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Conclusion

The formal architecture of the proposed Electoral Commission, an institution with overarching functions and powers in elections, is a crucial ingredient in the holding of multiparty democratic elections.  The law and the Constitution ought to provide for maximum independence and impartiality of the electoral authority and for a clear mandate.  The proposed ZEC Bill, while a step in the right direction, contains too many incursions on the independence and impartiality of the proposed Commission and adds to the confusion among electoral institutions over their respective mandates.   The independence and impartiality of the Commission are undermined by provisions for the appointment of Commissioners and for Ministerial intervention in the Commission’s performance of its functions.  There is also a need to provide more stringent restrictions to exclude, at minimum, high ranking political office-holders from being appointed as Commissioners. The introduction of the Electoral Commission should be an opportunity to clarify existing jurisdictional confusion among electoral bodies.  It is unfortunate that the ZEC Bill misses such an opportunity. 

Even a well-designed law providing for an Electoral Commission is only one important step toward creating an environment to build the confidence of voters in the legitimacy of the electoral process and its results.  The proposed Commission will require, inter alia, adequate funds and staff, if it is to function effectively.  Other electoral institutions, such as the Delimitation Commission, the Registrar-General’s Office, the Electoral Supervisory Commission, and the Electoral Directorate must also be impartial and viewed as such by voters.  The recently gazetted Electoral Bill provides for many of the day-to-day electoral processes.  It, too, should adhere to and encourage democratic principles.  Finally, voters must enjoy freedoms of assembly, association, movement, expression, and information.