II. Sources of Weapons for Militias in Punjab and Kashmir

India has long accused the government of Pakistan of directly supplying weapons, as well as other forms of military support, to militants in Punjab and Kashmir. Most long-time observers of the region concur.⁽⁵⁾ Both Sikh and Kashmiri militant leaders have acknowledged as much,⁽⁶⁾ and many of the weapons used by militants in both states clearly were acquired in Pakistan. Nevertheless, there are many complexities and uncertainties about the arms supply relationship.

Available evidence suggests that most weapons obtained by Sikh and Kashmiri militants have come from two sources inside Pakistan: the arms bazaar in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province (nwfp)--a vast black market for weapons--and members of Pakistan's Inter-Services Intelligence (isi), operating either on their own or with the tacit or explicit complicity of the central Pakistani government. Many of the weapons acquired from these sources were siphoned off from U.S. arms transfers to Afghan mujahidin fighting Soviet forces--the so-called "Afghan pipeline" in which the U.S. funneled vast supplies of arms through the isi to the Afghan resistance.⁽⁷⁾

Origin of the Pipeline

The single most important factor in the introduction of small arms and light weapons into South Asia was the effort by the U.S. and Pakistan to arm the Afghan mujahidin resistance, by establishing a secret arms pipeline, in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979.

Soviet forces introduced tons of Soviet military material into Afghanistan, large quantities of which remained behind and have also been diffused throughout the region.⁽⁹⁾ In the 1980s, U.S. intelligence services developed a counter-strategy which involved the provision of enormous amounts of arms and ammunition to mujahidin leaders and commanders in the field. Vast quantities of material purchased by the U.S. for use by the mujahidin were diverted illicitly or remained in the region after the end of the war.

While support for the mujahidin began during the Carter Administration, it was after Ronald Reagan's election to the U.S. presidency that Afghanistan and Pakistan became revitalized "forward defense areas" where the battle against the Kremlin's "evil empire" would be waged. Once the Reagan Administration made the decision to arm the mujahidin resistance, albeit covertly, Pakistan became the conduit for a massive military assistance program. The cia then became its supplier, and the isi the intermediary and distributor.

Weapons Supplied and the Non-Accountability Policy

The CIA, however, faced the problem of concealing its responsibility for its acts, since the U.S. did not want to be seen as providing direct military assistance for the mujahidin. Consequently, U.S. intelligence services set up bank accounts in Switzerland into which the U.S. and Saudi governments directed their contributions to the Afghan resistance, which were then used to pay for weapons from a variety of sources. Wealthy individual Saudis and the Iranian government also contributed to the mujahidin but through their own channels; they favored direct payments to Afghan leaders such as Abdur-Rabbur Rasul Sayaf, who received support from Saudi sources, and Sheikh Huhsini, Hojetoleslam Zahedi and Ali Zahedi, who were supported by Iran.

In an attempt to conceal its support for the mujahidin, the U.S. initially purchased weapons from communist countries. In particular, the cia purchased massive amounts of arms from the Chinese government--primarily the Type 56 assault rifle (derived from the Kalashnikov AK47).⁽¹⁰⁾ The flood of Chinese assault rifles into the region was followed by other small arms and artillery from an array of sources, notably Egypt and Israel. In addition, the CIA scrambled to buy captured Soviet weapons and equipment, including the AK74, in part because the AK74 was more effective than the old AK47, and presumably also to cover up U.S. involvement in weapons supplies to the mujahidin.

The CIA reportedly purchased 60,000 rifles, 8,000 light machine guns and over one hundred million rounds of ammunition from Turkey, albeit from obsolete stocks and in poor condition. The CIA also procured, via Egypt, large quantities of Technovar antipersonnel landmines that were originally produced in Italy. Against the advice of the isi, between forty and fifty Swiss-designed Oerlikon anti-aircraft guns were provided, despite the fact that the mujahidin lacked basic training in fire control and ammunition cost $50 a round for a gun capable of expending 1,000 rounds a minute. Mortars were purchased from Egypt and Blowpipe surface-to-air missiles from Britain. Ironically, Soviet weapons were obtained from Israel--those captured during Israel's invasion of Lebanon. Equally incongruously, 100,000 Enfield .303 rifles were purchased from India--an erstwhile ally of the Soviet Union. A principal ammunition supply--thirty million rounds--was facilitated by a Pakistani arms merchant and originated from Pakistan Ordnance Factory (pof) supplies. This massive procurement effort meant that in 1983, for example, some 10,000 tons of weaponry were transferred to Afghanistan via Pakistan, rising to 65,000 tons in 1987.⁽¹¹⁾

The CIA's decision in 1986 to supply the mujahidin with the Stinger surface-to-air missile marked an important turning point. Not only did this missile help alter the conduct of the war in favor of the mujahidin (though perhaps not to the extent to which some observers have argued), but it also made impossible any assertion by the U.S. that it was uninvolved in the Afghan arms pipeline, a claim which had already worn thin by this time. Supply of the Stingers, however, was predicated on the condition that they would only be replaced when empty casings were surrendered. Although this constituted an effort toward greater accountability, it does not appear that the policy was followed with any real rigor; as discussed later in this chapter, hundreds of Stingers still remain unaccounted for. During the latter part of 1986, some one hundred Stingers--the first of many shipments--were turned over to the mujahidin; the majority went to Hekmatyar's Islamic Party, the long-term favorite of the ISI.

While the importance of these arms shipments for the war in Afghanistan was fundamental, the manner in which they were transferred had a profound effect upon south Asia in later years, flooding the region with sophisticated weapons that previously had been unavailable on such a large scale. Essentially, the policy adopted by the U.S. was based upon non-interference--once the wherewithal was delivered. Some government officials believed that the U.S. had failed in Vietnam because of excessive interference and micro-management. In Pakistan and Afghanistan the U.S. instituted exactly the reverse--macro-management and non-interference. Consequently, once arms reached either Rawalpindi or Karachi they were handed over to the ISI and ceased to be the charge of the CIA.

Muhammed Yousaf, director of the Afghan bureau of the ISI between 1983 and 1987, has said, "As soon as the arms arrived in Pakistan the CIA's responsibility ended. From then on it was our pipeline, our organization that moved, allocated and distributed every bullet that the CIA procured."⁽¹²⁾ It is possible, of course, that the reality may have been a less complete severance of U.S. responsibility upon delivery, but the operating principle clearly was to delegate to others the work on the ground.

Consistent with U.S. insistence on secrecy and its own non-accountability, apparently extremely poor records were kept of how many weapons were transferred, where and to whom. If the U.S. government maintained effective tracing and accounting procedures, their paper trail has yet to surface. Moreover, the military regime in Pakistan saw fit to suspend ordinary accounting. At Karachi, for example, port authority accounts were settled in cash, invoices were merely labeled "defence stores" and customs officials were not involved. The failure of the U.S. and Pakistan to keep track of or impose controls on the pipeline has been cited as a reason why it was virtually impossible to calculate the amount of weaponry imported through the covert program.

Leaks in the Pipeline

The covert nature and lack of oversight of arms shipments to the mujahidin also allowed the pipeline to leak persistently. After the cia made delivery to the isi in Karachi or Islamabad, the isi transported arms to the major storage depot at Ojhiri, outside Rawalpindi, or directly to Quetta and Peshawar. The arms then were turned over to Afghan party leaders, and transported as rapidly as possible into Afghanistan, both to maximize their impact against the Soviet forces and to avoid bottlenecks and capacity overload. According to a former isi director, the isi alone was permitted to decide which party would receive particular weapons. The real isolation of the cia from operations at the Pakistan end could be less than represented by the isi, but either way, the U.S. government bears responsibility for ultimate end-uses of the weaponry.

By the time the weapons reached the mujahidin commanders in the field, they had been loaded and off-loaded typically at least fifteen times over a distance of several thousand kilometers traveled by truck, ship, train, and pack animal. This allowed ample opportunity for arms to be removed. Apart from arms which went directly to Quetta from Karachi, the majority were handed over to the Afghan leadership at Peshawar before being sent through to the field commanders.⁽¹³⁾ In all likelihood, arms were siphoned off at every point of the pipeline. The isi leadership would have had first claim, followed by the Afghan party leaders. In addition, commanders in the field often sold weapons for a variety of reasons: to raise funds for transportation, ammunition, food, the evacuation of wounded guerrillas, and apparently for personal profit as well.

Yousaf has explained that despite efforts to get weapons out into the field as quickly as possible, delays often developed because of cash shortfalls which, he claims, prevented their transport into Afghanistan.⁽¹⁴⁾ When this occurred, weapons would remain in mujahidin warehouses located inside Pakistan, in Peshawar and Quetta. According to Yousaf, these warehouses had "no proper storage or security arrangements as they were run in the most casual and unmilitary fashion."⁽¹⁵⁾ This situation also presumably contributed to leaks from the pipeline.

It is not known how many weapons were transferred out of the pipeline, but informed sources suggest massive amounts. Indeed, a former head of the isi told an American journalist in 1993 that the isi still had access to three million Kalashnikovs, packed and greased.⁽¹⁶⁾ Allegedly, an immense fire at the arms depot at Ojhiri was deliberately set after the cia had demanded a spot-check on stores.

It was virtually assured that the arms pipeline would spring leaks at every juncture and that a dynamic black market for arms and ammunition would emerge unless rigorous checks were introduced and stringently applied. In the absence of any semblance of control, by 1985-1986, weapons from the Afghan pipeline had begun to find their way into commercial channels.⁽¹⁷⁾

⁽¹⁸⁾

The nwfp is the most remote and insecure province in Pakistan, relatively cut off from the political control of the central government in Islamabad. Geographically, it separates the rest of Pakistan from Afghanistan, and also contains the key communication link between Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent, the Khyber Pass.

While guns have long been a routine part of everyday life in the nwfp, during the past decade advanced small arms and light weapons have become increasingly available throughout the region, especially in such frontier towns as Landi Kotal, Dara, and Miram Shah. Since the end of the Afghan War, the availability of arms on the commercial market has increased considerably, and in some cases prices have fallen, despite the fact that conflict in and around Kabul continues almost unabated.

The array of weaponry for sale in the arms bazaars is unparalleled in South Asia. In these open bazaars virtually any type of non-major weapon can be procured with little effort and a relatively modest amount of cash. The streets of Dara are full of Pakistanis from Sind and Punjab provinces in pursuit of rifles, mainly the Kalashnikov and Type 56. After payment, delivery can be made to anywhere in Pakistan and possibly beyond. It is also widely rumored that the arms bazaars deal in much more sophisticated weapons, such as surface-to-air missiles. Although these are never placed on show in the bazaars (unlike the ubiquitous displays of assault rifles), the right kind of money and connections apparently give access to this discreet market.⁽¹⁹⁾

The arms in the nwfp come from many sources. Currently, weapons for sale in the arms bazaars fall into four categories: weapons from the Afghan pipeline; Soviet stocks captured during the Afghan war; locally produced arms; and arms arriving through miscellaneous routes such as the Middle East or Southeast Asia.

Afghan Pipeline Weapons

The nwfp bazaars are full of weapons which leaked from the Afghan arms pipeline. Prominent among these is the Chinese Type 56 assault rifle, as well as an assortment of weapons from Israel and Egypt. In April 1993, the Type 56 sold for Rs.15,000 (c.US$576), the MP5 for Rs.70,000 (c.US$2,700) and the G3 for Rs.30,000 (c.US$1,150).

Following the Geneva accords of 1988, which effectively marked the beginning of the end of the Soviet occupation, U.S. arms supplies to the mujahidin actually increased. These included antitank missile systems, Egyptian and Chinese multiple rocket launcher systems and electronic communications technology.⁽²⁰⁾ These systems remained in the region, and many are available for sale.

Soviet Weapons Captured in Afghanistan

Stocks of Soviet weapons captured after the withdrawal are considerable. These include Soviet and Eastern bloc Kalashnikovs and, importantly, the advanced AK74 rifle, which was largely unknown outside the Soviet bloc until examples began to turn up in this region.⁽²¹⁾ A range of models and versions are available, such as the Krinkov AK74, a model which would most likely have been captured from Soviet helicopter crews and which retails at Rs.20,000 (US$770). Other Soviet weaponry for sale in the arms bazaars include Soviet rocket propelled grenade launchers (RPGs) (Rs.10,000/US$384 plus Rs.100/US$3.80 per rocket). In addition, recoilless rifles and such sniper weapons as the SVD Dragunov have also become available.⁽²²⁾

Locally Manufactured Weapons

A third category of weapons are those manufactured by small-scale producers within the region. The most important of these are forgeries of the Soviet AK47, complete down to the reproduction of serial numbers, used many times over. These have been produced by the "factories" of Dara for many years with little more than hand tools. The quantities available are not large, however, and because the quality is inferior they retail at about Rs.6,000 (US$230). Purchasers are often uncertain whether an AK47 is of Soviet origin or a frontier copy, and frequently prefer to buy a Chinese model which they know will be authentic (because of difficulties in duplicating Chinese lettering of the serial numbers), thus lowering demand for Soviet AK47s.⁽²³⁾ Also, Chinese Type 56s are more readily available than their Soviet counterparts.

In addition, the Frontier Arms Company and the gmb factory of Peshawar turn out arms modeled on standard rifles and revolvers such as the Kalashnikov variants and the .32 caliber Webley.⁽²⁴⁾

Miscellaneous Sources of Weapons

Finally, the arms bazaars of the nwfp are full of miscellaneous weapons which probably arrived in the region through extremely circuitous and unpredictable routes--from Vietnam, for example, or the Middle East. These include unused copies of the M-16A2 rifle⁽²⁵⁾; the 9mm Calico carbine; the Winchester pump action shotgun (Rs.20,000/US$770); the long-barreled Uzi carbine; the German MP5 submachine gun; and G3s produced by the Pakistan Ordnance Factories. G3s from Iran have also appeared in the region, probably because after the fall of the Shah control of the border between Iran and Pakistan was relaxed. One G3 seen by the Arms Project, priced at Rs.30,000 (US$1,150), bore the markings of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which co-produces the rifle.

Stinger Missiles

Inevitably, there has been a considerable amount of attention directed towards the fate of the unused Stingers, especially given their capability for downing civil or military aircraft. There is little reliable evidence of how many Stingers survived after the Soviet withdrawal because, as time passed, the accounting system, such as it was, relaxed considerably; an unknown number are therefore missing. In 1989, for example, the Pentagon could only guess that between 200 and 500 Stingers were in mujahidin hands.⁽²⁶⁾

Since the end of the war, the U.S. government has tried in vain to recover the missiles, offering substantial sums of money for their return. One report noted that the cia is spending $65 million trying to buy them back.⁽²⁷⁾ It is possible that the missiles are gradually finding their way across borders, especially since they have only a limited role in the battles now being fought in and around Kabul.

There is some evidence of cross-border transit. In September 1987 a captured Iranian gunboat revealed sixteen Stingers whose serial numbers matched with those handed over to the mujahidin.⁽²⁸⁾ According to a 1990 Washington Post account, U.S. officials believe that Kashmiri militants have obtained U.S.-made Stingers originally supplied to Afghan mujahidin through the pipeline, although none of them seem to have been used.⁽²⁹⁾ A 1988 article suggested that Sikh militants may have acquired Stingers.⁽³⁰⁾

Lack of Control Over nwfp Arms Markets

The development of the nwfp as a major source of weapons and ammunition is understandable when seen in the context of both Afghanistan's and Pakistan's political histories and contemporary situations. First, the situation in Afghanistan remains chaotic and close to anarchy. Although weapons are still required given the persistent fighting, stockpiles are also considerable and the opportunity for profit continues.

Second, the Pakistan government has exercised little control over the border. Moreover, it has only limited jurisdiction over the interior of the nwfp; its practical authority barely extends further than the roadways. The roadways are patrolled by Pakistani Rangers, a paramilitary force whose training and discipline is minimal and who report directly to the local tribal officials. The Pakistan Army and police forces play only a minimal role in this region. Consequently, the transportation and marketing of guns and ammunition is easier here than anywhere else in South Asia.

Third, the nwfp region and Pakistan as a whole are gaining in importance as a central area for drug production and smuggling. As a general rule, wherever drug production is prevalent, the proliferation of illegal weapons also proceeds apace.⁽³¹⁾ The Pakistani government has consistently failed to make serious progress against drug production or trafficking. Senior law enforcement personnel are poorly paid and susceptible to bribes. In fact, at least three national parliamentarians are reportedly involved in drug trafficking.⁽³²⁾

Indian authorities maintain that most of the weapons found in the possession of Sikh militants enter from Pakistan, and that the majority are facilitated or even shipped directly by the isi.⁽³³⁾ However, Pakistani support for Sikh militants is likely at a lower level than for militants in Kashmir, in large part because Pakistan has a far smaller political stake in Punjab. In 1985, two long-time observers of Indian politics asserted that over the years:

[a]rms were regularly smuggled across the border, and it is more than likely that President Zia [of Pakistan] turned a blinder eye than usual. It is certain that he did not object to Bhindranwale's terrorists crossing the border to seek temporary refuge from the police....⁽³⁴⁾

They maintained, however, that "Zia adopted a very cautious attitude to the Punjab crisis."⁽³⁵⁾ This perspective was shared by another observer who in 1990 asserted that, while

Sikh separatists continue to wreak havoc with weapons obtained in Pakistan, the level of assistance to the guerrillas from Pakistan's government appears to be lower than in Kashmir...some guerrillas say that they conduct their own training and only cross into Pakistan to purchase weapons.⁽³⁶⁾

Certainly, many of the weapons used by Sikh militants bear a very close resemblance to those that came through the ISI-administered Afghan arms pipeline, especially the Chinese Type 56 which was a central feature. What is less clear, however, is to what extent the weapons have been deliberately sold or otherwise transferred to Sikh militants by the isi, and to what extent they have been obtained without government assistance through purchases from arms bazaar merchants and other private actors. In either case, it appears that Sikh militants have moved freely across the border into Pakistan and have secured arms without hindrance by Pakistan authorities.

Weapons Seizures

The Punjab police claim that between 1987 and mid-1993 they seized more than 2,000 Kalashnikov-type rifles from Sikh militants, all of which they claim came from Pakistan.⁽³⁷⁾ The overwhelming majority of Kalashnikov-type weapons reportedly seized from militants have been of Chinese origin--Types 56, 56-1 and 56-2.⁽³⁸⁾ The Type 56 was purchased in large quantities by the cia and transferred to the isi for use by the Afghan mujahidin. Of all the AK47s reportedly seized in Punjab, fewer than ten have been found to be of Soviet origin. A very small number (four or five) of the more advanced AK74--thought to be produced only in the former Soviet Union and former East Germany--have been seized. In addition, 160 Kalashnikovs have been captured that bear no markings or serial numbers, suggesting that they are local frontier-produced weapons.⁽³⁹⁾ Indian intelligence sources in late 1992 claimed that Sikh militants were still in possession of 1,543 AK47s, 106 rocket launchers and 112 general purpose machine guns and light machine guns.⁽⁴⁰⁾

In addition to small arms and ammunition, Chinese stick grenades and landmines have also been recovered from Sikh militants. These include antitank mines and Claymore-type antipersonnel landmines. They also have estimated holdings of 1,500 kilograms of RDX and PETN explosives capable of being set off by remote control. In addition, authorities claim to have seized some 20,000 other weapons and fifty quintals (one quintal equals one hundred pounds) of explosives.⁽⁴¹⁾ One published account noted that in the last five months of 1992, counterinsurgency forces in Punjab, seeking to eliminate the Sikh militancy, seized twenty-five tons of explosives, and 550 assault rifles.⁽⁴²⁾ Sources also told the Arms Project that in 1989, militants had gained access to Toyomoro FM transceivers, which permit the monitoring of telephone calls and radio messages.

Other miscellaneous weapons which have turned up in militant hands are manufactured in a variety of countries. According to one source, for example, authorities have seized Chinese submachine guns and general purpose machine guns, U.S.-made M16 rifles, and Israeli Uzis.⁽⁴³⁾

Security Fence

In 1988, the Indian government built a double fence on the Indian side of the border between Indian Punjab and Pakistan, which includes lighting and electrification. The fence, however, may be less of a deterrence than the Indian authorities claim, as lighting and electrification does not extend for the entire length.⁽⁴⁴⁾ A government intelligence report prepared in late-1992 stated, for example, that 150 AK47s, sixty revolvers and eight quintals of explosives had recently been smuggled across the Punjab border.⁽⁴⁵⁾

Nonetheless, the fence has had some effect upon the flow of arms. Since its construction, new supply lines have opened up, across the Thar desert (Pakistani Punjab to Rajasthan) and across the Jammu and Kashmir border, the latter route possibly used by both Sikh and Kashmiri militants.⁽⁴⁶⁾ Some believe that the isi and the Pakistan Rangers pass on arms to narcotics smugglers in the Rahimyar Khan region during the sandstorms which occur in April and May for transportation across the border to Jaisalmer from the staging posts of Bijnot, Islamgarh and Salansar, just inside the Pakistan border, south of the town of Bahawalpur.⁽⁴⁷⁾

Indian Security Force Involvement

Sikh militants also have received help directly from members of the Indian security forces. In November 1992, for example, two consignments of weapons were smuggled through the Ajnala sector of the Punjab, to the north of Amritsar, with the help of Border Security Force personnel. Five members of the bsf were later suspended, one of whom is due to stand trial for "waging a war against the nation."⁽⁴⁸⁾

Another observer has noted that:

A lone Indian border guard looks the other way if properly bribed. So do Pakistani rangers on the other side, who also provide occasional covering fire for such groups as the Bhindranwale Tiger Force of Khalistan slipping across the frontier for another night of mayhem.⁽⁴⁹⁾

For strategic and historical reasons, Pakistan has a far more active interest in Kashmir than in Punjab or anywhere else in India. It appears that, over the years, Pakistan has established a program of military training, weapons supplies, and political support to assist Kashmiri militants. It is widely accepted by western and non-western experts that the isi is the main body facilitating movement of weapons across the border to Kashmiri militants.⁽⁵⁰⁾

Pakistan's ISI

The Arms Project concurs in the consensus of expert opinion that isi operatives transfer weapons to Kashmiri militants. Still, the extent to which the isi actively assists and directs the flow of weapons from Pakistan to India remains unclear, as does the level of sanctioning authority within the isi and the Pakistani government.

An important article in the Washington Post on May 16, 1994 cited Pakistani military sources--including two serving and two recently retired army officials familiar with the internal functioning of the isi--as claiming that Pakistan had temporarily ceased direct support for Kashmiri insurgents in 1993 after the U.S. threatened to add it to the list of countries sponsoring terrorism, which would trigger a severing of economic ties. According to the article, the government's efforts to curb the isi's covert assistance program for Kashmiri militants included firing isi head Javed Nasir and all of his top assistants. It quotes one former minister involved in the program as stating, "At one point just before Gen. Nasir was sent packing, the isi was spending 100 million rupees per month (about $3.3 million) on the Kashmiri operation alone." The article also notes that during this period, Pakistan funneled support through "private organizations," frequently operated by former army and isi officials.⁽⁵¹⁾

Moreover, the article asserted that, according to Pakistan military sources, in early 1994 Pakistan began again to arm, train, and provide logistical support to Kashmiri militants, although at a much lower level than before, and that the isi and the Field Intelligence Unit were coordinating arms transfers from Pakistan's Azad Kashmir to Kashmiri militants in India. These Pakistani military sources reportedly stated that at a meeting of top army generals in early 1994, a decision was made to resume active support for Kashmiri militants under "a more secretive and professionally managed program."⁽⁵²⁾

Ostensibly private organizations have continued to supply arms to the militants, in operations overseen by the Pakistani army. Jamaat-i-Islami, the major Islamist political party in Pakistan, allegedly claimed in April 1994 that it collected 25 million rupees (almost one million dollars) in a nationwide fundraising campaign to support the militant cause in Kashmir. And, at times, the transfer of arms to Kashmiri militants may be carried out by members of the isi without explicit authorization.⁽⁵³⁾

In addition to weapons supplies from the isi and other official or quasi-official sources, it also appears that significant quantities of weapons are purchased through commercial channels, in particular through the arms bazaars in the nwfp.⁽⁵⁴⁾ It is not known, however, how numbers of weapons purchased on the open market compare to the numbers acquired with the assistance of the isi.

Kashmiri militants do not deny that they receive support from inside Pakistan. Indeed, at the end of 1990, one observer wrote:

Moslem guerrillas fighting the Indian government in Kashmir acknowledge that they are receiving arms and training from Pakistan, as well as advice from Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence agency (isi). The level of Pakistani assistance has been substantial and steady since earlier this year, according to the guerrillas.⁽⁵⁵⁾

Amanullah Khan, the chairman of the jklf, has acknowledged that weapons are smuggled across the Pakistani border to his forces in Indian Kashmir, although he has maintained that the weapons are bought in "tribal areas of northern Pakistan."⁽⁵⁶⁾

High-ranking Pakistani government officials have announced full moral and political support for the Kashmiri militants.⁽⁵⁷⁾ Other Pakistani government officials have acknowledged the existence of training camps (presumably unauthorized) inside Pakistan for Kashmiri guerrillas. The Pakistani government has, however, consistently denied arming or training the Kashmiri militants that are operating in India.

These denials notwithstanding, Asia Watch has noted that the Pakistan army's field intelligence unit reportedly helped organize the jklf in the Indian-held Kashmir valley as early as 1964. By 1988, Pakistan's isi had begun to establish training camps in Pakistani-controlled Azad Kashmir manned by Pakistan army officers brought out of retirement.⁽⁵⁸⁾ According to Indian and American intelligence sources cited in the international press, sixty-three Pakistan-operated camps have been functioning at different times over the past two years, half in Azad Kashmir and half elsewhere in Pakistan. At least eleven of these camps have apparently operated continuously. In addition, Pakistan has reportedly trained hundreds of militant leaders and has smuggled hundreds of weapons into the Kashmir valley, including rocket launchers and Kalashnikov rifles from U.S.-supplied Afghan aid stockpiles.⁽⁵⁹⁾ In early 1990, a free-lance photographer and a Western television crew were shown militant recruits receiving arms instruction in the Azad Kashmir section of Pakistan.⁽⁶⁰⁾

The importance of the training bases in Azad Kashmir and elsewhere cannot be overestimated in assisting arms transport to Indian Kashmir. Moreover, even though the details of this extensive training provided by Pakistan have yet to be documented, such training cannot be divorced from the abusive tactics employed by Kashmiri militants.

The majority of the weapons in the possession of Kashmiri militants point to the Afghan pipeline, either from the arms bazaars of the nwfp or stocks still controlled by the isi. One expert notes with regard to weapons used by Kashmir's militants that:

virtually the entire arsenal points to sources close to the Afghan war....[A] high volume of weaponry, most of it Chinese--notably Type 56-1 folding stock assault rifles, pistols, stick grenades and Type-69 rocket-propelled grenades--suggests the diversion of bulk consignments intended for the Afghan conflict...⁽⁶¹⁾

The fact that an AK47 sells for the equivalent of U.S.$870 in Kashmir--somewhat lower than the going price in Dara in the nwfp⁽⁶²⁾--suggests that commercial gain is minimal or non-existent, which points both to the number of weapons which must have reached the region and the likely involvement of the isi. The massive stockpiles of weapons available to the isi can facilitate a very high level of support for insurgencies at very low dollar cost to the Pakistani government, although the political cost, including the impact on human rights, may be much higher than envisioned.

Weapons Seizures

Hard, reliable figures are, for obvious reasons, hard to come by. Sources told the Arms Project that 7,000 AK47s were seized from Kashmiri militants between early-1990 and the end of the 1992, as well as 150 machine guns, 500 rocket launchers, 1,500 rocket grenades, and several tons of explosives.⁽⁶³⁾ State authorities claim that between 1988 and mid-1993 almost 8,000 AK series assault rifles, 455 rocket launchers, and 8,030 grenades were recovered.⁽⁶⁴⁾ One May 1994 report maintained that since 1990 Indian security forces have captured more than 10,000 AK47s, 465 machine guns and hundreds of mines and explosives.⁽⁶⁵⁾

With regard to the numbers of weapons seized entering from Pakistan, Union Minister of State Rajesh Pilot provided the Rajya Sabha (Upper House) with the following figures for arms the security forces claimed to have recovered at the border between Kashmir and Pakistan between 1990 and mid-1993: 150 rocket launchers, 1,926 AK type assault rifles, 710 pistols, thirty-four guns, 366 rockets, 5,248 grenades and bombs, 643 mines and forty-four walkie-talkie sets.⁽⁶⁶⁾ A recent report noted that in a major anti-arms smuggling operation mounted on April 17-18, 1994, Indian government forces claimed to have thwarted attempts to bring small arms and explosives across the border from Pakistan to militants in Kashmir. Pakistani sources claimed that Indian security forces killed as many as twenty people during the operation.⁽⁶⁷⁾

To a certain extent, whether Kashmiri militants acquire weaponry through commercial routes or through isi transfers may depend increasingly on the ideology of a particular militant group. Asia Watch noted in 1991, for example, that "the ideological bent of other groups, including the Hezb-ul Mujahidin, has reportedly attracted the support of Pakistan's military intelligence, the Directorate of Inter-Services Intelligence (isi), which reportedly provides arms and training for some of these organizations."⁽⁶⁸⁾

Similarly, Asia Watch suggested in 1991 that Pakistan's assistance to the jklf, which favors independence for Kashmir, has reportedly been declining in favor of the pro-Pakistan Hezb-ul Mujahidin.⁽⁶⁹⁾

In addition, the ranks of the jklf are drawn mostly from the urban Muslim middle classes, boat owners and carpet makers who can afford to buy their own weapons, which means that they are not forced to rely upon the largesse of the isi. One press report quoted a member of the jkslf, the student wing of the jklf, as stating that the jkslf bought its arms from smugglers in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and India itself.⁽⁷⁰⁾

There is also evidence that Kashmiri militants are obtaining weapons directly from Muslim groups based in Afghanistan.⁽⁷¹⁾ These groups, of course, received enormous quantities of weapons through the pipeline. According to one account:

There is evidence at least some of the rebel factions have established ties with the mujahidin of Afghanistan, who now have ... a huge arsenal of American and Pakistan-supplied weapons.⁽⁷²⁾

Reports also have suggested that Kashmiri militants have received training in guerrilla warfare from Afghan guerrillas at Zawar, Afghanistan, ninety minutes drive into Afghanistan from Pakistan.⁽⁷³⁾

One long-time observer writes that the isi may be aiding these efforts:

Pakistan's Inter-Service Intelligence agency has promoted the interests of Hezb-i-Islami, a fundamentalist group in Afghanistan led by Gulbuddian Hekmatyar. Hekmatyar's links to other local fundamentalist groups, as well as his stated disenchantment with India's Afghan policy, suggest that he may well be, with isi's acquiescence, providing aid and comfort to the insurgency.⁽⁷⁴⁾

Indian Security Force Involvement

As in Punjab, there have been instances of the security forces in Kashmir becoming involved in the weapons trade to militant organizations. For example, in 1991, a top militant leader, Master Innayat, was killed in an encounter with the security forces, allegedly while transporting sixty-seven rifles from Baramulla (some sixty kilometers west of Srinagar) to Srinagar. Later that day the security forces reported seizing only twenty-nine rifles and the rest were allegedly sold back to the militants within twelve hours.⁽⁷⁵⁾

Supply Routes

Most of the weapons acquired by Kashmiri militants enter from the western side of the state, probably through the Haji Pir Pass and the Tosha Pass, the arc around the main road which leads from the border through Baramula to Srinagar.⁽⁷⁶⁾ The Times of India reported in 1991 that Indian authorities claimed to have identified seventy-two routes used by militant forces crossing the line of control from Pakistan.⁽⁷⁷⁾

One source explained to the Arms Project that in Srinagar weapons are often disbursed through a network of interconnected swampy lakes. Because the lakes are overgrown with vegetation and linked by numerous small channels, it is relatively easy for arms smugglers to remain undetected by Indian security forces, most of whom are not native to the city and are therefore unfamiliar with the lake system.

Militants in Punjab and Kashmir obtain many of their weapons from sources in Pakistan. The Arms Project concurs with the widespread expert opinion that isi operatives are directly involved at least in some of the weapons transfers to Kashmiri militants. The extent to which the central government in Pakistan actively orchestrates or facilitates these transfers to militants in Punjab or Kashmir, however, is thus far impossible to confirm, and in any case, may fluctuate.

Between 1983 and 1987, the head of the isi, General Akhtar, was the second most powerful person in Pakistan, enjoying daily access to then-President Zia. The relationship between the isi and the highest level of central government, at least during that period, was obviously close. Therefore, it can be reasonably assumed that Zia was well aware of the actions of the isi high command. Since then, although relations between the isi and the central government--to which it is accountable--have varied, given the tensions between Pakistan and India over Kashmir and public statements by senior government officials supporting the goals of the Kashmiri opposition, it is virtually certain that the central government at a minimum tacitly condones weapons transfers to militants seeking independence from India.

Similarly, the extensive evidence of long-standing programs to train Kashmiri militants suggests support from the central government of Pakistan. With the support in arms supply, training, and related assistance goes a degree of responsibility for the observance of humanitarian law by the militant forces.

Although it cannot be irrefutably established that isi chiefs were directly responsible for leaks from the Afghan pipeline, the nearly total control of the isi over the pipeline makes it a virtual certainty that the isi leadership bears responsibility for what could be seen as the "directed" leakage to favored insurgents. Moreover, even if it were shown that lower level isi operatives have always been responsible and the high command never had full knowledge of illicit transfers, whether for profit or with political intent, the Arms Project regards the isi and the central government as responsible because of their failure to account for arms shipments intended for the mujahidin. By refusing to impose verifiable controls, the isi high command and the central government made possible weapons transfers from the pipeline to new recipients, who had no obligation to account for their actions.

Furthermore, the government bears responsibility for its failure to regulate closely the involvement of the isi in the transfer of weapons and provision of training to militants, and to investigate allegations of any such activities of which it was not already aware. The government must also be held accountable for its failure to impose explicit human rights conditions upon the recipients of Pakistani assistance.

With regard to the U.S., wider geopolitical concerns were clearly the primary focus when the decision was made to open the pipeline, namely securing the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan. Yet, American policy makers were not sufficiently concerned about the broader impact--and in particular the human rights consequences--of the pipeline upon South Asia. Any knowledgeable analysis of the isi or the relationship between the nwfp and the central administration in Islamabad would have concluded that the unmanageable proliferation of weapons was inevitable. The U.S. should have foreseen the implications of a failure to fence off the Afghan pipeline from other theatres of conflict in the region, particularly those in which Pakistan has had a historical commitment. The cost can be measured by the erosion of respect for human rights throughout the region.⁽⁷⁸⁾

The failure of both the United States and Pakistan to exert controls over the operation of the pipeline contributed significantly to the massive proliferation of weapons throughout South Asia and the human rights consequences thereof. The rupture of the pipeline meant that by the mid-1980s weapons intended for Afghan insurgents were both making their way into commercial channels and being transferred directly to Kashmiri militants and, most likely, to Sikh militants.

The mass diffusion of officially unaccounted-for weaponry into the region from the pipeline in the mid-1980s facilitated the arming of militants in Punjab and Kashmir and, as demonstrated in Chapters 3 and 4, gave them increasingly lethal means with which to commit violations of the laws of war.

5. See, for example, John Ward Anderson and Molly Moore, "After Cold War, U.S.-Pakistani Ties are Turning Sour; U.S. Threatens Sanctions, Alleging Support for Terrorism," Washington Post, April 21, 1993. This report notes that the U.S. State Department was considering formally naming Pakistan as a supporter of terrorism because of official assistance to Sikh and Kashmiri militants, and indicates that the cia "long has had solid information that Pakistan has trained, funded and supplied such rebels."

6. See, for example, Steve Coll, "India-Pakistan Wage Covert Proxy Wars," Washington Post, December 8, 1990; James P. Sterba, "Border Battle In Militaristic Pakistan, Struggle With India Bolsters Self-Identity," Wall Street Journal, December 28, 1990.

7. Washington Post also cited a former isi official who claimed that Pakistani officials developed close ties to Indian Muslims who fought alongside the Mujahidin in Afghanistan, segregating them in special training camps, and later providing assistance through them to insurgencies in Kashmir, Punjab, and Assam. Anderson and Moore, "After Cold War...," Washington Post.

8. Much of the material in this section is drawn from Chris Smith, "The Diffusion of Small Arms and Light Weapons in Pakistan and Northern India," (London: Brassey's/Centre for Defence Studies, 1993). Mr. Smith conducted much of his research as a consultant for the Arms Project. Other important sources on the Afghan pipeline include Muhammed Yousaf and Mark Adkin, The Bear Trap: Afghanistan's Untold Story (London: Leo Cooper, 1992), and Mark Urban, War in Afghanistan, (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1990).

9. See, for example, D. Isby, "Soviet Arms Deliveries and Aid to Afghanistan 1989-91," Jane's Intelligence Review, August 1991, p. 348. The Arms Project does not address this issue in this report for two reasons, the most obvious being that the Soviet Union no longer exists. Second, our information suggests that Soviet-made weapons have not been used by Sikh and Kashmiri militants to the extent that pipeline weapons have been.

10. There are many different types of assault rifles, produced by various manufacturers. See generally, Edward Ezell, Small Arms Today (Harrisburg: Stackpole Books, 1988). The terms AK47, assault rifle, automatic rifle and Kalashnikov are used interchangeably by informants in the field, journalists, and many other observers. Many of the weapons referred to in the region as AK47s, assault or automatic weapons, or Kalashnikovs, however, are in fact Chinese-origin Type 56, modelled on the AK47. Unless otherwise noted, we also use these terms interchangeably.

11. The information in this paragraph comes from Yousef and Adkin, The Bear Trap, pp. 83-89, and Urban, War in Afghanistan, p. 187.

12. Yousaf and Adkin, The Bear Trap, p. 97.

13. According to Yousaf, "The pipeline was divided into three distinct parts. The first part belonged to the cia, who bought the weapons and paid for their delivery to Pakistan; the second stretch was the isi's responsibility, getting everything carried across Pakistan, allocated to and handed over to the parties at their headquarter offices near Peshawar and Quetta, the third and final leg of the journey belonged to them. The parties allocated the weapons to their Commanders and distributed them inside Afghanistan." Ibid., p. 97.

14. Yousaf alleges that these cash shortfalls were due to the cia's failure to provide adequate funds to the isi for disbursement to the mujahidin. Ibid., p. 106.

15. Ibid.

16. Arms Project interview with Ed Gargon of New York Times.

17. Arms Project interviews, Karachi, Pakistan, April 6, 1993.

18. Information in this section is based on field research in the nwfp by Chris Smith, consultant to the Arms Project, during March and April 1993, including visits to Landi Kotal and Dara.

19. Arms Project interviews, Northwest Frontier Province.

20. Urban, p.244.

21. Arms Project interview. As noted earlier, the cia also bought up Soviet-made AK74s for use in its covert assistance program to Afghan mujahidin. It may be difficult to distinguish AK74s captured from the Soviets from AK74s procured by the cia for the pipeline.

22. I.K. Malik, "Small Arms and the Police in Pakistan," Small Arms World Report, Institute for Research on Small Arms and International Security, Vol. 1, No. 3 (May 1991).

23. Traditionally, the difference between the Soviet and the frontier produced AK47 was most obvious from the color of the steel --the latter tended to be more blue-gray, the former black. Frontier producers have to some extent overcome this obvious difference by spray-painting.

24. "Pakistani Production," American Rifleman, No. 4, (1991), pp. 66-67.

25. The serial number of one located by the Arms Project at Dara was 042733; so far we have been unable to trace it.

26. Tim Weiner, "Blowback," New York Times Magazine, March 13, 1994; Jane's Defence Weekly, March 25, 1989, p. 271.

27. Weiner, "Blowback," New York Times Magazine.

28. Urban, War in Afghanistan, p. 225.

29. Coll, "India, Pakistan Wage Covert `Proxy Wars'," Washington Post.

30. "Sikhs Reportedly Given Stinger Anti-air Missiles," Washington Post, April 11, 1988.

31. See, for example, R.T. Naylor, "Covert Commerce and Underground Finance in the Modern Arms Black Market," Presentation at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences Conference, International Trade in Light Weapons, Cambridge, Mass., Feb. 24-25, 1994.

32. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, U.S. Department of State, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, Washington, D.C., April 1993, p. 6. See also M.W. Brauchli, "Drug Trade Blooms in Lawless Reaches of Pakistani Frontier," Wall Street Journal Europe, June 9, 1993.

33. In 1993, the U.S. threatened to put Pakistan on a list of countries that support terrorism in part because of isi assistance to Sikh and Kashmiri militants. See, e.g., Anderson and Moore, "After Cold War...," Washington Post.

34. Mark Tully and Satish Jacob, Amritsar: Mrs. Gandhi's Last Battle (London: Jonathan Cape Ltd. 1985), p. 212.

35. Ibid.

36. Coll, "India and Pakistan Wage Covert `Proxy Wars,'" Washington Post.

37. Arms Project interview with K.P.S. Gill, Chandigargh, March 26, 1993.

38. Ibid. The Type 56 is a standard Chinese Kalashnikov, the Type 56-1 has a folding stock, the Type 56-2 is a copy of the Soviet SKS carbine with a folding bayonet.

39. Arms Project interview.

40. Kumar, D., "Punjab terrorists regroup on the quiet." Times of India, November 24, 1992.

41. Arms Project interviews with members of the Punjab CID.

42. Jane's Defence Weekly, January 23, 1993, p. 32.

43. Arms Project interview.

44. Arms Project interview.

45. Kumar, Times of India, November 24, 1992.

46. Arms Project interview.

47. "Pak likely to smuggle in more arms," Indian Express, April 19, 1993.

48. "Over-the-counter trade in illegal weapons." Times of India, April 10, 1993.

49. James Clad, "Terrorism's Toll," Far Eastern Economic Review, October 11, 1990, p. 34.

50. See, e.g., John Ward Anderson, "Pakistan Aiding Rebels in Kashmir," Washington Post, May 16, 1994; "The Covert Arms Trade," The Economist, February 12, 1994, p. 23; Jane's Defence Weekly, Jan. 15, 1994, p. 19; Sumit Ganguly, "The Prospects of War and Peace in Kashmir," in Rajuk G.C. Thomas, ed. Perspectives on Kashmir: The Roots of Conflict in South Asia, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1992), p. 359; Sumit Ganguly, "Avoiding War in Kashmir," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1990, p. 37; Selig S. Harrison, "Showdown in Kashmir," Peace and Security, Vol. 5, No. 3, Autumn 1990, pp. 8-9.

51. John Ward Anderson, "Pakistan Aiding Rebels...," Washington Post.

52. Ibid.

53. Arms Project interviews. See also Anderson, "Pakistan Aiding Rebels...," Washington Post.

54. Arms Project interviews. See also, R.A. Davis, "Kashmir in the Balance," International Defense Review, April 1991; Christopher Thomas, "Indian Border Forces Masses as Kashmir 'War Season' Looms," The Times, June 24, 1990.

55. Coll, "India, Pakistan Wage Covert `Proxy Wars'," Washington Post.

56. James P. Sterba, "Border Battle: In Militaristic Pakistan, Struggle with India Bolsters Self-Identity," Wall Street Journal, December 28, 1990; Christopher Thomas, "Indian Border Force Masses as Kashmir 'War Season' Looms," Times, June 24, 1990.

57. See, e.g., "Pakistan to Back J-K Ultras: Sharif," Times of India, December 25, 1990.

58. Asia Watch, Kashmir Under Siege, p. 22.

59. Selig S. Harrison, "Sparks of War in Kashmir," Washington Post, April 23, 1990.

60. Malcolm Davidson, "Kashmir Militants Shown Training in Pakistan," Reuters, May 2, 1990.

61. R.A. Davis, "Kashmir in the Balance," International Defense Review, April 1991, p. 301. Certainly, the geographic proximity of Kashmir to Islamabad (along with Karachi, the first destination in Pakistan of cia weapons shipments bound for the Afghan mujahidin) and Rawalpindi (the location of major isi storage sites for pipeline weapons) would facilitate the transfer of pipeline weapons from Pakistan across the border to Kashmiri militants.

62. Arms Project interviews.

63. Arms Project interviews, Delhi, March 1993.

64. Asia Watch and Physicians for Human Rights, Pattern of Impunity, p. 29.

65. Rahul Bedi, "On the Kashmir beat," Jane's Defence Weekly, May 21, 1994.

66. "Over-the-counter trade in illegal weapons," Times of India, April 10, 1993.

67. Jane's Defence Weekly, April 30, 1994, p. 21.

68. Asia Watch, Kashmir Under Siege, p. 20. See also, Raymond Whitaker, "Militants of Kashmir Show Their Hand," Independent, June 8, 1990.

69. Asia Watch, Pattern of Impunity, p. 29.

70. "Militants of Kashmir Show Their Hand," Independent, June 8, 1990.

71. See, e.g., Ibid; Davis, "Indian border force masses...," Times; Jane's Defence Weekly, January 15, 1994, p. 19.

72. Anthony Spaeth, "No Peace in the Valley," Harpers, April 1993, p. 82.

73. Mansoor Khan, "Kashmiris Get Training in Afghanistan from Guerrilla Experts," Reuters, April 22, 1990.

74. Sumit Ganguly, Foreign Affairs. See also, Anderson and Moore, "After Cold War...," Washington Post.

75. "Over-the-Counter Trade..." Times of India.

76. Arms Project interviews.

77. Asia Watch, A Pattern of Impunity, p. 152; W.P.S. Sidhu, "The Challenge in the Mountains," India Today, June 30, 1991.

78. Of course, the people in Punjab and Kashmir have not been the only victims of the Afghan pipeline. In fact, the principal victims of attacks by groups using this weaponry have been Afghans who have died by the thousands even since 1992 from indiscriminate shelling and attacks.