR), whose constituency is largely drawn from northerners.
[7]See generally Ruth Marshall-Fratani, "The War of 'Who is Who': Autochthony, Nationalism, and Citizenship in the Ivorian Crisis," African Studies Review, Vol. 49, No 2 (September 2006), pp. 9-43.
[8]Prior to the 1995 elections, the National Assembly adopted a new electoral code that stripped non-Ivorian African residents of the right to vote, and barred presidential candidates if either of their parents was of a foreign nationality and if they had not lived in Côte d'Ivoire for the preceding five years. The impetus behind the law's adoption was widely viewed as the exclusion of Ouattara's candidacy.
[9]General Gueï had been Army chief of staff under Bédié until the 1995 presidential elections when he was dismissed for refusing to use the army against protestors.
[10]Amnesty International, "Côte d'Ivoire: Some military personnel believe they have impunity above the law," AI Index: AFR 31/003/2000, September 18, 2000.
[11]Thomas Hofnung, La Crise Ivoirienne: Dix clés pour comprendre (Paris: La Découverte, 2005), p. 43.
[12]Over 200 people were killed and hundreds were wounded in the violence surrounding the October presidential and December parliamentary elections. Abuses perpetrated by state security forces, including killings, rape, torture, and arbitrary arrest are examined in detail in Human Rights Watch, Côte d'Ivoire – The New Racism: The Political Manipulation of Ethnicity in Côte d'Ivoire, vol. 13, no.6 (A), August 2001, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2001/ivorycoast/.
[13]The attempted coup was led by a number of junior military officers who had been at the forefront of the 1999 coup, but left after several of them were detained and tortured under Gueï. In late 1999 they fled to Burkina Faso, where they were thought to have received training and possibly other forms of support in the two years between their exile from Côte d'Ivoire and their return on September 19, 2002.
[14]The MPCI was joined by two western groups: the Movement for Justice and Peace (Mouvement Pour la Justice et la Paix, MJP) and the Ivorian Popular Movement for the Great West (Mouvement Populaire Ivoirien du Grand Ouest, MPIGO). The MJP and MPIGO included hundreds of Liberian fighters, many of whom had formerly fought with armed groups linked to then-Liberian President Charles Taylor. To a lesser extent, these groups also included Sierra Leonean fighters who had been members of the Sierra Leonean rebel group, the Revolutionary United Front (RUF).
[15]The ceasefire was shattered on November 4, 2004, when the government launched bombing raids on rebels in the north. French troops responded to the attacks after nine French peacekeepers were killed in an air attack on Bouaké on November 6, 2004. French aircraft immediately destroyed two Ivorian Sukhoi 25 fighter-bombers, the kernel of the country's tiny air force, on the ground at Yamoussoukro. The French attack against the Ivorian Air Force triggered a stream of invective against France and foreigners from Ivorian state broadcasters and pro-government newspapers which urged "patriots" to take to the streets to defend the nation. French homes, businesses and institutions were looted and torched prompting the biggest evacuation of foreigners in the country's post-colonial history. Some 8,000 people from 63 countries left Côte d'Ivoire in November 2004. Amnesty International estimates that dozens of civilian demonstrators were killed or injured in clashes with French peacekeepers. Amnesty International, "Côte d'Ivoire: Clashes Between Peacekeeping Forces and Civilians; Lessons for the Future," AI Index: AFR 31/005/2006, September 19, 2006, http://web.amnesty.org/library/Index/ENGAFR310052006?open&of=ENG-CIV (accessed November 12, 2007).
[16]Linas-Marcoussis brokered by the French government in January 2003; Accra III brokered by West African countries and then-UN-Secretary-General Kofi Annan in July 2004; and the Pretoria Agreement brokered by South African President Thabo Mbeki on behalf of the African Union and signed in South Africa in April 2005.
[17]United Nations Security Council, "Presidential Statement; The Situation in Côte d'Ivoire," S/PRST/2007/8, March 28, 2007.
[18]The Ouagadougou Agreement originally set forth an ambitious 10-month timetable, which, had it been followed, would have led to citizen identification, voter registration, disarmament, and presidential elections by early 2008. However, since signature, target dates for the completion of disarmament the identification process have been pushed further and further back, leading to signature of a revised timetable in late November 2007.
[19]"Processus électoral: La CEI projette la présidentielle à Octobre 2008," Fraternité Matin (Abidjan), September 14, 2007.
[20]For a survey of the often widespread human rights abuses committed by both sides of the Ivorian conflict since fighting began in September 2002 up through 2007, see Human Rights Watch, Trapped Between Two Wars: Violence against Civilians in Western Côte d'Ivoire, vol. 15, no. 14 (A), August 2003, http://www.hrw.org/reports/2003/Côtedivoire0803/; Côte d'Ivoire: The Human Rights Cost of the Political Impasse, December 2005, http://hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/Côte1205/index.htm; Côte d'Ivoire – Country on a Precipice: The Precarious State of Human Rights and Civilian Protection in Côte d'Ivoire, vol. 17, no. 6 (A), May 2005, http://hrw.org/reports/2005/cdi0505/; 'Because They Have Guns…I'm Left with Nothing': The Price of Continuing Impunity in Côte d'Ivoire, vol. 18, no. 4(A), May 2006, http://hrw.org/reports/2006/Côtedivoire0506/; Côte d'Ivoire: 'My Heart is Cut': Sexual Violence by Rebels and Pro-government Forces in Côte d'Ivoire, vol. 19, no. 11(A), August 2007, http://hrw.org/reports/2007/cdi0807/.

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