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I believe that the catastrophe we are seeing in East Timor today is the end result of an Indonesian military plan to thwart independence. That plan was put into action in January 1999, shortly after President Habibie announced that he would give East Timorese the option of leaving Indonesia. It involved establishing a network of armed anti-independence militias and using violence, threats, and murder to try to intimidate independence supporters into not registering and not voting in the referendum that was held on August 30. That strategy failed. The fallback, foreseen by some diplomatic analysts months before, was to have the losers challenge the vote as unfair and unleash such violence that further moves toward independence would become impossible.
The army plan has gone according to script. The militias should have been stopped much, much earlier, but the critical question is what to do now when churches and health clinics are being burned to the ground, and displaced people and pro-independence supporters are being killed. We believe the administration should concentrate on five measures, all of them immensely difficult:
1. Secure Indonesian permission for an multinational peacekeeping force and ensure that the U.S. contributes to that force in a significant way. Getting permission is easier said than done. The political climate in Jakarta is tense, and increasingly anti-UN and anti-Western. The message being conveyed to the public by the Indonesian press is not that the violence in East Timor is a murderous rampage by army-backed militias, but that it is a civil war between pro-autonomy and pro-independence forces. Moreover, it is being portrayed, utterly unfairly, as having been sparked in large part by a UN operation that was biased from the beginning and designed only to further the strategic interests of larger powers, including Australia and the U.S. In this climate, agreeing to an international force led by those same powers would be political suicide for Habibie and Wiranto, and they both know it. Either or both may even see that there is political support to be gained from standing firm. This means that even relatively explicit warnings of the economic consequences of letting the violence continue may have little effect.
We believe that all non-humanitarian assistance, and especially direct budgetary support to the Indonesian government, should be suspended immediately, together with any pending sales or deliveries of military equipment, including spare parts. If the Indonesian government agrees to an international peacekeeping force within days, some non-military assistance could be resumed, but full economic and military relations should not be restored until three conditions are met: UNAMET is able to fully resume its functions in all thirteen districts of East Timor; the displaced are able to return home safely; and militia commanders responsible for acts of violence are arrested and prosecuted.
We believe that for maximum impact, this suspension of military and economic aid and military sales must be coordinated with Japan, Germany, Australia, and other members of the donor consortium called the Consultative Group on Indonesia or CGI. (In July, the CGI pledged $5.9 billion to Indonesia to assist in its economic recovery.)
If the Indonesian government does agree to a multinational force, Congress should strongly support some form of American participation, although it is understood that a large part of the burden would be taken on by Australia.
2. Get relief workers and aid agencies back into East Timor as soon as possible.
All health and humanitarian workers in East Timor have now been evacuated. There are now no witnesses to what is happening on the ground. Telecommunications were cut off as part of Habibie's martial law decree of September 6 and have been only partially restored. The few satellite telephones, in the U.N. compound and at a guerrilla base, were the only way of reaching the outside world yesterday. There were reports from one humanitarian agency, forced to evacuate on Tuesday, that hospitals and clinics were being systematically destroyed. Just as when Indonesian invaded in East Timor in 1975, the majority of the deaths may come less from killing than from the inability of a huge and growing displaced population to find food or get medical care.
As discussions take place with the Indonesian government over a multinational force, one consideration should be how the force can assist with the return and protection of humanitarian agencies to address this looming disaster. Without such a force, East Timorese will be left at the mercy of the Indonesian army, and it has shown no mercy thus far.
3. Press Indonesia to remove all restrictions on relief and humanitarian work in West Timor as soon as possible.
East Timorese were pouring into West Timor at a rate of 3,000 per hour according to the International Committee of the Red Cross, and there were believed to be some 60,000 there as of yesterday. Some of them had been forcibly expelled with the direct involvement of Indonesian military and police. This morning I called Atambua, the West Timorese town on the border with East Timor, and learned that members of the Dili-based militia, called Aitarak, were accompanying truckloads of refugees into town; some of those refugees are housed at the district military command and police headquarters. Numerous eyewitness reports indicate that militia members have a presence in some of the refugee camps. The camps also include many pro-Indonesian displaced, including non-Timorese. Those fleeing or forced out by militia violence have no protection against assault, nor are they likely to get any unless international agencies are able to have a full-time presence in the camps, carry out a full range of humanitarian services, and have enough confidence in local authorities to know that reports of abuses against refugees will be thoroughly investigated. But instead of cooperation from local authorities, relief workers are being denied access and told that refugees blame foreigners for what has happened to them. It is not only critical that forcibly expelled refugees are protected and have access to assistance; it is also essential that their stories get out, so that the world understands how and by whose hand they got to West Timor.
In discussions on East Timor at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in New Zealand, the administration should give high priority to this issue and work out with other APEC members a strategy for persuading the Indonesian government to lift restrictions on access.
4. Protect the results of the August 30 referendum.
The East Timorese defied the guns and machetes of the militias and turned out in overwhelming numbers to cast their votes for independence. The militias, and the army that created and backed them, must not be allowed to do to independence what the Burmese government did to democracy in 1990. They are trying to do this now by the scorched earth policy and forcible expulsions of people and by the smear campaign against UNAMET and the statements, made repeatedly by Indonesian officials including Foreign Minister Alatas, that the UN was biased, allowed major electoral fraud in the referendum, and only half-heartedly investigated allegations of irregularities in the registration and polling processes.
- The scorched earth policy and expulsions will leave the militias in charge of large parts of East Timor unless they are pushed out and disarmed. They have publicly rejected the results of the referendum, and there is a concern that they will try to effectively partition East Timor, with the western districts refusing to join an independent state. The countries that encourage the formation of UNAMET and helped finance or monitor the referendum, including the U.S., cannot let this happen. It is for this reason that it must work to see that Indonesia ensures the safe return of refugees and arrests the perpetrators of violence.
- The smear campaign means that there is real possibility that the People's Consultative Assembly, which meets in November, may refuse to ratify the results of the referendum on the grounds that it was not fairly conducted. A senior official of Megawati Soekarnoputri's party, Dimyati Haryono, said as much yesterday. U.S. officials should use every opportunity to remind Indonesian officials and opposition leaders that they are on record as promising to respect the results of the referendum, and that both President Habibie and senior members of the Cabinet acknowledged on the day after the vote that it had been orderly, free, and fair.
5. Press Indonesia to end martial law in East Timor.
We do not believe that martial law is justified or desirable. The army could have stopped the violence with the troops it had on the ground. If some militia leaders are saying today that they have declared a "ceasefire", it is not the result of a new military commander or the increased powers granted to the military under martial law. It is because of an order given by Jakarta that could and should have been given six months ago. Violence is likely to continue when and where the army sees fit. The fact that soldiers operating under martial law and accompanying a UNAMET convoy to its warehouse on Wednesday did nothing to stop the militias from attacking is all the evidence one needs that new troops will not be guarantors of peace.
We fear that martial law will be used to keep restrictions on communications to ensure that the army's work takes place out of public view. We fear it will be used to mount operations against guerrillas, who between January and the referendum largely refrained from the use of violence, and members of CNRT, the pro-independence political organization. Today we received reports that at least one senior leader of CNRT, Mauhudu, was arrested in East Timor and brought to Kupang, West Timor, where he is believed to be in police detention. That may be the beginning of a pattern.
Finally, we fear that martial law will be used as a cover to find "evidence" that the August 30 referendum was unfair, such as allegedly uncounted pro-autonomy ballots. With no impartial witnesses to document how this "evidence" was uncovered, any claims of such discoveries should be treated with the greatest skepticism.
I should also point out that there is no indication of how long martial law will endure, nor who, other than the military, will decide when order has been restored.
The U.S. should make it clear to the Indonesian army that arrests of key militia leaders would be a key test of the army's will to restore order, and that martial law should be lifted.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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